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II THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
Comparative cognition research aims at assessing and comparing the cognitive 
abilities of non-human primates and other non-human animals, typically in order to link 
variation in cognitive abilities to variation in brain size or socio-ecological factors. Ultimately, 
this allows us to enhance our understanding of how the human mind works and how our 
mental processes might have evolved. While such cognitive comparisons have traditionally 
been conducted between different species and have largely ignored within-species variation 
in cognitive abilities, recent research efforts are beginning to focus on such individual-level 
differences. Understanding to what degree individuals of a single species differ in cognitive 
abilities is vital to be able to reliably infer species differences. This fundamentally includes to 
determine how much of the inter-individual variation can be explained by cognitive ability 
per se rather than non-cognitive factors. Only then will we be able to improve existing 
cognitive tests and develop new ones that reliably measure cognitive performance and allow 
for fair species comparisons.  
This thesis aims at identifying and quantifying the influence of such non-cognitive 
factors that may affect cognitive performance. It contributes to a recent line of research that 
has begun to assess such potentially influential factors in an attempt to optimise the 
measurement validity and reliability of primate cognition tests and ultimately allow for fair 
comparisons of cognitive abilities both within and across species. 
In a series of three experimental studies (Chapters 2-4), I investigated whether 
individual differences in a number of non-cognitive factors lead to individual differences in 
cognitive performance in physical cognition tasks and whether improving test designs helps 
both the internal (measurement accuracy) and external validity (generalisability) of cognitive 
tests.  
In my first study (Chapter 2), I investigated if individual differences in emotional 
reactivity lead to individual differences in cognitive performance. I addressed in common 
marmosets (Callithrix jacchus), whether those individuals who tend to be highly emotionally 
aroused during cognitive testing perform differently in an object permanence task compared 
to their conspecifics who remain calm. My findings revealed substantial individual variation 
in the marmosets’ emotional reactivity that affected their motivation to participate. 
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Marmosets, mainly males, who showed a strong spontaneous emotional reaction to the 
experimenter and the test situation, were often distracted and participated in fewer trials. 
Importantly, however, their cognitive performance in the object permanence task remained 
unaffected. Highly emotionally aroused males performed equally well in those test trials in 
which they did participate. Importantly, however, this was only the case when I controlled 
performance for attention and because I used clear pre-defined criteria that determined 
when to stop a test session prematurely owing to lack of motivation. Therefore, when testing 
non-human primates with cognitive tasks researchers need to be aware of inter-individual 
differences in the subjects’ emotional reactivity and their potential effects on participation 
and attention. Ideally, attention to the test stimuli is quantified and taken into account when 
analysing the data, and clear stop criteria are consistently applied to avoid testing subjects 
who are not fully motivated to engage with the test. In such cases, a test session should be 
discontinued and only resumed later when the subject is more motivated to participate.  
In my second study (Chapter 3), I investigated whether task format, i.e., how the 
cognitive test is designed and the test stimuli are presented to the subject, affects cognitive 
performance. Specifically, I focussed on one widely used aspect of task format, i.e., the 
number of test stimuli in typical choice paradigms in which a subject has to make a correct 
choice among several options in order to pass a test trial. I found that when I tested the 
marmosets with a classical two-choice memory test in which they had to remember the 
location of a food item, their performance did not decrease with increasing memory 
demands (i.e., longer time delays). This indicated that this memory test did not measure 
memory performance and its validity needed improvement. To determine if the subjects had 
not been sufficiently motivated to choose correctly because even choosing at random would 
give them a 50:50 chance to discover the food reward, I tested a second sample of 
marmosets and squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) with a novel nine-choice memory test 
version and the two-choice version. My results confirmed that these experimentally naïve 
monkeys performed equally poor in the two-choice version. In the nine-choice memory test, 
however, they performed significantly better and showed longer retention ability, and their 
performance decreased with increasing memory demands as predicted. My findings thus 
highlight that the very frequently used two-choice paradigm is problematic to quantify 
cognitive abilities in marmosets and squirrel monkeys, and most likely in other species too. 
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However, small modifications to the test design can significantly increase the measurement 
validity of such cognitive tests.  
In my third study (Chapter 4), I explored if individual differences in the amount of 
required testing time lead to individual differences in cognitive performance. Some subjects 
are less consistently motivated to participate in a full test session per day and require more 
time to complete the task. Since access to non-human primates is often limited, researchers 
often have to exclude these subjects from testing and, if possible, replace them with other 
subjects who are more consistently motivated to participate. However, such opportunistic 
testing could bias the results if these dropouts differ systematically in cognitive ability. In fact, 
it is well conceivable that some individuals are less interested in participating because the 
task is more difficult for them compared to their more motivated conspecifics. To explore 
this possibility, I tested marmosets and squirrel monkeys with a test battery consisting of a 
range of tasks from several physical cognition domains. Importantly, in our full testing 
approach, we minimised dropouts by giving each subject sufficient time to complete the 
tasks, even if this would take a considerable number of test sessions. A direct comparison of 
subjects who completed the task within a typical time limit (and would have been included 
in opportunistic testing) and subjects who completed the tasks after the time limit would 
have expired (and would have dropped out) revealed no difference in cognitive performance. 
My findings show that opportunistic testing does not necessarily bias the results of cognitive 
studies. Although full testing is often important, such as in general intelligence testing where 
the same subjects have to be tested with a whole test battery and dropouts critically affect 
statistical analysis, opportunistic testing may be a valid alternative in other studies when full 
testing is not feasible.   
My thesis contributes to the recent paradigm shift in comparative cognition and 
related research disciplines that acknowledge and focus on individual-level differences in 
cognitive abilities. Furthermore, my findings add to the recently growing body of empirical 
literature on non-cognitive factors whose potential influence on test performance have to 
be taken into consideration in order to optimise existing and develop novel tests of primate 
cognition. Once this task is achieved, we will be able to conduct fairer and more meaningful 
species comparisons in order to better understand how much of our evolutionary heritage 












Die vergleichende Kognitionswissenschaft erforscht die intellektuellen Fähigkeiten 
nicht-menschlicher Primaten und anderer Tiere, üblicherweise um einen Zusammenhang 
zwischen der Variation dieser Fähigkeiten und der Variation von Hirngröße oder sozio-
ökologischen Faktoren herzustellen. So erweitert sie letztlich unser Verständnis davon, wie 
der menschliche Intellekt funktioniert und wie unsere mentalen Prozesse im Laufe der 
Evolution entstanden sein könnten. Traditionelle Studien verglichen bis vor kurzem in erster 
Linie die kognitiven Fähigkeiten verschiedener Arten. Unterschiede innerhalb einer Art 
wurden weitgehend vernachlässigt. Neuere Studien haben jedoch damit begonnen, den 
Fokus auf Unterschiede zwischen Individuen innerhalb einer Spezies zu verlagern. Ein 
besseres Verständnis individueller Unterschiede innerhalb einer Art bildet eine wesentliche 
Voraussetzung, um Rückschlüsse auf Artunterschiede ziehen zu können. Es gilt insbesondere 
herauszufinden, welcher Anteil der inter-individuellen Variation sich tatsächlich durch 
kognitive Fähigkeiten und nicht durch andere Faktoren erklären lässt. Dann erst werden wir 
in der Lage sein, bestehende kognitive Tests zu verbessern und neue Tests zu entwickeln, 
welche die kognitive Leistung zuverlässig messen und faire Artenvergleiche ermöglichen. 
Ziel dieser Dissertation ist es, nicht-kognitive Faktoren, welche die kognitive Leistung 
beeinflussen können, ausfindig und quantifizierbar zu machen. Damit liefert sie einen Beitrag 
zu einer neuen Forschungslinie, die bereits mit der Evaluierung solch potenzieller 
Störfaktoren begonnen hat, um basierend darauf die Validität und Reliabilität kognitiver 
Tests für Primaten zu optimieren. Dies soll schliesslich faire Vergleiche kognitiver Fähigkeiten 
sowohl innerhalb als auch zwischen Arten ermöglichen. 
In drei experimentellen Studien (Kapitel 2-4) erforschte ich mittels physikalischer 
Kognitionstests, ob individuelle Unterschiede im Bereich nicht-kognitiver Faktoren zu 
individuellen Unterschieden in der Testleistung führen und ob Verbesserungen der 
Testdesigns die interne (Messgenauigkeit) und externe Validität (Generalisierbarkeit) 
kognitiver Tests erhöhen. 
In meiner ersten Studie (Kapitel 2) untersuchte ich, ob individuelle Unterschiede in 
der emotionalen Reaktivität zu individuellen Unterschieden in der kognitiven Leistung 




erhöhter emotionaler Erregung (Arousal) neigen, anders abschneiden als ihre gelasseneren 
Artgenossen. Meine Ergebnisse zeigten beträchtliche individuelle Unterschiede in der 
emotionalen Reaktivität von Krallenaffen, die sich auf ihre Motivation, an einem 
Objektpermanenz-Test teilzunehmen, auswirkten. Dies traf vor allem auf männliche 
Krallenaffen zu. Sie reagierten emotional sehr stark auf den Experimentator und die 
Testsituation, waren oft abgelenkt und nahmen an weniger Testdurchgängen teil. 
Entscheidend war jedoch, dass ihre kognitive Leistung nicht von der Ausprägung ihrer 
emotionalen Reaktion betroffen war. Emotional hochreaktive Männchen schnitten in jenen 
Testdurchgängen, an denen sie teilnahmen, gleich gut ab wie ihre Artgenossen. Zu diesem 
Ergebnis kam ich, wenn ich nur die Leistung in jenen Testdurchgängen berücksichtigte, in 
denen die Affen aufmerksam waren. Entscheidend war zudem, dass ich klare, vordefinierte 
Abbruchkriterien verwendete, die bestimmten, wann eine Testreihe wegen mangelnder 
Motivation vorzeitig zu beenden war. Beim Testen kognitiver Fähigkeiten nicht-menschlicher 
Primaten müssen sich Wissenschaftler folglich solcher individueller emotionaler 
Reaktivitätsunterschiede und derer möglichen Auswirkungen auf Teilnahme und 
Aufmerksamkeit der einzelnen Tiere bewusst sein. Idealerweise sollte die Aufmerksamkeit 
gegenüber den Teststimuli quantifiziert und bei der Datenauswertung berücksichtigt 
werden. Ebenso sollten klar definierte und einheitliche Abbruchkriterien verhindern, dass 
Primaten getestet werden, die nicht gänzlich motiviert sind. In solchen Fällen ist es ratsam, 
die begonnene Testsitzung zu beenden und erst dann fortzusetzen, wenn ein Individuum 
wieder motiviert ist, teilzunehmen. 
In meiner zweiten Studie (Kapitel 3) untersuchte ich, ob das Aufgabenformat, d. h. 
die Art und Weise wie ein Test konstruiert ist und wie die Teststimuli dem Affen präsentiert 
werden, die kognitive Leistung beeinflusst. Ich konzentrierte mich dabei auf ein weit 
verbreitetes Testformat, bei dem der getestete Primat aus mehreren Optionen eine korrekte 
Wahl treffen muss, um einen Testdurchgang zu bestehen. Zunächst konfrontierte ich 
Krallenaffen mit einer klassischen Gedächtnisaufgabe mit zwei Auswahlmöglichkeiten: Sie 
mussten sich über ansteigende Zeitintervalle merken, wo sich ein Futterstück befand. Ihre 
Leistung nahm jedoch mit steigenden Gedächtnisanforderungen, d. h. längeren 
Verzugsintervallen, nicht ab. Dies wies darauf hin, dass der verwendete Gedächtnistest die 
Erinnerungsleistung der Krallenaffen nicht zuverlässig messen konnte und dessen Validität 
verbessert werden musste. Ich wollte herausfinden, ob die Affen schlichtweg nicht 
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hinreichend motiviert waren, das korrekte Versteck zu wählen, weil sie sogar bei einer rein 
zufälligen Wahl eine 50:50-Chance hatten, die Futterbelohnung aufzudecken. Daher 
konfrontierte ich eine zweite Gruppe von Krallenaffen und Totenkopfäffchen sowohl mit 
einer neuartigen Gedächtnis-Aufgabe mit neun Auswahlmöglichkeiten als auch mit der 
herkömmlichen Version mit nur zwei Optionen. Meine Ergebnisse bestätigten, dass diese 
Individuen, die vorher noch nicht getestet worden waren, in der letzteren Testversion 
ebenso schlecht abschnitten wie ihre Vorgänger. Im Gedächtnistest mit neun 
Wahlmöglichkeiten hingegen schnitten beide Spezies signifikant besser ab und ihre kognitive 
Leistung nahm nun, wie erwartet, mit steigenden Anforderungen an die Erinnerungsfähigkeit 
ab. Meine Ergebnisse veranschaulichen, dass sich das häufig eingesetzte Testparadigma mit 
zwei Wahlmöglichkeiten zur Quantifizierung der kognitiven Fähigkeiten von Krallenaffen und 
Totenkopfäffchen, und sehr wahrscheinlich anderer Arten, nicht eignet. Jedoch können 
bereits kleine Veränderungen des Testdesigns die Messgültigkeit solcher kognitiven Tests 
erhöhen. 
In meiner dritten Studie (Kapitel 4) erforschte ich, ob individuelle Unterschiede in der 
benötigten Testungszeit zu individuellen Unterschieden in der kognitiven Leistung führen. 
Manche Individuen sind weniger anhaltend motiviert, an einer vollen Testsitzung pro Tag 
teilzunehmen. Sie benötigen mehr Zeit, um eine Testaufgabe abzuschließen. Da der Zugang 
zu nicht-menschlichen Primaten oft eingeschränkt ist, müssen Forscher solche Individuen oft 
von der Testung ausschliessen und durch andere ersetzen, die kontinuierlicher an der 
Teilnahme motiviert sind. Solch opportunistisches Testen könnte jedoch dann die Resultate 
verfälschen, wenn sich die Testabbrecher (Dropouts) hinsichtlich ihrer kognitiven 
Fähigkeiten systematisch unterscheiden. Es ist durchaus denkbar, dass diese Individuen 
deshalb weniger interessiert sind, weil der Test für sie schwieriger ist als für ihre motivierten 
Artgenossen. Um diese Möglichkeit zu prüfen, testete ich Krallenaffen und Totenkopfäffchen 
mit einer Testbatterie, die sich aus einer Reihe von Tests aus mehreren physikalischen 
Kognitionsdomänen zusammensetzte. Bei diesem umfassenden Testungsansatz war 
entscheidend, dass ich die Dropouts auf ein Minimum reduzierte, indem ich jedem 
Teilnehmer ausreichend Zeit zur Verfügung stellte, die Testaufgaben zu bewältigen. Ein 
direkter Vergleich jener Individuen, die eine Aufgabe innerhalb eines typischen Zeitlimits 
abschlossen (und bei opportunistischem Testen in der Stichprobe verblieben wären) mit 




ausgeschlossen worden wären) ergab keinen kognitiven Leistungsunterschied. Meine 
Ergebnisse zeigen daher, dass opportunistisches Testen nicht zwangsläufig zu einer 
Verfälschung der Resultate kognitiver Studien führt. Vollumfängliches Testen ist oft wichtig, 
wie etwa bei allgemeinen Intelligenztests, bei denen dieselben Individuen mit einer ganzen 
Testbatterie getestet werden müssen und Dropouts die statistischen Analysen entscheidend 
beeinträchtigen. In anderen Studien kann opportunistisches Testen jedoch eine valide 
Alternative sein, wenn eine vollumfängliche Testung nicht umsetzbar ist. 
Meine Dissertation trägt zum kürzlich erfolgten Paradigmenwechsel in der 
Vergleichenden Kognitionswissenschaft und verwandten Disziplinen bei, der individuelle 
Unterschiede kognitiver Fähigkeiten anerkennt und diese zum Forschungsgegenstand 
macht. Darüber hinaus erweitern meine Erkenntnisse den neuerdings wachsenden Fundus 
an empirischer Literatur zu non-kognitiven Faktoren, deren möglicher Einfluss auf die 
Testleistung in Erwägung gezogen werden muss, um bestehende kognitive Tests für 
Primaten zu optimieren und neue Tests zu entwickeln. Erst wenn uns dies gelungen ist, 
werden wir in der Lage sein, fairere und aussagefähigere Artenvergleiche durchzuführen und 
besser zu verstehen, wie viel unseres evolutionären Erbes wir mit anderen Primaten teilen 
und wie sich unser ausserordentlich komplexer menschlicher Intellekt im Laufe der Evolution 
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1.1 Comparative cognition 
 
1.1.1 What is comparative cognition? 
 
 Comparative cognition is an interdisciplinary field of research that focuses on 
understanding and comparing mental processes in humans and other animals and aims to 
reconstruct how cognitive abilities evolved by comparing various extant species. One central 
goal, particularly of psychologists and anthropologists working in this field, is to better 
understand how the human mind works and evolved. Ultimately, by identifying to what 
extent we share cognitive abilities with other animals, we aim to reconstruct how our 
elaborate cognition may have evolved and how we became such a successful species. In 
order to reconstruct how a given cognitive ability may have evolved, comparative 
psychologists, for instance, use an experimental task to investigate if the ability or the 
capacity to acquire the ability, is present in two or more species. Since pre-linguistic human 
infants and nonhuman animals cannot be asked verbally about what they know about their 
physical and social environment, their cognitive abilities have to be inferred from their 
performance in human-designed cognitive tasks.  
 To test for different evolutionary scenarios, researchers often opt to compare species 
with a particularly high or low degree of phylogenetic relatedness, and who vary with regard 
to potentially influential social or ecological factors. If two evolutionary closely related 
species perform well in the cognitive task, it is inferred that the required mental capacity to 
succeed was already present in the last common ancestor the two species shared in their 
evolutionary history. If two evolutionary distantly related species succeed in the cognitive 
task, whereas the trait is absent in their close relatives, it is concluded that convergent 
cognitive evolution took place, meaning that the capacity for the underlying mental ability 
evolved independently and at different times after the split from their last common ancestor. 
Another possible scenario is that only one of the two species performs well suggesting that 
different adaptations in response to different physical or social environments play a role. If 
only species A passes the task, this indicates that the cognitive capacity only evolved in this 
species but not in species B, presumably because species B was not exposed to similar 
challenges and selection pressures (Boyd & Silk, 2012). A critical precondition to justify such 
often far reaching conclusions is, however, that different species are tested in a fair manner 




designed to measure, a challenge we should not underestimate and to which I will turn later 
(see 1.2.3ff).  
 
1.1.2 Is it possible to compare cognition between different animal species? 
 
Conducting fair comparisons of cognitive abilities across a wide range of different 
animal species turns out to be a considerable challenge for the field of comparative 
cognition. In fact, it is such a challenging mission that some researchers have argued that it 
will remain an impossible one (e.g., Bitterman, 1965, 1988; MacPhail, 1982, 1987). Bitterman 
for instance, argued that comparing the cognitive abilities of vertebrate and invertebrate 
species in a fair manner will never be possible because of profound differences in their 
anatomy and perception. Intriguingly, some invertebrates, such as octopuses and other 
cephalopods, possess a highly developed visual system, high levels of dexterity and have 
shown remarkable cognitive abilities (Mather & Kuba, 2013; Tricarico et al., 2014) indicating 
some degree of convergent evolution of the distantly related invertebrates (particularly the 
mentioned molluscs) and vertebrates (e.g., some mammalian and some bird species). 
However, despite these fascinating analogies, Bitterman may be correct that biological 
(sub)phyla are perhaps not the best starting point for fair cognitive comparisons. Even when 
narrowing down such comparisons to vertebrates, different taxa still differ substantially in a 
range of anatomical (e.g., dexterity) and perceptual (e.g., vision) features and these physical 
differences in turn may mask or exaggerate differences in their mental abilities. For instance, 
some bird species, particularly corvids and parrots, possess particularly large brains in 
comparison to other birds (Cnotka et al., 2008; Iwaniuk et al., 2005; Sultan, 2005). Moreover, 
some of the structures in avian brains, particularly the neopallium in the forebrain, have been 
classified as homologous to the mammalian neocortex which plays a central role in higher 
cognitive abilities (Güntürkün & Bugnyar, 2016; Jarvis et al., 2005). Corvids and parrots have 
indeed demonstrated remarkable cognitive performance in several experimental paradigms 
(e.g., tool manufacture and use: New Caledonian crows, Corvus moneduloides, (Hunt, 1996; 
Hunt & Grey, 2004), episodic-like memory: Florida scrub jays, Aphelocoma coeruleus, 
(Clayton & Dickinson, 1998); and mirror self-recognition in magpies, Pica pica (Prior et al., 
2008)). Some of these findings suggest convergent evolution of cognitive abilities between 
birds and primates (e.g., Emery & Clayton, 2004) and some researchers have claimed that 
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some of these cognitive abilities equal those of great apes (e.g., Emery, 2006). However, 
despite their highly developed brains and accurate vision, interacting with the same 
experimental apparatuses that are used for primates in order to solve a cognitive problem 
may prove difficult since birds rely almost exclusively on using their beaks. Even when 
narrowing down species-comparisons further to mammals other than primates, similar 
issues remain. Canids such as wolves, domestic dogs, hyenae, and foxes are relatively small-
brained and have relatively poor vision. Moreover, like birds, they do not have hands, a 
physical constraint that has to be taken into account when adapting cognitive test 
apparatuses and paradigms that have initially been developed for primates who have the 
highest levels of dexterity in the animal kingdom (Begun, 2015). The opposite is the case for 
the canid sense of smell which is so highly developed in comparison to primates (with the 
exception of some prosimians, Rushmore et al., 2012) that the odour of experimental stimuli, 
i.e., food rewards, has to be masked in order to prevent canids from solving a task by picking 
up olfactory cues rather than visual or auditory ones (e.g., Miklósi et al., 2003). Large-brained 
mammals such as elephants and dolphins also rely on using their noses to handle 
experimental apparatuses. Thus, valid quantifications of cognitive abilities across species are 
difficult to achieve, and these difficulties are more prominent the more these species vary 
from each other morphologically, perceptually, and phylogenetically.  
 
1.1.3 Comparative cognition within primates  
 
As I mentioned earlier, studying and comparing other animals’ minds can help us to 
reconstruct how the human mind evolved and this task is most convincingly achieved by 
studying the cognitive abilities of our closets living relatives, the non-human primates. 
Despite the above-mentioned limitations of between-species comparisons, more 
conservative comparisons should be legitimate, at least within the primate order, even 
though clear differences in anatomy and perception are also present between different 
primate taxa. Primates are divided into two suborders, prosimians and anthropoids. 
Prosimians (lemurs and lorises), who are mostly nocturnal, differ considerably from 
anthropoid primates in their olfactory and visual systems, which is particularly expressed in 
an enhanced sense of smell and their reduced ability to perceive and distinguish colours, 




species, such as mouse lemurs (Microcebus murinus), in an ethical and fair manner, 
researchers test them under infrared light (Kittler et al., 2018). Even within anthropoid 
primates that include the tarsiers, New World and Old World monkeys, and small and great 
apes, remarkable differences in anatomy and perception remain. For instance, one New 
World monkey family, the aotids (also named owl or night-monkeys), became secondary 
nocturnal during the course of evolution and both their vision (reduced colour vision) and 
olfaction (enlarged olfactory bulbs) adapted to this night-active lifestyle, two physiological 
features they share with prosimians rather than other anthropoids (King, 2016). Even among 
the diurnal New World monkeys most of whom possess typical anthropoid vision, some 
morphological differences remain. All members of the callitrichid family (marmosets and 
tamarins), for instance, have claws rather than typical primate hands with finger nails (giving 
them the German name “Krallenaffen” which translates to “claw monkeys”), and some 
individuals, mostly male ones, have reduced colour vision regarding the red-green colour 
spectrum, similar to prosimians and aotids (Freitag et al., 20012; Pessoa et al., 2005). When 
testing marmosets, my main study species in this thesis, it is therefore important to build 
experimental apparatuses that are easy to handle with claws and to only use colours that all 
subjects can distinguish, i.e., blue and yellow experimental stimuli rather than red and green 
ones (Schmonn, 2011) or avoid colour altogether by simply using black and white 
components (Strasser & Burkart, 2012; Schubiger et al., 2015, 2016, 2018). Finally, even 
among Old World primates and between small and great apes, differences in limb 
morphology such as how flexible their hands are and whether they have opposable thumbs 
affect their ability to manipulate objects (Heldstab et al., 2016).  
 
1.1.4 Comparative primate cognition at the species-level 
 
The majority of past studies on the cognitive abilities of non-human primates have 
focussed on comparing two or more species regarding one or several cognitive abilities (e.g., 
Amici et al., 2008; Anderson et al., 2010; Mac Lean et al., 2014; Mulcahy et al., 2005; Petit et 
al., 2015). However, since fair species comparisons are difficult even when restricting them 
to the primate order and further to primate genera within the two suborders, it appears most 
sensible to start at the species level and compare individuals of the same species. Individuals 
of the same primate species may vary considerably in terms of cognitive abilities, but their 
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cognitive performance may also be influenced by inter-individual differences in non-
cognitive factors. In my PhD project, I took this latter and newer approach that allowed me 
to first identify the factors that influence cognitive performance in a single primate species, 
and, in a next step, to directly compare them to another species. In order to compare the 
cognitive abilities of individuals of my main study species, common marmosets (Callithrix 
jacchus) and to create conditions to later compare them to other primate species, it was 
essential to use cognitive tasks that are solvable regardless of a species’ evolutionary 
adaptations to its ecological niche. Therefore, in contrast to the commonly used approach to 
use ecologically valid tasks which is valuable in its own right, I focused primarily on tasks used 
in test batteries to assess general intelligence, an empirical entity that correlates with an 
individual’s ability to solve a diverse range of problems, largely independent of its niche-
specific adaptations, and that can only be assessed using reasonably abstract tests.  
 
1.1.5 Domain-generality versus modularity of cognitive abilities 
 
How the human mind evolved is a vividly debated topic that has attracted much interest 
in the scientific community. Currently, researchers from several disciplines still disagree if or 
to what extent natural selection acted on the evolution of domains of cognitive abilities to 
deal with specific problems, on so-called higher cognitive abilities in general that can be 
applied to a variety of different contexts, or a combination of the two (for an extensive 
review, see Burkart, Schubiger, & van Schaik, 2017a, b).  
 Among the proponents of the domain-specific view, there is currently little consensus 
on what a domain actually constitutes. Depending on the research discipline, cognitive 
domains have been described from broad clusters of similar cognitive abilities such as a 
physical versus a social domain (comparative psychologists, e.g., Tomasello & Call, 1998, 
Herrmann et al., 2007) to highly specialised modules that can be localised in the brain and 
supposedly adapted to solve a particular problem that our ancestors repeatedly encountered 
as far back as in the Pleistocene (evolutionary psychologists, e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 1989, 
2002, 2013). The physical domain entails those cognitive abilities that help an individual to 
understand and adequately respond to problems posed by its physical environment such as 
gravity and connectivity that help it to find food and avoid predation. Cognitive abilities from 




social environment such as finding mates and cooperating or competing with conspecifics. 
Examples of specialised brain-modules in humans that supposedly evolved for a single 
purpose are the so-called “cheater detector” and a brain area responsible for the recognition 
of faces (Cosmides et al., 2005; Ermer et al., 2007; Fiddick et al., 2005; Stone et al., 2002). 
The first proponents of the domain-general view (differential psychologists, e.g., 
Spearman, 1904, 1927) studied stable individual differences across a broad range of 
cognitive abilities in humans. For this purpose, they developed and validated measuring 
instruments, so-called general intelligence test batteries, that consisted of numerous 
subtests, each of which assessing a particular cognitive ability. After more than a century of 
testing large human samples, these test batteries are now standardised and normed for 
different populations of people and there is now ample evidence and wide acceptance for 
(domain)general intelligence in humans (Deary et al., 2010). General intelligence 
corresponds to the positive manifold, i.e., the fact that overall, all the cognitive tests scores 
are positively correlated across individuals and result in a single factor ‘g’ in factor-analytical 
approaches (see 1.2.1). From an evolutionary point of view, an intriguing question is whether 
general intelligence is unique to humans or whether there is evolutionary continuity across 
the animal kingdom. In chapters 1.2 and 1.3, I point out that domain-general cognitive 
abilities in non-human animals have so far received much less attention which is reflected in 
the scarcity of suitable measurement instruments. This lack of interest in domain-general 
cognitive abilities in non-humans is partly caused by the fact that evolutionary scenarios of 
how cognitive abilities may have evolved seem more straightforward if one assumes that the 
animal mind is composed of a small number of modules to which other modules are added 
whenever needed (Clune et al., 2013; Geary & Huffman, 2002; Sherry, 2006). 
 
1.2 General intelligence 
 
1.2.1 What is general intelligence? 
In my thesis, I will use Gottfredson’s (1997) broad intelligence definition when speaking 
of general intelligence. According to Gottfredson, intelligence “is a very general capability 
that among other things, involves the ability to reason, plan, solve problems, think abstractly, 
comprehend complex ideas, learn quickly and learn from experience. It is not merely book 
learning, a narrow academic skill, or test-taking smarts. Rather it reflects a broader and 
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deeper capability for comprehending our surroundings – ‘catching on’, ‘making sense’ of 
things, or ‘figuring out’ what to do.” When speaking of non-human primates, I will use a 
simplified definition of general intelligence, namely reasoning ability and behavioural 
flexibility. 
Psychometrically, general intelligence correlates with the general intelligence factor g 
that emerges in humans when their test scores from a cognitive test battery consisting of a 
wide range of different tasks are analysed using factor-analytical statistical methods: a 
person who performs well in one cognitive test will likely do so in many others. This g-factor, 
the positive correlation of an individual’s cognitive performance scores across domains, is 
also known as the ‘positive manifold’. In humans, the existence of g is now well established 
and widely accepted (Carroll, 1993; Deary et al., 2010). In non-human primates, however, far 
less effort has been invested into developing cognitive tests to investigate whether similar 
consistent individual differences exist within a single species.  
Meta-analyses across many non-human primate species delivered some evidence for 
domain-generality of cognition, i.e., they found that between-species variation in 
performance across various cognitive tasks is best explained by a single factor ‘G’. 
Furthermore, the loading of each species on this factor is positively correlated with brain 
size, reflecting that larger-brained primate species, particularly the great apes, outperform 
smaller-brained species systematically across all cognitive domains (Deaner et al., 2006; 
Reader et al., 2011). However, such meta-analyses hinge on the quality of the published 
experimental studies. Unfortunately, the methods and results of experimental cognitive 
studies are often not reported in sufficient detail to be replicated accurately, and even small 
differences in methods within or between research facilities can lead to different outcomes. 
Moreover, although the term general intelligence is often used interchangeably for within-
species (g) as well as between-species (G) comparisons, it is currently unknown whether 
between-species variation necessarily suggests within-species variation. Therefore, what is 
needed are valid and reliable comparisons of individuals within the same species.  
To date, the most convincing findings regarding g still stem from research on human 
subjects (see Figure 1). However, the intriguing question is whether g is a uniquely human 
phenomenon or if there is continuity in the evolution of this domain-general cognitive meta-
ability, i.e., do other primate species show similar consistent individual differences in 




Even though general intelligence at the species-level was originally thought to be an 
exclusively human trait, there is now accumulating evidence for g in several non-human 
animal species, suggesting evolutionary continuity, at least along the mammalian lineage and 
in some passerine birds (bower birds: Isden et al., 2013, Kaegy et al., 2011; and robins: Shaw 
et al., 2015). While most of this research has focused on rodents (mice and rats; e.g. 
Anderson, 1993; Galsworthy et al., 2002, 2005; Kolata et al. 2005, 2007; Light et al., 2008, 
2010; Matzel et al., 2003, 2006) who can easily be kept and bred under captive conditions, 
evidence for g has more recently also been found in non-human primates, i.e., rhesus 
macaques (Herndon et al., 1997), cotton-top tamarins (Banerjee et al., 2009) and orang-
utans (Damerius et al., 2017b), and the performance of chimpanzees across physical and 
social cognitive tasks also largely corresponds to this pattern (Hopkins et al., 2014; Woodley 
of Menie et al., 2015), with the exception of tasks containing a strong spatial component 
(Herrmann et al., 2010; see also van Schaik et al., 2012).  
 
1.2.2 How is general intelligence measured in humans? 
 
In humans, general intelligence is often measured with cognitive test batteries that 
consist of a number of cognitive subtests, i.e., nonverbal and verbal tasks that assess a wide 
range of different cognitive abilities. After being given verbal instructions, the test person 
has to solve cognitive tasks such as reasoning (e.g., identify which of several pictured abstract 
objects completes a logical series of similar objects), mental rotation (e.g., imagine which 
side of a 3-dimensional geometric figure would be visible after turning the figure in space to 
a certain number of degrees), memory (e.g., remembering the items of a ‘shopping’ list), or 
verbal fluency (e.g., generating as many words as possible that begin with a given letter). A 
widely used example of such a test battery is the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS; 
Wechsler, 2008). 
Hundreds of large datasets on human intelligence, as measured by cognitive test 
batteries, support a hierarchical structure of cognitive abilities with general intelligence as 
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Figure 1.1 Measuring general intelligence ‘g’ in humans. Intelligence tests reveal a hierarchical structure of our 
cognitive abilities. The 16 different subtests measure a broad range of cognitive abilities. Some subtests load 
highly on group factors, that is cognitive domains such as spatial ability and memory. Loadings are indicated by 
numbers next to the arrows and represent the correlations between subtests and group factors (domains), e.g., 
three of the 16 subtests load equally high on the reasoning domain. Finally, all group factors are highly 
correlated with a single factor, the general intelligence factor g. (Modified after Deary, Penke, & Johnson, 2010). 
 
Importantly, the cognitive test batteries available for human participants have 
regularly been evaluated regarding their validity (whether they truly measure the cognitive 
abilities they were designed to measure) and their re-test reliability (whether they produce 
repeatable results when administered twice). In addition, they have been standardised using 
large samples (usually thousands) of test persons from a variety of social and educational 
backgrounds and from different age groups (norms).  
 
1.2.3 How is general intelligence measured in non-human animals? 
 
During the last two decades, a large number of cognitive tasks and psychometric tests 
have been developed for non-human primates and they have often been widely used to 
compare a large number of different species. However, the majority of cognitive tests that 
have been developed and are currently available for non-human primates have not yet been 
evaluated regarding their measurement validity in a comparable way to cognitive tests 
available for humans.  
Only in the last decade, researchers have started to test non-human primates with 
whole test batteries that are composed of several subtest that assess a wide range of 
cognitive abilities. The most prominent example is the Primate Cognition Test Battery (PCTB) 
(Herrmann et al., 2007) that consists of 16 subtests from two broad cognition domains, the 




contain 1-4 different tasks: ‘space’ (spatial memory, object permanence, rotation, and 
transposition), ‘quantities’ (relative numbers and addition numbers), and ‘causality’ (noise, 
shape, tool use, and tool properties). The social domain entails three scales: ‘social learning’ 
(social learning), ‘communication’ (comprehension, pointing cups, attentional state) and 
‘Theory of mind’ (gaze following and intentions). The PCTB was not specifically designed to 
assess general intelligence at the intra-specific level, but when the full test battery was used 
for this purpose, the findings were mostly negative (Herrmann et al., 2012, Amici et al., 2015) 
or inconclusive (Herrmann et al., 2010). However, when a subset of the tasks was used, the 
findings were mostly positive and in support of g (Hopkins et al., 2014; Woodley of Menie et 
al., 2014; see also Burkart, Schubiger, & van Schaik, 2017a).  
Moreover, for non-human primates (and other animals), there are no norms to which 
the performance of a subject of a given species could be compared. Part of the problem is, 
that it is difficult to obtain large sample sizes, partly because researchers often do not have 
access to large enough numbers of non-human primate individuals, and partly because 
testing non-human animals is generally more demanding and time-consuming than testing 
human subjects.  
The cognitive tests that are currently available for non-human primates compare best 
to criterion-referenced tests used for humans. Rather than being compared to other 
individuals, a subject’s performance is compared to an objective criterion, usually how many 
per cent correct responses (e.g., choices between two or several options, one of which is 
classified as the correct choice) it has made out of a hundred per cent possible responses.  
 
1.3 Measurement validity of cognitive test instruments 
 
Despite the widespread lack of adequate validations, many tasks and the few existing 
cognitive test batteries are increasingly used for between-species comparisons. However, 
between-species comparisons rely on good experimental paradigms that provide truly 
comparable data within species and to date very little research has evaluated whether this 
is the case. Therefore, it is now time to call their internal or construct validity (Cronbach & 
Meehl, 1955) into question, that is whether cognitive tasks actually do measure what their 
human developers attempted to measure and to improve existing paradigms accordingly if 
this is not the case. 
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While construct validity is essential for within and across species comparisons of one 
or a small number of cognitive abilities, this may not be a comparable issue for within species 
comparisons of general intelligence that encompass tests from several domains. 
Nevertheless, although it may not be essential that each subtest measures the exact 
cognitive ability it was designed for, it is essential that it truly measures cognition rather than 
variation in other, non-cognitive, factors such as motivational ones.  
 
1.3.1 The replication crisis in psychology 
 
Although empirical researchers, such as psychologists and other scientists, can 
control many confounding factors in well-designed experimental studies, there is a 
considerable risk that a variety of biases potentially affect the outcomes of a study. In order 
to identify such potentially confounding factors, it is essential that empirical studies and their 
findings are replicated by researchers other than the original study authors. Recently, it 
became evident that replication of published findings it not always possible. When fellow 
researchers do attempt but fail to replicate research findings, even seemingly well-
established ones, this can question not only the validity of the original findings but also 
whether the original authors used appropriate research practices, as illustrated by the 
‘replication crisis’ in psychology (e.g., John et al., 2012; Makel et al., 2012;                                  
Pashler & Wagenmaekers, 2012).  
There are many other factors that can affect the replicability of studies in psychology 
and in science in general. It is therefore essential for researchers to be aware of sources of 
potential biases and use objective research practices in order to reduce biases to a minimum 
and facilitate later replications of their results. Examples for such biases are that researchers 
tend to, often subconsciously (Newell & Shanks, 2014), design experiments and interpret the 
participants’ behaviour in favour of their hypotheses (confirmation bias; Wason, 1960) or 
stop their data collection prematurely if a significant result is found, or conducting several 
small rather than one larger study. 
One issue of psychological studies is that that sample sizes and thus statistical power 
tend to be relatively small. Sometimes this is even the case for psychometric studies as has 
been demonstrated by a meta-analysis on the positive correlation between how well pre-
verbal infants habituated to stimuli during their first year of life and their IQ scores up to 




reported a significant positive correlation between habituation in early infancy and later child 
IQ, only one quarter of these studies had substantial statistical power and, contrarily to what 
would have been expected, the correlation was stronger in those studies with smaller sample 
sizes. One possible explanation was that several biases affected the results of those studies 
with smaller sample sizes, as Bakker et al. (2012) point out. For instance, since testing pre-
verbal human infants is more demanding than older children and adults (e.g., clear verbal 
instructions are not possible), some participants might have been excluded in those studies 
based on arbitrarily chosen exclusion criteria and this in turn may have biased the results.  
 
1.3.2 Replication crisis in comparative cognition research? 
 
Contrarily to human psychology, the field of comparative cognition research has not 
(yet) been hit by the replication crisis to the same extent, but perhaps only because 
replication attempts are even more scarce than in other fields. In fact, it is very likely that 
comparative psychology and cognition research are even more prone to systematic biases 
that prevent replicability, because testing non-human primates and other animals is even 
more challenging than testing pre-linguistic human infants. While researchers can largely 
avoid many potential self-induced biases (such as confirmation biases) by using appropriate 
and objective experimental methods, the challenge of obtaining sufficiently large sample 
sizes remains because access to non-human individuals is often limited (Stevens, 2017). This 
is particularly the case for many primate species who are only housed in a few facilities 
around the world to which local research groups usually have priority access. Large sample 
sizes can often only be achieved by testing individuals from several different research 
facilities such as zoos or in larger sanctuaries where, sadly, non-human primates are more 
abundant owing to loss of their natural habitats (e.g., Damerius et al., 2017a, b; Herrmann et 
al., 2011). An alternative when large samples are not available is the replication of a study’s 
findings in equally small but independent samples (as I have done in Study 2, Chapter 3). 
Another factor particularly relevant when testing non-human individuals is the internal 
validity of cognitive studies (if they truly measure the dependant variables they intend to 
measure, rather than non-cognitive factors; Campbell, 1957). One important aspect, for 
instance, that may affect the validity and replicability of findings and which is often not 
considered appropriately in comparative cognition studies with non-human animals, is their 
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phenotypic plasticity (Voelkl & Würbel, 2016) at the species-and individual level. For 
instance, a subject’s response to the experimental conditions not only depends on these 
conditions per se but also on the subject’s internal state which is determined by its past and 
current exposure to environmental influences and its genetic predisposition to react to its 
environment in a particular way. As a consequence of this, different subjects may be at 
different points on the spectrum of possible states (termed the ‘reaction norm’, Woltereck, 
1909) which affects how they respond during cognitive testing. However, while this inherent 
individual variation in behaviour may affect a subject’s performance in a cognitive test, it is 
biologically meaningful and cannot simply be classified as measurement error. Since 
replications will be conducted under slightly different environmental conditions, particularly 
across different research facilities, it is therefore essential to be aware of and ideally assess 
this type of variation (as I have done in Study 1, Chapter 2). 
The use of standardised experimental methods increases the internal validity of a 
cognitive study, including the construct validity of cognitive tests (how well they capture the 
construct they were designed to measure), and thus the reproducibility of a study. As I had 
mentioned earlier, a cognitive test’s construct validity may not be a comparable issue for 
within species comparisons of general intelligence that encompass tests from several 
domains because this approach acknowledges that different cognitive abilities are not fully 
isolated from each other and some overlap between tests is to be expected (see also Huber, 
2017; Ramus, 2017). However, although it may not be essential that each subtest measures 
the exact cognitive ability it was designed for, it is essential that it truly measures some aspect 
of cognition rather than non-cognitive factors such as emotional (as I have directly assessed 
in Study 1, Chapter 2) or motivational ones (as I have directly assessed in Study 1, Chapter 2, 
and indirectly in Study 2, Chapter 3). 
While the internal or construct validity of cognitive tests is essential for within and across 
species comparisons of one or a small number of cognitive abilities, a study’s external validity 
(how well the findings generalise to other circumstances such as environmental conditions 
or to other species, Campbell, 1957) is also important as it will influence large-scale 
comparative studies (across research facilities) and their replicability. I assessed the external 
validity of Studies 2 (Chapter 3) and 3 (Chapter 4) by exploring whether my findings 




1.4 Goal of this thesis: Assessing the influence of non-cognitive factors on 
cognitive performance  
 
In a recent review paper, we provided an overview of the current state of comparative 
research regarding general intelligence and explored if the studies truly captured intelligence 
rather than statistical and methodological artefacts (Burkart, Schubiger, & van Schaik, 2017a; 
see Appendix). Furthermore, we suggested in what directions future research efforts could 
venture to extend our knowledge on general intelligence in nonhuman animals. We 
proposed a set of criteria that may be useful for future studies in order to (a) reliably 
determine if a given species possesses general intelligence, and (b) evaluate whether an 
experimentally and statistically determined g is a valid measure of intelligence in its broad 
definition (i.e., reasoning ability and behavioural flexibility) rather than just a methodological 
or statistical artefact as many researchers have claimed (e.g., Amici et al., 2012; Arden & 
Zietsch, 2017; Huber, 2017; Kovacs & Conway, 2017; Locurto, 2017; Shuker et al., 2017).   
There is currently only a single cognitive test battery available that has been 
specifically designed to measure general intelligence in non-human primates and indeed 
found evidence for g in a New World monkey species, the cotton-top tamarin (Saguinus 
oedipus; Banerjee et al., 2009). However, like other test batteries, this battery has not yet 
been evaluated regarding whether it truly measures g rather than other factors that are not 
primarily cognitive in nature such as the subjects’ motivation to attend and participate. 
The aim of my PhD project was to take a first step into this direction by evaluating, in 
how far several non-cognitive factors affect cognitive performance in some of the subtests. 
The ultimate goal would be to investigate if a meaningful g-factor can be extracted in non-
human primates and how we can best measure it. I tested common marmosets (Callithrix 
jacchus), close evolutionary relatives of tamarins, with an adaptation of five of these subtests 
(A-not-B, Detour-Reaching, Quantity Discrimination, Reversal Learning, and Memory; see 
Figure 1.2) in order to conduct a first evaluation and explore influential factors. All five tasks 
represented cognitive paradigms that have often been used to test non-human primates and 
involved a clear choice by the subject so that performance could be compared. The same 
applied to the additional memory task I had developed for Studies 2 and 3 in which both 
common marmosets and common squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) were tested with a 
subset of these cognitive tasks. 
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Figure 1.2 The cognitive test battery used in this thesis. The six subtests (blue rectangles) of our test battery 
with 1-2 tests per supposed cognitive domain (green boxes in the middle). Fifteen marmosets were tested with 
subtests 1-5, eight squirrel monkeys were tested with subtests 1, 2, 5, and 6, and 12 marmosets from an 
additional sample were tested with subtests 5 (two-choice version) and 6 (nine-choice version). 
 
1.4.1 Thesis overview 
 
Several criteria have been emphasised to warrant reliable results in comparative 
cognition studies (Burkart, Schubiger, & van Schaik, 2017a). In this thesis, I focused on several 
of the listed criteria (see Table 1.1). First, I ruled out that the subtests of the cognitive test 
battery measured factors other than purely cognitive ones such as state anxiety and 
motivation (Chapters 2 and 3). Second, while I prioritised testing the same individuals with 
all subtests and my sample size was therefore relatively small, the subtests consisted of 
diverse tasks tapping into several cognitive abilities (Chapter 4). Moreover, in contrast to 
other researchers (Herrmann et al., 2007; Banerjee, 2009), I did not categorise the cognitive 
tasks into a priori domains (Chapter 4). Third, I replicated the puzzling results of one task, the 
two-choice memory test, with two independent samples representing my study species and 
an evolutionarily closely related species (Chapter 3). Fourth, comparable to general 
intelligence studies with humans, I avoided tasks that are prone to secondary modularisation 
such as tool-use related ones, that would have measured cognitive abilities that appear to 
be evolutionary adapted (primary) modules but in fact need to be learned even by species 
with high general cognitive ability (secondary modules).  Instead, I ensured that all subtests 







Table 1.1 A list of proposed criteria to avoid statistical and methodological artefacts to reliably 
identify a general intelligence factor g in nonhuman animals. The second and third column indicate 
to what extent these criteria have already been applied in rodents and primates, the last column 
indicates which criteria I applied in this thesis. (Table after Burkart, Schubiger, & van Schaik, 2017) 
 
 
Criteria to avoid statistical & 
 methodological artefacts 
 
 
Applied in previous studies? 
 








New World primates 
 
 
1) Empirical control for confounds: 
• Anxiety 
• Motivation 












Yes, in Chapters 2 & 3 
 
2) Use of: 
• Diverse tasks 
• Statistical methods 
without an a priori 
categorisation of tasks 
into domains  
• Large samples 
 
 





Yes, in Chapter 4, apart 
from large samples 
 
3) Replication of results in 
independent samples (when large 







Partly, in Chapter 3 
 
4) Avoidance of tasks prone to 













1.4.2 Do individual differences in emotion affect motivation and cognitive performance?      
(Chapter 2) 
 
The first study of my PhD project focused on the potential effects of individual 
differences in the subjects’ emotional reactivity on their intrinsic motivation to participate 
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Figure 1.3 Overview of the aims of the thesis. Experimental assessment of three non-cognitive factors that 
could potentially affect the cognitive performance of the study subjects and lead to biased results. The dotted 
line and arrow in the motivation box indicate that the subjects’ motivation to make correct choices was only 
indirectly assessed in Study 2 by varying the chance probability of success. 
 
When testing nonhuman primates, including marmosets, some individuals appear at 
times emotionally aroused, inattentive and not highly motivated to participate in a cognitive 
test. In our facility, in such cases, a test session is terminated, the subject released back to 
its home enclosure, and the session continued on the following day. While most subjects re-
engage in cognitive testing after applying this procedure, some still refuse to participate after 
such a break or continue to complete only a small number of trials per test session and 
testing day. Consequently, they eventually have to be excluded from further testing owing 
to ethical considerations (i.e., to avoid psychological distress) and time constraints (i.e., 
having to finish an experiment within a given time frame).  
The aim of Study 1 (Chapter 2) was therefore to systematically quantify individual 
differences in the marmosets’ emotional reactivity towards experimenters and the test 
situation, and to assess whether and how this affected the monkeys’ participation and 
performance in a cognitive test (Figure 1.4). If individual differences in emotional reactivity 
lead to individual differences in the monkeys’ cognitive performance, it would be essential 




cognitive performance of highly emotionally reactive monkeys remained unaffected, 
including them in test batteries would be less essential. Moreover, if performance was not 
affected by the identity of the experimenter, the use of additional experimenters would be 
justified. 
  
Figure 1.4 Study 1. Assessing the potential effect of individual differences in the subjects’ emotional reactivity 
towards experimenter and test situation on their cognitive performance in an object permanence task. 
 
As I will discuss in Chapters 2 and 5, I found considerable individual variation in the 
marmosets’ emotional reactivity, and experimenters who were strangers elicited more 
arousal in the marmosets compared to highly familiar experimenters. Nevertheless, although 
highly emotionally aroused subjects tended to be less attentive and participated in fewer 
trials, their performance in an object permanence task was not affected.  
 
1.4.3 How valid are standard memory tasks? (Chapter 3) 
 
In my second study, I assessed and improved the construct validity (Cronbach & Meehl, 
1955) of the memory test of the cognitive test battery. A cognitive test is regarded as 
construct-valid if it truly measures the cognitive ability (i.e. the cognitive construct) it was 
designed to measure, without additional factors, such as motivational aspects, significantly 
influencing an individual’s test score.  
The memory test in the classical two-choice task format was supposed to measure the 
marmosets’ ability to remember, over increasingly longer time delays, the location of a food 
item visibly hidden in one of two containers. If this test validly measured long-term memory, 
I would have expected – in accordance with Ebbinghaus’ forgetting curve - the marmosets’ 
to have increasing difficulty to remember the reward’s location over the course of the 
experimental sessions as a consequence of the increasing delays. However, in contrast to my 
expectation, I observed an initial peak, a medium low and a final peak in the subjects’ 
supposed memory performance. One explanation for this pattern of results was that 
inhibition demands might have played a role in that it was most difficult for subjects to wait 
before being able to make a choice if the delay intervals had a medium duration. In any case, 
Chapter 1 
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the relatively low performance of the marmosets in general and the absence of a typical 
forgetting curve indicated that other factors than memory ability were determining the 
marmosets’ performance in the task.  
A more plausible explanation was that, overall, the marmosets performed poorly owing 
to the relatively low cost of using a random-choice strategy rather than remembering the 
reward’s actual location. Even when choosing one of the two locations at random, a subject 
had a 50% chance per test trial that its choice was correct, allowing it to consume the food 
reward. If such a lack of motivation to choose correctly had caused the unexpected pattern 
of results, then lowering the possibility of random success by increasing the cost of a wrong 
choice (that would not allow the subject to consume the food item) should increase the 
subjects’ motivation to choose correctly and lead to the expected forgetting curve. In order 
to further explore this possibility, I devised a new memory test version with nine rather than 
only two choice options. A new group of marmosets and squirrel monkeys was tested with 
both a two-choice and the nine-choice test version so that the performance in the two test 
versions could be directly compared in the two evolutionary closely related New World 
monkey species (Figure 1.5).  
  
Figure 1.5 Study 2. Assessing the potential effect of the number of choice options (an aspect of the task 
format that affects the chance probability of success) on the subjects’ motivation to use an appropriate 
choice strategy and their performance in a memory task.  
 
As I will discuss in Chapters 3 and 5, both species performed better in the nine-choice 
than the two-choice memory test and, in accordance with my initial expectation, their 
performance in the nine-choice memory now decreased with increasing length of the time 
delay period, according to the expected forgetting curve. 
 
1.4.4 Do individual differences in time to complete a cognitive test affect performance? 
(Chapter 4) 
 
In my third study, I assessed whether individual differences in required testing time 
to complete a cognitive task lead to individual differences in cognitive performance. As I had 




subjects participate equally readily and consistently in cognitive tests. While all female 
subjects and some of the male subjects tended to be highly (food) motivated and maintained 
their motivation over the course of the numerous sessions of the test battery’s subtests, 
other male subjects only participated in a few trials per session and required much more 
time to complete a test. The common practice in previous cognitive studies by other 
researchers has been to simply exclude those subjects with motivational issues from (further) 
testing and to select other subjects instead who participate more consistently in order to 
minimise testing time and maximise sample sizes. However, if these subjects are not 
motivated because the test is cognitively too demanding for them, excluding such subjects 
would heavily bias the results of the study.  
To assess whether individual differences in required testing time affected the 
cognitive performance of marmosets and squirrel monkeys in the cognitive test battery 
(Figure 1.6), I used a full testing approach that gave the subjects sufficient time to complete 
the tasks at their own pace which reduced the number of dropouts. For each cognitive task, 
I compared the performance of subjects who completed the task within the expected 
number of testing days (and would have remained in the study sample had I used the classical 
opportunistic approach) to those subjects who needed longer (and would have been 
excluded in opportunistic testing). If the latter subjects differ from the former in terms of 
cognitive performance and ability, this would indicate that my full testing approach is not 
only advisable for general intelligence testing but for all types of cognitive testing. If, the two 
groups do not differ in terms of cognitive performance, this would indicate that opportunistic 
testing with numerous dropouts does not necessarily lead to a bias in the results.   
 
 
Figure 1.6 Study 3. Assessing the potential effect of individual differences in time subjects require to complete 
a cognitive task on their cognitive performance in a set of cognitive tasks. 
 
As I will discuss in Chapters 4 and 5, I found that the two groups did not differ and 
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When testing primates with cognitive tasks, it is usually not considered that subjects 
differ markedly in terms of emotional reactivity towards the experimenter, which potentially 
affects a subject’s cognitive performance. We addressed this issue in common marmosets 
(Callithrix jacchus), a monkey species in which males tend to show stronger emotional 
reactivity in testing situations, whereas females have been reported to outperform males in 
cognitive tasks. In a two-phase experiment, we first quantified the emotional reactivity of 14 
subjects towards four different experimenters performing a standardized behavioural action 
sequence, and then assessed whether and how it affected the subjects’ participation and 
performance in a subsequent object permanence task. A test session was terminated if a 
subject refused to make a choice in four consecutive trials. Highly emotionally aroused 
individuals, particularly males, were less likely to participate in the cognitive task and 
completed fewer trials. However, whenever they did participate and were attentive to the task, 
their performance was not affected. Our results suggest that differences in emotional 
reactivity towards an experimenter have no major impact on cognitive performance if strict 
criteria are applied on when to abandon a test session, and if performance is corrected for 
attention to the test procedure. Furthermore, they suggest that the reported sex differences 
in cognitive performance in marmosets may be owing to motivational and attentional factors, 









Whenever researchers conduct experiments with human or nonhuman primates, there 
is a risk that they will unintentionally influence the study’s outcome in one or several ways. 
Consequently, the study subjects might change their behaviour in response to the 
experimenter rather than the experimental conditions. In order to avoid experimenter effects 
and to optimize comparability of results, different experimenters are usually trained to use 
identical standardized procedures. But can we ever be certain that different experimenters 
conducting the same test with the same subjects reliably obtain the same results in terms of 
the subjects’ cognitive performance scores? One possibility is that different experimenters 
may elicit different emotional reactions in the subjects. In particular, some subjects may feel 
more at ease or more nervous with a specific experimenter than others. Such individual 
differences in emotional reactivity may influence a subject’s motivation to participate in a 
cognitive test with this experimenter, and, importantly, this lower motivation in turn may 
affect their cognitive performance.  
 Possible effects of experimenters on subjects’ performance scores in cognitive studies 
have been extensively studied in humans, and rodents, but only rarely been addressed 
systematically in non-human primates. The numerous reports of experimenter effects on the 
cognitive performance of human subjects include experimenters forming personal 
expectations on how different subjects might perform (e.g., Rosenthal, 1963) or differences in 
the way experimenters interact with their subjects such as being friendly or neutral                   
(e.g., Siegwarth et al., 2012). In studies with rats, biases such as an experimenter’s expectation 
regarding a subject’s cognitive abilities or the degree of familiarity between the experimenter 
and the subject have been shown to potentially affect a subject’s performance (see Schellinck 
et al., 2010). Systematic investigations of experimenter effects in non-human primates are rare 
and include two studies on capuchin monkeys, an observational field study on the putative 
effects of the presence of a human observer on the subjects’ movement and activity patterns 
(Crofoot et al., 2010), and an experimental study that suggested experimenters may bias the 
results of cognitive tests by selectively choosing subjects with homogenous personality traits 
(Morton et al. 2013).  
Crofoot et al. (2010) analysed the movement and activity patterns (recorded via 






absence of a human researcher. Overall, the capuchins did not change their movement and 
activity patterns in the presence of a human researcher. More subtle behavioural differences, 
however, could not be measured, such as the relative frequency of particular activities              
(e.g., vigilance, distress, or resting behaviour), and whether individuals differ systematically in 
such responses to the presence of a human researcher.  
Morton et al. (2013) analysed whether the outcome of cognitive tests in captivity is 
affected by the so-called personality selection bias. In captive experiments, researchers can 
control for most confounding variables by careful study design. However, researchers may 
tend to selectively choose their study subjects based on particular personality traits, such as 
openness. This selection bias may ultimately result in a performance bias if such a personality 
trait is linked to cognitive performance. Morton and colleagues rated capuchin monkeys 
(Sapajus apella) on five personality dimensions and analysed their participation (how many 
sessions they completed) and performance (how fast they learned to choose correctly) in two 
training tasks. In the first task, food was positioned in front of one of two test compartments 
that the monkeys could freely access, and a correct response was to sit in the compartment 
that had the food in front of it. In the second task, a small opaque cup was placed in front of 
one compartment and a larger opaque cup in front of the other one, and a correct response 
was to sit in the compartment that had the larger cup in front of it. The authors found that 
individuals scoring higher on openness were more likely to participate and performed better 
in the first task, and assertiveness affected the monkeys’ performance in both tasks, with less 
assertive subjects performing better than more assertive ones. Arguably, only the second task 
measured a truly cognitive component, and it is in this task that an individual’s openness score 
no longer had an effect on its performance score. The negative effect of assertiveness may be 
best understood as individuals having motivational priorities other than food. A direct link 
between personality traits and cognitive ability per se could thus not be demonstrated 
unambiguously. 
A study on rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta, Toxopeus et al., 2005), however, showed 
that high levels on one dimension of trait anxiety, as assessed behaviourally in the group 
context in response to a loud noise, negatively impacted performance in a learning test. This 
result may suggest a link between one of three dimensions of trait anxiety and cognitive 
performance, but, as the authors stress, highly anxious subjects could simply be less attentive 






This argument is particularly convincing since anxiety was also linked with low status: 
subordinate individuals may be less attentive to the task simply because they have to 
constantly monitor dominant conspecifics. In order to disentangle such confounding effects 
from genuine cognitive ability, it is necessary to control cognitive performance with regard to 
whether the subjects were attentive to the test procedure in the first place or not. 
Importantly, excluding subjects from participation in cognitive tests is problematic, 
regardless of whether exclusions target individuals of a specific personality type, to the extent 
that they differ systematically in genuine cognitive performance. But even in the absence of 
such sampling biases, the risk of indirect and subtle experimenter influences on the subjects’ 
performance remains. According to the Yerkes-Dodson law (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908), an 
individual performs best in a cognitive task if its emotional arousal is at an optimal level, which 
tends to be a medium degree of arousal. This optimal arousal level may vary both between and 
within individuals. While personality and trait anxiety may to some extent explain the origin of 
arousal-level differences between individuals, an individual’s emotional arousal-levels also may 
vary from one cognitive task to the other, either as a consequence of task difficulty or a variety 
of other causes. Therefore, it is essential that the experimenter is aware of individual 
differences in the subjects’ emotional reactivity and their possible consequences on its 
motivation, attention and cognitive performance. Ideally, a subject’s behavioural signs of 
emotional arousal are evaluated prior to and during cognitive testing. The aim of our study was 
to systematically assess these issues in common marmoset monkeys (Callithrix jacchus). 
 Marmosets belong to the primates smallest in body size (Ford et al., 2009), which 
arguably makes them particularly likely to show high emotional reactivity toward human 
experimenters owing to the body size difference between experimenter and subject. 
Furthermore, reported and observed sex differences make them a particularly interesting 
study species to investigate the effect of emotional reactivity towards the experimenter on 
their participation and performance in cognitive tasks. In the wild, male marmosets are more 
vigilant than females (König et al., 1998), and in captivity, they seem to be more easily 
emotionally aroused during cognitive testing (personal observation). Emotionally aroused 
males often appear less willing to participate in a full test session or less attentive to the 
experimental stimuli when they do so. Intriguingly, male marmosets have also been reported 
to perform more poorly in cognitive tasks than females (Brown et al., 2010; Yamamoto et al., 






simply reflects emotional reactivity, a lack of motivation and attention or a true sex difference 
in cognitive ability. Yamamoto and colleagues (2004) tested female and male marmosets with 
a cognitive task that required the subjects to open an opaque plastic container by piercing its 
lid in order to obtain a raisin that they could see through a small hole in the lid. Male 
marmosets needed more time to approach and solve this task and used fewer strategies to 
obtain the reward. Brown et al. (2010) tested female and male marmosets’ capacity to perceive 
biological motion by presenting them with point-light patterns of a walking hen on a computer 
screen. They found that female subjects paid more attention to the biological motion stimuli 
than males and spent more time inspecting them. The results of both above mentioned studies 
were interpreted as a sex differences in marmosets’ cognitive abilities. However, an alternative 
explanation is that the poor performance of male marmosets found in these studies was an 
artefact of a lower motivation (e.g., to work for food) or lower attention resulting from higher 
emotional arousal in the test situation. 
The aim of our study was to systematically assess individual differences in the subjects’ 
spontaneous behavioural response to an experimental situation and their potential effect on 
their participation and performance in a cognitive task. In a two-phase experiment conducted 
in a single session, we quantified behavioural and bodily indicators of elevated emotional 
reactivity when marmosets were confronted with different experimenters and investigated 
whether variation in emotional reactivity towards an experimenter influenced the subjects’ 
motivation to participate and their performance in a commonly used cognitive task.  
In the first phase, an experimenter performed a standardized sequence of behavioural 
actions in front of the individual subject. This sequence consisted of the experimenter entering 
the room, performing a succession of six standardized actions, leaving and re-entering the 
room and finally offering a highly desirable reward to the subject. In the second phase, the 
same experimenter conducted an object permanence task with the subject, composed of a 
visible and an invisible displacement condition of six trials each. In order to maximize variation 
in emotional reactivity, we used different experimenters that were either familiar women 
(whom we expected to elicit low levels of emotional arousal) or unfamiliar men (whom we 
expected to elicit high levels of emotional arousal). 
We addressed three main questions: (1) Do individual subjects react differently to 
different experimenters in terms of emotional arousal? (2) Are subjects with a stronger 






(3) Do subjects with a stronger emotional response towards an experimenter perform worse 
in a cognitive task given they participate?  
 We expected to find substantial variation in the subjects’ emotional reactivity and that 
male marmosets would react more strongly, particularly in response to unfamiliar 
experimenters. Furthermore, we anticipated that high emotional reactivity would lead to low 
participation whereas we had no prediction on whether high emotional reactivity would be 
linked to cognitive performance given we controlled for attention to the test stimuli and their 
manipulation. If males show higher emotional reactivity and lower participation as well as 
lower performance, even after controlling for attention, this would suggest genuine sex 
differences in cognitive ability. If, however, they showed higher reactivity, lower participation, 
but no difference in cognitive performance after controlling for attention, this would suggest 
that sex differences in cognitive performance are driven by motivational and attentional 
factors, rather than cognitive ability per se. 
 




Study subjects were 14 adult captive common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) of equal 
sex distribution, with a mean age of 7.11 years, living in family groups at the Primate Station 
of the Anthropological Institute of the University of Zurich. All marmosets were captive-born 
and mother-reared and participated in this study on four mornings after being fed their regular 
breakfast meal, a vitamin and calcium-enriched porridge. For a description of the study sample 
see Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1 Description of study sample. Listed are the fourteen subjects’ name, sex (7 females and               
7 males) and age in years. 
 
Subject Sex Age Subject Sex Age 
Jugo Male 5.8 Thilo Male 4.3 
Juri Male 11.0 Venezia Female 6.5 
Kaliper Male 10.7 Venus Female 7.7 
Kapi Male 9.8 Verona Female 6.5 
Tabor Male 3.6 Vesta Female 7.7 
Tale Female 4.3 Vito Male 6.0 








To maximize variation in the marmosets’ emotional reactivity, we used four different 
human experimenters: two familiar women whom we expected to elicit low emotional arousal, 
and two unfamiliar men whom we expected to elicit high emotional arousal based on our 
experience with the study species (similar effects have recently been reported for rodents by 
Sorge et al, 2014). The marmosets had never seen the unfamiliar experimenters before this 
study but regularly participated in other studies with the familiar experimenters for at least a 
year. Note that the aim of this study was not to identify why marmosets react more strongly 
to some experimenters than others, i.e., to disentangle the effect of the experimenters’ 
familiarity or gender on marmosets’ emotional reactivity, which would have required 
counterbalancing the two factors. Rather, we were interested in the consequences of high 
emotional reactivity, regardless of its origin, for the marmosets’ participation and performance 
in a subsequent cognitive task. Consequently, we chose experimenters whom we anticipated 
to produce the highest variation in the subjects’ emotional reactivity. All four experimenters 
wore indiscernible black clothes and, most importantly, featureless black shoes as marmosets, 
an arboreal New World monkey species, tend to react strongly to obtrusive features at ground 
level (unpublished data). 
 
2.3.3 Experimental set-up 
 
All marmosets were tested individually in the same familiar experimental room and cage 
in which they had previously been tested in several socio-cognitive experiments (e.g., Burkart 
et al. 2007; Burkart et al. 2009). The experimental cage contained the actual test compartment 
(41 x 33 x 53 cm) and a directly connected second compartment of the same size. The two 
compartments were divided by a grid wall containing a rectangular opening (15 x 22.5 cm) in 
its bottom half through which the subject could move away from the experimenter and testing 
table and closer to its group members. We thereby ensured that very highly aroused subjects 
did not feel restricted in space. Each subject was tested individually in the same test 
compartment while its group members were waiting in an adjacent cage (100 x 78 x 122 cm). 
This waiting cage was connected to the experimental cage through a short gateway. Its lateral 
wall facing the experimental enclosure was covered with an opaque grey plastic board, its front 






seeing the experimenter until it was their turn to enter the test compartment while still 
allowing the current subject to hear and smell, but not see, its group members. Having such 
minimal ‘contact’ with group members is essential for marmosets’ welfare as complete 
isolation from conspecifics imposes distress on this highly social species. Both cages were 
elevated 1.15 m from the ground as marmosets are arboreal and thus appear more 




The basic experimental apparatus consisted of a testing table, a wooden board                  
(40 x 40 cm) with two lateral plastic rails that was mounted on an adjustable tripod table so 
that the board’s front was flush with the front of the experimental compartment. The wooden 
board of the testing table served as a base for the experimental equipment during the 
experimenter’s behavioural action sequence (phase 1) and for the sliding platform and the 
cups during the cognitive task (phase 2). The equipment for the experimenter’s behavioural 
action sequence consisted of two transparent glass containers (6 x 3 cm) with white plastic 
lids, one of which was half-filled with fine-grained pet sand, as well as of a digital timer and a 
dead cricket (Acheta domesticus; about 12 mm in size). The cognitive test apparatus itself 
consisted of a rectangular sliding platform (33.7 x 25 cm) made of cardboard that was covered 
with a washable wood-patterned plastic surface, and three cylindrical opaque black plastic 
cups (3.8 x 2.6 cm). The three aligned cups were placed at a distance of 3 cm from the 
platform’s front edge, and the distance between the middle and each outer cup was 10 cm.    
All three cups were initially openly placed on the sliding board and kept in place with double-
sided adhesive pads attached to the side that was lying on the board. 
 
2.3.5 Experimental procedure 
 
The experimental procedure consisted of two consecutive phases conducted in a single 
session with a maximal total duration of approximately 15 minutes that mainly depended on 
whether and how long an individual subject participated in the cognitive task. We used a 
within-subject design, where each of the four experimenters performed the two-phase 
experiment with all subjects. In phase 1, the experimenter (hereafter E) performed a series of 






phase 2, the E conducted a short object permanence task with the same subject. This resulted 
in 56 experimenter-subject dyads. Both phases, the standardized behavioural action sequence 
and the object permanence task, were identical for all subject-experimenter pairs. 
Experimenter order was counter-balanced across subjects to control for order effects. The two 
phases of the experiment are shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Two consecutive phases of the experiment. In phase 1, the experimenter (E) performed a sequence of 
six behavioural actions in front of the subject: (1) standing perpendicularly to it with head and eyes oriented away, 
(2) looking at the subject while oriented towards it and establishing eye contact, (3) manipulating an object 
(pouring sand between two transparent containers), (4) holding up a cricket (out of reach), (5) placing the cricket 
onto the test table/board (out of reach) and (6) leaving the test room (cricket still out of reach), re-entering it and 
giving the cricket to the subject. In phase 2, E conducted a cognitive task with the subject that consisted of two 
short object permanence tests of six trials each. In the first test, E placed the cricket under one of the three cups 
and closed all cups. In the second test, E again placed the cricket under one cup but then exchanged its location 
with an adjacent one. The subject made its choice by touching or lifting one of the cups. 
 
Phase 1 – The standardised behavioural action sequence of the experimenter 
 
The E entered the room, called the subject’s name, walked towards the experimental 
cage on a marked line on the floor while looking down to this line and stopped 50 cm in front 
of the testing compartment, leaving the testing table between the E and the subject. The E 
then performed a standardized sequence of six behavioural actions, each lasting 30 seconds. 
A digital timer beeped to indicate when a 30 second interval had ended. For each action of the 
behavioural sequence, the E retrieved the equipment from a storage table at the back wall of 
the room and replaced it onto this storage table before starting the next action.  
 
The experimenters’ six sequential actions 
 
(1) Standing still:  
The E stood in front of the subject’s test compartment. The E’s body, head and eyes 
were facing 90 degrees away from the subject while the arms were in a neutrally stretched 
position on the sides of the E’s body. After 30 seconds, the E turned towards the subject, and 






(2) Establishing eye contact:  
The E was now facing the subject and tried to establish eye contact for 30 seconds by 
following the subject with head and eye gaze. 
(3) Manipulation of an unfamiliar object:  
The E took the two small transparent containers (one was filled with sand, the other 
was empty) and placed them on the testing table. The E started the timer and removed the 
containers’ lids, subsequently lifted up the containers, one in each hand, and visibly poured 
the sand from one container into the other and vice versa as soon as the first container was 
empty. The E repeated pouring the sand between the two containers, until 30 seconds had 
elapsed, closed the lids again and placed the containers back onto the storage table. 
(4) Holding food:  
 After taking a cricket from the storage table, the E again stood in front of the testing 
table, as in the previous sequence, started the timer and held up the cricket visibly about 25 
cm in front of E’s chest without offering it to the subject. While doing so the E was facing the 
digital timer on the apparatus for 30 seconds. 
(5) Placing food out of reach/E present:  
The E laid down the previously held cricket onto the wooden platform at a distance of 
17 cm (which is just out of the subject’s reach) from the front of the test compartment 
and looked at the cricket for 30 seconds while standing still. 
(6) Placing food out of reach/E absent:  
The E left the room while the cricket remained placed on the wooden platform and out 
of the subject’s reach. After the 30-second interval had elapsed, the E re-entered the room, 
picked up the out-of-reach cricket from the wooden board/test table and offered it to the 
subject. 
 
Phase 2 - Object permanence test 
 
Immediately after completing the behavioural action sequence, the E conducted a short 
object permanence task with the subject, consisting of two tests of six trials each, (1) a visible 
displacement test and (2) an invisible displacement test. The procedure corresponded 
principally to the one used by Mendes and Huber (2004) who found considerable individual 






twice under each of the three cups in a counterbalanced manner. In the invisible displacement 
test and in contrast to Mendes & Huber we did not use a transport cup and ensured that, at 
the time of the subject’s choice, the reward appeared equally often in each location, twice on 
the left (A), twice in the middle (B), and twice on the right (C). To enhance comparability, all 
subjects first received six trials of the simpler test, the visible displacement. The invisible 




The E started the testing session by first placing the sliding platform with the three open 
black cups onto the test table. The E then called the subject’s name, showed it a cricket, placed 
it in front of one of the open cups, and closed the cups from left to right. 
Test 1: Visible displacement 
In the visible displacement test, directly after baiting, the E slid the platform towards the 
test compartment so that the subject was able to make its choice by touching or lifting one of 
the cups.  
Test 2: Invisible displacement 
In the invisible displacement condition, the E baited one cup in the same way as in the 
visible displacement condition but performed a transposition immediately after closing all 
cups. The transposition consisted in the E exchanging the location of two cups, the baited and 
an adjacent empty one by simultaneously moving them on the board from one location to the 
other using the index and middle fingers of both hands. This resulted in the E’s hands crossing, 
whereby the hand moving the baited container was always in the front. As in the visible 
displacement condition, the E then slid the platform towards the test compartment and 
allowed the subject to make its choice.  
For both the visible and the invisible displacement test a choice was defined as the first 
cup the subject either lifted or touched. The procedure following the subject’s choice was 
identical for both tests. If the subject correctly chose the baited cup, it obtained the cricket 
reward and the next trial started immediately. If the subject chose the wrong cup, the E drew 
back the platform, showed the subject the wrongly chosen container was empty and then 
opened the other two cups from left to right. The E then retrieved the cricket, placed it on the 
storage table, and continued with the next trial after a 15 sec time delay. If the subject refused 






time out imposed. The next trial was directly started instead and the no-choice trial was 
repeated once all six trials of the test had been conducted, e.g., after the sixth trial of the visible 
displacement test. 
Crucially, clear stop criteria were applied on when to terminate a test session. Testing 
was discontinued if a subject refused to choose any cup in four consecutive trials or if a subject 
did no longer make a choice in the last three trials of the invisible displacement test. This 
procedure ensured that subjects were allowed to leave the test situation if they were highly 
emotionally aroused, refused to make any choices or stopped choosing during the test session 
and thus appeared unmotivated. Therefore, while all subjects were presented with at least 
four of the six trials in the first test (visible displacement), not all subjects entered the second 
test (invisible displacement).  
 
2.4 Data recording and analysis 
 
2.4.1 Dependent measures during phase 1 
 
In order to assess the extent of emotional reactivity in the subjects, we used several 
visible and audible behavioural indicators of emotional arousal usually shown by marmosets in 
stressful or challenging situations. We expected these indicators of emotional reactivity to be 
more pronounced with the unfamiliar than the familiar experimenters. 
Behavioural indicators of arousal  
 
(1) Tail-brush 
In common marmosets, piloerection is most clearly visible in the brushing of the tail. A 
brushed tail indicates general vegetative arousal, but not necessarily of negative valence 
(Dettling et al. 2002).  
(2) “Tsik” vocalisations 
Tsik vocalisations are mobbing calls that marmosets typically emit in response to 
unfamiliar humans, stressful noises, other marmoset groups, and potential predators (Martins, 
Bezerra, and Souto 2008).  
(3) “Egg” vocalizations 
Egg vocalizations have been described as vigilance calls and are usually uttered if an 






(Martins Bezerra & Souto, 2008). 
(4) Self-scratching 
Self-scratching has been described as a stress-associated behaviour for primates, 
including marmosets (Bassett et al, 2003).  
(5) Escape  
An escape involved the subject rattling and gnawing on the closed door (a grey plastic 
panel) on top of the experimental compartment in an attempt to leave the test situation. 
 (6) Not taking offered food 
Not taking offered food was a subject’s refusal to retrieve the cricket from the E’s hand 
who offered it as a reward in the end of phase 1. From previous experiments, all subjects were 
used to retrieve rewards from an E’s hand.  
 
2.4.2 Data analysis 
 
Both phases of the experiment, the behavioural action sequence of the E and the 
cognitive task, were video-recorded continuously with a digital camera. The subjects’ 
spontaneous emotional response in the first phase was coded and analysed continuously from 
video recordings using the software package Interact from Mangold. Coding of phase 1 started 
as soon as the E started the digital timer and ended as soon as the subject had retrieved the 
cricket from the E’s hand.  
The definitions of the dependent variables are summarized in Table 2.2. The variables 
tail-brush (1) and escape (5) were measured as states. The beginning and end of a tail-brush 
state was determined by visible brushing or de-brushing of the tail, captured as a quick change 
(within a few seconds) in the degree of its piloerection. The duration of an escape state was 
delimited by the visible and audible start and end of the joggling and gnawing on the door at 
the top of the experimental compartment. The variables tsik calls (2), egg calls (3), self-
scratching (4) and not taking offered food (6) were treated as events. Every individual egg and 
tsik vocalisation were coded as an event. Self-scratching was defined as an event of the subject 
using a hand or foot to scratch a part of its own body. Not taking the offered food was recorded 
as a single occurrence of the subject not retrieving the offered food from E’s hand. The 
durations for the two state variables were measured in seconds and calculated as percentages 






absolute frequency of the behaviour by the total duration of phase 1. 
 
Table 2.2 Definitions of the emotional reactivity measures. Four dependent variables (1,2,3, and 5) 
were included in the statistical analysis while the other two dependent variables (4 and 6 in italics) were 
excluded owing to floor effects. 
 
2.4.3 Dependent measures during phase 2 
 
Task participation was defined as the total number of trials the subjects completed in the 
visible and invisible displacement test.  
The subjects’ performance in the cognitive test was live-coded by the E who noted each 
of the subject’s choices as correct, wrong or non-choice, and later verified these choices based 
on the video clips. Furthermore, we coded from the video clips for each trial in which a subject 
participated, whether the subject had actually seen the baiting and displacement or not, based 
on its head and body orientation during the manipulation of the experimenter. If the subject’s 
head and eyes were oriented in a way that the E’s hand and the containers were in its line of 
sight at the moment of the baiting and the transposition, a trial was coded as seen by the 
subject.  
Task performance was calculated separately for each test and defined as the number of 
correct choices in all trials in which the subjects had paid attention to the presentation and 
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2.4.4 Reliabilities and Statistical Data Analysis  
 
In order to assess inter-rater reliability of behavioural coding for phase 1, and of task 
performance and attention in phase 2, 20% of the 56 video clips were coded by a second rater. 
Krippendorff’s alpha coefficient was calculated for each dependent variable (Hayes & 
Krippendorff, 2007; Krippendorff, 2011). For the emotional reactivity variables from phase 1, 
alpha was generally high: egg calls α(12) = 0.99, tail-brush α(12) = 0.91, tsik calls α(12) = 0.97, 
and escape α(12) = 0.99. For phase 2, the cognitive task, all choices and non-choices were 
double-checked based on the video recordings. Correspondence between initially noted 
choices and double-checked choices was a 100%. Krippendorff’s alpha for the subjects’ 
attention in the first object permanence test was α(72) = 1.00 for both the first and second 
object permanence task.  
The dependent variables from phase 1 were first subjected to a principal component 
analysis (PCA without rotation) that established whether they represented the same or 
different dimensions of the subjects’ emotional reactivity. However, self-scratching and not 
taking offered food were not used in this PCA owing to floor effects. Self-scratching was an 
extremely rare behaviour, and with the exception of two male subjects who refused to accept 
the food from one unfamiliar experimenter, all subjects accepted the offered reward from all 
four experimenters.  
The principal components extracted from the PCA were used as explanatory factors in 
subsequent general linear mixed models (GLMMs) with task participation, task performance, 
and attention, as response variables, using the Standard Least Squares option and the 
restricted maximum likelihood method (REML). In all models, experimenter nested in 
experimenter group, and subject, were included as random effects. All statistical analyses were 
conducted using the software Jmp 10. We used a significance level of α = 0.05 for all statistical 
tests, and all tests were two-tailed. 
Is there individual variation in emotional reactivity towards different experimenters? 
 
 In order to answer the first question of whether the extent of the subjects’ emotional 
reactivity differed when confronted with familiar versus unfamiliar experimenters, a separate 
GLMM was conducted for each of the two components resulting from the PCA (i.e., arousal 







Do individual differences in emotional reactivity affect the subjects’ participation in the 
cognitive task? 
 
 To address the second question of whether elevated emotional reactivity (phase 1) 
influenced a subject’s motivation to participate in the cognitive task (phase 2), we ran GLMMs 
for the whole object permanence task with the relative number of completed trials out of 
twelve as response variable. As fixed effects, we included arousal (as measured by factor 1 of 
the PCA), avoidance (as measured by factor 2), subject’s sex, and their uni- and bivariate 
combinations with and without interactions. The best model was identified based on the 
lowest value of the Akaike information criterion, controlled for small sample sizes                        
(AICc, Hurvich and Tsai, 1989). This model selection approach was chosen to account for the 
limited number of subjects. 
Furthermore, we tested whether the extent of a subject’s emotional reactivity affected 
how attentive it was during the baiting procedure in the first object permanence test and 
during the baiting and the transposition procedure of the cups in the second test. Therefore, 
we ran a second series of nine GLMMS with the same fixed and random effects as above, but 
the response variable was the number of trials a subject had attended to divided by all 
participated trials. 
Do individual differences in emotional reactivity affect the subjects’ performance in the 
cognitive task? 
 
We analysed the third question of whether high emotional reactivity towards the 
experimenter and the test situation influenced the subjects’ performance in the cognitive task 
by running several GLMMs separately for each of the two object permanence tests.  
Analogous to question 2, we ran two series of nine different GLMMs all of which 
included the fixed effects subject’s sex, arousal, avoidance and their interactions. Furthermore, 
we used two different response variables to elucidate how the subjects’ attention to the test 
procedure influenced their performance, i.e., the total number of correct trials divided by the 
number of participated trials and the total number of correct trials a subject had attended to 









2.5.1 Two independent dimensions of emotional reactivity 
 
The PCA on the four emotional reactivity measures in phase 1 (Table 2.2) revealed two 
independent dimensions with Eigenvalues greater than 1 (2.167 and 1.186). Three dependent 
variables loaded highly on the first factor that explained 54.2% of the total variance in the 
dependent measures: egg calls (0.857), tail-brush (0.840) and tsik calls (0.837). Since all three 
variables represented audible and visible behavioural signs of arousal, the first factor was 
named “arousal”. The fourth variable, escape, loaded very highly (0.954) on the second factor 
which explained 29.7% of the total variance and was named “avoidance” (see Table 2.3).               
To avoid collinearity issues, the two emotional reactivity factors, arousal (factor 1) and 
avoidance (factor 2), were used for all further statistical analyses.  
  
Table 2.3 The two-factor structure of the subjects’ emotional reactivity: arousal and avoidance 
behaviour. Loadings of the four dependent variables on the two extracted principal components 
(factors). Both stress-related vocalizations and piloerection of the tail (tail-brush) loaded highly on the 
first factor, arousal, which explained 54.2% of the total variation. The subjects’ attempts to leave the 
situation loaded highly on the second factor, avoidance, which explained a further 29.7 % of the total 
variation. High factor loadings are indicated in bold 
 
 
2.5.2 Individual variation in emotional reactivity 
 
A first GLMM with the response variable arousal and the fixed effects experimenter 
group and subject’s sex, and their interaction, showed no significant main effect of 
experimenter group on subjects’ arousal (F(1, 2) = 12.88, p = .070), although there was a trend 
for the subjects’ arousal to be more pronounced when confronted with unfamiliar as opposed 
to familiar experimenters. There was, however, a significant effect of the subjects’ sex                
F(1, 12) = 7.28, p = .019. A posthoc Student’s t-test revealed that male marmosets showed 
significantly higher arousal than females t(12) = 2.70, p = .019 (Figure 2.2). Furthermore, the 
interaction between experimenter group and subjects’ sex was highly significant                           
	
 
D ep endent variable 
 
 
F1  arousal 
 
 
F2  avoidance 
Egg calls 0 . 857 -0.287 
Tail-brush 0 . 840 0.360 
Tsik calls 0 . 837 -0.251 






F(1, 38) = 8.55, p < .006. A Tuckey HSD posthoc test revealed that male marmosets showed 
significantly more emotional arousal when confronted with unfamiliar experimenters (Least 
Square Mean = 1.56, SE = 0.41) than with familiar ones (LS Mean = -0.22, SE = 0.41) and than 
female subjects with both unfamiliar (LS Mean = - 0.44, SE = 0.41) and familiar experimenters 
(LS Mean = - 0.90; SE = 0.41).  
 A second GLMM with avoidance as response variable revealed a strong trend in the 
same direction. Again, there was no significant effect of experimenter-group F(1, 2) = 0.31,           
p = .634 but a significant effect of the subjects’ sex F(1, 12) = 4.86, p = .048. Male marmosets 
generally showed more avoidance behaviour than females t(12)= 2.21, p = .048 (Figure 2.2). 
However, although there was a trend for more pronounced escape behaviour of male 
marmosets in response to the unfamiliar experimenter group, the interaction between 
experimenter-group and subject’s sex was not significant F(1, 38) = 1.42, p = .241. 
 
Figure 2.2 Effect of a subject’s sex on its emotional reactivity. The dark grey bars represent the subjects’ mean 
arousal (as measured by factor 1 of the PCA), the light grey bars their mean avoidance levels (as measured by 
factor 2). The two left bars represent female subjects (♀♀), the two right bars males (♂♂). Note: To better visualize 
the values that resulted from the PCA, they were transformed by adding a factor of 5 so that all values appeared 
greater than zero. 
 
2.5.3 Emotional reactivity influences the subjects’ participation 
Participation in the object permanence task  
 
The best model to explain the effect of the subjects’ emotional reactivity on their overall 






included subject’s sex as the only fixed effect (model 1, see Table S2.1 in the supplementary 
material). In this model a subject’s sex had a highly significant effect on the number of 
completed trials F(1, 12) = 41.16, p < .0001. However, the model that additionally included 
arousal, showed nearly identical performance (model 4, ΔAICc = 1.840, see Table S2.1). In this 
model, both effects, a subject’s sex (F(1, 13.2), p < .002) and arousal (F(1, 36.6) p < .024) 
significantly influenced participation in the test. A Student’s t-test (t(12) = 6.42, p < .0001) 
revealed that male subjects completed significantly fewer trials (LS Mean = 0.46, SE = 0.09) 
than females (LS Mean = 0.99, SE = 0.09), who in fact all participated in all six trials of the visible 
displacement test and in most trials of the invisible displacement test (Figure 2.3a). 
The relatively small difference between the two models (ΔAICc = 1.836) indicates that 
both variables, a subject’s sex and its arousal, explain the individual variance in participation 
equally well. Their interaction was not significant (model 5, Table S2.1).  
 
Attention in the object permanence task 
 
 The best model for the response variable attention, the number of seen trials out of all 
participated trials, was the one which only included the fixed effect arousal F(1, 31.3) = 30.94, 
p < .0001 (model 2, AICc = 40.780, see Table S2.2 in the supplementary material). Highly 
aroused subjects saw the test procedure in fewer participated trials than subjects with low 
arousal. Moreover, although there was no significant effect of avoidance on overall attention, 
avoidant subjects were less attentive in the first object permanence test (F(1, 21.54) = 9.16,    
p = .006 (Figure 2.4a). 
 
2.5.4 Emotional reactivity does not influence cognitive test performance 
 
Performance in test 1 visible displacement 
 
When using the subjects’ uncorrected performance as response variable, i.e., the 
number of correct trials of all participated trials in the first test, the best of the nine models 
based on the lowest Akaike information criterion was the one that included avoidance as the 
only fixed effect F(1, 38.1) = 7.29, p = .010 (model 3, ΔAICc = 18.035, see Table S2.3a in the 
supplementary material). Highly avoidant subjects made fewer correct choices than less 
avoidant ones (Figure 2.4b). 






trials in which the subject saw the baiting of the cup, the best model was still the one with the 
fixed effect avoidance F(1, 36.01) = 2.40, p = .130 (model 3, AIC =  20.090, see Table S2.3b) but 
a subject’s avoidance level no longer had a significant effect on its performance. Moreover, 
the model that only included subject’s sex as fixed effect (model 1, ΔAICc = 0.315 see Table 
S2.3b) and the model including arousal only (model 2, ΔAICc = 1.876, see Table S2.3b) can be 
considered as equivalent based on their ΔAICc values lower than 2. None of these effects were 
significant. 
 
Performance in test 2 invisible displacement 
 
When we used the uncorrected performance as response variable, the best model 
included only subject’s sex (model 1, AICc = -4.251, see Table S2.4a in the supplementary 
material). Male subjects tended to perform more poorly than females but this effect was not 
significant F(1, 13.85) = 1.90, p = .189.  
When we used the corrected performance as response variable and thus controlled for 
attention, the best model was, as for test 1, the one including avoidance as single fixed effect 
F(1, 18.95) = 1.05, p = .318 (model 3, see Table S2.4b). However, the two models that only 
included sex (model 1, ΔAICc = 1.319) and arousal (model 2, ΔAICc = 0.368) resembled it closely 




Figure 2.3 A subject’s sex and emotional arousal affected its participation but not its performance in the object 
permanence task. Mean percentages of (a) participated trials of a subject in the object permanence task, and (b) 
correct trials in the second test, invisible displacement, corrected for attention. A subject’s sex is indicated by its 









Figure 2.4 Emotional avoidance affected a subject’s attention but not its performance in the first object 
permanence test, visible displacement. Shown is the effect of a subject’s avoidance levels on (a) the mean 
percentage of trials it paid attention to, (b) its uncorrected performance: the mean percentage of correct of all 
participated trials, and (c) its corrected performance: the mean percentage of correct trials it paid attention to in 
the visible displacement test. A subject’s sex is indicated by its gender symbol (♀ = female, ♂ = male). 
 
2.6  Discussion 
 
The aim of this study was to quantitatively assess whether and how a subject’s emotional 
reactivity towards an experimenter and the test situation impacts participation and 
performance in a cognitive task.  
In a two-phase experiment conducted in a single session, we quantified the extent of 
emotional reactivity of common marmosets towards four different experimenters. We then 
assessed whether and how emotional reactivity affected the subjects’ participation and 
performance in a subsequent object permanence task. To maximize variation in the subjects’ 
emotional reactivity, we confronted subjects with two groups of experimenters whom we 
expected to elicit high variation in emotional reactivity, two male experimenters, who were 
complete strangers to the subjects, versus two familiar female experimenters. In the first phase 
of the experiment, the experimenters performed an identical standardized sequence of 
behavioural actions in front of the subjects. We found considerable variability in the subjects’ 
spontaneous emotional response as measured by four behavioural indicators that represented 
two independent dimensions of emotional reactivity, arousal and avoidance. The marmosets 
behaviourally expressed high arousal by showing piloerection of the tail and emitting two 
distress-related vocalizations, whereas avoidance was expressed by attempts to leave the 
experimental situation. Overall and in accordance with our expectation, male subjects were 






with unfamiliar ones. They also tended to try to avoid the situation more often than female 
marmosets, independently from experimenter familiarity.  
The extent of emotional arousal and avoidance during phase 1 had affected the male 
subjects’ participation in the subsequent object permanence task in phase 2, whereas the 
participation of females was largely unaffected. Moreover, marmosets who had shown more 
attempts to leave the situation in phase 1 were less attentive to the test procedure when they 
eventually participated in the cognitive test.  
 In contrast to their participation, the subjects’ cognitive performance in the object 
permanence task was not affected by emotional reactivity, given we controlled their 
performance for whether they had had paid attention to the experimental procedure or not. 
However, when not controlling for attention, avoidant individuals made more mistakes. 
Together, the results show that individuals who were avoidant in phase 1 were less likely to be 
attentive to the task prior to making their choice, and therefore made more mistakes. Thus, 
controlling for attention is vital in particular for individuals who show higher emotional 
reactivity. We conclude that in common marmosets, emotional reactivity towards an 
experimenter affects participation and attention but not performance in cognitive tasks. An 
interesting direction for future studies is to disentangle what factors are responsible for the 
higher emotional reactivity of some individuals. Besides a subject’s sex, possible factors are its 
personality, its familiarity with the experimenter, the experimenter’s gender, similar 
personalities of both the subject and the experimenter, or a combination of these factors.  
In our study, male marmosets showed a stronger emotional response, were less 
motivated to participate, completed fewer trials, and were less likely to attend to the 
presentation and experimental manipulation of the cups and the reward. However, in the trials 
in which they did participate and paid attention to the presentation and manipulation of these 
stimuli, their cognitive performance did not differ from their female conspecifics’ performance. 
This result contrasts with the idea that female common marmosets possess better cognitive 
abilities than males (Yamamoto et al, 2004; Brown et al, 2010). Our results suggest that these 
reported sex differences in cognitive performance in marmosets are best understood in terms 
of motivational and attentional sex differences, such as a higher interest of female marmosets 
to work for food and of male marmosets to remain vigilant to the environment (see also König 






Our results have two implications for conducting experimental tests with marmosets, 
and arguably nonhuman primates in general. First, comparable results may be achieved with 
different experimenters, even if subjects vary individually in how they behaviourally respond 
to these different experimenters. It is crucial, however, to control for whether the subjects are 
attentive to the presentation and manipulation of the experimental stimuli, because 
particularly highly reactive individuals may participate in the task without paying attention to 
it, perhaps in order to quickly finish the experiment. Ideally, the experimenter should obtain 
the subject’s full attention before starting a test trial and closely attend to whether the subject 
stays attentive during the whole test procedure. However, monitoring a subject’s attention 
during testing can be difficult, because the experimenter has to avoid to inadvertently give 
visual cues to the subject and cannot look at it during the actual test trial. Therefore, it is vital 
to determine from video recordings for every trial if the subject had been fully attentive or not, 
and to correct its performance accordingly.  
The second implication is that excluding highly reactive animals from testing does not 
necessarily bias the results. In fact, the alternative explanation of the trait-anxiety effect in 
macaques (Toxopeus et al., 2005), i.e., that the adverse effect of trait-anxiety on cognitive 
performance results from attentional biases rather than cognitive ability per se, is supported 
by the present set of findings. Likewise, our results are consistent with the ones obtained by 
Morton et al. (2013) who basically showed a participation effect rather than a truly cognitive 
one.  
Based on our findings, we suggest that differences in emotional reactivity do not 
necessarily have an impact on cognitive performance. Thus, it is justifiable both to use different 
experimenters as well as to exclude very highly aroused and unmotivated subjects from 
testing. However, observable behavioural indicators of elevated emotional arousal should 
sensitise the experimenter to evaluate an individual subject’s attentional state prior to and 
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2.8 Supplementary material 
 
Tables S2.1 – S2.4 provide an overview of the results of the GLMMs computed in JMP 10 to determine 
the effects of a subject’s emotional reactivity and sex on its participation, attention, and performance in the 
object permanence. 
 
Shown are the models 1 to 9, the p-values for each included fixed, the corrected Akaike information 
criterion (AICc), and its difference to the best model (ΔAIC). 
     
 
Table S2.1 Effect of a subject’s emotional reactivity on its overall participation in the object permanence task. 
The response variable was the number of participated trials in both displacement tests. Model 1 
which only includes the subjects’ sex provides the best fit based on the lowest AICc. However, model 4 






















1 < .0001***      47.393 0 
 
2  .0007**     52.523 5.130 
 
3   .038*    61.085 13.693 
 
4 .0018** .0238*     49.229 1.840 
 
5 .0014** .315  .213   54.534 7.142 
 
6 .0003***  .736    54.207 6.815 
 
7 .019*  .679  .741  58.580 11.187 
 
8  .0002** .010**    50.265 2.872 
 
9  .018* .014*   .770 56.890 9.500 
 
 
Table S2.2 Effect of a subject’s emotional reactivity on its attention in the participated trials of the object 
permanence task. The response variable was the number of participated trials that were actually seen by the 






















1 <.0001***      46.725 5.945 
 
2  .0001**     40.780 0 
 
3   .651    62.401 21.621 
 
4 .063 .001**     43.426 2.646 
 
5 .040* .056  .198   48.621 7.841 
 
6 <.0001***  .253    52.250 11.469 
 
7 .026*  .859  .610  56.511 15.731 
 
8  <.0001*** .590    47.266 6.486 
 







Table S2.3 Effect of a subject’s emotional reactivity on its performance in the visible displacement test. The 
response variable was the number of correct out of all participated trials of a subject (a) without and (b) 
with correction for attention. 
 
(a) Performance in visible displacement, not corrected for attention 
The best fitting model is Model 3. Highly avoidant subjects performed worse in the test than subjects 






















1 .176      22.894 4.345 
 
2  .911     24.603 6.568 
 
3   .010*    18.035 0 
 
4 - -     29.138 11.103 
 
5 .161 .627  .752   36.162 18.128 
 
6  .962  .018*    24.622 6.356 
 
7 .864  .440  .854  29.622 11.588 
 
8  .585 .010*    24.701 6.667 
 
9  .166 .002*   .077 27.603 9.566 
 
 
(b) Performance in visible displacement, corrected for attention 
Model 3 is still the best model but the effect of a subject’s avoidance level on its performance in the visible 
displacement test was no longer significant after excluding trials in which the subjects had not been 























1 .247      20.404 0.315 
 
2  .721     21.966 1.876 
 
3   .130    20.090 0 
 




.428  .757   33.912 13.832 
 
6  .646  .248    26.330 6.240 
 
7 .600  .795  .839  31.487 11.397 
 
8  .559 .112    26.690 6.003 
 










Table S2.4 Effect of a subject’s emotional reactivity on its performance in the invisible displacement test. The 
response variable was the number of correct out of all participated trials of a subject (a) without and                     
(b) with correction for attention. 
 
(a) Performance in the invisible displacement, not corrected for attention 
The best fitting model is Model 1. Males showed a non-significant trend to perform worse in the invisible 
displacement test given they participated. But model 3 can be considered as equivalent based on Δ<2. 






















1 .189      4.251 0 
 
2  .842     2.075 2.175 
 
3   .674    2.711 1.540 
 






-  -   9.250 13.501 
 
6  .225  .796    2.909 7.160 
 
7 .780  .028*  .011*  1.034 5.285 
 
8  .912 .695    5.125 9.375 
 
9  .571 .193   .210 9.501 13.752 
 
 
(b) Performance in the invisible displacement, corrected for attention 
The response variable was the number of correct out of all participated trials that were seen by the subject. 
Model 3 which included only the fixed effect avoidance was the best model. But model 1 and 2 can be 






















1 .694      15.676 1.319 
 
2  .203     14.726 0.368 
 
3   .318    14.357 0 
 






.146  .328   29.410 15.053 
 
6  .825  .365    21.481 7.123 
 
7 .269  .060  .968  23.226 8.869 
 
8  .458 .479    21.500 7.143 
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In cognitive tests, animals are often given a choice between two options and obtain a 
reward if they choose correctly. We investigated whether task format affects subjects’ 
performance in a physical cognition test. In experiment 1, a two-choice memory test, 15 
marmosets, Callithrix jacchus, had to remember the location of a food reward over time delays 
of increasing duration. We predicted that their performance would decline with increasing 
delay, but this was not found. One possible explanation was that the subjects were not 
sufficiently motivated to choose correctly when presented with only two options because in 
each trial they had a 50% chance of being rewarded. In experiment 2, we explored this 
possibility by testing eight naïve marmosets and seven squirrel monkeys, Saimiri sciureus, with 
both the traditional two-choice and a new nine-choice version of the memory test that 
increased the cost of a wrong choice. We found that task format affected the monkeys’ 
performance. When choosing between nine options, both species performed better and their 
performance declined as delays became longer. Our results suggest that the two-choice format 
compromises the assessment of physical cognition, at least in memory tests with these New 
World monkeys, whereas providing more options, which decreases the probability of obtaining 
a reward when making a random guess, improves both performance and measurement validity 
of memory. Our findings suggest that two-choice tasks should be used with caution in 






When the cognitive abilities of animals are assessed with cognitive tests, subjects are 
often presented with two options to choose from and rewarded with a food item if they choose 
the correct option. This two-choice task format has been used to test, in a range of animal 
species, a variety of cognitive abilities such as memory (e.g., delayed response tasks in bees, 
Apis mellifera; pigeons, Columba livia; several rat strains; many other species, including 
primates; reviewed in Lind, Enquist, & Ghirlanda, 2015), understanding intentional deception 
(chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, Woodruff & Premack, 1979; dogs, Canis familaris, Petter, 
Musolino, Roberts & Cole, 2009) or inferential reasoning (dogs, Erdöhegyi, Topál, Virányi,                
& Miklósi, 2007; carrion crows, Corvus corone corone, Mikolatsch, Kotrschal, & Schloegel, 
2012; chimpanzees, bonobos, Pan paniscus, orang-utans, Pongo pygmaeus, gorillas, Gorilla 
gorilla, Call, 2006). One test that has extensively used the two-choice format in particular with 
a wide range of animal species is the object choice task. This task tests for sociocognitive 
abilities by assessing a subject’s ability to use an experimenter’s gestural cues (e.g., gaze, point, 
touch) in order to locate a reward that is hidden under one of usually two containers. The 
tested species include primates (all four great apes and some Old and New World monkeys), 
domesticated mammals (dogs; foxes, Vulpes vulpes; cats, Felis catus; horses, Equus caballus; 
goats, Capra hircus) and undomesticated terrestrial (wolves, Canis lupus; bats, Pteropus spp.) 
and marine mammals (dolphins, Tursiops truncatus; seals, Halichoerus grypus and 
Arctocephalus pusillus; sea lions, Otaria byronia), corvids (jackdaws, Corvus monedula, 
nutcrackers, Nucifraga columbiana) and parrots (African grey parrot, Psittacus erithacus); see 
Mulcahy and Hedge (2012) for a review. 
Although the two-choice task format is widely used in comparative psychology, there 
is recent evidence that in some circumstances the task may not be a suitable method for 
assessing cognitive abilities. Burkart and Heschl (2006), for instance, found that common 
marmosets, Callithrix jacchus, a New World monkey species, chose at random when presented 
with only two containers in an object choice task, but they were able to use the experimenter’s 
cues much more reliably and made more correct choices when presented with nine instead of 
only two containers to choose from. A likely explanation is that lowering the probability of 
obtaining a reward by random choice helped the marmosets to overcome an inherent social 






In physical cognition tasks, such social biases should not influence a subject’s 
performance, because these tasks usually do not involve any social interaction between 
subject and experimenter. Memory tests, such as delayed response tasks (e.g., Kendrick, 
Rilling, & Denny, 1986; Lind et al., 2015; Rodriguez & Paule, 2009) for instance, often require 
the subjects to first observe and later remember in which of two locations a reward has been 
hidden without obtaining any communicative cues. Consequently, if social biases alone were 
responsible for the effect of task format on the marmosets’ performance in the object choice 
task, lowering the chance probability of success should not affect their performance in such 
non-social cognition tasks. Nevertheless, the subjects may prefer to choose in a random 
manner for other reasons, for instance to avoid the effort of memorizing. To date, it is not 
known whether, or to what extent, task format and chance probabilities also affect 
performance in physical cognition tests. But if they do so in a similar way, as demonstrated for 
social tests, this has far-reaching consequences for the validity of species comparisons that are 
often based on tasks that differ in format.  
In the present study, we tested New World monkeys with a physical cognition test that 
assesses their memory ability and investigated whether an alternative task format with nine 
choices would also be more suitable than the traditional two-choice task format.                                   
In experiment 1, we tested common marmosets with a traditional two-choice memory test, 
i.e. the memory subtest (hidden reward retrieval) of a cognitive test battery designed to assess 
general intelligence in nonhuman primates (Banerjee et al., 2009).  In this traditional delayed 
response memory test, the subjects had to remember the location of a food reward over 
various time delays. After watching how a food reward was hidden in one of two locations, the 
subject could no longer see the reward and had to wait until the delay interval had expired 
before it could choose one of the two locations. New World monkeys, particularly smaller 
species such as marmosets (Miles, 1956; Miles, 1957a) and squirrel monkeys, Saimiri sciureus 
(French, 1959; Miles, 1957b), have been shown to perform worse on such delayed response 
tasks than Old World monkeys (mainly rhesus macaques, Macaca mulatta) and apes (e.g., 
Fischer & Kitchener, 1965; Harlow, 1932; Miles & Meyer, 1956; reviewed in: Tomasello & Call, 
1997). Even though the methodological details are not always comparable, New World 
monkeys have also been shown to perform as well as (capuchins, Cebus apella) or better than 
(spider monkeys, Ateles geoffroyi) Old World monkeys (long-tailed macaques, Macaca 





smaller monkeys usually still perform well above chance, at least with short delays (comparison 
of apes and monkeys, Fischer & Kitchener, 1965). We therefore expected the marmosets to 
pass the traditional memory test in experiment 1. Furthermore, in humans, ability to 
remember a specific memory content declines exponentially the more time has elapsed since 
its acquisition, a phenomenon known as the forgetting curve (Ebbinghaus, 1885, 1913; 
hereafter Ebbinghaus effect). In experiment 1, we therefore expected that the marmosets’ 
performance would similarly decline with increasing duration of the time delay if this test 
accurately measured memory performance.  Since the marmosets performed relatively poorly 
in experiment 1 and did not show an Ebbinghaus effect, we conducted experiment 2, which 
was designed to assess the effect of reducing the chance of obtaining a reward when choosing 
at random. We tested a new sample of marmosets and squirrel monkeys and compared their 
performance in a traditional two-choice versus our newly developed nine-choice version of the 
memory test. 
	






 Fifteen common marmosets, eight males and seven females, participated in this study. 
All subjects were housed in social groups consisting of two to six individuals at the Primate 
Station of the Department of Anthropology of the University of Zurich, Switzerland. Their 
indoor enclosures had both daylight and artificial light and were composed of one to three 
components (depending on group size) measuring 1 x 2 m and 2 m high, each of which was 
equipped with several climbing structures such as natural branches, a sleeping box, an infrared 
lamp and a mulch floor. Whenever the weather conditions allowed it, each group had free 
access to an outdoor enclosure. The marmosets were fed a vitamin and calcium-enriched 
porridge in the morning, fresh fruit and vegetables at lunchtime, and gum and mealworms in 
the late afternoon. In addition, they received a daily protein snack in the afternoon such as 
pieces of cooked egg. Water was available ad libitum from water dispensers. All subjects were 






enter and leave the test enclosure through semi-transparent plastic tubes that were connected 
to their home enclosures and were not handled at any time.  
Materials and Set-up 
 
 
Each subject was tested individually in the same compartment (41 x 53 cm and 33 cm 
high) of a larger test enclosure, with its group members present in an adjacent enclosure              
(100 x 122 cm and 78 cm high) so that the subject could hear and smell but not see them 
during testing. The test compartment had a transparent Plexiglas window front containing two 
rectangular openings (4 x 2.5 cm). The test apparatus consisted of two white opaque cylinder-
shaped plastic containers (3.0 cm in height and 5.3 cm in diameter) that were attached to a 
wooden board (33 x 33 cm) placed 2 cm from its front, and was placed on the wooden test 
table (40 x 40 cm) that was level with the test compartment’s floor. The test apparatus could 
be slid in and out of the subject’s reach. The two containers were filled with dark-brown bark 
mulch that corresponded to the flooring substrate in the marmosets’ home enclosures. A small 
piece of a yellow locust, Schistocerca gregaria, served as a reward in each trial. At the beginning 
of each trial, the test apparatus was placed just out of the subject’s reach and the two 
containers were each covered with a rectangular piece of mulch approximately the same size 




The experimenter stood behind the test apparatus, called the subject’s name, said 
‘look’ while showing it the reward and started a trial as soon as the subject was attentive. She 
removed the cover of one of the two containers, placed the food reward in the container and 
again covered it with the piece of mulch so that the reward was no longer visible and both 
containers, the baited and the empty one, remained covered. After the delay interval had 
expired, she slid the board with the containers towards the test compartment’s window. The 
subject could then make a choice by reaching through one of two rectangular openings in the 
window and removing the cover with its hand(s). There were six conditions with increasing 
time delays of 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 and 30 s. Each test session consisted of 10 trials of one delay 
condition, if possible, conducted on the same day, which resulted in a total of 60 trials per 
subject. The reward’s location was counterbalanced in a pseudo-randomized manner so that 





never in the same container in more than two consecutive trials. Prior to entering the actual 
test sessions, each subject went through a pretest phase in which the experimenter followed 
the same procedure but did not impose a time delay. After the subject reached criterion                
(≥ 80% correct choices within a single pretest session of 10 trials), it entered the test phase. At 
the beginning of each test day, the subject received one warm-up trial, again without a time 
delay. Once a subject had finished the six test sessions, it was retested with one full session 
without a delay. If the subjects had understood the task, we expected their performance in 
this retest session to be higher than or at least as high as in the test sessions because the retest 
involved no memory demand. We used two predefined criteria for stopping a test session:         
(1) the subject did not make a choice in three consecutive trials, and (2) the subject was no 
longer attentive (not looking at the test apparatus but vigilant towards its surroundings 
instead) to the task, and/or emotionally aroused (producing vocalizations of discomfort and 
showing piloerection of the tail; for definitions see Schubiger, Wüstholz, Wunder, & Burkart, 
2015), and indicated it wanted to leave the test compartment (climbing to and rattling on the 
door on top of the test compartment). If the subject met at least one of these criteria, it was 
allowed to go back to its home enclosure and the session was continued the following day.  
 
3.3.2 Data scoring and analysis 
 
 Of the 12 subjects who completed all test sessions, one male subject (Jugo) only 
completed five trials of the retest and a second male subject (Vito) did not participate in the 
retest. Three subjects, two males (Kapi and Kantor) and one female (Kitty), did not complete 
the whole test phase, which resulted in a final total trial number of 756.  
All trials were video recorded. The experimenter coded the subjects’ choices live using 
check sheets and checked all trials a second time using the video clips. Five trials (0.7%) had to 
be excluded from the analysis owing to ambiguous behaviour of the subject or experimenter 
error. A second rater coded 20% of the trials from videos. The Kappa statistic was used to 
determine the reliability between the two raters. Inter-rater reliability was excellent                
(Kappa = 0.96, P < .000, N = 150).  
We ran a generalised linear mixed model (GLMM) with delay condition as fixed and 
subject as random factor to determine whether the delay condition significantly affected the 






which of the six delay conditions the subjects performed above chance levels (more than 50% 
correct choices) and whether their retest performance was still in the range of the criterion to 




This and the following experiment were conducted under guidelines established by the 
National Veterinary Office of Switzerland and licensed by the Veterinary Office of the Canton 




In the pretest phase, the marmosets reached criterion (≥ 80% correct choices within a 
single session) within 1 - 11 sessions of 10 trials each (mean = 2.93, SD = 2.55, t14 = 3.70,                  
P = .002). In the test phase, the marmosets chose the correct container across delay conditions 
in 59% (SD = 8%) of all trials and thus significantly above chance (t14 = 4.04, P = .001).  The 
GLMM with delay condition as fixed factor and subject as random factor showed that the 
duration of the delay had a significant effect on the subjects’ performance (F5, 63.77 = 3.31,            
P = .010). We had also predicted that the subjects’ performance in the test phase of 
experiment 1 would decline with increasing length of the time delay, consistent with the 
Ebbinghaus effect. However, after an initial decline in the number of correct choices that was 
in line with this prediction, the subjects showed improved performance in the longest two 
delay conditions (Figure 3.1). A one-sample t-test demonstrated that the marmosets 
performed significantly above chance after delays of 5 s (mean = 66%, SD = 12%, t14 = 5.12,         
P < .001), 10 s (mean = 59%, SD = 15%, t14 = 2.42, P = .030) and 25 s (mean = 68%, SD = 16%, 
t11 = 4.01, P = .002), but not after delays of 15 s (mean = 48%, SD = 17%, t13 = -0.34, P = .741), 
20 s (mean = 46%, SD = 16%, t12 = -0.81, P = .432) and 30 s (mean = 58%, SD = 17%, t11 = 1.70, 
P = .117).  
In the retest no-delay condition, the marmosets chose the correct container in 66% of 
all trials (SD = 16%), which is significantly above chance (t10 = 3.46, P = .006) and higher than in 
five of the six test conditions, but differs significantly from the initial 80% criterion in the 







Figure 3.1 Performance in experiment 1. Subjects had to reach criterion (≥ 80% correct trials within a single 
session) in the pre-test phase (no delay) before entering the test phase (delays = 5 to 30 s) and were re-tested 
without a delay after completing the test phase. The red line indicates the chance level of 50%. Significance levels 
for above chance performance are indicated by *P < .05, **P < .01. Error bars: 95% confidence intervals. 




We tested 15 common marmosets with a traditional memory test (Banerjee et al, 
2009). In this memory test, the subjects had to remember, over several time delay intervals 
ranging from 5 to 30 s, in which of two locations the experimenter had hidden a reward. All 
subjects passed the pretest phase, in which no delay was imposed, and, as a group, the 
marmosets also passed the test phase, by overall performing above chance. In contrast to our 
predictions, however, the marmosets’ performance in the memory test did not decline with 
increasing delay duration, and they showed low levels of correct performance. It is unlikely 
that the marmosets were unable to remember the reward’s location since they performed well 
after relatively long delays of up to half a minute. Moreover, saddle-back tamarins, Saguinus 
fuscicollis, another callitrichid species and close phylogenetic relative, have been shown to 
remember the location of food items over much longer delay intervals of up to 24 h when 
tested in a naturalistic foraging task (Menzel, Juno and Garrod, 1985). An alternative 
explanation for the marmosets’ unexpected performance in the hidden reward retrieval test 
(experiment 1) is that they may not have been sufficiently motivated to choose correctly, 
particularly after short delays, because of the low cost of a wrong choice. When choosing 
randomly between the two possible reward locations, they still had a 50% chance of receiving 





































action and the subject’s choice that the cost of a wrong choice increased owing to the longer 
waiting period.  
We therefore designed a second experiment to explore whether the task format,           
i.e., the number of choice options, could explain the unexpected pattern of results in the 
traditional memory subtest. Based on the findings of Burkart & Heschl (2006) in a modified 
object choice task and our results from experiment 1, we developed a new memory test 
consisting of nine choice options. This reduced the probability of making a correct choice by 
chance from 50% in the two-choice memory test to 11% and thus made a subject’s wrong 
choice more costly. We investigated whether this nine-choice format, which had been shown 
to increase the performance of marmosets in the above-mentioned social cognition task, 
would also be more suitable than the two-choice format in physical cognition tests. To do so, 
we compared the performance of a naïve marmoset group in the traditional and our new 
memory test. In addition, we also tested a group of squirrel monkeys with the same two task 
formats and directly compared the performance of the two species. This allowed us to evaluate 
whether task format effects are specific to common marmosets or also present in other 
nonhuman primates. We expected both species to perform better in the nine-choice memory 
test and to find an Ebbinghaus effect. Furthermore, we expected the squirrel monkeys to 
outperform the marmosets as they have in previous delayed response studies (Miles & Meyer, 
1956; Miles, 1957b; Treichler, 1964; Tsujimoto & Savaguchi, 2002), owing to their larger 
absolute and relative brain size (in proportion to their small body size, squirrel monkeys have 
the largest brains of all primates; Rowe, 1996), which correlates with general performance in 
physical cognition tasks (Deaner, van Schaik, & Johnson, 2006; Reader, Hager, & Laland, 2011). 
 






We tested 15 common marmosets with a traditional memory test (Banerjee et al., 
2009). In this memory test, the subjects had to remember, over several time delay intervals 
ranging from 5 to 30 s, in which of two locations the experimenter had hidden a reward. All 





marmosets also passed the test phase, by overall performing above chance. In contrast to our 
predictions, however, the marmosets’ performance in the memory test did not decline with 
increasing delay duration, and they showed low levels of correct performance. It is unlikely 
that the marmosets were unable to remember the reward’s location since they performed well 
after relatively long delays of up to half a minute. Moreover, saddle-back tamarins, Saguinus 
fuscicollis, another callitrichid species and close phylogenetic relative, have been shown to 
remember the location of food items over much longer delay intervals of up to 24 h when 
tested in a naturalistic foraging task (Menzel, Juno, & Garrod, 1985). An alternative explanation 
for the marmosets’ unexpected performance in the hidden reward retrieval test (experiment 
1) is that they may not have been sufficiently motivated to choose correctly, particularly after 
short delays, because of the low cost of a wrong choice. When choosing randomly between 
the two possible reward locations, they still had a 50% chance of receiving a reward in each 
trial, and it was only after longer delays between the experimenter’s hiding action and the 
subject’s choice that the cost of a wrong choice increased owing to the longer waiting period.  
We therefore designed a second experiment to explore whether the task format,             
i.e., the number of choice options, could explain the unexpected pattern of results in the 
traditional memory subtest. Based on the findings of Burkart & Heschl (2006) in a modified 
object choice task and our results from experiment 1, we developed a new memory test 
consisting of nine choice options. This reduced the probability of making a correct choice by 
chance from 50% in the two-choice memory test to 11% and thus made a subject’s wrong 
choice more costly. We investigated whether this nine-choice format, which had been shown 
to increase the performance of marmosets in the above-mentioned social cognition task, 
would also be more suitable than the two-choice format in physical cognition tests. To do so, 
we compared the performance of a naïve marmoset group in the traditional and our new 
memory test. In addition, we also tested a group of squirrel monkeys with the same two task 
formats and directly compared the performance of the two species. This allowed us to evaluate 
whether task format effects are specific to common marmosets or also present in other 
nonhuman primates. We expected both species to perform better in the nine-choice memory 
test. Furthermore, we expected the squirrel monkeys to outperform the marmosets as they 
have in previous delayed response studies (Miles & Meyer, 1956; Miles, 1957b; Treichler, 
1964; Tsujimoto & Savaguchi, 2002), owing to their larger absolute and relative brain size               






Rowe, 1996), which correlates with general performance in physical cognition tasks (Deaner, 
van Schaik, & Johnson, 2006; Reader, Hager, & Laland, 2011). 
 
Set-up  
All subjects of both species were tested individually in a separate test compartment of 
a larger test enclosure. The measurements of the marmosets’ test compartment closely 
resembled those in experiment 1, whereas the squirrel monkeys’ test compartment measured 
110 x 98 cm and 77 cm high. We again used a test apparatus that could be slid forwards and 
backwards on a test table (Figure 2). The apparatuses for the marmosets (M) and the squirrel 
monkeys (S) were identical and differed only in measurements that were adjusted to the 
marmosets’ smaller body size. They consisted of a wooden frame (M: 40 cm x 37.5 cm;                   
S: 80 cm x 75 cm) containing three wooden platforms (vertical distance between platforms:                    
M: 12.5 cm; S: 35 cm) that was mounted on a wooden sliding board (M: 45 cm x 30 cm;                                       
S: 95 cm  x 50 cm). Empty cylindrical black plastic cups (diameter: 3.1 cm; height: M: 1.1 cm;    
S: 2.3 cm) with lids were used to hide the reward. For the nine-choice test, three cups were 
placed equidistant (M: 14 cm; S: 29 cm) between each outer and the middle cup) on each 
platform (outer cups at M: 4.5 cm; S: 11 cm from the lateral frame). For the two-choice test, 
two cups were placed on the middle platform (in-between distance: M: 11 cm; S: 25 cm;             
distance from the lateral frames: M: 10 cm; S: 25 cm). In both tests, the cups were held in place 
by Velcro tape strips. The front of the test enclosure consisted of a lattice that allowed the 
subjects to reach out and choose one of the cups. 
 
Figure 3.2 Test apparatus in experiment 2. Shown are both tests: (A) two-choice, and (B) nine-choice 










The experimenter’s procedure in the pretest and test phase corresponded to that used 
in experiment 1 with the exception of two additions in the test phase: (1) the experimenter 
said ‘come’ while pushing the apparatus towards the subject once the delay had expired in 
order to encourage the subject to make its choice, and (2) the subject received one to three 
warm-up trials (no delay) prior to each test session, and the test session only started once it 
had chosen correctly in a warm-up trial. There were four increasing delay conditions ranging 
from 5 to 20 s and each test session consisted of 12 trials of one delay condition. When 
choosing correctly, the subjects received their favourite rewards, a mealworm or a piece of a 
cashew nut (squirrel monkeys) and a cricket or a piece of a cooked apple (marmosets). The 
same stop criteria as in experiment 1 were used to decide when to terminate a session and 
continue testing on the next day.  
We used a within-subject design in which every subject of each species was tested with 
both task formats, the one with two choice options and the one with nine choice options, in 
counterbalanced order. This resulted in two groups within each species: one group first 
completed the two-choice format followed by the nine-choice format while the second group 
was tested in the opposite order. One male marmoset (Lexus) completed the whole two-choice 
memory test but only the 5 s delay condition in the nine-choice memory test. The final sample 
size therefore consisted of eight marmosets (four females and four males) in the two-choice 
and seven marmosets (four females and three males) who completed all conditions in the nine-
choice test, as well as seven male squirrel monkeys, who completed both tests.  
 
3.4.2 Data scoring and analysis 
 
All trials were video-recorded and the experimenter coded the subjects’ choices live 
using check sheets. A second rater coded 21% of the trials from videos. The Kappa statistic was 
used to determine the reliability between the two raters. For the marmosets one trial had to 
be excluded owing to experimenter error (no delay imposed). Inter-rater reliability was 
excellent (100%) for both squirrel monkeys (Kappa = 1.00, P < .001, N = 144) and marmosets 
(Kappa = 1.00, P < .001, N = 156).  
 To test which factors best explained the subjects’ performance, we ran GLMMs using 






condition, test order and interactions (species*task format, species*delay, species*order,        
task format*delay, task format*order, delay*order), and included subject as random factor. 
The best model was determined using the AICc, the Akaike information criterion corrected for 
small sample sizes (Hurvich & Tsai, 1989).  
Since the probability to be successful by chance differed between the two-choice and 
nine-choice format, we could not use the subjects’ raw scores to directly compare their 
performance in the two conditions in the same statistical model but first had to compute a 
performance measure that was independent of the task format. For this purpose, we 
computed a performance score for each individual and condition according to the equation 
below, which corresponds to the square root of the chi-square value and in which a higher 
value represents better performance. Observed values correspond to the individual number 
of correct choices per delay (raw scores of 1 - 12) and expected values were calculated as the 
number of correct choices expected by chance (six out of 12 in the two-choice and 1.33 out     







Finally, we conducted one-sample t tests for each test format to determine in which conditions 




In the pretest phase, the subjects reached criterion (≥ 80% correct within a single 
session) after one to two sessions (mean = 1.07, SD = 0.26) in the two-choice memory test and 
after one to seven sessions (mean = 2.27, SD = 1.71) in the nine-choice task. The subjects took 
significantly longer to reach criterion in the nine-choice than the two-choice task (t14 = -2.61, 
P = .021). There was no species difference in the number of pretest sessions in the two-choice 
(squirrel monkeys: mean = 1.00, SD = 0.00; marmosets: mean = 1.13, SD = 0.35; t13 = – 0.93,         
P = .369) or in the nine-choice memory test (squirrel monkeys: mean = 1.57, SD = 1.57; 
marmosets: mean = 2.88, SD = 2.10; t13 = -1.54, P = .015). 
The best model included only the fixed-effects test format and delay condition and no 
interactions. Task format had a highly significant effect on the subjects’ performance                   





significant effect of species in any of the models. Two separate GLMMs based on raw scores 
of performance, one for each task format, with species, delay and order as fixed factors and 
subject as random factor, demonstrated that delay condition had a significant effect on the 
subjects’ percentage of correct choices for the nine-choice format (F1, 39.88 = 5.46, P = .003) 
while there was only a trend for the two-choice format (F1, 42 = 2.49, P = .073; see also            
Figure 3.3). 
In the two-choice memory test, mean performance across all test sessions was 
significantly above chance, i.e., > 50% correct choices (mean = 59%, SD = 18%, t59 = 4.02,                
P < .001). Split per delay condition, the subjects as a group performed significantly above 
chance in the 5 s (mean = 61%, SD = 15%, t14 = 2.87, P = .015) and 10 s (mean = 65%, SD = 19%, 
t14 = 2.97, P = .010) delay conditions, but not in the 15 s (mean = 60%, SD = 19%, t14 = 1.92,         
P = .076) and 20 s conditions (mean = 52%, SD = 16%, t14 = 0.40, P = .695). In the nine-choice 
memory test, they also performed significantly above chance, i.e., > 11% correct choices, 
across all test sessions (mean = 25%, SD = 19%, t56 = 5.43, P < .001). Moreover, they performed 
well above chance after delays of 5 s (mean = 34%, SD = 21%, t14 = 4.13, P = .001), 10 s            
(mean = 26%, SD = 19%, t13 = 3.00, P = .010), 15 s (mean = 26%, SD = 20%, t13 = 2.79, P = .015), 




Figure 3.3 The effect of task format on performance in experiment 2. The subjects’ mean performance (χ-
transformed test scores to account for the two different chance levels) in the two-choice (yellow/light bars) and 
the nine-choice memory test (green/dark bars). Error bars: 95% confidence interval. Asterisks * and ** indicate 
performance significantly above chance (P < .05 and P < .01, respectively) in one-sample-t-tests on the raw values 










In experiment 2, we tested common marmosets and common squirrel monkeys, two 
evolutionarily closely related species, with both the two-choice and nine-choice task format of 
a memory test. As predicted, we found that task format affected the performance of both 
species. When the subjects were allowed to choose between nine rather than only two 
options, they performed better, and, in line with our prediction, their performance decreased 
with longer delays, consistent with the Ebbinghaus effect. However, the larger-brained squirrel 
monkeys did not outperform the marmosets, although the small sample size makes it difficult 
to identify whether this finding is a true absence of a species difference or instead reflects a 
lack of statistical power. In contrast to the present findings, squirrel monkeys had outcompeted 
marmosets in delayed response studies. However, some of these studies did not contain a true 
memory component (Miles & Meyer, 1956; Miles, 1957b) or they contained a stronger working 
memory component (Tsujimoto & Savaguchi, 2002). In the latter study, the reward’s location 
was not randomised and subjects had to keep in mind their previous choices and base their 
next choices strategically on these.  
 Both New World monkey species in our study remembered the reward’s location for 
longer time periods in the nine-choice format than in the two-choice format. However, their   
performance was still moderate, for instance in relation to closely related saddle-back tamarins 
(Menzel et al., 1985) who remembered as many as 30 different locations over much longer 
delays. Apart from species differences, a likely explanation is that the tamarin study was more 
naturalistic than ours in that the subjects remained in the group setting during experiments, 
and the locations to choose from were distributed over a much larger area. In fact, Fischer and 
Kitchener (1965) had argued that delayed-response tasks with a strong spatial component are 
easier to solve for nonhuman primates than nonspatial ones. The more pronounced spatial 
component may thus have tapped into the tamarins’ adaptive behaviour as extractive foragers 
(Peres, 1992) and thereby made the tasks easier to solve. However, whenever the aim is to 
assess an individual’s cognitive ability per se, rather than a specific adaptation to a narrow 
cognitive problem, it is preferable to present a task in an abstract rather than a naturalistic 
manner. This is perhaps most evident for general intelligence test batteries that consist of a 
number of subtests assessing a wide range of abilities from various cognitive domains to 
identify whether they are all based on a single domain-general cognitive ability (Burkart, 





subtest of one such test battery, and we developed our nine-choice memory test as a possible 
alternative.  
 
3.5 General discussion 
 
We conducted two experiments in order to explore whether the task format affects 
cognitive performance of nonhuman primates in physical cognition tests as has been reported 
for a widely used social cognition test (Burkart & Heschl, 2006). When testing marmosets with 
a traditional two-choice memory test (experiment 1), we found that, in contrast to the 
Ebbinghaus effect, their performance did not continuously decline with increasing delay 
duration. To address the possibility that our results reflected a lack of motivation to memorise 
the location of the food rather than the marmosets’ ability to do so, we designed a new version 
of the memory test (experiment 2) with nine choice options instead of two, which lowered the 
probability of making a correct choice by chance from 50% to 11%. Both marmosets and 
squirrel monkeys performed better in the nine-choice memory test, and their performance 
now continuously decreased with increasing delay duration, consistent with the Ebbinghaus 
effect we had predicted. Our results suggest that the nine-choice format is more accurate in 
assessing memory performance in the two New World monkey species, and that the                    
two-choice format negatively affects performance not only in a social cognition task, but also 
in a physical one.  
Our findings have important implications for studies that assess cognitive performance 
in nonhuman primates and other animals for comparative purposes. Examples of such 
comparisons include the assessment of differences in cognitive performance across different 
tasks between individuals of one species (e.g. to investigate general intelligence; Banerjee et 
al., 2009; Herrmann, Hernàndez-Lloreda, Call, Hare & Tomasello, 2010), between conspecifics 
differing in certain traits (e.g., to investigate sex differences; Schubiger et al., 2015) or 
environmental/ontogenetic conditions (e.g., to investigate rearing differences; Damerius & 
Forss et al., 2016; Herrmann & Call, 2012), and differences in cognitive performance between 
species (i.e., to investigate evolutionary trajectories; Amici, Aureli, & Call, 2008, 2010). For all 
these comparative purposes it is crucial that differences in measured performance reflect true 
differences in the subjects’ cognitive abilities and cannot be attributed to differences in their 






Decreasing the chance level probability of success, as we have done in the present 
study, is one way of promoting the subjects’ motivation. But although using more than two 
choice options is advantageous in some cognitive tests with animals, it is probably not feasible 
in others. Examples of physical cognition tests that require the two-choice format are those in 
which the subject has to base its choice on more or less apparent differences in the amount 
(e.g., numerical discrimination tests, Agrillo, 2014) or external features (e.g., tool functionality, 
Mulcahy & Schubiger, 2014) of the test stimuli. In such tests, additional options could either 
lead to ambiguous choices or be too demanding for a subject’s working memory. However, the 
costs of a wrong choice can also be increased in two-choice tests, e.g., by requiring subjects to 
choose by performing an effortful behavioural response such as unscrewing a lid, pulling in the 
chosen item, or a similarly effortful behaviour. 
In sum, we found that nonhuman primates may not be sufficiently motivated to fully 
engage in a cognitive task when presented in a two-choice format but that some 
methodological modifications can restore their motivation.  
If future studies show that our findings generalize to other species beyond marmosets 
and squirrel monkeys, and to cognitive domains other than memory, it may be preferable to 
replace the two-choice format with alternative task formats. Otherwise, cognitive 
performance may be biased in comparisons both within and across species, for instance 
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Dropouts are a common issue in cognitive tests with non-human primates. One main 
reason for dropouts is that researchers often face a trade-off between obtaining a sufficiently 
large sample size and logistic restrictions, such as limited access to testing facilities. The 
commonly used opportunistic testing approach deals with this trade-off by only testing those 
individuals who readily participate and complete the cognitive tasks within a given time frame. 
All other individuals are excluded from further testing and data analysis. However, it is 
unknown if this approach merely excludes subjects who are not consistently motivated to 
participate, or if these dropouts systematically differ in cognitive ability. If the latter holds, the 
selection bias resulting from opportunistic testing would systematically affect performance 
scores and thus comparisons between individuals and species. We assessed the potential 
effects of opportunistic testing on cognitive performance in common marmosets (Callithrix 
jacchus) and squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) with a test battery consisting of six cognitive 
tests: two inhibition tasks (Detour Reaching and A-not-B), one cognitive flexibility task (Reversal 
Learning), one quantity discrimination task, and two memory tasks. Importantly, we used a full 
testing approach in which subjects were given as much time as they required to complete each 
task. For each task, we then compared the performance of subjects who completed the task 
within the expected number of testing days with those subjects who needed more testing time. 
We found that the two groups did not differ in task performance, and therefore opportunistic 
testing would have been justified without risking biased results. If our findings generalise to 
other species, maximising sample sizes by only testing consistently motivated subjects will be 







Cognitive performance in animals can be assessed as pure proof of principle, i.e. to test 
whether a specific ability can be found in a given species. However, cognitive performance is 
increasingly assessed also for comparative purposes, both between and within species. At the 
inter-specific level, two or more species are tested with the same cognitive task(s) in order to 
explore species differences and similarities in cognitive abilities. These differences are usually 
hypothesised to emerge because the species have faced different selection pressures in their 
evolutionary past, such as challenges posed by their social or ecological environment. 
Examples of such studies suggest that enhanced inhibitory control is found in species with a 
fission-fusion social group structure (Amici, Aureli, & Call, 2008) or a feeding ecology that 
requires more patience (Stevens, Hallinan, & Hauser, 2005), that more tolerant species show 
increased socio-cognitive performance (Joly et al., 2017), and that species who rely on a diet 
rich in fruit (Rosati, Rodrigues, & Hare, 2014) or food caching species (Prasvosudov & Roth, 
2013) show enhanced spatial memory. Encountering specific social and ecological challenges 
can thus, over evolutionary time, lead to domain-specific cognitive adaptations. 
Cognitive comparisons can also focus on the individual level, allowing researchers to 
investigate differences and similarities between individuals of the same species. Examples 
include studies exploring the effects of aging (Lacreuse et al., 2014; Gray et al., 2017; Mattison 
& Vaughan, 2017), sex differences (e.g., Wobber et al., 2014; Schubiger et al., 2015), or links 
between cognitive performance and personality (e.g., Carere & Locurto, 2011; Griffin, 
Guiliette, & Healy, 2015). Finally, individual differences can be compared across a variety of 
cognitive tasks. If cognitive abilities co-vary across individuals of the same species, this is 
consistent with the notion of domain-general cognition rather than domain-specific cognitive 
adaptations, and thus general intelligence which facilitates solving a wide range of problems, 
particularly novel ones (see Burkart, Schubiger, & van Schaik, 2017 for a review).  
Whenever the goal is to compare cognitive performance across species and individuals, 
it is crucial to take into account that an individual’s performance in a test is also affected by 
factors that are not primarily cognitive in nature, such as emotion, motivation and health. We 
may thus risk measuring individual differences in such non-cognitive factors rather than 





meaningless. The same is true if individuals are selected for inclusion in a cognitive study based 
on such non-cognitive factors. 
In the last decade, researchers have started to systematically re-address the risk that 
cognitive tests may inadvertently measure individual (and species) differences in non-cognitive 
factors rather than true differences in the cognitive abilities. A number of experimental studies 
in non-human primates has systematically assessed both external (testing-related) and internal 
(subject-related) factors to determine how they affect the subjects’ cognitive performance 
(Table 1). Examples for internal factors that affect cognitive performance in physical cognition 
tasks include individual differences in the subjects’ psychological predispositions (e.g., 
temperament and personality structure (Toxopeus et al., 2005; Herrmann et al., 2007; Morton, 
Lee, & Buchanan-Smith, 2013) , and emotional reactivity (Schubiger et al., 2015) and individual 
differences in the subjects’ ontogenetic experience with the social environment (e.g., rearing 
conditions (van Schaik & Burkart, 2011), level of contact with humans (Damerius et al., 2017a) 
and conspecifics (Damerius et al., 2017b). 
Examples of external non-cognitive factors that have been addressed so far include 
aspects of the test design, setup and procedure such as how the test apparatus and test stimuli 
are presented to the subject (e.g., task format (Schmitt & Fischer, 2011; Gazes, Billas, & 
Schmidt, 2018; Schubiger, Kissling, & Burkart, 2016; Carducci et al., 2018; also see                   
Burkart & Heschl, 2006 for a similar effect in a social cognition task), and how subjects are 
rewarded when they pass a test trial (e.g., reward type (Gazes et al., 2018)).  
 
 
Table 4.1 Non-cognitive internal (subject-related) and external (testing-related) factors potentially 





Effect on performance? Species Reference 






et al., 2005 
Temperament Physical cognition  Performance ­ in bolder subjects Chimpanzees (Pan troglo-
dytes) & orangutans 
(Pongo pygmaeus) 
Herrmann 
et al., 2007 
Personality 
 
Training  Performance ­ in subjects with high 
openness & low assertiveness 
scores 
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(1) Skill repertoire ­ in mother-
reared individuals 
(2)    Skill repertoire ¯   in orphaned  
         Individuals 
Various primate species Reviewed 
in:  
van Schaik & 
Burkart, 
2011 
Set of skills & learning speed ­ in 
enculturated individuals; even 






Problem-solving Performance ­ in subjects with high 
HOI (Human-Orientation Index)  
Sumatran (Pongo abelii)   





Forss et al., 
2017a 
Human care          
& social 
housing with 














Performance  ­  
(1) with inedible test stimuli 
(2) with edible test stimuli if 
reward items differ in food type 
 
Olive baboons (Papio 
anubis)  




Performance ­ with edible test 
stimuli  
 
Brown capuchins (Cebus 
sapajus apella) 
Gazes et al., 
2018 
 
Performance ­ with rewards of 
higher value  
Brown capuchins (Cebus 
sapajus apella)  
& common squirrel 
monkeys (Saimiri 
sciureus) 
Memory (1) Performance ­ with more 
choice options (9 instead of 2) 
(2) Performance ¯ with delay 
duration (in line with forgetting 
curve) 
 
Common squirrel  
monkeys (Saimiri 
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when excluding subjects who take 
longer to complete all test trials 
Common marmosets 
(Callithrix jacchus)  











1see Burkart & Heschel, 2006 for a similar positive effect of more choice options in an object choice task 
 
 Despite these recent efforts to assess potential biases on cognitive performance, one 
important aspect of comparative testing has largely been neglected. Comparative testing 
requires a sufficiently large sample size to make valid inferences. Researchers therefore should 
test a sufficient number of individuals to reach adequate statistical power, often under logistic 





is opportunistic testing, i.e. only testing those individuals who readily participate and respond 
to the experimental tasks and drop those who respond too slowly or to erratically. By only 
including the ready participants, researchers can maximise sample size if enough subjects but 
only limited testing time is available. Some subjects may be more reluctant to participate 
because of non-cognitive attributes such as a tendency to react to the test situation with 
elevated emotional arousal. Those subjects may no longer be motivated to participate in a 
cognitive test after a relatively low number of completed trials or get easily distracted during 
testing (as found in marmosets, particularly males (Schubiger et al., 2015). Other subjects, 
however, may be reluctant to participate because their cognitive skills do not allow them to 
pass the task and earn rewards. If so, their exclusion would be detrimental to any meaningful 
comparison of cognitive ability. 
An open question is therefore whether opportunistic testing, here defined as using 
strict stop criteria to restrict total testing time, results in a selection bias because the subjects 
included in the study differ in cognitive ability from a random sample of the population.  
The aim of the present study was to address this question in two New World primate 
species, common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) and squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus). The 
subjects were tested with a cognitive test battery consisting of five commonly used paradigms: 
Detour Reaching, A-not-B, Quantity Discrimination, Reversal Learning, and a two-choice 
Memory task (largely adapted after an existing test battery for New World monkeys (Banerjee 
et al., 2009), as well as a nine-choice Memory task (Schubiger, Kissling, & Burkart, 2016). 
Importantly, in contrast to opportunistic testing, we gave each subject as much time as it 
needed to complete each task at its own pace. We then compared, for each cognitive task, the 
performance of subjects who had completed the task within the expected time frame                
(i.e., a predefined number of days or trials to complete the task) to the performance of those 
subjects who needed longer. If cognitive ability had an effect on how long an individual took 
to complete a cognitive test, then subjects who needed longer to complete a test should either 
perform worse or better than those subjects who completed the test in the expected time 
frame. In this case, opportunistic testing would indeed bias the results and would need to be 
abandoned in future studies. If there was no difference between the two groups, however, the 
commonly used opportunistic testing approach that excludes some subjects would be equally 






4.3 Materials and methods  
 
4.3.1 Study sample 
 
As summarized in Table 4.2, 27 adult common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) from six 
family groups and 8 adult common squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) from two bachelor 
groups participated in this study. The initial study sample consisted of the 15 marmosets               
(7 females and 8 males) in the upper section of the table who were tested with the whole test 
battery of subtests 1-5 (hereafter tasks). Kitty (female) who became Kantor’s partner later in 
the study (after he had to be separated from his brothers Kaliper and Kapi) was tested with 
task 5. The remaining 11 marmosets (5 females and 6 males) were only tested with both 
memory tasks (5 and 6) when we assessed in a parallel study whether memory task 5 truly 
measured the ability to remember the location of a reward (Schubiger et al., 2016). The squirrel 
monkeys (8 males) were only tested with tasks 1, 2, 5 and 6 because their temporal availability 
for testing was restricted. The study subjects had previously participated in some cognitive 
experiments, but we randomly chose those subjects to include in our study who were available 
because they were not participating in other studies of cognitive or behavioural nature at the 
time. We tested all individuals of both squirrel monkey groups (the only two groups of this 
species that were housed at the Primate Station) and all adult individuals of the available 
marmoset family groups.  
All monkeys were captive-born and mother-reared and housed in family (marmosets) 
and bachelor groups (squirrel monkeys) consisting of two to eight individuals in indoor-and 
outdoor enclosures. The marmosets’ indoor enclosures had both daylight and artificial light 
and were composed of one to three components (depending on group size) measuring at least 
4 m3, each of which was equipped with several climbing structures such as natural branches,     
a sleeping box, an infrared lamp and a bark mulch floor. Whenever the weather conditions 
allowed it, each group had free access to an outdoor enclosure. The squirrel monkeys’ indoor 
enclosures measured 16.55 m3 (smaller group) and 24.77 m3 (larger group) and were equipped 
with climbing structures, an infrared lamp and a bark mulch floor. Since the squirrel monkeys’ 
indoor enclosures mainly had artificial UV-light, each group had constant free access to a fully 
roofed outdoor enclosure, and in addition, the two groups took turns in accessing a larger 





the morning, fresh fruit and vegetables at lunchtime, and gum and mealworms in the late 
afternoon. In addition, they received a daily protein snack in the afternoon such as pieces of 
cooked egg. The squirrel monkeys were fed a mixture of pellets and cottage cheese in the 
morning, a variety of vegetables and a small amount of fruit at lunchtime, and a protein snack 
such as cockroaches in the late afternoon. Water was available ad libitum from water 
dispensers (marmosets) or water bowls (squirrel monkeys). All subjects were tested between 
their regular feeds and never food deprived during the study. Testing time was restricted to 
8.30-12.00 hours in the morning and 13.00-16.30 in the afternoon.  Each subject was only 
tested once per day and never during the monkeys’ general resting time from 12.00-13.00 
hours. The monkeys could freely enter and leave the test enclosure and were not handled by 
the experimenter at any time before, during or after the cognitive test sessions. After the 
completion of this study, the monkeys continued living at the Primate Station, eventually 
participating in other non-invasive studies. 
 
Table 4.2 Individual subjects by species and family group, their sex (female/male), mean age (in years) 
during testing, time needed to complete and performance scores in each task. A performance score 
value in regular font indicates that the subject completed the cognitive task and its performance could 
be fully analysed whereas a performance score value in italics indicates that the subject did not 
complete the full task but its performance could be analysed for parts of the tasks.  A dash (-) indicates 
that the subject participated in such a small number of trials that its performance could not be analysed 
and an empty cell indicates that a subject refused to participate at all. Grey cells indicate that a subject 






ID Individual Species Sex Age 1. Detour Reaching 2. A-not-B 3. Quantity 
Discrimination 
4. Reversal Learning 5. Memory 1 6. Memory 2  
     Days Correct 
inhibition 









correct          
1 = yes        








 TI Days 
(2nd value    
= 4 delay 
condition) 
 




b a & b 
combined  
M1 Juri C. j. m 11.2  6 0.10 1.00 5 0 - - 0.5 0.22 21/13 0.60  0.58   
M2 Venezia C. j.  f 6.6 5 0.50 0.90 12 0 3 0.67 0.9 0.00 12/7 0.61  0.62   
M3 Venus C. j.  f 8.0 5 0.45 0.95 5 1 3 0.70 1 0.77 21/13 0.53  0.44   
M4 Verona C. j. f 7.1 5 0.25 0.90 11 1 3 0.67 1 0.44 10/6 0.57  0.53   
M5 Vesta C. j.  f 7.9 5 0.25 1.00 7 1 3 0.80 1 0.22 8/7 0.57  0.53   
M6 Vito C. j.  m 6.8 6 0.05 0.05 5 0 6 0.73 0.6 0.33 25/18 0.66  0.56   
M7 Vreni C. j. f 10.4 5 0.35 0.70 5 1 3 0.77 1 0.00       
M8 Jugo C. j.  m 5.9 7 0.05 0.70 10 0 3 0.77 0.4 0.10 16/8 0.42  0.43   
M9 Tabor C. j.  m 4.7 6 0.55 0.95 5 1 2 0.70 1 0.00 14/10 0.53  0.55   
M10 Tale C. j. f 3.8 10 0.30 0.80 5 1 3 0.83 1 0.20 8/6 0.60  0.55   
M11 Tessy C. j.  f 11.6 5 0.00 0.00 7 1 3 0.50 0.9 0.49 12/6 0.50  0.45   
M12 Thilo C. j.  m 5.0 11 0.50 0.85 5 1 4 0.67 1 0.22 12/6 0.68  0.70   
M13 Kaliper C. j. m 11.4 6 0.25 0.95 47 0 - - - - 16/14 0.58  0.56   
M14 Kapi C. j.  m 9.0 6 0.45 1.00 15 0 4 0.70 - - -/10 -  0.51   
M15 Kantor C. j.  m 10.7 6 0.20 0.50 7 1 - - - - -/- -  -   
M16 Kitty C. j. f 4.6          -/- -  -   
M17 Lex C. j.  m 8.8          4  0.69 0.69 8 0.13 
M18 Nando C. j.  m 2.0          11  0.60 0.60 5 0.04 
M19 Nautilus C. j. m 2.5          9  0.48 0.48 12 0.10 
M20 Nebula C. j.  F 2.5          12  0.54 0.54 9 0.21 
M21 Nina C. j.  F 8.8          4  0.53 0.53 4 0.46 
M22 Nuno C. j. m 2.0          -  - - - - 
M23 Lancia C. j.  f 12.8          4  0.69 0.69 4 0.21 
M24 Lexus C. j.  m 12.8          8  0.56 0.56 - - 
M25 Lili C. j. f 2.0          4  0.58 0.58 4 0.21 
M26 Lola C. j.  f 2.3          -  - - - - 
M27 Lotus C. j.  m 3.0          -  - - - - 
S1 Chipo S. s. m 9.6 5 0.00 0.00 5 1     4  0.90 0.90 4 0.58 
S2 Chris S. s. m 7.6 5 0.00 0.05 5 1     4  0.60 0.60 4 0.10 
S3 Darwin S. s. m 7.4 6 0.00 0.00 5 1     5  0.56 0.56 6 0.17 
S4 Dave S. s. m 8.4 6 0.00 0.00 5 1     4  0.56 0.56 4 0.08 
S5 George S. s. m 6.3 5 0.00 0.00 5 1     4  0.50 0.50 4 0.17 
S6 Helio S. s. m 5.3 5 0.00 0.00 - -     -  - - - - 
S7 Hugo S. s. m 2.1 6 0.65 1.00 5 1     4  0.79 0.79 4 0.40 




4.3.2 General set-up 
 
 
All subjects were tested individually in a dedicated test enclosure that was connected 
to their home enclosures through a semi-transparent plastic tube. Once the doors on each end 
of the tube were opened, the subject could voluntary and freely enter the tube and walk to the 
test enclosure without being handled by humans at any time. The actual test compartment for 
the marmosets consisted of a white rear wall, a white floor, two lateral grid walls and a clear 
Perspex window front. Depending on the cognitive task and respective apparatus, the window 
front contained one or two rectangular openings through which the subject could reach with 
its arms to access the apparatus. Each test apparatus was placed on a wooden board (varying 
size and features) that was mounted on a height-adjustable test table and flush with the test 
compartment’s window. The test compartment used for the squirrel monkeys also had a white 
plastic wall in the back and a white floor, and three grid walls. The measurements of the test 
apparatuses (Table S4.1) were adapted to the squirrel monkeys’ larger body size (Rowe, 1996). 
 
4.3.3 General procedure 
 
 
The general testing procedure was identical for both species. Before and after each test 
trial, the experimenter positioned an occluder (a wooden or cardboard sheet) between the test 
compartment’s window and the test apparatus. Its removal announced the next trial to the 
subject and the experimenter called the subject’s name and said ‘look’ and made sure that the 
subject was attentive to the test apparatus and procedure. In the first task (Detour-Reaching), 
the test apparatus remained within the subject’s reach and was accessible to the subject as 
soon as the experimenter had removed the occluder between the test compartment’s front 
and the test apparatus. In all other tasks, the apparatus was mounted on a sliding platform and 
remained out of the subject’s reach until the baiting process was completed (tasks 2-6) or the 
time delay had expired (tasks 5-6). The experimenter then pushed the test apparatus into the 
subject’s reach so that the subject could make its choice. After a correct choice, the 
experimenter waited for the subject to consume the reward, retracted the test apparatus, set-
up the occluder, and immediately continued with the next trial. After a wrong choice, however, 
the experimenter quickly retracted the test apparatus out of the subject’s reach so that no 
second choice was possible. She then retrieved the reward, showed it to the subject and placed 




immediately after the subject had completed a given test trial. In task 1, this ensured the 
monkeys’ wellbeing by keeping the duration of each test session as short as possible because 
a single test trial took up to 2 minutes. In task 2, it was important to quickly continue with the 
next trial in order to get the subjects into the intended routine of repeatedly choosing the same 
cup. In tasks 3, 4, 5 and 6, the experimenter only continued with the next test trial once a            
15-second (tasks 3-4) or 10-second (tasks 5-6) time interval had expired. This brief delay was 
intended to make a wrong choice more costly and encourage subjects to concentrate and 
attempt to choose correctly. Again, since test sessions in tasks 5 and 6 took inherently longer 
than in the other tasks because each test trial already involved a time delay of up to 30 seconds, 
the slightly shorter additional inter-trial interval after a wrong choice kept total testing time to 
a minimum. It is unlikely that this slight difference in inter-trial intervals was perceived by or 
affected the subjects’ motivation differently because in each task a beep tone announced the 
end of the delay after a wrong choice. Since food preferences differed between the two 
species, marmosets received mealworms, crickets or locusts as rewards, whereas squirrel 
monkeys received mealworms or small pieces of cashew nut.  
If a subject lost motivation during a test session and expressed this by refusing to make 
a choice in 3 consecutive test trials or showed behavioural signs of emotional arousal or 
avoidance (as determined by the stop criteria in Schubiger et al., 2015), the experimenter 
stopped testing and continued the test session on the following day. Importantly, we gave each 
subject as much time as it needed to complete each task during a total testing period of one to 
several months.  
The criteria to determine the expected amount of testing time in which each task would 
have had to be completed under an opportunistic testing regime were adopted from a similar 
study (Banerjee et al., 2009) with the exception of tasks 4 and 5a for which these stop criteria 
would have been too strict. For tasks 4 and 5a, we defined expected testing time as the amount 
of time in which the majority of subjects had completed the task, because applying the above-
mentioned stop criteria would have resulted in most or all subjects being excluded from further 
testing.   
For those subjects who needed longer than expected to complete a task but were not 
excluded under our full testing regime, we determined the maximum total testing period for 
each task based on what appeared reasonable depending on the total number of test trials 




complete each task at its own pace including breaks from testing as required (several days or 
weeks). We discontinued testing after this time period had expired because it was not justified 
to continue testing for a completely unlimited time period for animal welfare reasons.  
In this section, we provide an overview of the 6 subtests of the test battery (see also 
Table 4.3). Further details regarding the test apparatuses are available in Table S4.1.  
 




Measured cognitive ability 
 
Procedure, Sessions, Trials 
 
Performance measure(s) 
1. Detour-Reaching  
 
Inhibition of a pre-potent 
(motor) response to directly 
reach for the reward in central 
trials 
Reward in one of 3 positions 
behind Perspex panel; 
5x12 = 60 trials: 
20 central (fully behind panel) 
20 left (half exposed) 
20 right (half exposed) 
Successful detour-reaching:  
% correct of 20 inhibition 
(central) trials at 1st attempt 
Learning from error: 
% correct of 20 inhibition 





Inhibition of a learned routine 
to again choose cup B in the 
last trial in which the reward is 
placed under cup A instead 
 
Reward is placed under one of 
two cups (A and B);  
(1) 5x (or more) under cup B 
until correct choice in five 
consecutive trials 
(2) 1x under cup A in last trial 
Correct choice on last trial:           
cup A yes/no 
3. Quantity   
    Discrimination  
 
 
Understanding of quantities 
by choosing the larger of two 
amounts of food pellets 
Simultaneous presentation of 
two amounts of food pellets; all 
possible pairs of amounts 1-5; 
3x10 = 30 trials 
Choice of larger quantity: 
% correct of all 30 trials 
 




Associative learning & reversal 
1. Learning of a pattern-
reward association 
2. Reinforcement of the 
learned association 
3. Reversal of learned the 
association 
 
Simultaneous presentation of      
two patterns in 3 test phases: 
1. Food visible; then covered 
by pattern 
2. Food hidden; only 
patterns visible 
3. Food hidden; but now 
under opposite pattern 
Number of 12-trial sessions to 
reach criterion in each phase 
Associative Learning: 
Number of sessions to learn 
association in phases 1 & 2 
Complete Reversal: 
Number of sessions to learn 
reversed association in phase 3 
Transfer Index1:  
Reversal (% correct trials 2-12 in 
1st session of phase 3)/pre-
reversal (% correct trials in last 
session of phase 2) 
 
5. Memory 1 
 
 
Remembering the reward’s 
location after a time delay 
(seconds): 
(a) 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30  
 
(b) 5, 10, 15, 20 
 
(a & b) 5, 10, 15, 20 
Reward is placed in one of two 
possible locations: 
(a) 6 conditions:  
6x10 = 60 trials 
(b) 4 conditions: 
4x12 = 48 trials 
(a & b) 4 conditions:  
4x12 = 48 trials 
Remembering one of two 
locations: 
(a) % correct choices across all 
6 delays (sample 1) 
(b) % correct choices across all 
4 delays (sample 2) 
(a & b) % correct choices   
          across all 4 delays    
          (sample 1 & 2) 
 
6. Memory 2 
 
Remembering the reward’s 
location after a time delay 
(seconds): 5, 10, 15, 20 
Reward is placed in one of nine 
possible locations: 
4x12 = 48 trials 
 
Remembering one of nine 
locations: 
% correct choices across all            





4.3.4 The cognitive test battery 
 
Task 1: Inhibition a – Detour Reaching 
 
Measured cognitive ability. Inhibition of a predominant motor response (directly 
reaching for a food item that is placed behind a transparent barrier) in favour of applying an 
adequate and successful response (reaching around the barrier to be able to successfully access 
the food item).  
Test apparatus. A static transparent barrier (a quadratic Perspex panel) was vertically 
attached to the top of a wooden board. The task required the subject to reach around the 
barrier in order to grasp a food item that was placed behind it.  
Familiarisation phase. The subject was given the opportunity to explore the test 
apparatus in the test compartment without a food reward present for a duration of 10 minutes.  
Test phase. In each trial, the experimenter placed the food item on the board and 
behind the Perspex barrier in one of 3 positions: left, central or right. In the two lateral 
conditions that simply served as distractors, only half of the reward was positioned behind the 
left or right-side edge of the Perspex barrier while its other half remained exposed. To 
successfully retrieve the reward, the subject could directly reach for it and grasp it. In the actual 
test condition (central trials), however, the reward was placed in the middle of the Perspex 
barrier so that it was fully occluded by it. To successfully retrieve the reward, the subject had 
to inhibit directly reaching for the reward as this would have resulted in its hand colliding with 
the Perspex barrier. It had to reach around the barrier instead so that it could grasp the reward 
without reaching into the barrier (successful Detour Reaching). 
If the subject successfully reached around the barrier at its first attempt, the trial was 
noted as correct. If it failed to do so and reached into the barrier instead, the trial was noted as 
incorrect. Yet, contrarily to an earlier study (Banerjee et al., 2009), the apparatus was kept in 
place after such initial failure for a maximum of 2 minutes, which allowed the subject the 
opportunity to make further attempts to reach around the barrier. If a subject eventually 
succeeded within the 2-minute period, the trial was noted as correct after initial failure and the 
next trial was started. If the subject did not make any further detour- reaching attempts or still 





The Detour-Reaching task entailed 5 sessions of 12 trials. In each test session, the 
reward appeared 4 times in each of the 3 positions (left, central, right) in a counterbalanced 
and pseudo-randomised order, with the rule that the reward never appeared in the same 
location on more than two consecutive trials. This generally resulted in the completion of the 
full 5 test sessions and 60 trials in 5 consecutive days. However, subjects who did not complete 
a whole session or refused to participate at all on a given day were tested the following day. 
This resulted in the test sessions being spread over more than the expected 5 days. We stopped 
a test session on a given day if a subject was not motivated to complete all trials. However, we 
allowed these subjects to eventually complete all 5 sessions of the task in as many testing days 
as it needed.  
Outcome variables. (1) Successful detour-reaching: per cent correct trials of the                  
20 central trials at first attempt. (2) Learning from error: per cent correct trials at first attempt 
plus after initial failure (further detour-reaching attempts).  
Stop criterion in opportunistic testing. In opportunistic testing, the five sessions of the 
Detour-Reaching task would have been supposed to be completed within five consecutive days 
(see Occluded Reach task, (Banerjee et al., 2009).  
 Of the 23 subjects in our study sample who completed the Detour-Reaching task, nine 
of the 15 marmosets (M1, M6, M8, M9, M10, M12, M13, M14, and M15) and 3 of the 8 squirrel 
monkeys (S3, S4, and S7) needed longer than five testing days to complete the five test 
sessions. These 12 subjects would have been excluded from (further) testing owing to 
motivational issues, had we stopped testing after five consecutive days as in opportunistic 
testing. 
In our full testing, in which we gave the monkeys a total testing time period of 1 month 
to complete the Detour-Reaching task, all 12 individuals who needed more testing time than 
expected eventually also completed the task and no subject had to be excluded. 
 
Task 2: Inhibition b – A-not-B 
 
Measured cognitive ability. Inhibition of a learned routine, i.e. to avoid choosing the 
same location that had consistently been rewarded and switching to a second location instead 
that was now being rewarded. In order to successfully choose the correct cup, the subject had 




Test apparatus. Two opaque black plastic cups (A and B) were placed upside-down on a 
wooden sliding platform. The cups were attached to the board in a way that the experimenter 
could easily open and close them by flipping them back and forwards.  
Familiarisation. The subjects learned (1) how to open the cups, (2) that only one cup at 
the time would contain a reward, and (3) that only one choice was possible in each trial.  
Test. The test consisted of 6 trials conducted in a single session. During the first 5 trials, 
the experimenter placed a reward under cup B while the subject was watching, closed both 
cups simultaneously and quickly pushed the test apparatus within the subject’s reach. The 
subject could then reach out to choose one of the two cups, by lifting it or attempting to do so. 
In the 6th trial, the experimenter placed the cricket under cup A instead of B.  
Cup A was only baited once a subject had correctly chosen cup B in 5 consecutive trials. 
If the subject did not correctly choose cup B in the first 5 consecutive trials, the experimenter 
repeated baiting cup B until the subject succeeded. If a subject did not make 5 consecutive 
correct choices within a single test session of 14 trials, it was tested again the following day. If 
a subject stopped participating during the session, it was also tested the following day. 
Outcome variable. Correct choice in the last trial (cup A instead of B): yes/no. 
Stop criterion in opportunistic testing. In opportunistic testing, testing with subjects 
who failed to choose cup B in the first 5 consecutive trials would have been stopped and those 
subjects would have been excluded from further analysis.   
In our study, this would have resulted in losing 9 of the 22 subjects in the analysis who 
participated in the actual test. Eight of the 15 marmosets (M2, M4, M5, M8, M11, M13, M14 
and M15) and one of the 7 squirrel monkeys (S8) did not achieve 5 correct B-choices in the 
initial 5 consecutive B-trials and therefore needed longer to succeed in 5 consecutive B-trials.  
In our full testing approach in which we gave the monkeys one month (including the 
familiarisation phase) to complete the A-not-B task and as many B trials as needed, all 9 subjects 
who needed more than 5 B-trials to reach criterion eventually did so and completed the actual 
test. We only had to exclude one other squirrel monkey (S7) because he still refused to 







Task 3: Quantity Discrimination  
 
Measured cognitive ability. Understanding of quantities by distinguishing between pairs 
of different quantities, i.e., two amounts of edible items.  
Test apparatus. Schmitt & Fischer (2011) had reported that two monkey species 
performed best when the two quantities to choose from consisted of (1) inedible items 
(tokens), or (2) edible items that differed from the reward items in food type. In our study, we 
therefore used monkey chow pellets as stimulus items and crickets as a reward for a correct 
choice. Pellets are interesting enough to attract the marmosets’ attention because they are 
edible but not desirable enough to distract them from the task at hand. However, in contrast 
to other studies (Schmitt & Fischer, 2011; Banerjee et al., 2009), the subjects in our study were 
not allowed to consume as many items as they had chosen, regardless of whether their choice 
was correct. Rather, the marmosets were rewarded with a single cricket if they correctly chose 
the larger pellet quantity in a given test trial and received no reward for an incorrect choice.  
Pre-test. The subjects were presented with a single and obvious numerical contrast         
(1 vs. 6 pellets), and the location of the larger quantity was counterbalanced and pseudo-
randomised for all contrasts. This ensured all subjects understood they had to choose the larger 
of two pellet quantities in order to obtain the cricket. Before proceeding to the test phase, they 
had to reach the criterion of  ³ 80% correct trials within a single pre-test session of 10 trials. 
Test. The test consisted of 3 sessions of 10 trials each. In each session, the subjects were 
presented with 10 different numerical contrasts (all possible quantity combinations of the           
1-5 pellets). As in the pre-test phase, the location of the larger quantity was counterbalanced 
and pseudo-randomised for all contrasts. 
Outcome variable. Per cent correct trials (choice of the larger amount) across all 3 test 
sessions.  
Stop criterion in opportunistic testing. Under an opportunistic testing regime, testing 
would have been stopped if a subject did not complete the 30 trials within 3 sessions that were 
conducted on 3 consecutive days and this subject would have been excluded from the analysis.  
Of the 15 marmosets who had entered the pre-test, 12 subjects participated in the 
actual Quantity Discrimination test. Nine subjects (7 females and 2 males) completed all 3 test 
sessions within the expected time frame of 3 testing days (one male subject even within 2 days). 
The remaining 3 male subjects needed up to twice as long to complete the task (M12 and M14 




Under our full testing regime, in which we gave the monkeys one month (including the 
pre-test) to complete the task, the 3 above mentioned male individuals also completed the 
task. The only individuals we had to exclude were 3 other males (M1, M13, and M15) who were 
still not motivated to fully participate in the pre-test after a total testing period of one month 
and once their conspecifics had completed the whole task.  
 
Task 4: Reversal Learning  
 
Measured cognitive ability. Cognitive flexibility, i.e., reversing a previously learned 
association to a new one if the previously learned association is no longer rewarded.  
Test apparatus. The apparatus consisted of a wooden board that contained two food 
wells and two rectangular wooden plates with two distinct black and white patterns printed on 
top.  
Familiarisation phase. Each subject was familiarized with the basic setup and procedure 
in order to ensure it understood that it needed to uncover the baited well to obtain the reward 
by pushing away the correct plate. In this phase, both wooden plates looked identical (no 
patterns). In each trial, the experimenter placed a cricket in full sight of the subject in one of 
the two food wells and covered both wells with the plates. Pushing away the plate from the 
baited well allowed the subject to retrieve the cricket. To pass to the test phase, the subjects 
had to reach the criterion of 10/12 correct trials. 
Test Phase 1 – Unhidden baiting – Learning of an association. The subjects were allowed 
to watch the baiting process to learn the association between one of the two patterns and the 
food reward. As in the familiarisation phase, the now patterned plates were initially each 
positioned behind one of the two food wells. The experimenter then placed a cricket in one 
food well and simultaneously covered both wells with the patterned plates.  The reward was 
always under the same pattern and only choosing the correct one of the two patterns was 
rewarded. The criterion to move on to the next phase was again 10/12 correct trials.  
Test Phase 2 – Strengthening of the learned association. The experimenter baited the 
food well with the same pattern as in phase 1 but now behind the occluder so that the subject 
could not observe the baiting process. As in phase 1, she simultaneously placed both patterned 




She then removed the occluder and the subject could make its choice. The criterion to move 
on to the next phase was again 10/12 correct trials. 
Test Phase 3 – Reversal of the learned association. The experimenter followed the same 
procedure as in phase 2 with the crucial difference that she now always placed the food reward 
under the opposite pattern (i.e., the one that had previously not been rewarded). The criterion 
was again 10/12 correct trials. 
Outcome variables. Number of sessions to reach criterion (80% correct trials within a 
single session) in each of the 3 test phases: (1) learning the association between one pattern 
and the food reward, (2) strengthening of the learned association and (3) reversal of the 
learned association. In addition, we used a cognitive flexibility measure, the Transfer Index        
(TI, Rumbaugh, 1997), which puts a subject’s performance in the first session of phase 3 
(reversal) in relation to its performance in the last session of phase 2.  
Stop criterion in opportunistic testing. Had we used an opportunistic testing regime, 
subjects who did not complete each test phase in a maximum of 7 sessions would have been 
excluded from further testing. Since none of the marmosets in our study completed phase 3 
within 7 sessions, this approach would have resulted in eventually losing the whole study 
sample.  
In our full testing approach, we did not use such a strict criterion but we discontinued 
testing with subjects who (1) needed more than 19 test sessions of 12 trials in the last of the     
3 test phases (reversal) or (2) failed to complete phase 2 or 3 owing to motivational issues over 
a total testing period of 5 months. Of the 15 marmosets who participated in the Reversal 
Learning task, only one male subject (M13) lost motivation very early on and failed to complete 
phase 1.  Of the 14 remaining subjects, two males (M14 and M15), did not complete phase 2, 
despite having reached criterion very quickly in phase 1. Finally, of the 12 subjects who had 
completed phase 2 and entered phase 3, five subjects could not be tested until completion of 
the reversal: three males (M1, M6 and M8) who completely refused to participate owing to 
motivational issues and two females (M2 and M11) who developed a strong side bias in           
phase 3 which they did not overcome. However, since all 12 subjects had completed the first 






Task 5: Memory 1 – traditional task format with two choice options 
 
Measured cognitive ability. Remembering in which of two locations a food reward has 
been hidden over increasing time delay periods. 
Memory task 1a). In the traditional two-choice Memory task version 1a), the test 
apparatus and procedure largely corresponded to the Hidden Reward Retrieval test in Banerjee 
et al., 2009. Two white plastic containers were attached to a wooden board that could be slid 
into the subject’s reach. Both containers were filled with dark bark mulch and a small piece of 
a yellow locust was used as a reward in each trial. 
Memory task 1b). In the two-choice Memory task version 1b), the test apparatus 
consisted of two black containers with loosely placed lids that were attached to the middle one 
of three wooden platforms held together by a wooden frame (for details see Schubiger et al., 
2016). 
Pre-test. A no-delay condition was used as a pre-test. In this pre-test, the subjects could 
witness the baiting and choose immediately afterwards, without delay. Pre-test criterion was 
reaching ³ 80% correct choices in a single 10-trial session. This ensured the subjects 
understood the task at hand before being exposed to time delay.  
Test. At the beginning of each trial, both containers were covered with a rectangular 
piece of bark mull in Memory task 1a) or the containers were closed in Memory task 1b). Once 
the subject was attentive, the experimenter did the following: In Memory task 1a, she removed 
the cover of one of the containers, placed a piece of a locust in the container and put the cover 
back in place so that the bright yellow locust was no longer visible and both containers looked 
the same. In Memory task 1b, the experimenter lifted the lid of one of the two cups, placed a 
mealworm in the cup and closed it so that the mealworm was no longer visible to the subject. 
During the time delay period (5-30 seconds in Memory task 1a and 5-20 seconds in              
Memory task 1b), the test apparatus remained out of the subject’s reach. As soon as the time 
delay had expired, the experimenter pushed the test apparatus into the subject’s reach 
allowing it to choose one of the two containers. The subjects were tested with one session of 
10 (Memory 1a) or 12 (Memory 1b) trials per day. A correct choice consisted of uncovering 
(Memory 1a) or opening (Memory 1b) the baited container.  
Outcome variable: Number of correct trials (per cent correct choices) across all delay 
conditions in Memory 1a (6 delays, 60 trials) and Memory 1b (4 delays, 48 trials), as well as in 




Stop criterion in opportunistic testing.  
Memory 1a). In opportunistic testing, subjects would have been excluded if they did not 
complete all 6 test sessions in the expected 6 testing days (Hidden Reward Retrieval, Banerjee 
et al., 2009). Since none of the subjects in marmoset sample 1 who participated in this two-
choice memory task fulfilled this criterion, they would all have been excluded from further 
testing and no statistical analysis would have been possible.  
However, the majority of subjects completed the task within 12 testing days which we 
set as expected testing time instead. 
In our full testing approach, we gave each marmoset as many test sessions as it needed 
to complete the pre-test and the 6 test sessions during a 5-month testing period. Of the 
subjects who needed more than 12 testing days, five (M1, M3, M6, M8, and M13) eventually 
completed Memory task 1a. However, three other marmosets (M14, M15, and M16) had not 
completed the whole task once the 5-month testing period expired and had to be excluded 
from statistical analysis.  
Memory 1 b). In opportunistic testing, subjects would have been excluded if they failed 
to complete the 4 test sessions in the expected 4 testing days. This would have resulted in 
excluding 4 of the 8 marmosets (M18, M19, M20, and M24) and one of the 8 squirrel monkeys 
(S3) who participated in Memory task 1b).  
We gave each subject a 5-month testing period (including the pre-test) to complete the 
memory task. Fifteen of the 19 monkeys (8 of the 11 marmosets of study sample 2 and 7 of the 
8 squirrel monkeys) who had entered Memory task 1b eventually completed the full task within 
the given testing period. The remaining 3 marmosets (M22, M26, and M27) and one squirrel 
monkey (S6) had lost motivation early in the pre-test or after a very small number of test trials 
and the experimenter could not regain their motivation to fully participate. Using our full 
testing approach, we thus only had to exclude these 4 subjects from statistical analysis who 
were not sufficiently motivated to participate in the actual test.  
Since the two versions of Memory test 1 slightly differed in terms of used methodology 
which could potentially have affected the results, we first analysed and reported them 
separately. In a third analysis, we then also combined the subjects of marmoset sample 1 who 
had completed the first 4 test sessions of Memory task 1a) and the subjects of marmoset 




Using our full testing approach in which we had given each subject sufficient time to 
complete the (first) four delay conditions of Memory task 1, we obtained performance scores 
for one more male marmoset from sample 1 (M14) who had dropped out in Memory task 1a 
because they had not completed all 6 delay conditions. Therefore, we only had to exclude two 
subjects of study sample 1 (M15 and M16) who had not completed all trials of the 4 test 
sessions after expiration of the 5 months testing period.  
Three other marmosets (M22, M26, and M27) of study sample 2 and one squirrel 
monkey (S6) also had to be excluded because they had dropped out in the pre-test phase or 
after only a few test trials owing to motivational issues.  
 
Task 6: Memory test 2 – Optimised test format with nine choice options 
 
Measured cognitive ability. Remembering in which of nine locations a food reward has 
been hidden over increasing time delay periods. 
Apparatus and procedure. This memory task differed from task 5 in that nine rather 
than two options were available to choose from. The apparatus and procedure were identical 
to the ones used in Memory task 1b) with the only difference being that 9 rather than only 2 
cups were used. The method has been described in detail in an earlier publication (Schubiger 
et al., 2016). 
Outcome variable. Per cent correct choices across all delay conditions (4 delays,                   
48 trials). 
Stop criterion in opportunistic testing. In opportunistic testing, subjects would have 
been excluded if they had not completed the 4 delay conditions in 4 sessions conducted on       
4 consecutive days.  
In our full testing approach, we continued testing for a total testing period of 5 months 
in order to allow every subject to complete the test. Seven of initially 11 marmosets and 7 of 
initially 8 squirrel monkeys completed the whole Memory task 2 whereas one marmoset (M24) 
only completed the first test session (the 5-second delay condition). Three marmosets           
(M22, M26, and M27) and one squirrel monkey (S6) eventually had to be excluded because 
they had either not completed the pre-test or only a very small number of test trials before 




4.4 Data analysis 
 
For each of the six cognitive tasks, we analysed whether individuals who finished the 
task in the expected time (i.e., would have been included in opportunistic testing) differed in 
performance from individuals who needed longer (i.e., would have been excluded in 
opportunistic testing but were included in our full testing). We ran Generalised Linear Mixed 
Models (GLMMs), with the exception of the A-not-B task (task 2) for which we computed 
Fischer exact tests owing to the small number of trials in this task. The outcome variables for 
cognitive performance were the response variables, and subject was included as a random 
factor in all models. Testing time needed to complete a given test was included as a binary fixed 
factor: expected amount of time vs. longer. Individual test session, species (where applicable) 
and all two-way interactions were also included as fixed factors in the models. We calculated 
all models with biologically meaningful factor combinations and identified the best model using 






Of the 23 individuals who completed the Detour-Reaching task, 11 individuals 
completed the task in time (≤ 5 days; 6 marmosets, 5 squirrel monkeys) whereas 12 individuals 
took longer than expected (> 5 days; 9 marmosets, 3 squirrel monkeys). The best model to 
explain performance in the Detour-Reaching task included the fixed factors test session            
(F(4, 84) = 8.48, p = .000), species (F(1, 21) = 1.26; p = .274), and their interaction 
(session*species: F(4, 84) = 5.51, p = .001). Thus, individuals who finished the task in the 
expected time did not differ in performance from individuals who took longer to complete it 
(see Figure 4.1). The interaction session*species indicates that while the marmosets improved 
their performance over the course of the five sessions and therefore learned to inhibit to 








Figure 4.1 The subjects’ performance in the 6 cognitive tasks depending on how much testing time they needed 
to complete each task. The dotted line marks the expected amount of time after which testing would have been 
discontinued and subjects who needed longer would have been excluded had we used the classical opportunistic 
approach. Marmosets are represented by ID numbers M1-M27 and gender symbols, squirrel monkeys by                     









Of the 22 individuals who completed the A-not-B task, 13 individuals                                           
(7 marmosets, 6 squirrel monkeys) completed the test trials in time (five B-trials to criterion). 
Nine individuals (8 marmosets, 1 squirrel monkey) took longer than the expected amount of 
testing time (> five B-trials) to reach criterion (5 consecutive correct B-trials) before receiving 
the final (A) trial. Overall, 8 of the 15 marmosets and all 7 squirrel monkeys who completed the 
A-not-B task correctly chose cup A in the last trial and therefore passed the task whereas the 
remaining 8 marmosets failed it. Since a GLMM was not applicable owing to the relatively small 
number of test trials, two Fisher exact tests were conducted instead. The first Fisher exact test 
determined whether testing time (the number of B trials required to correctly choose cup B in 
five consecutive trials) affected the subjects’ performance (whether they correctly chose cup 
A in the last trial). The second test determined whether the species difference in performance 
was significant. Although there was a non-significant trend that subjects who needed more 
time to complete the A-not-B task were more likely to fail it, testing time had no significant 
effect on the monkeys’ performance (Fisher’s exact test; p = 0.178). Likewise, there was a non-
significant trend for squirrel monkeys to outperform marmosets (Fisher’s exact test; p = .121) 
(see Figure 4.2). 
 
4.5.3 Quantity Discrimination   
 
Of the 12 marmosets who completed the Quantity Discrimination task, nine individuals 
did so in time (≤ 3 days; 7 females, 2 males) whereas 3 individuals took slightly longer than 
expected (> 3 days; 3 males). Overall, the 12 subjects who completed the Quantity 
Discrimination test performed well above chance (Mean score = 71% correct choices, SD = 8%; 
t(11) = 8.53, p = .000). The best model to predict cognitive performance was the one that only 
included one fixed effect, testing time, which did not affect the marmosets’ performance          
(F(1, 10) = 0.42; p = .534) (see Figure 4.3).  
 
4.5.4 Reversal Learning  
 
For the Reversal Learning task, we first report how long (number of test sessions) the 
subjects needed to reach the learning criterion (≥ 80% correct trials within a single session) in 




average to complete a 12-trial test session affected their performance (per cent correct trials 
in the last session). Finally, we answer the central question: whether the amount of testing time 
(in this task measured as the number of completed trials per testing day) affected the subjects’ 
cognitive flexibility (as measured by the TI).  
Phase 1 - Learning of an association 
Of the 14 marmosets who completed phase 1, all individuals did so in time whereas no 
subject took longer than expected. In phase 1, the 14 marmosets reached criterion (≥ 80% 
correct trials in a single session) within an average of 2 test sessions (M = 2.07, SD = 1.60), with 
the minimum being 1 session and the maximum 6 sessions (see Figure S4.3).  
Phase 2 - Strengthening of the learned association 
Of the 12 marmosets (7 females and 5 males) who completed phase 2 (strengthen the 
learned association), seven (4 females and 3 males) did so in time whereas 5 (3 females and        
2 males) needed longer than expected. The number of 12-trial sessions needed to complete 
phase 2 ranged from 4 to 13 sessions, with the average being 7 sessions (M = 6.75, SD = 3.11) 
(see Figure S4.3).  
Phase 3 Reversal of the learned association 
Of the 7 marmosets (4 females and 3 males) who completed phase 3 (full reversal of 
the initially learned association), only 1 female subject (Vesta) did so in time whereas 6 subjects 
(4 females and 2 males) needed longer. The marmosets completed phase 3 in 7 to 19 sessions, 
with the average being 13 sessions (M = 12.57, SD = 4.96) (see Figure S4.3).  
Transfer Index (TI) 
All of the 12 marmosets who had entered phase 3, completed at least the first test 
session of the reversal. To compare cognitive flexibility between individuals, the TI was 
calculated for each of these subjects. In order to determine whether testing time, i.e.,  the 
number of days a subject needed to complete a session in phase 2 (expected = 1 session                
of  12 trials per day; longer = < 1 session of 12 trials per day) or a subject’s sex had an effect on 
its cognitive flexibility (as measured by the TI), we ran GLMMs with the fixed effects time, sex, 
and the interaction of these two factors. The two models that only included testing time and 
sex, respectively, only differed marginally from each other (ΔAICc < 1). Neither time                     
(F(1, 10) =  0.62, p = .808) nor sex (F(1, 10) = 0.91, p = .362) significantly affected a subject’s TI 





4.5.5 Memory 1 – Traditional two-choice task 
 
Version a) Marmoset sample 1 
 
Of the 12 marmosets (6 females and 6 males) who completed the 2-choice Memory 
task 1 a (study sample 1), 6 subjects did so in our set time (≤ 12 days) whereas 6 subjects took 
longer (> 12 days). The best model to predict whether time needed to complete the task had 
an effect on the monkeys’ performance only included the fixed effect time which did not have 
a significant effect on performance (per cent correct trials): F(1, 10) = 0.71; p = .420. The two 
models that only differed marginally from the best model (ΔAICc < 1) each also included only 
one fixed effect, delay and sex respectively. Delay condition had a significant effect on a 
subject’s performance (F(1, 5) = 3.44; p = .009) whereas a subject’s sex did not (F(1, 10) = 0.17; 
p = .690) (see Figure S4.4a).  
Version b) Marmoset sample 2 & squirrel monkeys 
 
Of the 15 monkeys (8 marmosets and 7 squirrel monkeys) in study sample 2 who 
completed the two-choice memory task, eleven individuals (5 marmosets, 6 squirrel monkeys) 
did so in time (≤ 4 days) whereas the other 5 individuals (4 marmosets, 1 squirrel monkey) 
needed longer (> 4 days). 
The best model only included the fixed factor time which did not have a significant 
effect on the monkeys’ performance (F(1, 18.66) = 0.38; p = .544) (see Figure S4.4b).  
 
Extended study sample (all subjects from both task versions a and b) 
 
When combining the (first) four delay conditions of those marmosets (sample 1 and 2) 
and squirrel monkeys who had completed all essential trials of the two-choice memory task, 
we obtained performance scores for two more male marmosets from sample 1 (Kapi and 
Kantor) who had dropped out in Memory task 1a because they had not completed all 6 delay 
conditions. Of the 28 monkeys (7 squirrel monkeys and 21 marmosets) who completed the four 
delay conditions, ten (4 marmosets and 6 squirrel monkeys) did so within the expected time     
(4 days) whereas 18 (1 squirrel monkey, 17 marmosets) took longer (> 4 days). The best model 
only included the fixed factor delay which had a highly significant effect on the monkey’s 
performance (F(3, 81) = 5.33, p = .002). Although the next best model also included time, 
required testing time did (as in all other models) not significantly affect performance                   




4.5.6 Memory 2 – Optimised nine-choice memory task (marmosets 2 & squirrel monkeys)  
 
 
Of the 14 monkeys (7 marmosets of study sample 2 and 7 squirrel monkeys) who 
completed the nine-choice memory task, nine individuals (3 marmosets, 6 squirrel monkeys) 
did so in time (4 days) whereas the other 5 individuals (4 marmosets, 1 squirrel monkey) 
needed longer (> 4 days). Time to complete the 9-choice memory task (4 days versus > 4 days) 
did not affect the subjects’ performance in the 9-choice memory task (no significant effect in 
any of the models). The best model only included the fixed effect delay which did affect 
performance (i.e. the proportion of correct choices): F(1, 3) = 5.48; p = .003, indicating that 
memory performance decreased with increasing retention delay. While species had no effect 
on overall performance in any of the models, there was a significant interaction of delay and 




We tested marmosets and squirrel monkeys with six cognitive tasks of a modified 
version of a cognitive test battery that had been developed for New World monkeys (Banerjee 
et al., 2009). These were Detour Reaching, A-not-B, Quantity Discrimination, Reversal Learning 
and two memory tasks. We used a full testing approach and tested all available individuals. This 
approach is in contrast to the commonly used opportunistic testing approach in which subjects 
are excluded if they fail to complete a cognitive task (or pre-test) within a predefined time 
frame. Our full testing approach thus allowed each subject ample opportunity to complete each 
task at its own pace. The main question was whether the amount of testing time a subject 
required to complete a task affected its cognitive performance in that task. Our results show 
that this was not the case and that in each task the performance of subjects who needed longer 
than expected to complete the task did not differ from those who completed the task in time.  
It is important to stress that even in our full testing approach, we lost subjects from the 
sample. This was because the monkeys were never forced to enter the testing enclosures but 
had to be at least sufficiently motivated to approach the testing area voluntarily to be included. 
While we had made every effort to allow each individual to complete each task at its own pace, 
it was not justified to continue testing for a completely unlimited time period. Therefore, we 




being given ample time to complete them, differ in cognitive ability from subjects who 
completed the tasks.  
Despite this possible exception, our findings suggest that opportunistic testing in 
primates (i.e. only testing subjects who readily participate) does not bias the results of cognitive 
tasks in several physical domains, at least in marmosets and squirrel monkeys. To what extent 
they generalise to tasks from the social domain or to paradigms that do not require subjects to 
choose between a set of presented options remains to be established.  
Species differences in cognitive performance were minor and mostly non-significant, 
even though we cannot exclude that this may be owing to the relatively low number of squirrel 
monkeys in our sample. The only significant effect was that in the detour reaching task, 
marmosets increased their performance over time, whereas squirrel monkeys did not, which 
led to increased inhibition performance in marmosets in later trials (see Figure S4.1). One 
possible explanation is that the marmosets are better at inhibiting a direct reach for food 
because, as cooperative breeders, they frequently share food with immature group members 
including food offering and calling others to a food source (Brown, Almond, & Bergen, 2004). 
Food sharing, and in particular proactive food offering, arguably requires the ability to inhibit 
the immediate impulse to take and consume the food. To further test this possibility, future 
tasks could compare whether marmosets who are more inclined to share food indeed show 
stronger detour reaching performance. Intriguingly, in the second inhibition task, the A-not-B 
task, marmosets did not outperform the squirrel monkeys but there was rather a trend in the 
opposite direction. It thus appears that the two inhibition tasks measure different aspects of 
inhibitory control. This possibility is consistent with Mac Lean et al. (2014) who tested a large 
number of primate (and other) species with the same two inhibition tasks and likewise did not 
find a particularly strong correlation between the two.  
Our finding that the selection bias that results from opportunistic testing does not affect 
cognitive performance in marmosets and squirrel monkeys in several physical cognition tasks 
adds to the list of non-cognitive factors that have been studied so far regarding their potential 
to affect cognitive performance (Table 4.1).  While required testing time did not affect cognitive 
performance in our study, another testing-related factor, task format, did affect cognitive 
performance of non-human primates (Schmitt & Fischer, 2011; Carducci et al., 2018) and it 




Although the effects of subject-related factors (such as individual differences in personality 
traits or housing conditions) seem less ambiguous, the overall pattern remains inconclusive. 
To sum up, we showed that at least for two New World monkey species and the given 
set of cognitive tasks, opportunistic testing does not bias the test results. If our findings 
generalise to other non-human primate species and cognitive tasks, then maximising sample 
sizes by only testing consistently motivated subjects will be a valid alternative whenever a 
sufficiently large number of subjects is available but full testing is not feasible owing to time 
constraints.   
Future studies should extend the list of non-cognitive factors that affect cognitive 
performance, so that the validity and reliability of existing cognitive tests can be further 
improved and newly developed tests will be less prone to performance biases. Once this task 
is achieved, cognitive test batteries can then be used more reliably to compare the cognitive 
abilities of non-human primate individuals and species.  
 
4.7 Ethics Statement 
 
This study was performed in accordance with the Swiss legislation and licensed by the 
Veterinary Office of the Canton of Zurich (Licence number 183/13, 24826, degree of severity: 
0, i.e., no harm). Thus before, during and after this study, the monkeys were never 
constrained or subjected to any pain, suffering or injury and their general state of health 
was not impaired. All cognitive tasks were conducted non-invasively between the monkeys’ 
regular feeding times. The monkeys could freely enter and leave the test enclosure without 
being handled by humans at any time and were never isolated from their social groups. After 
the completion of this study, the monkeys continued living at the Primate Station, eventually 
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4.9 Supporting Online Information  
 








Measurements (in cm) 






Window front (1) 18.0 x 2.5  
Wooden board with an indentation (1cm deep) for Perspex panel 34.0 x 37.0 42.0 x 46.0 
Transparent Perspex panel (0.5 cm in thickness); quadratic surface exposed 8.0 x 9.0 13.5 x 14.5 







Window front (1) 18.0 x 2.5  
Wooden board  34.0 x 37.0 42.0 x 46.0 
2 black plastic cups (each with a silver insulating strip on its base) Ø 2.6, h. 3.8 Ø4.5, h: 5.2 
Reward: mealworm (or cricket) 
 
  




Window front (2) 18.0 x 2.5  
Wooden board  
with 4 wooden sliding rails for sliding platforms 
41.0 x 40.0     
2.0 x 33.0  
2 transparent plastic sliding platforms  
with white plastic handles on their front ends  
28.0 x 7.0  
1.0 x 7.0 
2 small petri dishes with white floors (plastic foil)  
and transparent lids 
 Ø 5.2, h: 1.2 
Ø 5.6, h: 0.7 
2 white flat cotton pads to keep the pellets in place       Ø 5.0 




4. Reversal Learning 
 
 
Window front (2)   
1 wooden sliding board with  
2 round food wells at 2 cm distance from board’s front 
33.5 x 32.5 
Ø 5.1, h: 1.6  
2 wooden plates, each with pattern (=paper covered with plastic foil):  
1) white triangle on black background  
2) alternating black and white “waves” 





5. Memory 1a 
 
 
Window front (2)  
1 wooden sliding board with  
2 round food wells at 2 cm distance from board’s front 
33.5 x 32.5 
Ø 5.1, h: 1.6  
2 white round plastic containers (11 cm apart) 
filled with ramial chipped bark mulch 
Ø 5.1, h: 3.1 
 
2 cover plates (= larger rectangular bark mulch pieces of equal size)  
Rewards: yellow desert locusts 
 
 
5. Memory 1b  
 
 
Wooden sliding board 45.0 x 30.0 95.0 x 50.0 
Wooden frame with 3 platforms w: 40 x h: 37.5 W: 80.0 x h:75.0 
2 black plastic cups with grey lids Ø 3.1, h: 1.1 Ø 3.1, h: 2.3 
2 Velcro tape strips   
Rewards: crickets or small pieces of a cooked apple (M); mealworms or 
small pieces of cashew nut (S)  
 
  
6. Memory 2 
 
 
Wooden sliding board  45.0 x 30.0 80.0 x 75.0 
Wooden frame with 3 platforms w: 40 x h: 37.5 w: 80.0 x h: 75.0 
9 black plastic cups with grey lids Ø 3.1, h: 1.1 Ø 3.1, h: 2.3 
9 Velcro tape strips   
Rewards: crickets or small pieces of a cooked apple (M); mealworms or 
small pieces of cashew nut (S)  
  









Figure S4.1 Performance in the 5 test sessions of the Detour-Reaching task. Successful detour-reaching 
in the inhibition trials at (a) first attempt and (b) after initial failure to reach around the transparent 




Figure S4.2 Number of test sessions to criterion in the 3 phases of the Reversal Learning task. Fewer 
(12-trial) sessions indicate better performance, hence the negative prefix on the y-axis. Phase 1 - 
learning of the initial association between a pattern and a reward. Phase 2 - strengthening of the learned 











Figure S4.3 The subjects’ performance in the two versions of Memory task 1 depending on how much 
testing time they needed to complete the task. The dotted line represents the expected amount of time 
(number of testing days) after which testing would have been discontinued and subjects who needed 
longer would have been excluded had we used the classical opportunistic approach. (a) The marmosets 
of study sample 1 (represented by ID numbers M1-M16 and gender symbols) were tested with version 
a of Memory 1 (adapted from Banerjee et al., 2009), (b) the marmosets of study sample 2 (ID numbers 
M17-M27 and gender symbols) and the squirrel monkeys (represented by yellow triangles) were tested 
with version b (Schubiger et al., 2016). The two versions of Memory 1 slightly differed in details of 
experimental set-up (apparatus) and design (number of delay conditions; also see Table 4.3 and                    

















5.1 Summary of findings 
 
In this thesis, I aimed at identifying if current tests of primate cognition allow for fair 
comparisons of cognitive abilities within and between non-human primate species and how 
they can be improved, if necessary, in order to help us gaining insight into how the human mind 
might have evolved. Until recently, such studies with non-human primates have mainly focused 
on between-species rather than within-species comparisons of cognitive abilities without 
questioning the validity of the used cognitive tasks. However, in order to be able to compare 
the cognitive abilities of different species in a fair manner, it seems important to first attempt 
to better understand in how far individuals of a single species vary. In my thesis, I used this 
modern approach by primarily focusing on a single New World primate species, common 
marmosets (Callithrix jacchus). In addition, I conducted first comparisons to common squirrel 
monkeys (Saimiri sciureus), the closest evolutionary relatives of marmosets, apart from other 
callitrichids. My main goal was to assess the internal validity of a set of commonly used 
cognitive tasks (i.e., whether they truly measure individual differences in cognition rather than 
non-cognitive factors). In order to do so, I conducted a series of three experimental studies that 
addressed if several non-cognitive factors (i.e., individual differences in emotional reactivity, 
task format, and time to complete a task) affected the monkeys’ performance. 
 
5.1.1 Individual differences in emotional reactivity affect motivation but not cognitive 
performance 
 
In my first study, I investigated if individual differences in levels of emotional reactivity 
affect performance in cognitive tasks. In order to elicit variation in emotional reactivity, 
individual marmosets were tested with an object permanence test by the same human 
experimenters who were either familiar or unfamiliar to the marmosets. Unfamiliar 
experimenters were more likely than familiar experimenters to induce emotional arousal in the 
marmosets during testing because the marmosets were not habituated to unfamiliar 
experimenters. The results showed considerable individual variation in marmosets’ 
spontaneous emotional reactivity. Male subjects, especially, tended to experience elevated 
emotional arousal which they behaviourally expressed in piloerection and repeated vigilance 
and mobbing vocalisations. They also tended to avoid approaching the test stimuli and to 




reactive male subjects participated in fewer test trials and tended to be easily distracted during 
the test procedure. However, in those trials in which they did participate and were attentive to 




Figure 5.1 Findings of Study 1. A subject’s emotional reactivity (arousal and avoidance behaviour) in the test 
situation affected its participation (number of completed test trials) but not its performance (number of correct 
trials) in the object permanence task. 
 
My findings illustrate that differences in emotional reactivity have no major impact on 
subjects’ cognitive performance. Importantly, however, this only applies if performance is 
controlled for whether the subjects were attentive during the stimulus presentation, and if 
clear stop criteria are applied that determine under which circumstances a test (session) has to 
be discontinued. For the marmosets, this was the case when a subject repeatedly refused to 
make a choice (in 4 consecutive test trials) or clearly avoided the test situation by repeatedly 
climbing to the test compartment’s entrance/exit door and trying to open the door to leave. 
While such stop criteria prevent performance biases in cases of particularly high emotional 
arousal, giving subjects the possibility to discontinue a test session at any time is also essential 
for animal welfare reasons.  
When testing marmosets and possibly other non-human primates, experimenters have 
to be aware that particularly male subjects will often be vigilant towards their environment and 
attend to visual and auditory stimuli other than the test stimuli. In such cases, the experimenter 
will have to regain the subject’s attention and ensure it is watching the test procedure before 
making a response (e.g., a choice). In studies in which this is only possible to a certain degree, 
such as mine in which it was essential for comparability reasons that all experimenters 
continuously proceeded with their actions, it is advisable to later code from the video 
recordings in which trials the subject was truly attentive. This will allow researchers to correct 
the subjects’ performance scores accordingly by only analysing trials in which the subjects were 






5.1.2 Some widely used memory tests are not valid 
 
In my second study, I addressed construct validity, i.e., if cognitive tests measure the 
cognitive ability (i.e., the cognitive construct) they were designed to measure. Specifically,                
I explored whether one aspect of the task format (the number of test stimuli to choose from) 
affected the performance of marmosets and squirrel monkeys in a typical long-term memory 
test. This was achieved by testing both species with two versions of the memory task: a 
traditional two-choice and	a novel nine-choice version. When comparing the performance of 
the two species on the same two tasks, the results suggested that increasing the number of 
choice options from two to nine improved their motivation to choose correctly. And this in turn 
had a positive effect on their performance: they performed better in the nine-choice memory 
test than the two-choice version (Figure 5.2). One likely explanation for this finding is that 
subjects may have used a random selection strategy in the two-choice task but not in the nine-
choice task because there was more at stake in this version by choosing randomly. There was 
only a 11.1% chance that the subject could find the reward by choosing at random compared 
to a 50% chance in the two-choice task. The most important result was, however, that in the 
nine-choice test version, the monkeys’ performance decreased as the long-term memory 
demands increased. The fact that their performance in the nine-, but not in the two-choice task 
mapped the Ebbinghaus forgetting curve suggests that only the novel nine-choice memory test 




Figure 5.2 Findings of Study 2. The number of choice options affected motivation and performance. Subjects 
performed better in a memory test with nine than with two options and only in the nine-choice task their 
performance decreased with longer time delays during which the reward’s location had to be remembered.  
 
My findings that relatively small changes to the task format (i.e., increasing the number 
of available choice options) promoted the motivation of marmosets and squirrel monkeys to 






5.1.3 Individual differences in time to complete a cognitive test do not necessarily affect 
performance 
 
In my third study, I investigated the potential effect of individual differences in the 
amount of required testing time on individual differences in performance. In particular,                    
I assessed whether the common opportunistic testing approach that excludes subjects who 
need longer than the scheduled amount of testing time to complete a task leads to a bias in 
the performance results.  For this purpose, I tested marmosets and squirrel monkeys with a full 
testing approach that allowed individuals to complete the tasks of the cognitive test battery in 
more than the scheduled testing time/days. I then compared the performance of subjects who 
needed more than the scheduled testing time, i.e., who would typically be excluded from 
testing, with those subjects who completed the tasks in the scheduled time and would 
therefore not be excluded in opportunistic testing. The results revealed that the performance 
scores of the two groups of subjects did not differ in any of the cognitive tasks (Figure 5.3). 
Therefore, although opportunistic testing leads to a bias in selecting which subjects participate 
in a test based on their motivation, it does not necessarily lead to a bias in the results. 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Findings of Study 3. Individual difference in required testing time did not affect the subjects’ 
performance in any of the cognitive tasks of the test battery. 
 
Based on my findings, opportunistic testing can be considered as an acceptable 
alternative to full testing when the latter is not feasible owing to external circumstances. This 
is an important finding because the central issue that researchers working with non-human 
primates often have to deal with is limited access to test facilities that restricts the time frame 
of an experimental study. Therefore, opportunistic testing can be a reasonable option in such 
situations, at least in marmosets and squirrel monkeys, as it may have no or little effect on the 








5.1.4 Overview of findings 
 
As summarised in Figure 5.4, only one of the three non-cognitive factors, task format, 
seriously affected the cognitive performance of the two New World monkey species I tested. 
The other two factors, a subject’s emotional reactivity and the amount of testing time required 
to complete a task did not.  
In order to illustrate which potentially confounding factors can be best controlled by 
researchers, I had divided those non-cognitive factors into external ones (related to the test 
design) and internal ones (related to the subject’s state). However, the two kinds of factors 
overlap to some degree. The external factor ‘opportunistic testing’, for instance, is a way in 
which the experimenter deals with an internal factor, the subject’s required ‘testing time’. How 
much time a subject requires to complete a cognitive task depends on its ‘motivation to 
participate’, which in turn is partly affected by its ‘emotional reactivity’ levels that also affect 
its attention in the cognitive task. When a subject is too emotionally aroused or ceases to 
attend and respond to the cognitive task, the experimenter has to stop a test session (and 
continue testing on another day) in order to avoid that the subject’s behaviour might negatively 
affect cognitive performance. If some subjects repeatedly react in this way, cognitive testing 
can become so time-intensive that the experimenter eventually has to exclude the subject from 
further testing (opportunistic testing). Since experimenters have little influence on the subject’s 
emotional reactivity levels, or its motivation to participate, apart from attempting to closely 
monitor and regain its attention, they can only ensure that the subject’s performance is 
corrected accordingly. Methodological aspects, however, that might affect a subject’s 
motivation and performance, can be better controlled via careful test design and by evaluating 
and optimising the task’s measurement validity and reliability.  
In this thesis, I conducted such an evaluation by assessing the measurement validity         
of the test battery’s original memory task. My results suggested that two New World monkey 
species used a random-choice strategy in the two-choice memory task rather than 
remembering the location of the food reward during delay periods. Although this non-memory 
strategy does not allow the subject to locate the reward 100% of the time, it does give the 
subject a 50% chance of finding the reward on each trial rather than making the effort of 
remembering the location of the food reward during the delay periods. In the novel nine-choice 
version of the memory test, however, a subject’s strategy to choose at random resulted in a 




remember the reward’s location in the 9-choice version which was reflected in the monkeys’ 
better performance and their increasing difficulty to remember the reward’s location as the 
time delays got longer and the long-term memory demands increased. Therefore, this new test 
version enhanced the memory test’s validity substantially. Importantly, a task format with more 
than the usual two or three options will likely enhance the validity of other cognitive tests with 





Figure 5.4 Summary of findings. Green ticks indicate that an effect of the respecting factor was found; orange 

















6.1 Contribution of my PhD thesis to comparative cognition in primates 
 
The findings of this thesis add to the list of non-cognitive factors that have been studied 
so far regarding their potential to affect cognitive performance in physical cognition tasks 
(summarised in Table 6.1). My second and third study complement the external (test 
design/method-related) non-cognitive factors that have been addressed by other comparative 
cognition researchers working with non-human primates. While opportunistic testing and the 
selection bias that results from it did not affect performance in the two New World monkey 
species I tested, task format not only affected cognitive performance in one of my studies (and 
rendered the two-choice memory test version invalid) but it also did so in earlier studies 
conducted by other researchers. In fact, task format more generally can sometimes influence 
performance differently in different species. Two Old World primate species, for instance, olive 
baboons (Papio anubis) and long-tailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis), performed better in a 
quantity discrimination task (i.e., were more likely to choose the larger of two amounts of 
items), when the test stimuli were inedible rather than edible (Schmitt & Fischer, 2011). 
Interestingly, the monkeys performed equally well with edible test stimuli provided they were 
rewarded with the same number of food items they had chosen but of a different food type. 
The same experiment was later conducted with two New World monkey species (Gazes et al., 
2018) and it was shown that brown capuchins (Cebus sapajus apella) performed best with 
edible rather than inedible items and outperformed squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) who 
performed relatively poorly overall. In a recent study, capuchins (Sapajus spp.) were tested with 
a visual object discrimination task in which either just visible or additional haptic information 
(via tactile exploration of the objects) was available. The capuchins performed better (i.e., took 
fewer trials to successfully distinguish between the two objects) when they were allowed to 
manipulate the objects by touch, thereby showing visuotactile integration (Carducci et al., 
2018).  
My findings (Study 1, Chapter 2) that individual differences in emotional reactivity affect 
the subjects’ motivation to participate but not their cognitive performance add to the list of 
internal (subject-related) non-cognitive factors that potentially affect cognitive performance 
that have so far been quantified. Long-tailed macaques with trait anxiety (as assessed by a 
strong and stable behavioural reaction to a sudden loud noise) performed worse in a reversal 
learning task than their conspecifics without this trait (Toxopeus et al., 2005). In both 




chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and orang-utans (Pongo pygmaeus), bolder subjects performed 
better in the physical subtests of a large cognitive test battery than shyer subjects (Herrmann 
et al., 2007). In the social subtests, however, temperament had no effect on the apes’ cognitive 
performance. Certain personality traits, particularly openness and assertiveness, affected the 
participation and performance of capuchin monkeys (Sapajus apella) in a training task (Morton 
et al., 2013). More open and less assertive subjects participated and performed better than 
less open and highly assertive subjects. While temperament and personality traits are 
characterised through a high degree of stability over time, a subject’s level of emotional 
reactivity may differ from situation to situation. The marmosets in my first study who showed 
a strong spontaneous emotional reaction to an experimenter and the test situation participated 
in fewer trials of an object permanence task than their less emotionally reactive conspecifics 
(Schubiger et al., 2015). Importantly, however, their cognitive performance was not affected. 
Finally, rearing conditions appear to form a special class of factors. Per se they are 
external factors, but increasing evidence suggest they may causally change cognitive 
performance in primates (Damerius et al., 2017a, 2017b). For instance, rearing conditions 
affect primates’ cognitive skill repertoires, most likely because having ample opportunity to 
learn socially from adult conspecifics (ideally by being raised by one’s mother) allows primates 
to acquire a larger set of skills than being deprived of this opportunity (by growing up with 
peers as an orphan (reviewed in van Schaik & Burkart, 2011). In orangutans (Pongo abelii and 
Pongo pygmaeus), performance in a problem-solving task was best predicted by the degree of 
orientation towards humans (as measured by the Human Orientation Index (HOI)). Subjects 
who were more human-oriented as a consequence of their individual histories with humans 
were more explorative and more successful at using tools to retrieve honey from a wooden 
apparatus than less human-oriented subjects (Damerius et al., 2017a). Furthermore, being 
cared for by humans and being housed with conspecifics allowed orang-utans to be more 
curious and explorative than their single-housed conspecifics and perform better in several 








6.2 How can tests of primate cognition be improved? 
 
I evaluated empirically, for the first time, the validity of a cognitive test battery for non-
human primates. For this purpose, I used several criteria that we had proposed in an earlier 
publication (Burkart, Schubiger, and van Schaik, 2017a, see Appendix) to establish whether it 
truly measured individual differences in cognitive abilities (i.e., reasoning ability and 
behavioural flexibility) or whether a number of not primarily cognitive confounding factors 
affected task performance. My findings (summarised in Table 6.1) contribute to the recent 
efforts of improving existing cognitive tests that assess the cognitive abilities of non-human 
primates.  
First, I experimentally controlled for emotional and motivational confounds in the first 
two studies (see Chapters 2 & 3). I found that marmosets express their emotional arousal levels 
(visibly and audibly) in their appearance and behaviour and tend to avoid the testing area once 
their arousal levels have peaked. Other species may express high arousal differently, but it is 
essential that the experimenter identifies behavioural indicators of arousal before and keeps 
monitoring them during cognitive testing.  
Subjects experiencing above-average emotional arousal levels tend to be reluctant to 
fully participate in a cognitive task and get easily distracted when they do participate. In 
marmosets this was particularly the case for many male individuals who often tended to be 
vigilant towards their surroundings rather than the cognitive task and did often not complete 
a full test session on a given day. Although larger-bodied primate species with less predation 
risk may not need to be as emotionally reactive as the small-bodied marmosets, it is essential 
to use clear stop criteria for all non-human primate species. This ensures that testing is paused 
when a subject is clearly no longer motivated to participate in further trials which is essential 
for its wellbeing and to obtain meaningful performance scores.  
Second, I empirically explored the role of the monkeys’ motivation to perform well in 
cognitive tasks and improved the validity of a classical memory task by increasing the number 
of choice options which in turn motivated the monkeys to perform well (i.e., make as many 
correct choices as possible). Similar changes to the task format may also improve the validity 
of other cognitive tasks and species and reduce the probability that confounding factors such 
as motivational issues impact cognitive performance.  




Taken together, with the exception of one of the memory tasks, I could rule out that the 
subtests of the cognitive test battery measured non-cognitive factors rather than true cognitive 
performance. Therefore, I empirically controlled for individual differences in the subjects’ 
emotional reactivity (as quantified as the spontaneous emotional response to human 
experimenters in Study 1, Chapter 2) their motivation to participate (Study 1, Chapter 2) and 
perform well (Study 2, Chapter 3) in cognitive tasks.  
In addition, while I prioritised testing the same individuals with all subtests and my sample 
size was therefore relatively small, the subtests consisted of diverse tasks tapping into several 
cognitive abilities: inhibitory control, understanding of quantities, cognitive flexibility, and long-
term memory (Study 3, Chapter 4).  
Third, I could replicate the results from Study 2 (Chapter 3) in two independent samples 
representing my study species and an evolutionarily closely related species. Both New World 
primate species performed better in the nine-choice than the two-choice memory test and only 
the former accurately measured long-term memory. Future studies should replicate in other 
species if this improvement of the task’s internal validity also helps other species to perform 
better. 
Fourth, comparable to general intelligence studies with humans, I avoided tasks that are 
prone to secondary modularisation, such as tool-use related ones, that would have measured 
cognitive abilities that appear to be evolutionary adapted (primary) modules but in fact need 
to be learned even by species with a high general cognitive ability (secondary modules).  
Instead, I ensured that all subtests were as abstract as possible (Studies 1-3, Chapters 2-4). 
Likewise, other studies should use sufficiently abstract test set ups to avoid measuring adapted 





Table 6.1 Overview of the findings and recommendations for future primate cognition studies 
 
 
Criteria to avoid statistical   
& methodological artefacts 
 
 
Findings of this thesis 
 
Recommendations for future studies 
 
1) Empirical control for fo
confounds: 
 
• Emotional reactivity ✔ 
Subject’s spontaneous emo-
tional reaction towards ex-
perimenter & test situation  
 
• Motivation ✔ 
Subject’s readiness to par-
ticipate, concentrate, and per-
form well in a cognitive test  
 
• Task format ✔ 
Chance probability of being 
successful 
 
Study 1 (Chapter 2) 
 
ð Subjects behaviourally expressed elevated 
emotional arousal (e.g., via persisting 
piloerection, vigilance & mobbing calls) and 
tended to avoid the test area 
 
ð High emotional reactivity affected the 
subjects’ motivation to participate in a 
cognitive test (i.e., how many test trials they 
completed)  
 
ð Cognitive performance was not affected by 
emotional reactivity, if the experimenter 
used pre-defined criteria on when to stop a 




ð Assess behavioural signs of ele-
vated emotional reactivity before 
and during testing 
 
 
ð Define clear stop criteria before 
testing & apply them consistently 
(e.g., refusal to make a choice in 
X consecutive trials)  
 
ð Apply these criteria to stop a test 
session if a subject shows signs of 
high reactivity or low motivation 
 
Study 2 (Chapter 3) 
 
ð A subject’s motivation to use an appropriate 
choice strategy was affected by task format 
(i.e., the number of options in a choice-task) 
in a memory test 
 
ð A change to a cognitive task’s presentation 
format (i.e., nine choice options made wrong 
choices costlier) improved the task’s validity 
(i.e., the novel version measured the 






ð Be aware that motivational 
factors might bias performance, 
and design cognitive tests 
accordingly  
 
ð Ensure the subjects’ test scores 
capture individual differences in 
their cognitive abilities rather 
than in non-cognitive factors, 
such as motivational ones 
 
 
2) Use of: 
 
• Diverse tasks ✔ 
• Analytical routines with-
out an a priori categori-
sation of tasks into do-
mains ✔ 
• Large samples ✗ 
 
 
Study 3 (Chapter 4) 
 
ð The cognitive test battery consisted of six 
tasks from several broad domains of physical 
cognition: inhibition (2 tasks), quantity dis-
crimination (1 task), cognitive flexibility            




ð Use a wider range of cognitive 
tests assessing various cognitive 
abilities 
 
ð Use larger sample sizes if possible 
 
3) Replication of results in 
independent samples, 
when large samples are 
not available ✔ 
 
 
Study 2 (Chapter 3) 
 
ð Experimentally naïve marmosets & squirrel 
monkeys were tested with the same two 
memory test versions as the marmosets from 
the initial study sample (sample 1) 
 
ð The poor performance results of the 
marmosets from sample 1 in the two-choice 
memory task version could be replicated with 
an independent marmoset sample (sample 2) 
and in a second species, squirrel monkeys 
 
ð The better overall performance & decline 
with increasing memory demands in the 





ð Studies with different species are 
needed to further establish the 





4) Avoidance of tasks 




Whole thesis; Studies 1-3 (Chapters 2-4) 
 
ð In all cognitive tasks the test stimuli were 
presented in an abstract manner (e.g., a 
number of aligned containers) and no tasks 
required learned cognitive skills 
 
 
ð Use abstract test set-ups, even 
when using as many as nine 
experimental stimuli, to avoid 
adapted search strategies 
 




6.3 Is the test battery suitable for future studies on general intelligence? 
 
The ultimate goal of this thesis was to determine if the cognitive tasks were suitable to be 
used in larger test batteries that could then be used in future studies to assess general 
intelligence (i.e., reasoning ability and behavioural flexibility) in large samples of non-human 
primates without risking that a psychometrically and statistically identified g would simply 
reflect a methodological and statistical artefact (Burkart, Schubiger & van Schaik, 2017a, b). 
While, apart from the two-choice memory task, the tasks may be suitable for general 
intelligence studies, using an opportunistic testing approach is not advisable.  
Opportunistic testing, in which subjects with motivational issues are excluded from the 
study sample and replaced by more consistently motivated subjects, allows to minimise total 
testing time and to maximise sample sizes which can be advantageous for many cognitive 
studies. However, it still remains to be established whether opportunistic testing is as 
unproblematic for other cognitive tasks and other primate species. As my results suggest, it is 
not a favourable approach for general intelligence testing because it is important that every 
individual obtains a performance score in each task. Missing test scores result in small sample 
sizes because subjects with any missing test scores are excluded in principal component 
analyses used to identify the existence of g. Full testing is therefore advisable because, unlike 
in other cognitive studies, new subjects cannot simply be added to replace the dropouts as the 
study proceeds, even if they would be available. This is particularly the case if the test battery 
contains a larger number of cognitive tests, unless additional experimenters are used (which is 
justified if standardised methods are used, as my results have shown). A more favourable 
approach would be to conduct full testing but only use cognitive tests with a reasonable 
number of test sessions and trials. For instance, in the two tasks with the largest number of test 
sessions (Reversal Learning and Memory), some subjects eventually even dropped out when 
they were given several months to complete the task. This was particularly the case for the 
Reversal Learning task in which individual subjects were tested until they reached a learning 
criterion and indicates that those tasks that consist of a reasonably small number of test 








In conclusion, this thesis contributes to the recent paradigm shift in comparative 
cognition research that acknowledges the importance of exploring individual variation within 
species. This shift in focus from comparing species to comparing individuals allows to better 
evaluate the measurement validity and reliability of cognitive tasks. While it is common practice 
in cognitive research with humans to evaluate cognitive test batteries regarding these quality 
criteria, such evaluations are currently missing in research with non-human primate species.  
 I took a first step into this direction by evaluating the role of non-cognitive confounding 
factors that might potentially affect cognitive performance and bias the results of cognitive 
studies. My findings demonstrate how researchers can evaluate and increase the validity of 
available cognitive tests, as shown for two New World primates and one cognitive test battery.  
If my findings generalise to other species, they will eventually allow fairer and more meaningful 
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Abstract: The presence of general intelligence poses a major evolutionary puzzle, which has led to increased interest in its presence in
nonhuman animals. The aim of this review is to critically evaluate this question and to explore the implications for current theories about
the evolution of cognition. We first review domain-general and domain-specific accounts of human cognition in order to situate attempts
to identify general intelligence in nonhuman animals. Recent studies are consistent with the presence of general intelligence in mammals
(rodents and primates). However, the interpretation of a psychometric g factor as general intelligence needs to be validated, in particular
in primates, and we propose a range of such tests. We then evaluate the implications of general intelligence in nonhuman animals for
current theories about its evolution and find support for the cultural intelligence approach, which stresses the critical importance of
social inputs during the ontogenetic construction of survival-relevant skills. The presence of general intelligence in nonhumans
implies that modular abilities can arise in two ways, primarily through automatic development with fixed content and secondarily
through learning and automatization with more variable content. The currently best-supported model, for humans and nonhuman
vertebrates alike, thus construes the mind as a mix of skills based on primary and secondary modules. The relative importance of
these two components is expected to vary widely among species, and we formulate tests to quantify their strength.
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1. Domain-general and domain-specific accounts
of human cognition
“Animal behavior is driven by instincts, whereas human
beings behave rationally.” Views like these are still com-
monly expressed and deeply anchored in the Western
worldview (e.g., Pinker 2010). A modern version of this
dichotomy construes animals as having domain-specific,
modular cognitive adaptations, whereas humans have
domain-general intelligence. However, we now know that
in human cognition, domain-specific components are ubiq-
uitous too (Cosmides & Tooby 2013), perhaps even in
complex cognitive tasks such as logical inference (Cosmides
et al. 2010) or solving Bayesian probability problems
(Lesage et al. 2013). At the same time, much evidence
has accumulated that nonhuman minds are not exclusively
made up of domain-specific specializations, but that
domain-general cognitive processes may also be wide-
spread. These empirical findings have implications for con-
temporary theories of the evolution of general intelligence,
highlighted in section 3, provided it is established that
general intelligence in animals is both real and refers to
the same construct as in humans.
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The evolution of general intelligence poses a major
puzzle. Because modular systems may readily evolve (Pav-
licev & Wagner 2012; Schlosser & Wagner 2004; Shettle-
worth 2012b; but see Anderson & Finlay 2014; Lefebvre
2014), the evolution of the mind as a set of domain-specific
adaptations or modules can easily be imagined. Indeed, a
small set of dedicated modules, without any domain-
general cognitive abilities, to which additional modules
can be added as needed, may be the ancestral state of ver-
tebrate cognition. This perspective is so convincing that it
has led to accounts of massive modularity, not only for
animal cognition, but also for human cognition as well
(reviews: Barrett 2015; Frankenhuis & Ploeger 2007;
Hufendiek & Wild 2015).
Evolutionary pathways leading to the emergence of
domain-general cognitive processes, on the other hand, may
appear less straightforward, because such open-content
processes translate far less reliably into fitness-enhancing
behavior, and because they may also require disproportion-
ate amounts of energetically costly brain tissue compared to
domain-specific specializations (van Schaik et al. 2012).
Consequently, compared to the evolution of additional
cheap and reliable, domain-specific, specialized cognitive
solutions to specific problems, the evolution of general cog-
nitive processes might pose greater obstacles to natural
selection. Nonetheless, humans possess general intelli-
gence, and if general intelligence can also be found in
nonhuman animals, we can attempt to identify the evolu-
tionary processes that can lead to its emergence, including
the specific case of humans.
The aims of this review are (1) to critically evaluate the
evidence for general intelligence in nonhuman animals,
and (2) to explore the implications of its presence in nonhu-
mans for current theories of cognitive evolution. To achieve
these aims, we will review the theoretical background and
evidence from a variety of research traditions, such as
animal behavior and psychology, psychometrics and devel-
opmental psychology, and evolutionary psychology.
Whereas all of these fields share an interest in understand-
ing how the mind works, they are not well integrated, and
attempts at integration have not yet produced consensus
(e.g., Eraña 2012; Evans 2011; 2013; Toates 2005). In
this target article, we will therefore selectively focus on
those aspects that are necessary to integrate the findings
from animal studies on general intelligence with what is
known about humans. As non-experts in several of these
fields, we are aware that we may not fully represent all of
the relevant aspects of the respective theories, let alone
solve current controversies in individual fields. Neverthe-
less, we hope that this article serves as a first step in achiev-
ing the much-needed integration across these disciplines at
a more fine-grained level, which will eventually enable the
development of a more unified theory of cognitive
evolution.
This article is structured as follows.We first briefly review
conceptualizations of both domain-generality and domain
specificity of human cognition, and use this as background
to situate current evidence for general intelligence in non-
human animals, which is increasingly reported in various
species based on factor-analytical approaches. We examine
alternative explanations for these findings and develop a
set of empirical criteria to investigate to what extent a statis-
tically derived psychometric factor does indeed correspond
to general intelligence as broadly defined. Such criteria are
increasinglymet in rodent studies but are strikingly underex-
plored in primates or birds.
Next, we discuss different evolutionary theories that may
explain why and how general intelligence can be wide-
spread in nonhuman animals even though it is not immedi-
ately obvious how it can reliably produce fitness-enhancing
behavior. We argue that the broad version of the cultural
intelligence approach (Tomasello 1999; van Schaik &
Burkart 2011; van Schaik et al. 2012) can best account
for the current body of evidence. We end by proposing a
model that construes the mind of both humans and nonhu-
man vertebrates as a mix of truly modular skills and seem-
ingly modular skills that are ontogenetically constructed
using general intelligence abilities. We refer to them as
primary and secondary modules, respectively. Species dif-
ferences are likely with regard to the importance of these
components, and we formulate tests to quantify their
strength.
1.1. The positive manifold and general intelligence
Intelligence in humans has been intensely studied for more
than a century (e.g., reviewed in Deary et al. 2010; Nisbett
et al. 2012). It is broadly defined as involving “the ability to
reason, plan, solve problems, think abstractly, comprehend
complex ideas, learn quickly and learn from experience. It is
thus not merely book learning, a narrow academic skill, or
test-taking smarts. Rather it reflects a broader and deeper
capability for comprehending our surroundings – ‘catching
on,’ ‘making sense’ of things, or ‘figuring out what to do’”
(Gottfredson 1997, p. 13). This definition has received
broad acceptance (Nisbett et al. 2012). In animals, intelli-
gence is thought to involve an individual’s ability to
acquire new knowledge from interactions with the physical
or social environment, use this knowledge to organize effec-
tive behavior in both familiar and novel contexts, and
engage with and solve novel problems (Byrne 1994; Rum-
baugh &Washburn 2003; Yoerg 2001). Thus, general intel-
ligence, as defined in either humans or nonhuman animals,
stresses reasoning ability and behavioral flexibility.
The concept of human general intelligence is built on one
of the most replicated findings in differential psychology. In
humans, performance across tasks of different cognitive
domains is positively correlated: the positive manifold.
Factor-analytical procedures applied to large data sets of
individual performance across tasks consistently reveal a
single factor that loads positively overall and can explain a
significant amount of variation, often termed g for (psycho-
metric) general intelligence. Within this psychometric,
factor-analytical approach, an individual’s loading on this
factor thus estimates its intelligence. Performance in specific
cognitive tasks (e.g., Raven’s Progressive Matrices) or test
batteries (e.g., Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale [WAIS])
is highly correlated with g, and is in fact often used as a
proxy measure for it, for instance in studies aimed at localiz-
ing g in the brain (Burgess et al. 2011; Colom et al. 2006;
Gläscher et al. 2010). In this article, we will speak of
general intelligence when referring to the broad definition
of Gottfredson (1997) that stresses reasoning ability and
behavioral flexibility, and of psychometric intelligence
when referring to the entity estimated by the psychometric
variable g. For humans, it is generally assumed that g esti-
mates general intelligence, based on the strong empirical
correlations between the two, as reviewed below.
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Psychometric intelligence, estimated through g, typically
explains around 40% of variance in test performance,
whereas the rest is explained by group factors and variance
unique to specific tasks (Plomin 2001). It has been found
that g in humans has a clear genetic foundation (Davies
et al. 2011), and in the absence of adverse environments
that compromise the complete deployment of an individu-
al’s capacity, heritability can explain remarkably high pro-
portions of variance (Joshi et al. 2015; Nisbett et al.
2012). Furthermore, g has robust correlates in brain struc-
ture and function, such as brain size, gray matter substance,
cortical thickness, or processing efficiency (Deary et al.
2010; Jung & Haier 2007). However, rather than being
localized in specific brain parts, it seems to be a system-
level property of the brain (Pietschnig et al. 2015).
Finally, g is also a good predictor for various measures of
life outcome, including school achievement, the probability
of being in professional careers, occupational attainment,
job performance, social mobility, and even health and sur-
vival. In particular, it is better at predicting such variables
than specific cognitive abilities on their own (reviewed in
Deary et al. 2010; Reeve 2004).
1.1.1. The structure of cognition. The structure of human
cognition continues to be debated (e.g., Ortiz 2015). None-
theless, the presence of g is now widely accepted due to the
pervasive evidence from Carroll’s (1993) seminal meta-
analysis of over 460 carefully selected data sets on human
cognitive ability. An influential account is Horn and Cat-
tell’s fluid-crystallized gf-gc model (see also Major et al.
2012). Fluid intelligence gf refers to the capacity to think
logically and solve problems in novel situations indepen-
dently of previously acquired knowledge, and to identify
patterns and relationships, whereas crystallized intelligence
gc refers to the ability to use skills, knowledge, and experi-
ence and crucially relies on accessing information from
long-term memory. An explicit causal link from gf to gc is
provided by investment theory (Cattell 1987), which is
the developmental version of the gf-gc model and finds
considerable empirical support (Thorsen et al. 2014).
An integrated version, the so-called CHC (Cattell-Horn-
Carroll) theory, has been supported by several studies and
is a widely accepted consensus model (McGrew 2009). The
CHC model is hierarchical, placing a general factor g at the
top, which affects both gf and gc. Most current models
involve some hierarchical structure involving a general
factor, g, and fluid intelligence, gf (but see, for instance,
Bartholomew et al. 2009; Major et al. 2012; van der Maas
et al. 2006). In fact, some have argued that gf and g repre-
sent the same entity (Kan et al. 2011), and the previously
mentioned definition of intelligence in a broad sense in
fact emphasizes elements of both constructs.
Somemodels of general intelligence that do not involve g
are also still being considered. Van der Maas et al. (2006),
for instance, have presented a dynamic model of general
intelligence that assumes independent cognitive processes
early in ontogeny. Over the course of development, the
positive manifold emerges because of mutually beneficial
interactions between these initially independent processes.
To the extent that one agrees to equate general intelligence
with the positive manifold, the mutualism model may be
viewed as a model of general intelligence for human and
nonhuman animals in which variation between species
would reflect the extent to which mutually beneficial
interactions between cognitive processes arise during
development. Because, across species, bigger brains
require more time to mature than smaller brains (Schuppli
et al. 2012), and thus have more opportunities to develop
such mutually beneficial interactions, such a scenario is
compatible with an evolutionary perspective.
1.1.2. Executive functions and intelligence. Closely related
to general intelligence are executive functions, or EFs
(Barbey et al. 2012; Blair 2006). EFs refer to “general-
purpose control mechanisms that modulate the operation
of various cognitive subprocesses and thereby regulate the
dynamics of human cognition” (Miyake et al. 2000, p. 50).
In other words, they are “a family of top-down mental pro-
cesses needed when you have to concentrate and pay atten-
tion, when going on automatic or relying on instinct or
intuition would be ill-advised, insufficient, or impossible”
(Diamond 2013, p. 136). Three core EFs can be distin-
guished, namely inhibitory control (behavioral inhibition,
cognitive inhibition, and selective attention), working
memory (Baddeley 2010), and cognitive flexibility.
Various measures of EFs have shown strong correlations
with g/gf. Whereas the average correlation between
working memory and g is 0.72, in some studies using
latent variable analysis, it even reached identity (Colom
et al. 2005; Nisbett et al. 2012), leading some authors to
suggest that the two cannot be distinguished from each
other (Royall & Palmer 2014). That g and EF are closely
related is consistent with two further lines of evidence.
First, working memory can be trained, and these training
gains can translate into gains in general intelligence even
though not all procedures are effective, and it is not
always clear whether the training affects working memory
per se or instead improves learning strategies (reviewed
in Klingberg 2010; Morrison & Chein 2011; Nisbett et al.
2012; Shipstead et al. 2012). Second, growing up bilin-
gually, which makes high demands on a variety of EFs on
a routine basis, is associated with stronger EFs in non-lin-
guistic contexts, and thus with g (Abutalebi & Clahsen
2015; Bialystok et al. 2012; Rabipour & Raz 2012). None-
theless, because EFs do not provide the logical problem-
solving functions and learning that are the hallmark of
general intelligence (Embretson 1995), some aspects of
general intelligence are independent of EFs.
In sum, evidence for domain-general intelligence in
humans, estimated by the first factor derived in psychomet-
ric, factor-analytical approaches, is pervasive, and is backed
up by neurobiological evidence and various correlates of
life-outcome measures. The psychometrically derived g
factor is thus consistent with the broad notion of general
intelligence, which stresses reasoning ability and behavioral
flexibility and invokes cognitive processes such as learning
and remembering, planning, and executive functions. This
conclusion raises the question of the evolutionary origin of
general intelligence in humans, which we will address by
reviewing recent developments in the nonhuman literature.
To do so, we will review evidence for g in animals, and
whether it is warranted to assume that g in animals is also
consistent with a broader notion of general intelligence.
Intelligent behavior needs to be distinguished from
behavior that may appear intelligent but lacks flexibility
(Shettleworth 2012a). Intelligent behavior in animals is
often referred to as behavior that shows some degree of
flexibility and emanates from some kind of mental
Burkart et al.: The evolution of general intelligence
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representation rather than immediate perception only
(Tomasello & Call 1997). For instance, when digging
wasps are interrupted anywhere in the sequence of
actions involved in measuring the size of a hole to place a
larva together with a prey item into it, they must start
again at the very beginning of the behavioral sequence
(Wooldridge 1968). Thus, many behaviors that at first
sight look like they are the product of reasoning or learning
turn out to be inflexible adaptations or modules (Sherry
2006). A collection of such dedicated adaptations presum-
ably represents the ancestral state (e.g., Shettleworth
2012a; 2012b), and thus the null model against which the
hypothesis of general intelligence has to be tested. Before
turning to nonhuman animals, we will therefore provide
an overview of domain-specific, modular conceptions of
the mind that have been put forward particularly, but not
exclusively, by evolutionary psychologists.
1.2. Cognitive adaptations and domain specificity
A domain-general factor of intelligence can be contrasted
with domain-specific cognitive mechanisms or adaptive
specializations (Cosmides & Tooby 2002). The basic idea
is that whenever a fitness-relevant cognitive problem
arises repeatedly and predictably over long periods of
time in a given species, natural selection favors a genetically
based, developmentally canalized (“hardwired”) solution to
this problem. For instance, natural selection may provide a
species with a particularly strong spatial memory to retrieve
stored food, without endowing it with more-powerful cog-
nitive capacities in other contexts (Sherry 2006). Impor-
tantly, domain-specific mechanisms cannot be used in
domains other than the ones for which they evolved,
whereas domain-general mechanisms can be used to
solve problems across domains.
Thus, themind of animals, including humans, can be con-
ceived of as a collection of adaptive specializations, often
construed as modules, each of which evolved to solve a spe-
cific adaptive problem (Duchaine et al. 2001). Notice that a
minduniquelymade upof these kinds of specific adaptations
is arguably incompatible with standard accounts of intelli-
gence, because virtually no learning and flexibility are
involved. Similarly, none of these specific cognitive adapta-
tions require the presence of the domain-general processes
underlying intelligence such as executive functions.
1.2.1. Modularity and general intelligence. A modular
organization of mind is particularly appealing to evolution-
ary thinking because modular systems allow parts to be
removed, added, or modified without affecting the function
of the structure as a whole. Therefore, modular systems
may be more evolvable or even the only evolvable
systems (Clune et al. 2013; Pavlicev & Wagner 2012;
Ploeger & Galis 2011; Schlosser & Wagner 2004; Shettle-
worth 2012b). Thus, whenever conditions are sufficiently
stable or at least predictable across generations, natural
selection should favor solving recurrent fitness problems
via modules rather than via general cognitive processes,
because the former solve these problems on average
quickly, effortlessly, and efficiently (Cosmides et al. 2010)
and can presumably evolve more readily. General
intelligence, in contrast, is thus expected to evolve under
conditions of social or environmental unpredictability.
Solutions to these evolutionarily novel problems have to
be acquired effortfully, via slow learning (e.g., Geary
2005; Geary & Huffman 2002).
The advantages of a modular solution to recurrent fitness
problems, however, are not necessarily as straightforward.
First, the fundamental assumption that a modular solution
is indeed more evolvable can be questioned on both empir-
ical and conceptual grounds (e.g., Anderson & Finlay 2014;
Bolhuis et al. 2011; d’Souza & Karmiloff-Smith 2011;
Lefebvre 2014). Empirical evidence for a direct mapping
of specialized adaptive behavioral functions to specific
modular neural units is actually rare, even for neural
systems as simple as those of invertebrates. Novel adaptive
functions seem mostly to be achieved via massive re-use of
neural tissue rather than via the addition of encapsulated
neuronal pools. Conceptually, the evolvability argument
seems largely incompatible with what is known about
short-term neuromodulation, brain plasticity over the life
span, response to damage, and ontogenetic principles of
brain development. The a priori evolvability argument,
therefore, does not lead to an unambiguous conclusion as
to the superiority of domain-specific over domain-general
organization.
Second, the other advantage of modularity – fast, effort-
less, and ultimately efficient solving of evolutionarily recur-
rent fitness problems –may hold only for particular notions
of modularity, such as Fodorian modules (Fodor 1983).
These are thought to be domain-specific functional units
that process distinctive input stimuli using distinctive
mechanisms. In particular, a module is thought to exclu-
sively process information from a specific domain and to
produce a correspondingly specific output in the form of
representations and/or a behavioral response. Fodor
listed criteria that must – at least to “some interesting
extent” (Fodor 1983, p. 37) – be fulfilled by a functional
unit to qualify as modular. These criteria include domain
specificity, mandatory processing, high speed, production
of shallow outputs (i.e., not requiring extensive processing),
limited accessibility, a characteristic ontogeny (reliable
emergence without explicit learning), a fixed neural archi-
tecture, and informational encapsulation (meaning it is
not affected by other cognitive processes, a criterion
thought to be particularly important). Paradigmatic exam-
ples of Fodorian modules are optical illusions. Accordingly,
the presence of modules involving the processing of
sensory information is widely accepted, and that their
speed and efficiency are beneficial is obvious. However, a
modular organization has also been proposed for more
higher-level cognitive processes including ones related to
folk psychology (e.g., processing of faces and facial expres-
sions, theory of mind, cheater detection), folk biology (e.g.,
animate-inanimate distinction, flora-fauna), or folk physics
(e.g., movement trajectories, gravity biases, representation
of space, solidity, and causality; summarized in Geary
2005). Indeed, massive modularity accounts hold that the
mind is exclusively made up of modules (Barrett 2015; Car-
ruthers 2005; Sperber 2001).
Massive modularity would appear to be irreconcilable
with general intelligence (and therefore with the ability to
solve evolutionarily novel problems), but much of the long-
standing controversy about the massive modularity hypoth-
esis of the human mind comes down to the use of different
notions of modularity (see also Barrett & Kurzban 2006).
Indeed, a variety of highly divergent notions have devel-
oped (Barrett 2015; Barrett & Kurzban 2012; Chiappe &
Burkart et al.: The evolution of general intelligence
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Gardner 2012; Coltheart 2011; Grossi 2014; Mahon &
Cantlon 2011), and many of these are much broader than
the Fodorian one (e.g., Sternberg 2011). Because they
also encompass the possibility of overarching, central
control processes (Carruthers 2011), they are entirely com-
patible with the coexistence of domain-general processes
and general intelligence (Barrett 2015; Carruthers 2011).
In fact, Carruthers (2011) argued that most modules are
specialized learning systems. Such broad notions of modu-
larity, however, arguably no longer support the original idea
of automatically providing fast and frugal solutions to recur-
rent fitness problems.
Unlike many proponents of massive modularity in
humans, comparative behavioral biologists and compara-
tive psychologists typically refer to notions of modularity
that hew closely to the classical Fodorian modules, that is,
dedicated, inflexible cognitive adaptations that have evolved
in response to specific recurrent fitness-relevant problems
(e.g., Fernandes et al. 2014; Shettleworth 2012a; 2012b).
Functional specialization here is mostly used in the biological,
ultimate sense – that is, referring to the specific adaptive
pressures that gave rise to the evolution of specific dedicated
modules. This perspective is grounded in research traditions
such as neuroecology (Sherry 2006) that have provided
empirical evidence for the occurrence among animals of ded-
icated cognitive adaptations, such as spatio-temporal memory
abilities in food-caching species, birds in particular (Brodin
2010; Pravosudov & Roth 2013). These cognitive adaptations
typically do not generalize to problems for which they did not
evolve.
A mind composed of such dedicated adaptations repre-
sents a plausible null model, and indeed a plausible ances-
tral state of vertebrate cognition. Dedicated adaptations
and general intelligence can obviously coexist (e.g., Cos-
mides et al. 2010; Geary 2005) – for instance, when the
output of modules serve as inputs for intelligent reasoning,
which may be responsible for the fact that in humans
general intelligence predicts reasoning ability even in evo-
lutionarily familiar contexts (Kaufman et al. 2011). The
key questions with respect to the evolution of general intel-
ligence, therefore, are how central, domain-general pro-
cesses could evolve on top of domain-specific adaptations,
whether and to what extent they also exist in nonhuman
animals, and what adaptive benefits drove their evolution.
1.2.2. Adaptive canalization beyond modularity. Strictly
domain-general approaches that construe the mind as a
general-purpose computer face several well-known prob-
lems (Cosmides & Tooby 1994; Cosmides et al. 2010;
Frankenhuis & Ploeger 2007; Heyes 2003; Kolodny et al.
2015; see also Table 1). First, an agent has to efficiently
identify relevant information and filter out irrelevant infor-
mation in the process of problem solving, a challenge
known as the frame problem. Second, once the relevant
information has been identified, the agent has to decide
what to do with it. To do so, she has to solve the problem
of how to pick and combine correct, adaptive behavioral
options or cognitive processes out of an exponentially
growing number of possibilities (the problem of the combi-
natorial explosion) or to learn important associations and
skills in a limited period of time despite dealing with rele-
vant stimuli that occur at a low rate (the poverty of the stim-
ulus problem). Third, correct responses have to be made
quickly and efficiently (the urgency problem). And
fourth, while doing so, the agent has to find general,
rather than only locally successful, solutions (the function-
ality problem). It is thus beyond doubt that some canaliza-
tion of cognitive processes is necessary.
Evolved Fodorian modules (referred to as “cognitive
adaptations” by behavioral biologists and neuroecologists)
are clearly one way of solving the problems highlighted pre-
viously, in particular when they define the entire sequence
from the acquisition of information to the adaptive behavio-
ral response.However, they are not necessarily the only pos-
sible way, and natural selection may also overcome these
problems in a different way that would allow domain-
general abilities to evolve. A straightforward solution to
this problemwouldbe that domain-general abilities coevolve
together with adaptive canalizing mechanisms that guide
how general abilities are applied. Canalizing mechanisms
can have a phylogenetic origin, such as a genetically prede-
termined preference for a certain category of stimuli: for
example, the preference for faces in human infants (Shah
et al. 2015). Alternatively, they can have an ontogenetic
origin, such as the propensity of chimpanzees from tool-
using communities to automatically perceive a stick as a
potential tool, compared to genetically indistinguishable
chimpanzees from non-tool-using communities who do not
recognize this affordance (e.g., Gruber et al. 2011).
Table 1 summarizes the phylogenetic and ontogenetic
canalizing mechanisms that ensure that domain-general
cognition produces adaptive behavior despite the problems
highlighted previously. Unlike Fodorian modules, these
mechanisms do not define the entire sequence from
signal detection to behavioral output, but may be deployed
at different stages during information processing. We will
now examine the evidence for such domain-general canali-
zation processes.
The first problem an individual faces is what to attend to
in the continuous stream of stimuli coming in from differ-
ent sensory modalities. This can be solved by innate dispo-
sitions or data acquisition mechanisms (also referred to as
phylogenetic inflection: Heyes 2003). Importantly here,
innateness is not equivalent to inflexibility because innate
dispositions to pay attention to one stimulus over another
can be conditional. For instance, an animal foraging for
berries may have an attentional bias to perceive small red
entities, but the same animal when exposed to a raptor
will be biased to perceive only potential hideouts. Alterna-
tively, animals can learn ontogenetically which targets are
particularly worth attending to (ontogenetic inflection).
Here, social guidance of attention may play a particularly
important role. Ontogenetic inflection automatically arises
whenever immatures follow the mother and later other
conspecifics, and is even more powerful in species that
follow gaze (Shepherd 2010). In many species, including
humans, immatures are particularly attracted to everything
conspecifics are interacting with, and immatures of some
species, such as aye-ayes (Krakauer 2005), marmoset
monkeys (Voelkl et al. 2006), or orangutans (Forss et al.
2015) are highly neophobic toward stimuli they have not
witnessed their mother or other familiar conspecifics inter-
act with. Natural selection can, therefore, favor the disposi-
tion to preferentially use social information to decide which
stimuli to attend to, and thus leave the specific target of
attention largely unspecified.
In a second step, the individual has to “decide” what to
do with the stimuli that have captured its attention,
Burkart et al.: The evolution of general intelligence
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because input mechanisms filter incoming stimuli but do
not produce behavior. Subsequent processes are therefore
required to determine what to do with these stimuli
without being stymied by the problems of poverty of stim-
ulus and the combinatorial explosion. First, in the case of
phylogenetic inflection, coevolution of input mechanisms
and response tendencies is frequent (Lotem & Halpern
2012), as when a moving stimulus in the sky automatically
triggers a flight reaction, but also when individuals are
more likely to associate a snake (but not a flower) with fear
(Cook &Mineka 1989), or a taste (but not an auditory stim-
ulus) with subsequent nausea (known as biologically pre-
pared learning or the Garcia effect: Garcia & Koelling
1966). Second, in the case of ontogenetic inflection, social
learning can also affect how the individual processes a stim-
ulus that has come to its attention. Third, the stimuli that
have attracted an individual’s attention may be integrated
with innate bodies of knowledge, so-called core knowledge
(Gelman 1990; Spelke & Kinzler 2007) or psychological
primitives (Samuels 2004), and so give rise tomore elaborate
skills and conceptual systems (Carey 2009).
A third problem for the individual is that decisions often
have to be made under time pressure (the urgency
problem). Evolved modules, heuristics, or direct and reflex-
ive triggering of responses are particularly good at providing
fast responses because they bypass central processes. But
quick and efficient responses can also be achieved in evolu-
tionarily novel contexts, such as solving algebraic equations
or playing chess, if a learned heuristic approach becomes
an automated subroutine and can be applied effortlessly
(Bilalic ́ et al. 2011; Chang 2014). Such problem solving
has similar surface properties to modular organization
sensuFodor. This fact has sometimes led to conceptual mis-
understandings (see also section 1.2.3), and is relevant for
approaches that try to identify domain-general processes
in nonhuman animals (see also section 2.4.3).
A final potential problem is that developmentally
acquired response tendencies may be successful in
solving local problems, but nevertheless may not ultimately
help an individual survive and reproduce (the functionality
problem). Individuals, be they animals or humans, typically
do not represent ultimate fitness goals in their everyday
behavior. Rather, they pursue a set of innate psychological
goals, which on average results in fitness-enhancing behav-
iors (Tinbergen 1963) but may become maladaptive in
environments other than the one in which the goals
evolved, as shown by our strong preferences for sweet,
fatty, and salty foods. However, innate goals may be mod-
ified or supplemented by socially acquired end-state prefer-
ences. For immatures, who are most strongly affected by
the canalization problems listed in Table 1, copying suc-
cessful adult individuals is widespread and generally
results in adaptive behavior because they are copying indi-
viduals who have survived until adulthood and managed to
reproduce. Socially acquired end-state preferences and
goals are particularly widespread in humans, who are
highly susceptible to conformity and prestige biases
(Dean et al. 2014; Richerson et al. 2016). Increasing evi-
dence also suggests the existence of such biases in at least
some nonhuman primates and birds (Aplin et al. 2015;
Kendal et al. 2015; Luncz & Boesch 2014; van de Waal
et al. 2013).
Table 1. Overview of some specific problems that a domain-general cognitive apparatus has to overcome in order to produce ultimately
adaptive behavior, as well as potential solutions – that is, adaptive canalization mechanisms. Note that these solutions may be very general
themselves, such as a preference for social learning. See text for references.
Problem Domain-General Canalization Processes Examples
The frame problem:
What to attend to?
Input filters (phylogenetic inflection) Facilitated detection of small red entities
(when hungry) or dark openings (when
chased)
Socially guided attention (ontogenetic
inflection)
Immatures following mothers, or following
mothers’ gaze
Problems of combinatorial explosion
and poverty of stimulus
What to do with the information?
Direct triggering, prepared learning Flight reactions, learning to be fearful of
snakes but not flowers
Socially guided learning Copying how to extract food from a matrix
Integration with core knowledge1 Embedding the expectation that objects
always fall down in a straight line (gravity
bias) with knowledge of solidity
The urgency problem:
How to reach a quick, efficient response?




Learned heuristics to solve algebraic
equations (secondary modules)
The functionality problem:
How to find generally, not only locally,
successful solutions?
Innate goals Innate template of a safe burrow, or of good
food
Socially acquired end-state preferences Learning by following mother what a good
sleeping place is; copying the goals of
successful individuals, conformity biases
1That is, evolved cognitive domains that are fleshed out with experience; for example, Gelman (1990).
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Despite being incomplete, Table 1 serves to highlight
that adaptive canalization of cognition not involving Fodor-
ian modules is possible, indeed potentially quite frequent.
It also highlights the prominent reliance on social inputs
to overcome the canalization problems inherent to
domain-general mechanisms. Social learning is broadly
defined in the animal literature – that is, learning influ-
enced by observation of, or interaction with, another
animal or its products (Heyes 1994; see also Box 1984). It
is widespread in the animal kingdom, both in vertebrates
and invertebrates, and ranges from processes as simple as
social facilitation and enhancement learning to observa-
tional forms of social learning such as true imitation (e.g.,
Hoppitt & Laland 2013). Interestingly, it is increasingly
assumed that many of the cognitive mechanisms involved
in social learning are of a general nature rather than special-
ized, and are thus not specific to social learning (Behrens
et al. 2008; Heyes 2012; 2016). Indeed, all forms of social
learning also include a major element of individual learn-
ing. This is most evident in forms such as stimulus enhance-
ment, where the attention of a naïve individual is drawn to
stimuli other individuals are interacting with, which then
releases individual exploration, play, and trial-and-error
learning with this stimulus. Individual learning and prac-
tice, however, are also involved in the acquisition of skills
through imitation learning, whereby it is typical that, after
observation, a phase of individual practice is required
(Galef 2015; Jaeggi et al. 2010; Schuppli et al. 2016).
Thus, natural selection for social learning seems to auto-
matically trigger selection on individual learning and
general cognitive ability, suggesting that ontogenetic cana-
lization through social learning may have contributed to
enabling the evolution of domain-general cognition, an
issue to which we return in section 3.3.
1.2.3. Primary and secondary modularization, and
implications for general intelligence in nonhuman
animals. Evolved Fodorian modules have specific surface
properties: they work fast, effortlessly, and automatically,
and they do not require significant amounts of executive
control and working memory. Nevertheless, identifying
modules in animals based on these properties is problem-
atic because skills, capabilities, and solutions to problems
that are acquired through effortful problem solving and
learning based on general cognitive processes may
become automatized over time, a process we refer to as
secondary modularization. After such secondary modulari-
zation, or automatization, these skills have many of the
surface properties in common with primary, evolved
Fodorian modules. Note that this distinction in primary
and secondary modularization is analogous to the distinc-
tion in primary and secondary cognitive abilities by Geary
(1995), but whereas the latter has been developed specifi-
cally for humans, the former is thought to apply to a
broad array of animal species.
Despite the similarities in surface properties, primary
and secondary modules differ fundamentally with regard
to their origin (see Table 2): Primary modules are
evolved adaptations with canalized, buffered development,
whereas secondary modules represent ontogenetically
acquired skills that were automatized during ontogeny. In
fact, secondary modularization is particularly common
during the immature period (d’Souza & Karmiloff-Smith
2011). A consequence of the different etiology of primary
and secondary modules is that the latter are more variable
in their content and distribution across individuals or pop-
ulations of the same species. Because little is known about
the ontogeny of many of the specialized cognitive modules
postulated for humans (Geary 2005), we should also
acknowledge the possibility that some or all of these are
secondary rather than primary (Anderson & Finlay 2014)
or at least subject to experiential influences. For instance,
even some prototypical modules such as those involved in
face perception depend on experience (Dahl et al. 2014).
The implication for the question of general intelligence
in nonhuman animals is that it is no longer possible to
uniquely rely on surface properties such as speed, effort,
efficiency, and reliability to infer the presence of evolved
domain-specific modules, because secondary modules
have similar properties. Instead, a better diagnostic tool
Table 2. Primary and secondary modules differ with regard to their etiology and development, which has implications for their content
and distribution within a species or population
Type of Module Etiology Development Content of Skills Distribution Examples













































1Greenough et al. (1987).
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for the presence of general cognitive abilities is the pres-
ence of variable skill profiles across individuals and geneti-
cally similar populations due to secondary modularization
(see section 2.4.3).
We have shown that human cognition involves elements
of domain-specific and domain-general processes, but that
the same can potentially be true for animals as well. Hence,
animal minds need not be bundles of specialized cognitive
adaptations. Having thus leveled the playing field, we first,
in section 2, review recent evidence for whether a positive
manifold (g) is present in nonhuman animals at all, and if
so, how such a g factor is best explained. In particular, we
will focus on the question whether such psychometric
intelligence shows any of the features usually referred
to as general intelligence. Even if we can be confident
that this is the case in humans, whether the same applies
to animals must be an empirical question (Galsworthy
et al. 2014), and we highlight different research
strategies that may prove to be fruitful in the future.
In section 3, we then use this pattern of results to
examine the ultimate evolutionary question of why
general intelligence evolved, and which selection pressures
may have favored it.
2. General intelligence in nonhuman animals?
Unless general intelligence is inextricably linked to lan-
guage, considerations of evolutionary continuity suggest
that nonhuman animals, especially our closest extant rela-
tives, the great apes, may well possess it too, at least to
some extent. The presence of evidence for executive func-
tions in animals (Chudasama 2011) supports this conten-
tion, as does the overall flexibility of brains in animals,
both during development and as response to experience,
including the training of cognitive skills (Johansen-Berg
2007; Kolb & Gibb 2015; Matsunaga et al. 2015; Sale
et al. 2014). According to most neurobiologists, such devel-
opmental plasticity is incompatible with purely domain-
specific descriptions of cognitive abilities (Anderson &
Finlay 2014; Prinz 2006; Quartz 2003). Nonetheless, evolu-
tionary plausibility does not amount to empirical evidence,
to which we turn now.
The question of whether general intelligence is unique to
humans has typically been addressed by asking whether we
find a positive manifold or psychometric intelligence, by
following two complementary approaches: First, within a
given species, in analogy to human studies, psychometric
test batteries have been applied to many individuals.
Second, broad comparative analyses (both experimental
and meta-analytical) have been conducted across species
to investigate whether species differ from each other in
general intelligence, rather than in specific cognitive adap-
tations. In addition, some studies have simultaneously ana-
lyzed intraspecific and interspecific variation in cognitive
performance. In the following subsections, we first give
an overview of these studies. We refer to general factors
extracted from intraspecific studies as g, and to those
extracted from interspecific studies as G. We then critically
assess to what extent alternative explanations may
account for the findings, and formulate criteria for future
studies that should help pin down to what extent a statisti-
cally derived g/G factor reflects general intelligence as
broadly defined.
2.1. Intraspecific studies of psychometric intelligence: g
Interest in the question of whether general intelligence
may be found in nonhuman animals briefly spiked in the
1930s and 1940s (Locurto & Scanlon 1998), after Spear-
man’s g factor (Spearman 1927) had become widely
known. These studies reported positive correlations
across various types of tasks, but predominantly concerned
mazes and mostly in non-primate species such as mice, rats,
and chicks (Locurto 1997). Because the model of a hierar-
chical structure of human cognition and the methodologi-
cal tools to detect it became widely available only in the
late 1940s, the design of these early studies was often not
suitable to detect g or any factor structure.
For the next half century, the question of animal general
intelligence was largely ignored, with interest resurging
only after the late 1990s, mainly focusing on mice and pri-
mates. Table 3 provides an overview of these studies that
have assessed and analyzed correlated performance across
three or more cognitive tasks within subjects of the same
species, for rodents, primates, and other species (see also
Bouchard 2014; Chabris 2007; Galsworthy et al. 2014;
Matzel et al. 2013).
In rodents, robust evidence for g is available from a range
of studies, mostly on mice, from test batteries including as
many as eight different tasks and various regimes of princi-
pal component analysis (e.g., reviewed in Bouchard 2014;
Galsworthy et al. 2014; Matzel et al. 2011b; but see
Locurto et al. 2003; 2006). In general, g explains between
30% and 40% of variation in cognitive performance, and
in rats, it is positively correlated with brain size (Anderson
1993). Moreover, heritability estimates of up to 40% have
been reported (Galsworthy et al. 2005). Test batteries
often include typical, rather basic learning tasks, such as
associative fear conditioning, operant avoidance, path inte-
gration, odor discrimination, and spatial navigation. Never-
theless, as in humans, the derived g factors have been
shown to covary with executive functions, such as selective
attention (Kolata et al. 2007; Matzel et al. 2011a) and
working memory (particularly working memory capacity:
Kolata et al. 2005; Matzel et al. 2008; Sauce et al. 2014)
as well as performance in tests of reasoning. For instance,
g derived from a standard mouse test battery predicted per-
formance in inductive (finding efficient search strategies in
a complex maze) and deductive reasoning (inferring the
meaning of a novel item by exclusion, i.e., “fast
mapping”: Wass et al. 2012). Working memory training
did increase g (Light et al. 2010; Matzel et al. 2011a),
mainly through its positive effect on selective attention
(Light et al. 2010; see also Sauce et al. 2014). Importantly,
g did not simply capture fear and stress reactivity (Matzel
et al. 2006), anxiety (Galsworthy et al. 2002), or other
lower-level biological processes such as sensory or motor
abilities (Matzel et al. 2006). In sum, for rodents, the
finding of a first component in cognitive test batteries
that corresponds to g is robust, and several implications
of its presence have been confirmed.
In nonhuman primates, only a handful of studies on the
consistency of individual-level differences in cognitive tasks
are available. Herndon et al. (1997) were interested in clas-
sifying patterns of age-related cognitive decline in adult
rhesus macaques, an Old World monkey species. They
found a first PCA factor that explained 48% of the variance
in cognitive performance and on which all six tasks loaded
Burkart et al.: The evolution of general intelligence
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Table 3. Intraspecific studies that have assessed and analyzed correlated performance across at least three cognitive tasks within subjects of the same species, for rodents, primates,
and other species
Species (n) Test Battery Key Findings and Conclusion Reference
Rodents Rats (22 + 201) 4 tasks: attention to novelty, speed, and accuracy of reasoning
(8-arm radial maze), response flexibility (detour problem)




strains: 34 + 41)
5 water escape tasks: route learning (Hebb-Williams maze),
use of spatial navigational cues (Morris water maze), spatial
reversal learning and visual reversal learning (T-maze), place
learning (4-arm maze); plus activity control task
Evidence for g in both strains (explaining 61% and 55% of
variance in the latency measures, and 28% and 37% in
the error measures); authors stress limited implication
for g because mainly spatial tasks were used; activity
loads on first factor in strain A but not in strain B.
Locurto and Scanlon
(1998)
Mice (40) 6 tasks: curiosity (spontaneous alternation in T-maze), route
learning (Hebb-Williams maze), use of spatial navigational
cues (Morris water maze), detour problem (burrowing task),
contextual memory, plug puzzle; plus anxiety in new
environments (open field)




Mice (60) 6 tasks: route learning (Hebb-Williams), place learning (plus
maze), and a set of detour problems; 3 working memory
tasks (8-arm radial maze, 4 × 4 radial maze, visual non-
matching to sample), plus 3 activity and stress control tasks
No evidence for g (first factor explains 19.4% of variance,
control tasks included in PCA).
Locurto et al. (2003)
Mice (56) Standard mouse battery of 5 tasks: associative fear
conditioning, operant avoidance, path integration (Lashley
III maze), odor discrimination, and spatial navigation
(spatial water maze) plus open field exploration task
Evidence for g (explaining 38% of variance); exploration
propensity related to individual learning ability.
Matzel et al. (2003)
Mice (21) Variant of standard mouse battery plus exploration task (open
field), long-term retention (retest in Lashley III maze after
30 days) and working memory task (simultaneous
performance in two 8-arm radial mazes)
Evidence for g (explaining 43% of variance); g covaried
with exploration and working memory capacity but not
with long-term retention.
Kolata et al. (2005)
Mice (84 unrelated,1
and 167 siblings)
Tasks fromGalsworthy et al. (2002) plus object exploration and
2nd problem-solving task
Evidence for g (explaining 23%–41% of variance);
g showed sibling correlations of 0.17–0.21 and an
estimated heritability of 40% (upper limit).
Galsworthy et al.
(2005)
Mice (47 + 51) Exp. 1: 5 tasks: detour, win-shift, olfactory discrimination, fear
conditioning, and operant acquisition; plus open field and
light-dark control tasks
Exp. 2: similar but optimized task battery (same detour and
fear conditioning but 3 new tasks, including working
memory); same control tasks
Evidence for g (explaining 28%–34% of variance) but only
after removing control procedures from the analysis;
g was stronger in the second experiment.
Locurto et al. (2006)
Mice (43) Standard mouse battery; plus 21 tests of exploratory behavior,
sensory/motor function (e.g., running and swimming speed,
balance tasks, grip strength) and fitness, emotionality, and
hormonal and behavioral stress reactivity
Evidence for g (explaining 32% of variance); open field
exploration and 7 other explorative behaviors also loaded
on this first factor, but g was not correlated with general
activity, sensory/motor function, physical characteristics,
or direct measures of fear; lower-level biological
properties loaded weakly and inconsistently on g.
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Table 3 (Continued)
Species (n) Test Battery Key Findings and Conclusion Reference
Mice (27) Standard mouse battery; plus selective attention (complex
discrimination), short-term memory capacity (nonspatial
radial arm maze), short-term memory duration (delayed
reinforced alternation)
Evidence for g (explaining 44% of variance); g was most
strongly correlated with selective attention, followed by
simple memory capacity and only weakly with short-term
memory duration.
Kolata et al. (2007)
Balb/C Mice (56) Standard mouse battery plus working memory span and
capacity, and 12 non-cognitive tests of unlearned behaviors
and fitness
Evidence for g (explaining 31% of variance); old subjects
(19–21 months of age) had lower g than young ones (3–5
months of age) but also showed higher variability.
Working memory capacity and duration explained
variance in g, and particularly so in old mice. Old mice
with age-related cognitive decline had increased body
weight and decreased activity. Some non-cognitive
variables were also correlated with g.
Matzel et al. (2008)
Mice (69) Standard mouse battery as adults; plus extensive exposure to
12 novel environments prior to testing
Evidence for g (explaining 27% of variance); exposure to
novelty as juveniles (from 39 days of age) and young
adults (from 61 days of age) increased exploration but did
not affect g compared to control groups when tested as
adults (from 79 days of age).
Light et al. (2008)
Mice (241) Standard mouse battery; subsample of 78 subjects also tested
with 2 additional spatial tasks (win-stay and reinforced
alternation)
Evidence for g (explaining 38% of variation); identification
of an additional domain-specific factor for tasks that
depended on hippocampal/spatial processing in
subsample.
Kolata et al. (2008)
Mice (60) Standard mouse battery; plus prefrontal cortex gene
expression profiles
Evidence for g (explaining 41%–42% of variance);
dopaminergic genes plus one vascular gene significantly
correlated with g; D1-mediated dopamine signaling in
the prefrontal cortex was predictive of g, arguably
through its modulation of working memory.
Kolata et al. (2010)
Mice (29) Standard mouse battery; plus extensive training on short-term
memory duration and working memory capacity, and a
selective attention task (Mouse-Stroop)
Evidence for g (explaining 30% of variance); working
memory training promoted g, largely but not exclusively
via increased selective attention; effects were smaller
when selective attention load of training task was
reduced.
Light et al. (2010)
Mice (42) Standard mouse battery: plus 2 exploration tasks (open field
and novel environments)
Evidence for g (explaining 40% of variance); link between g
and exploration propensity was mediated by different
rates of habituation in high vs. low g subjects.
Light et al. (2011),
experiment 2
Mice (26) 5 tasks: acquisition of three learning tasks (passive avoidance,
shuttle avoidance, reinforced alternation), reversal learning,
and selective attention; plus longitudinal working memory
training (radial arm maze task with overlapping cues, various
regimes) and four non-cognitive variables
Evidence for g (explaining 26%–37% of variance);
longitudinal working memory training prevented age-
related decline of attention, learning abilities, and
cognitive flexibility; non-cognitive variables loaded
moderately to weakly on g and in a non-consistent
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Mice (47) Standard mouse battery; plus deductive reasoning (inferring by
exclusion: fast mapping) and inductive reasoning (efficient
search strategy)
Evidence for g (explaining 27%–32% of variance);
g correlated with inductive and deductive reasoning
performance.
Wass et al. (2012)
Mice (26) 4 learning tasks: odor discrimination, reinforced alternation,
fear conditioning, radial arm maze plus attention battery
consisting of 4 tasks: Mouse-Stroop (conflicting visual and
olfactory cues), T-maze reversal, coupled latent inhibition,
and dual radial arm maze
Evidence for g (explaining 37% of variance); different types
of attention (external: selective attention; internal:
inhibition) contributed independently to variation in g.
Sauce et al. (2014)
Primates Rhesus macaques
(30+23)
6 non-social tasks (n = 30): delayed non-matching to sample
(acquisition time and performance after 120 sec delay),
delayed recognition span task (spatial and color condition),
and reversal learning task (spatial and object condition)
Evidence for g (explaining 48% of variance), g but none
of the other two extracted factors declined with age.
Age groups (age in years): young adults (<15), early-aged
(19–23), advanced aged (24–28), and oldest aged (≥29).
Herndon et al. (1997)
Subset of the 6 tasks above (n = 53): acquisition and 120″
performance in delayed non-matching to sample, spatial
delayed recognition span
Evidence for g (explaining 62% of variance); g declined
with age and was strongly correlated with g extracted
from the full test battery.
Cotton-top
tamarins (22)
11 mostly non-social tasks3: 10 from the physical domain, 1
from the social domain
Evidence for g (Bayesian latent variable approach) but no
additional group factors (domains).




15 of the 16 tasks of the PCTB4 from the physical and social
domain (tool use excluded)
Confirmatory factor analysis revealed different factor
structures for chimpanzees (factor 1: spatial tasks; factor
2: some physical and some socio-cognitive tasks) and
children (factor 1: spatial tasks; factor 2: some physical
tasks; factor 3: 6 social tasks);
Inconclusive regarding g for both human children and
chimpanzees because of inclusion of social domain and
low variability in performance in some of the tasks.
Herrmann et al.
(2010b)
Chimpanzees (99) 13 of the 16 tasks of the PCTB4 from the physical and social
domain (without the number addition, social learning, and
intention task)
Evidence for g (Parallel analysis); g was heritable
(heritability h2 = 0.525, p = 0.008).
Individual differences in cognitive performance and
heritability remained stable in a retest after two years
(n = 86).
Hopkins et al. (2014)
Evidence for g (loadings of tasks on first factor range from
0.048–0.607). Subtests with higher g loadings were more






Dogs (13) 3 tasks: response latencies in discrimination, reversal learning,
and visuo-spatial memory (3 delayed non-matching to
sample conditions)






6 tasks: four detour tasks, human point following, and
numerical discrimination
Evidence for g; confirmatory factor analysis on 8 variables
(4 detour performance plus speed and choice in point
and discrimination task), with latent factors navigation
speed, choice speed, and choice accuracy, best fit for
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positively. This factor, based on 30 subjects, was highly cor-
related with a factor derived from a subset of only three of
these tasks (all of which, again, loaded positively on it) in an
overlapping sample of 53 subjects. Furthermore, this puta-
tive g declined linearly with increasing age of the monkeys.
Banerjee et al. (2009) found evidence for g in a New
World monkey species, the cotton-top tamarin (Saguinus
oedipus). They tested 22 subjects with a battery consisting
of 11 tasks that assess a range of cognitive abilities such as
inhibitory control, quantity discrimination, and memory.
Owing to the relatively high number of missing individual
test scores, they used Bayesian analysis and found a g
factor but no group factors that would have corresponded
to more specialized cognitive domains (although the a
priori classification of domains is inevitably tenuous
without extensive validation; see also section 2.4).
Among great apes, evidence for g is more mixed. Herr-
mann et al. (2007) developed the Primate Cognitive Test
Battery (PCTB) consisting of 16 tasks from the physical
and the social domain, a priori placed into six categories
(i.e., space, quantities, causality, social learning, communi-
cation, and theory of mind) and applied it to 106 chimpan-
zees, 32 orangutans, and 105 two-year old human children.
Chimpanzees and human children performed equally well
(and better than orangutans) in tasks from the physical
domain, but the children outperformed both ape species
in the social domain. These results were not consistent
with g in any of the species, including human children.
To explicitly address the structure of individual differences,
Herrmann et al. (2010b) re-analyzed the data from the
chimpanzees and children in 15 of the 16 PCTB tasks
(tool use was not included) using a confirmatory PCA
(see sect. 2.4.1 for further discussion). They found a differ-
ent structure of cognitive abilities for chimpanzees (2
factors) and children (3 factors). In addition to a “Spatial”
factor in both species, only one additional “Physical-
Social” factor emerged in chimpanzees, whereas two addi-
tional factors, a “Physical” and a “Social” one, emerged in
children. The authors thus did not find evidence for g in
either chimpanzees or humans. However, human test bat-
teries typically do not include subtests assessing social cog-
nition. In fact, the relationship between general cognitive
processes and socio-cognitive processes is currently
poorly understood in humans (Korman et al. 2015). This
problem, however, does not explain the presence of two
other factors rather than a single g in human children.
More recently, Hopkins et al. (2014) tested 99 chimpan-
zees with a reduced and slightly modified version of the
PCTB consisting of 13 of the 16 tasks (including tool use
but excluding one of two quantity tasks, the social learning
task, and one theory of mind task). They report a g factor
derived from a non-rotated PCA and used quantitative
genetic analyses to estimate its heritability (h2), which was
found to be 53% and highly significant. Furthermore, the
results remained stable when 86 of the 99 chimpanzees
were retested with the same test battery after two years,
and were confirmed with parallel analysis. Woodley of
Menie et al. (2015) further analyzed the data set and con-
cluded that the more g-loaded a task is, the higher its her-
itability and phenotypical variability, as also found in
humans. The more g-loaded tasks also had higher coeffi-
cients of additive genetic variance, suggesting that cognitive
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Taken together, then, the psychometric studies in spe-
cific rodent and primate species lend increasing support
to the notion that the positive manifold is not unique to
humans but also present in nonhuman animals. Studies
on other lineages such as dogs (Arden & Adams 2016;
Nippak & Milgram 2005) and birds (Keagy et al. 2011;
Isden et al. 2013; Shaw et al. 2015) are also beginning to
provide evidence. However, a serious limitation of psycho-
metric studies in nonhuman animals is that they tend to
lack power with respect to sample size, the diversity of cog-
nitive tasks, or both. We discuss these limitations in section
2.4. Fortunately, there is a complementary approach,
which examines interspecific variation and is particularly
powerful to reveal evolutionary trends.
2.2. Interspecific studies of psychometric intelligence: G
In comparative approaches, the fundamental question is
whether some species systematically outperform others
across an array of distinct cognitive tasks, consistent with
the notion of psychometric and perhaps general intelligence,
or whether species differences are instead characterized by
independent variation in performance across tasks and
domains, consistent with higher domain specificity. Compar-
ative studies thus investigate whether what evolves are spe-
cialized skills or rather general intelligence. This approach
(Table 4) has predominantly been applied to primates but
also to birds and involves both meta-analyses and targeted
experimental comparisons.
For primates, Deaner et al. (2006) conducted a meta-
analytical study that compared the performance of 24
primate taxa tested with nine experimental physical-cogni-
tion paradigms using Bayesian hierarchical modeling
(Johnson et al. 2002). They found strong evidence for G,
which correctly predicted 85% of the species rankings
(but note that caution is needed when comparing the pro-
portion of explained variance between standard PCA and
Bayesian analyses). Moreover, in a follow-up study, G was
strongly correlated with brain size (Deaner et al. 2007).
In another set of studies, Reader and Laland (2002) col-
lected data from the literature on the incidence of innova-
tion, social learning, and tool use in 116 species of
Table 4. Interspecific, comparative studies that have assessed correlated cognitive performance across species
Species (n) Type of Study Key Finding Reference
Primate species (116) Correlation of ecologically relevant
cognitive abilities (innovation, tool
use and social learning) and volume
measures of the executive brain
(neocortex and striatum) and
brainstem (mesencephalon and
medulla oblongata)
The 3 measures were correlated
across nonhuman primate
species and with both absolute
and relative executive brain
volumes; results consistent
with G
Reader and Laland (2002)
Primate taxa (24) (3 great ape
species, 1 lesser ape, and 7
catarrhine, 6 platyrrhine, &
7 prosimian genera)
Meta-analysis of 9 experimental
paradigms (detour problems,
patterned-string problems, invisible
displacement, tool use, object
discrimination learning set, reversal
learning, oddity learning, sorting,
and delayed response) of captive
subjects using hierarchical Bayesian
latent variable analysis (Johnson et al.
2002)
Species- G explained 85% of
variance; great apes (Gorilla,
Pan, Pongo) outperformed all
other genera; G was positively
correlated with various
measures of brain size





Meta-analysis on ecologically relevant
tasks: behavioral innovation, social
learning, tool use, extractive foraging
(expanded data set from Reader &
Laland 2002), and tactical deception
(data from Byrne & Whiten 1990)
using principal component, factor,
and phylogenetic analyses
Species- G explained 65% of the
variance in cognitive
performance and covaried
with brain size. G also
covaried with results from
captive subjects: that is, the
species- G from Deaner et al.
2006 and learning
performance from Riddell &
Corl 1977)





Meta-analysis of data sets from Reader
et al. (2011, innovation, tool use,
social learning, and extractive
foraging) and Byrne and Whiten
(1990, tactical deception) using
principal axis factor analysis and unit
weighted factor analysis
Differences in cognitive abilities
among primates were
concentrated on G (explaining
almost 62% of variance), and
this effect was particularly
pronounced in catarrhines
(i.e., apes and Old World
monkeys)
Fernandes et al. (2014)
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nonhuman primates, both in captivity and in the wild, and
found that across species, all three measures were corre-
lated with each other (r2 values around 0.4), as well as
with brain size. In a follow-up study involving 62 primate
species (Reader et al. 2011), they found evidence for
general intelligence on the interspecific level (G) in princi-
pal component and factor analyses explaining 65% of the
variance, based on measures of innovation, social learning,
and tool use, as well as extractive foraging and tactical
deception. As in Reader and Laland’s (2002) earlier
study,G was correlated with brain size, but also with a com-
bined measure of performance across several learning
tasks, with learning set performance (both taken from
Riddell & Corl 1977), and the G measure of Deaner
et al. (2006).
More recently, Fernandes et al. (2014) compiled pub-
lished data from five cognitive domains (innovation, tool
use, social learning, extractive foraging, and tactical decep-
tion) across 62 primate species (data sets from Reader &
Laland 2002; and Byrne & Whiten 1990). Fernandes
et al. found that a single factor G explained almost 62%
of the total variance. Furthermore, they reported that cog-
nitive abilities that load more strongly on G show bigger
interspecific variation, weaker phylogenetic signals, and
faster rates of evolution. These results are consistent with
the idea that G has been subjected to selection pressure
stronger than narrow, more domain-specific abilities and
that G is thus the principal locus of selection in the evolu-
tion of primate intelligence (but see also section 2.5).
The only other taxon to which comparative approaches
have been applied are birds. As in primates, significant pos-
itive correlations across species were found between
innovation rates, tool use, and learning performance.
These studies also found positive correlations between
innovation rates and brain size as well as colonization
success (Ducatez et al. 2015; Lefebvre 2013; Lefebvre
et al. 2004; Sol et al. 2005).
2.3. Mixed studies combining intraspecific and
interspecific variation
Some studies have pursued a mixed approach by applying
test batteries to multiple individuals from several species
(see Table 5). For instance, Herrmann and Call (2012) ana-
lyzed data of 23 individuals from all four nonhuman great
ape species, which were studied in a range of tasks from
the physical domain, and found no support for the exis-
tence of g. Nevertheless, some subjects performed particu-
larly well (or poorly) across tasks, both in the sample of 23
great apes and in the 106 chimpanzees mentioned previ-
ously (Herrmann et al. 2010b), indicating that there was
some consistency in individual performance.
In another mixed study, Amici et al. (2012) found no evi-
dence for G or g when re-analyzing data from seven
primate species (all four great ape species, long-tailed
macaques, spider monkeys, and capuchin monkeys, totaling
99 individuals) from 17 cognitive tasks. In the Bayesian
approach used to analyze the data (see also Barney et al.
2015), the 17 tasks were a priori attributed to the
domains of inhibition, memory, transposition, and
support, similar to Herrmann et al. (2010b).
In contrast to intraspecific and interspecific studies,
mixed studies thus provide less support for psychometric
intelligence. Here, we offer a tentative suggestion to
Table 5. Mixed studies that have simultaneously analyzed correlated performance within and between species





Psychometric study using the Primate Cognitive
Test Battery (PCTB) consisting of 16 tasks
from the physical domain (space: spatial
memory, object permanence, rotation,
transposition; quantities: relative numbers,
addition numbers; causality: noise, shape, tool
use, tool properties) and the social domain
(social learning; communication:
comprehension, pointing cups, attentional
state; theory of mind: gaze following,
intentions) using analysis of variance
Chimpanzees and human
children performed
equally well (and better
than orangutans) in the
physical domain, but the
children outperformed
both ape species in the
social domain; results
not consistent with G




8 non-social tasks from various studies: spatial
knowledge (i.e., delayed response, inhibition,
A-not-B, rotations, transpositions and object
permanence), tool use (4 tests), inferential
reasoning by exclusion, quantity
discrimination, causal reasoning and color, size
and shape discrimination learning




Herrmann and Call (2012)
Chimpanzees (19),
orangutans (10),
bonobos (5), gorillas (8),
long-tailed macaques
(12), spider monkeys (18),
capuchin monkeys (27)
Re-analysis of data obtained from two
psychometric studies resulting in 17 tasks from
four physical domains (inhibition from Amici
et al. [2008; 2010], and memory, transposition,
and support from Herrmann et al. [2007]) with
captive subjects using a hierarchical Bayesian
modeling approach




Amici et al. (2012); Barney
et al. (2015)
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explain this absence of evidence for psychometric intelli-
gence in mixed studies that will need to be examined in
more detail in future work. First, despite including a
large number of individuals overall, the effective sample
size to identify g remains the number of individuals
within each species, and to identify G is the number of
species. This may strongly influence the outcome because
in mixed studies the detection of G is not based on
average species-specific performance as is done in interspe-
cific studies, but is instead based on individual values,
which are more susceptible to noise. A recent memory
task illustrates the superiority of species averages in esti-
mating abilities at the species level. In this study, both mar-
moset and squirrel monkeys as a group provided results
fitting the Ebbinghaus forgetting curve, but at the individ-
ual level, several individuals did not, indicating that the per-
formance of these individuals was strongly affected by noise
(Schubiger et al. 2016). Such noise may overshadow G,
especially in species that are very close in G.
A second issue is that in a sample of species with similar
G (e.g., according to Deaner et al. 2006), and thus both the
great ape study by Herrmann and Call (2012) and the study
by Amici et al. (2012), species-specific predispositions
linked to domain-specific adaptations may mask a G
effect. Thus, chimpanzees and orangutans are more extrac-
tion-oriented than bonobos or gorillas (van Schaik 2016), as
expressed, for instance, in species differences in tendencies
to handle objects (Koops et al. 2015), or to solve social
problems (Herrmann et al. 2010a). Such variation is
bound to produce species differences in mean performance
on some but not on other tasks, reducing the correlation
across tasks in the overall data set. Intraspecific compari-
sons obviously are not affected by this problem, whereas
the effect on interspecific comparisons is reduced the
broader the comparison in terms of G are, because major
interspecific differences in G lessen the effects of species
differences in domain-specific predispositions.
More generally, we can ask, if in a given lineage, a robust
G is found, whether this implies that all species in the com-
parison must have g, and vice versa. Several combinations
of evidence for g and G are possible, in particular in
mixed studies, as summarized in Table 6, and we discuss
likely explanations for these combinations.
The interpretation is straightforward whenever evidence
for g andG point in the same direction (see entries I and IV
in Table 6), and where it is positive for both, can be exter-
nally validated separately at both the level of g and G (see
also section 2.5). One potentially conflicting constellation is
when positive evidence for g but no evidence for G is avail-
able (as for entry II in Table 6). Such a result can arise if g is
present in only a few of the species involved in the compar-
ison, which might occur when distantly related lineages are
compared. The other conflicting constellation (entry III in
Table 6) is that comparative studies provide evidence forG,
but there is no evidence for g within the species involved in
the comparison. This was the case in some primate studies.
In principle, it is possible that we are dealing with cumula-
tive modularity and that by chance the distribution of
modules across the species included in the sample is hier-
archically nested. In this scenario, no correlation between
G and EFs or, arguably, brain size is expected, which is
inconsistent with current findings. The most likely cause
of constellation III, therefore, is lack of power of animal
studies to reliably detect the absence of g, due to the
small sample sizes and difficulties to construct a suitable
test battery, which make animal psychometric g studies
prone to Type II errors (see also section 2.4.1).
Taken together, there is increasing evidence for g in non-
human animals, particularly in mice and primates, for
which positive evidence is available for New World
monkeys, Old World monkeys, and chimpanzees (but see
Herrmann et al. 2010b). At the interspecific level based
on comparative analyses across species, studies of primates
and birds provide a robust pattern consistent with G.
Finally, mixed studies in primates that simultaneously
analyze within- and between-species variation yield a
more ambiguous pattern.
2.4. Facts or artifacts?
A legitimate concern is whether a presumptive g/G factor
can arise as an artifact, and a legitimate question is to
what, exactly, it corresponds. We now review why statistical
or methodological artifacts may produce false positives,
whereas secondary modularization may lead to false nega-
tives, and formulate criteria for future directions that may
be used to evaluate whether g/G corresponds to general
intelligence broadly defined.
2.4.1. Statistical issues. The use of PCAs or related proce-
dures involves a suite of decisions, including whether
exploratory or confirmatory analyses are applied, whether
non-rotated or rotated factors are considered, and
whether oblique or orthogonal rotations are used. A
Table 6. Summary of the potential combinations of evidence for g and G, and under what conditions apparently conflicting findings
can be reconciled
No Evidence for g Evidence for g
No evidence for G I: domain-specific cognitive abilities II: g is present in only a few of the species involved
in the comparative approach; or the involved
species are very close in G and evidence for it is
masked by variation in species-specific
predispositions
Evidence for G III: largely cumulative modularity; or artifact due
to lack of power of animal psychometric studies
IV: general intelligence, in particular if supported
by external validation of both g and G
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detailed discussion of factor-analytical procedures is far
beyond the scope of this review, and we refer readers to
the specialized literature (e.g., Barney et al. 2015; Garson
2013; Stevens 2012). However, because these decisions
may critically affect the conclusions of animal studies, we
must highlight some issues that appear relevant to the
empirical results summarized previously.
First, the use of confirmatory analyses requires an a
priori decision of what a domain is, and which tasks are
associated with the respective domains (this also applies
to Bayesian approaches that likewise categorize tasks a
priori to hypothesized domains: Amici et al. 2012; Barney
et al. 2015). The identification of domains of animal cogni-
tion, however, is not straightforward. For instance, some
classify spatial reversal learning tasks as spatial cognition
(e.g., Locurto & Scanlon 1998) whereas others stress
their inhibition component (Tapp et al. 2003). In reality,
of course, subjects may recruit several specific abilities to
solve a particular task, and in fact different subjects may
even recruit a different mix. Accordingly, Hopkins et al.
(2014) found that their exploratory PCA findings were
not entirely consistent with the a priori structure of the
PCTB originally proposed by Herrmann et al. (2007;
2010b). An a priori allocation of tasks to domains is thus
not straightforward; in fact, the structure of a species’ cog-
nition is an empirical question (see also sect. 1.1.1 for cor-
responding efforts in human intelligence research).
Accordingly, the use of confirmatory techniques may lead
to diverging results compared to analytical approaches
that are a priori agnostic with regard to factor structure.
Second, studies vary with regard to whether they present
rotated or non-rotated solutions. Because rotations are
designed to make the pattern of factor loadings more pro-
nounced, it is generally recommended to use non-rotated
solutions in g studies (Galsworthy et al. 2014; Jensen &
Weng 1994; Locurto et al. 2003; Plomin 2001; Woodley
of Menie et al. 2015). Rotated and non-rotated solutions
from the same data set are presented in Hopkins et al.
(2014) and Woodley of Menie et al. (2015). Whereas the
varimax-rotated solution (Hopkins et al. 2014, Table 1)
appeared to suggest that a general factor g was lacking,
the results of non-rotated solutions, verified by parallel
analysis, demonstrated it was in fact present.
Third, a common intuition in general intelligence studies
on animals is to compare the amount of variance explained
by a first factor, and to conclude that the higher the amount
of explained variance, the stronger the evidence for g. In
human studies, the first non-rotated factor typically
accounts for about 40% of variance (Plomin 2001), which
is in fact similar to what has been reported for mice (see
Table 3). However, an exclusive focus on the amount of
explained variance is problematic for empirical and concep-
tual reasons. Empirically, the proportion of explained vari-
ance not only depends on the statistical issues discussed
previously, but also on the heterogeneity of the subjects
in the sample: the more heterogeneous, the higher the pro-
portion of variance explained. In interspecific investiga-
tions, for instance, this means that studies that involve
species that vary widely in general intelligence and brain
size (e.g., 20 species of primates ranging from great apes
to prosimians) will find higher proportions of explained var-
iance than studies with a similar sample size, but where the
species are all relatively similar (e.g., 20 different species
from the same genus or taxonomic family). Conceptually,
to the extent that the mind is a combination of both special-
ized cognitive adaptations and domain-general processes
(see also sect. 4.1), very small proportions of explained var-
iance may still be indicative of a real g. Likewise, a first
factor with high loadings of some tasks but not others
may reflect the absence of general intelligence, but may
also reflect the co-occurrence of a general factor and one
or several additional, more specialized domains (e.g., for
spatial orientation, see Herrmann et al. 2007; see also
first PCA factor in Hopkins et al. 2014).
Last but not least, the most severe statistical restriction
of nonhuman psychometric studies is that they critically
lack power due to their small sample sizes. Reaching a
near-consensus about the structure of human intelligence
required meta-analyses involving thousands of subjects
(Carroll 1993). Obtaining sample sizes comparable to
human studies is unrealistic for most nonhuman animal
species, in particular for nonhuman primates (albeit less
so for rodents). However, replicating studies is feasible,
and if this reveals the same factorial solution in a different
set of subjects, and if combining such data sets also
increases the fit of the solution, we can be increasingly con-
fident that we are not dealing with statistical artifacts.
Unfortunately, although this approach minimizes Type I
errors, it suffers from very limited power to avoid Type II
errors. In other words, if successful, we can be confident
that we have obtained a real result, but if it fails, this may
reflect either the absence of a general factor or too low a
number of subjects. This shortcoming highlights the need
to use external validation for psychometric g/G studies, as
discussed below in section 2.5.
2.4.2. Methodological issues. We now turn to the possi-
bility that a g/G factor may arise as a methodological arti-
fact, because the results reflect variation in underlying
variables other than general intelligence (see also Mac-
phail’s [1982] contextual variables) or because the tasks
mainly tap into problems of the same domain.
Some individuals, or some species, may systematically
outperform others not because they are more intelligent,
but because they are less fearful and better habituated to
testing, are more motivated to participate in tasks, have
sharper senses, or are simply more active than others (Mac-
phail 1982). Ideally, such confounds are directly quantified,
as for instance in Matzel et al. (2006). In a sample of 43
mice individuals, they examined to what extent the
general learning ability g extracted via PCA from a test
battery of six cognitive tasks was correlated with 21 mea-
sures of exploratory behavior, sensory/motor function
(e.g., running and swimming speed, balance tasks), activity,
or fear/stress sensitivity. They found that g was not
explained by general activity, sensory/motor function, phys-
ical characteristics, or direct measures of fear, but was cor-
related with several exploratory behaviors. Follow-up
studies suggested that this link is caused by variation in
habituation rates when exposed to potentially stressful situ-
ations (Light et al. 2011) rather than by fearfulness influ-
encing both exploration and task performance: Treatment
with anxiolytic drugs did increase exploratory behaviors
but did not improve performance in individual tasks or g
(Grossman et al. 2007). Likewise, temporary environmen-
tal enrichment resulting in increased exploration tendency
did not improve performance on the cognitive test battery
(Light et al. 2008). Thus, exploration and g may covary
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because more exploratory individuals are more likely to
encounter contingencies in the environment that promote
learning and problem solving, which over time leads to
greater experience. The correlation between exploration
and g may thus reflect a long-term, cumulative effect of
experience on g. This is in line with investment theory
(Cattell 1987), and with findings in human infants, where
the preference for novelty and habituation is positively cor-
related with later performance in IQ tests (Teubert et al.
2011), but also with apes, where individuals more likely
to approach novel objects and a human stranger performed
better in physical-cognition tasks (Herrmann et al. 2007).
Thus, the rodent studies support the idea that g is not an
artifact of confounding factors.
Another non-cognitive factor that may explain variation
in cognitive performance is motivation to participate.
Female callitrichid monkeys have been reported to outper-
form males in problem-solving tasks (Brown et al. 2010;
Yamamoto et al. 2004). However, female callitrichids are
typically also more food-motivated, whereas males are
more vigilant than females (Koenig 1998). Accordingly,
males are less interested in participating in experimental
tasks and more easily emotionally aroused during testing.
But if male performance is controlled for the presence of
attention to the test stimuli, their performance is no
longer inferior to that of females (Schubiger et al. 2015).
The sexes thus do not differ in cognitive ability, but in
their motivation to participate in experimental tasks.
The problem that we may never be sure if species differ-
ences in cognitive performance are the result of differences
in cognitive ability or differences in contextual variables
(Macphail 1982) remains an ongoing challenge for any
species comparison. Nevertheless, not all tasks are affected
by this problem to the same extent. Reversal learning tasks,
for instance, are arguably less affected, because individuals
first have to reach a criterion of making an initial discrimi-
nation. Differences in sensory-motor abilities and so on
may well influence how difficult it is for a species to learn
a particular discrimination. However, the crucial test is
applied only once a specific criterion has been reached,
and at least in marmosets, the time needed to achieve
this criterion does not predict performance in the reversal
trials (Strasser & Burkart 2012). Furthermore, it is reassur-
ing that the strongest association between a specific task
and G in Deaner et al. (2006) was the one between reversal
learning and G.
A second fundamental methodological issue refers to the
task selection and battery development. With respect to
task design, it is increasingly recognized that small differ-
ences in methodological details can strongly influence
task performance, which has to be taken into account
when performing species comparisons. For instance,
memory performance strongly depends on task format in
both marmosets and squirrel monkeys. Tests of memory
often rely on a two-option choice task (e.g., Banerjee
et al. 2009), but many individuals are then happy to
follow a random choice, which yields a 50% reward rate.
When the choice involves many more options, subjects
will be more motivated to remember the location of the
food items and provide more-accurate estimates of their
ability to memorize the location of the food item (Schu-
biger et al. 2016). Regarding battery design, if all tasks in
the test battery are drawn from the same domain (i.e., a
lower-order group factor), rather than from a variety of
domains, the positive correlations will reflect a domain-
specific ability rather than a more general underlying cog-
nitive factor (g/G). For instance, a positive manifold
across a number of maze tasks is consistent with a spatial
factor, but not informative with regard to g. The issue of
task selection is thus closely linked to the identification of
domains in animal cognition, which in fact is part of the
empirical question that needs to be addressed in intelli-
gence research in animals in general, by using batteries as
diverse as possible and statistical procedures that are a
priori agnostic to the underlying factor structure.
2.4.3. False negatives as a result of secondary
modularization. Task selection may also bias the result
and potentially produce false negatives if tasks prone to sec-
ondary modularization are included. Secondary modulari-
zation refers to the process that during ontogeny,
individuals may specialize on a specific set of problems in
a particular domain (Table 2). Problem solving in this
domain becomes automatized and thus acquires many fea-
tures commonly associated with modules rather than
domain-general reasoning, particularly fast and frugal
information processing, which is independent of reasoning.
Thus, despite the presence of g in a given species, perfor-
mance among individuals across domains need not be cor-
related whenever heterogeneous developmental inputs
prevail that lead different individuals to specialize in differ-
ent tasks (see Fig. 1c). This applies in particular to the small
samples typical for nonhuman primate studies.
Prima facie, this situation (Fig. 1c) may seem incompat-
ible with the positive manifold, which is well documented
in humans and perhaps other animals. It is important to
keep in mind, however, that psychometric studies in
humans are typically performed on subject pools with a
rather uniform cultural background (the same is also true
for the rodent studies performed on lab animals with virtu-
ally identical rearing conditions). If, in human studies, the
cultural backgrounds of subjects were more diverse (e.g.,
ranging from Western-industrialized to a variety of
hunter-gatherer societies), and only a small number of sub-
jects tested, such an outcome (as in Fig. 1c) is quite likely
(see also Reyes-García et al. 2016). The notorious difficulty
of devising culture-free or at least culture-fair intelligence
tests is a direct consequence of this problem (Saklofske
et al. 2014).
The prime example for secondary modularization in non-
human primates is tool use, which is part of many test bat-
teries typically used with nonhuman primates (e.g.,
Herrmann et al. 2007; Reader et al. 2011). Nonhuman pri-
mates vary considerably with regard to tool use, with great
apes typically outperforming monkeys. But differences also
occur within a species, both between wild and captive
animals and among wild populations. Individuals of the
same species show much higher propensities to use tools
in captivity compared to their counterparts in the wild
(Meulman et al. 2012; van Schaik et al. 1999). Once profi-
cient, individuals show tool use with high degrees of autom-
atization and efficiency. Wild populations, too, vary
significantly with regard to their propensity to use tools
and solve tool-related problems (e.g., chimpanzees,
Gruber et al. 2011; orangutans, van Schaik et al. 2003; or
capuchin monkeys, Cardoso 2013), arguably because they
have ontogenetically acquired systematically different
affordances of sticks or stones, which are perceived as
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potential tools in habitual tool users but not in non-tool
users.
False negatives resulting from secondary modularization
(see Fig. 1c) can be minimized if subjects with comparable
rearing conditions are selected for the tests, but also if tasks
prone to secondary modularization are excluded from test
batteries. Thus, instead of naturalistic tasks that test for
ontogenetically constructed skills that are likely to
become automatized, such as tool use, or the ability to
point and understand pointing, or even to use human
language systems (Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 2005), it is
preferable to include tasks testing for more elementary
cognitive abilities, such as reversal learning, mental rota-
tion, or quantity discrimination. Likewise, tests should
avoid reliance on experience and knowledge of affordances
that may differ among individuals depending on their
biographies.
Although it is important to identify tasks and abilities
prone to secondary modularization, it is not always easy
to identify them. One way to do so is to examine the ontog-
eny of skills that are suspected to be the result of secondary
modularization. Such skills should be acquired by develop-
ing immatures after a period of learning (perhaps following
alternating series of instances of social learning and prac-
tice: Meulman et al. 2013; Schuppli et al. 2016), and
could also potentially show high variation among adults.
The increasing evidence for a major amount of skill learn-
ing by immature primates (e.g., Schuppli et al. 2016) and
mammals and birds more generally (van Schaik et al.
2016) suggests a greater prevalence of secondary modulari-
zation in nonhumans than revealed by the size of cultural
repertoires (Whiten & van Schaik 2007). Because in wild
populations, social and ecological problems tend to be
very uniform for all individuals, variation of skill profiles
(see Fig. 1) between populations (that live under similar,
wild or captive, conditions), rather than among individuals
of the same population, provides an additional heuristic
tool to distinguish between genuine primary and second-
ary modularity. This criterion would work for primate tool
use, for instance. Most powerful to disentangle primary
from secondary modularity, finally, are cross-fostering
experiments. When cross-fostered individuals exhibit
species-typical behavior from the foster species rather
than their own species, these behaviors clearly cannot
result from primary modules. If the same procedure
works within a species at the level of populations, it is sim-
ilarly evidence for secondary, and thus learned, modules.
2.5. Psychometric or general intelligence? Future
directions for animal studies
A crucial question that remains unanswered so far is to
what extent a reliably identified g/G actually captures
general intelligence in a broad sense: that is, reasoning
ability and behavioral flexibility (Byrne 1994; Gottfredson
1997; Rumbaugh & Washburn 2003; Yoerg 2001; see also
sect. 1.1). If it indeed does so, the processes underlying
general intelligence (see also sects. 1.1.2 and 1.2.3) in
animals should be broadly similar to those found in
humans, with the obvious exception of language, and
general intelligence should be correlated with independent
measures of reasoning ability and behavioral flexibility
(see also Bailey et al. 2007). If it is not, the statistically
derived psychometric factors may reflect cumulative mod-
ularity: that is, the coexistence of separate, but coevolved
modules.
These two possibilities can be teased apart empirically: If
g/G represents intelligence in a broad sense, it must be pos-
sible to independently assess its validity, for instance, by
showing that g/G is correlated with the domain-general
EFs, as has been shown for humans. In principle, an asso-
ciation at a higher hierarchical level (e.g., between-species
G) may be absent within the subgroups comprising it (e.g.,
within-species g), a phenomenon known as Simpson’s
paradox (Kievit et al. 2013). In the present case, we may
thus find a correlation between G and EFs but not
between g and EFs, which would suggest that g and G
were not aspects of the same phenomenon: that is,
general intelligence. Thus, to ensure that g and G are
related to the same phenomenon, one must validate both
of them independently.
Intraspecific studies of primates have so far largely
neglected the approach to validate g, but this approach
has provided fruitful insights in rodent studies. In
rodents, individual levels of g have been shown to correlate
with executive functions such as working memory. Matzel
Figure 1. Performance across different cognitive domains (D1-D4). Each line represents the performance of an individual (or, in highly
cultural species, of a population). (a) Performance is driven by domain-specific abilities; all individuals perform well in some domains but
worse in others, but individual differences across domains are random; (b) performance is driven by domain-general abilities and
individuals experience homogeneous developmental conditions, which leads to correlated performance between individuals across
domains; (c) performance is driven by domain-general abilities but heterogeneous developmental conditions lead to specialization and
secondary modularization of individuals in different domains. As a result, performance between individuals across domains is not
correlated despite the presence of g.
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et al. (2008; 2011b) have compared performance on stan-
dardized test batteries that reliably quantify g in mice
with several measures of working memory, including
short-term memory duration (how long can the mouse
remember which arms of a maze it has already visited?),
simple memory span (how many symbols associated with
food can the mouse remember?), and selective attention
(an adapted version of the STROOP task, in which the
subject has to focus on one dimension of the task while sup-
pressing a second dimension that provides conflicting infor-
mation). As in human studies, they found that g was most
strongly correlated with selective attention, followed by
simple memory span and only weakly with short-term
memory duration (Matzel et al. 2008; 2011b; Kolata et al.
2007). Moreover, they showed that training working
memory capacity, but not simple working memory span,
promotes selective attention and g (Light et al. 2010).
Future validation tests could also examine the correlation
between g and conduction speed or the ability to ignore
irrelevant, distracting information, which are known corre-
lates of g in humans (Melnick et al. 2013; Sheppard &
Vernon 2008).
The corresponding validation of psychometrically
derived g-scores in other species, particularly in nonhuman
primates, would be highly desirable. Nonetheless, some
evidence consistent with g representing domain-general
cognitive mechanisms is already available from nonhuman
primates. Within chimpanzees, heritability was strongest
for overall cognitive performance g rather than for distinct
aptitudes (Hopkins et al. 2014), as expected when the latter
are due to secondary modularization rather than reflect
specific adaptations. As a result, cognitive abilities that
load higher on g in chimpanzees are more heritable, pheno-
typically variable, and presumably the result of recent
natural selection (Woodley of Menie et al. 2015).
The independent evolution of large numbers of modules
instead of general intelligence is particularly difficult to rec-
oncile with interspecific findings of G. If we are dealing
with independent modules, each species would be
expected to possess a different repertoire of primary
modules, according to the specific adaptive problems it
faces. Importantly, across species, this should not result
in a stable G factor. Studies providing evidence for G,
however, suggest that particular species generally
perform better or more poorly across all tested domains.
This is also consistent with the empirical findings suggest-
ing that differences in cognitive abilities among primates
are concentrated on G (Fernandes et al. 2014). Further-
more, because specific skills, even if complex, can be per-
formed with a very modest amount of brain tissue (e.g.,
Chittka & Niven 2009; Holekamp et al. 2015; Patton &
Braithwaite 2015), one would not necessarily expect that
G as a reflection of a large number of dedicated modules
would correlate with brain size. The well-documented pos-
itive correlations between G and brain size thus further
suggests that G reflects general intelligence, as does the
finding that across primate species G was the principal
locus of selection in the macroevolution of intelligence
(Fernandes et al. 2014).
Empirical data also support a link between interspecific
G and executive functions: Across primate species, brain
size is not only correlated with G, but also with self (inhib-
itory) control (MacLean et al. 2014). This measure of self-
control is directly correlated, in addition (Fig. 2), with G as
established by Deaner et al. (2006), which has been derived
from a completely independent data set.
A particularly powerful, but likewise underexplored,
approach to construct validation consists in training individ-
uals to solve a task in one domain and test to what extent
they are able to apply their solution in a different
domain. Intraspecific variation in this kind of cognitive flex-
ibility (which is consistent with broad notions of general
intelligence as applied by comparative scientists) should
be correlated with psychometrically derived measures of
individual g. Such a pattern would confirm that g is
indeed a proxy of animal intelligence broadly defined.
Equally promising is to focus on unusually difficult prob-
lems relative to individual performance (i.e., problems that
cannot be solved in a routine way). For instance, perfor-
mance in difficult problems such as fast mapping or induc-
tive reasoning was correlated with independently assessed g
in mice (Wass et al. 2012). Particularly strong evidence
would include the demonstration that individuals recruit
the same basic cognitive processes for such difficult prob-
lems that are also strongly correlated with g, such as selec-
tive attention or working memory capacity (Matzel et al.
2013; Geary 2009).
Finally, particularly rigorous validation would be based
on extra-domain assays. Just as human g correlates with aca-
demic success, workplace success, health, and even happi-
ness (for references, see section 1), one could in principle
ask whether g in animals is correlated with outcomes
such as the size of cultural repertoires in nature, the
ability to rise in social dominance, or to find food during
periods of scarcity, and thus survival and even fitness.
Unfortunately, this approach is difficult to achieve
because it requires both reliably quantifying g and the
various real-life outcomes in animals under natural condi-
tions. More importantly, g may not necessarily predict
basic fitness measures such as reproductive success,
because of possible tradeoffs between investment into
improving general intelligence and other vital activities,
such as vigilance or social monitoring.
Figure 2. Positive correlation between the composite self-
control measure of MacLean et al. (2014) and G (Deaner et al.
2006). Adjusted r2 = 0.66, F(1,9) = 20.75, p = 0.001 based on
PGLS (phylogenetic generalized least squares) analyses. The
same results are also found when the inhibitory control tasks
included in the composite measure are analyzed separately
(Cylinder task: adjusted r2 = 0.58, F(1,11) = 20.75, p = 0.002;
A-not-B error: adjusted r2 = 0.41, F(1,12) = 10.03, p = 0.008).
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Table 7 summarizes the issues we have discussed in the
form of criteria that may be fruitful to guide future studies.
3. Implications for the evolution of general
intelligence
Taken together, although more validation remains to be
done, especially in primates, the body of evidence is cur-
rently more consistent with the presence of domain-
general cognitive abilities in primates and mice, reflected
in g and G, than with the exclusive presence of indepen-
dent, domain-specific cognitive adaptations. If general
intelligence is not limited to humans, this inevitably leads
to the question of the conditions favoring the evolution of
general intelligence, to which we now turn. Whereas the
evolution of Fodorian, specific, dedicated cognitive adapta-
tions in response to recurrent fitness-relevant problems is
seemingly straightforward (but see sect. 1.2.1), the evolu-
tion of general intelligence poses a puzzle. Domain-specific
cognitive adaptations can be instantiated with modest
amounts of neural tissue (Chittka & Niven 2009; Holekamp
et al. 2015; Patton & Braithwaite 2015) and directly bring
about fitness-relevant benefits. Domain-general cognitive
ability, however, seems to require substantial amounts of
additional expensive brain tissue (Deaner et al. 2007;
Reader et al. 2011), and is not automatically linked to
fitness-relevant benefits because survival-relevant skills
have to be ontogenetically constructed during a process of
learning (van Schaik & Burkart 2011). This ontogenetic con-
struction may be more successful in individuals with higher
cognitive ability, as posited by investment theory (Cattell
1987), but additional factors also come into play, which
renders the link between cognitive ability and fitness-rele-
vant skills more fragile. For instance, whether a survival-rel-
evant skill is acquired may also depend on pure chance (van
Schaik & Burkart 2011; van Schaik et al. 2016). Further-
more, in order to more reliably translate general cognitive
ability into fitness-relevant skills, some mechanisms for
adaptive canalizations (as highlighted in sect. 1.2.2,
Table 1) remain necessary, which have to coevolve or, if
already present, be linked to the evolving domain-general
cognitive processes. We are, therefore, faced with the
puzzle that domain-general cognitive ability apparently
Table 7. Criteria that may be useful in guiding future efforts to (a) reliably identify g/G in nonhuman animals and (b) evaluate whether a
statistically identified g/G captures intelligence in a broad sense: that is, reasoning ability and behavioral flexibility. The last two columns
indicate to what extent corresponding criteria have been applied in rodents and primates. See text for details (the relevant sections are
indicated in italics).
Criteria for Future Studies
Already Applied in
Rodents? (g) Primates?
(a) To avoid statistical and methodological artifacts:
. Use of large samples and diverse tasks, and analytical routines that do not require an a priori








. Empirical control for confounds such as motivation, anxiety, or lower-level biological
properties (2.4.2)
yes no
. Avoidance of tasks prone to secondary modularization (2.4.3) yes No
(b) To explore whether an empirical finding of g/G captures intelligence as broadly defined (2.5):
. Is g/G correlated with independently assessed executive functions? yes g: no
G: yes
. Does executive function training, in contrast to a non-cognitive control training, increase g? yes no
. Is g/G correlated with brain size? yes g: no
G: yes
. Is there evidence that g/G has been selected for? no yes
. Is g/G correlated with the ability to transfer solutions across domains (i.e., cognitive
flexibility)?
no no
. Does g predict performance in very difficult tasks? yes no
. Does g predict success in real life? no no
1 But not successfully: see Herrmann et al. (2010b); Hopkins et al. (2014); Woodley of Menie et al. (2015)
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evolved in at least some lineages, or perhaps even in birds
and mammals in general, even though its evolution has
had to overcome more obstacles compared to the emer-
gence of domain-specific cognitive adaptations. Hence,
the goal of this section is to delineate the conditions favoring
the evolution of general intelligence.
3.1. General intelligence as response to domain-specific
selection pressures
The most common approach to explain variation in cogni-
tion across species, which has a long and venerable tradi-
tion, is to look for specific cognitive challenges in the
social or ecological environment and investigate to what
extent species facing these challenges have evolved bigger
brains (Dunbar & Shultz 2007a; 2007b; Holekamp et al.
2015; Humphrey 1976; Jolly 1966; Parker 2015; Parker &
Gibson 1977). Comparative analyses, particularly in pri-
mates, have shown that brain size is indeed correlated
across species with various social and ecological variables,
such as social complexity based on bonded relationships
(Dunbar 1992; Dunbar & Shultz 2007b) and tactical decep-
tion (Byrne & Corp 2004), or extractive foraging (Parker
2015), manipulative complexity (Heldstab et al. 2016),
and perceived seasonality (van Woerden et al. 2014;
2010; 2012). Shultz and Dunbar (2006) presented similar
analyses for ungulates, with similar conclusions.
Nonetheless, much variation in brain size across species
remains unexplained by domain-specific pressures (Hole-
kamp 2007; van Schaik et al. 2012). Furthermore, not all
species that excel in socio-cognitive tasks, most likely
because of their complex social environment, also excel in
non-social tasks and evolve big brains. Socio-cognitive abil-
ities in hyenas, for instance, are on a par with those of the
larger anthropoid primates, but there is no evidence that as
in primates, this would be correlated with particularly pow-
erful cognitive abilities outside of this domain (Holekamp
et al. 2015). Likewise, callitrichid monkeys outperform
their sister lineage, capuchin and squirrel monkeys, in
socio-cognitive abilities, but the latter have superior physi-
cal cognition (Burkart & van Schaik 2010; 2016a; 2016b).
For additional examples of how specific sophisticated cog-
nitive skills can be achieved with very small brains, see
Chittka and Niven (2009) for insects or Patton and
Braithwaite (2015) for fish.
The crucial question thus is: Under what conditions do
specific cognitive challenges result in an increase in
general intelligence (and thus brain size) rather than in
domain-specific cognitive solutions that do not require
large amounts of brain tissue and do not translate into ben-
efits in other domains too?
3.2. Direct selection on general intelligence
Some have argued that general cognitive ability is not the
result of a domain-specific challenge but that it is directly
selected so as to help animals cope with novel or unpredict-
able environments and overcome unusual or complex eco-
logical challenges. According to this cognitive buffer
hypothesis, large brains facilitate the construction of novel
behavioral patterns through domain-general cognitive pro-
cesses such as innovation and learning (Lefebvre et al.
2013; Sol 2009a). In support of this hypothesis, more inno-
vative species tend to indeed have bigger brains – in birds
(Lefebvre et al. 1997) and primates (Reader & Laland
2002) – and innovation rates in the wild are correlated
withG across primate species (Reader et al. 2011). Further-
more, innovation rates and brain size, and thus presumably
G, predict colonization success in birds (Sol et al. 2005),
mammals (Sol et al. 2008), amphibians and reptiles (Amiel
et al. 2011), and in fishes (Shumway 2008; but see Drake
2007). Furthermore, large-brained birds use more success-
ful learned strategies to avoid collision with human vehicles
on roads (Husby & Husby 2014). Finally, anthropoid pri-
mates (but not lemurs, rodents, and omnivorous carnivores)
cognitively buffer environmental seasonality (S. Graber
et al. in prep.; van Woerden et al. 2014). Taken together,
this work convincingly demonstrates that big brains are
associated with greater behavioral flexibility and higher
innovation rates under naturalistic settings, and that these
in turn can be beneficial for a range of species when they
face novel and unpredictable environments.
What remains to be answered in light of these obvious
benefits, then, is why not all species evolved bigger and
more-powerful brains. It is self-evident that all extant
species are clearly smart enough for their current niche,
but it is equally evident that a slightly better understanding
that traces of a predator actually mark its presence, a better
memory for which food sources already have been visited,
or better object permanence to better keep track of a dis-
appearing prey would convey a fitness benefit relative to
conspecifics. We suggest that it is unlikely that focusing
exclusively on potential benefits resulting from gains in
brain size will further advance our understanding of the
conditions under which domain-specific pressures lead to
increased general intelligence. Rather, answering this ques-
tion requires a focus not only on the benefits, but also on
the costs of evolving a bigger brain.
3.3. Who can afford to evolve general intelligence?
Cultural intelligence
Some species have larger brains than others, which, at least
in primates, is associated with higher G. Why did these
species respond to domain-specific selection pressures
with an increase in general intelligence (see also sect.
3.1), or cope with environmental unpredictability by
increasing their brain and intelligence, rather than opting
for alternative, domain-specific adaptations (see also sect.
3.2)?
To answer these questions, it is important to keep in
mind that the conditions under which large brains can
evolve are to a substantial degree restricted by their costs
(Isler & van Schaik 2014). Brains are energy-hungry
organs that consume a large proportion of the energy avail-
able to an organism, particularly in growing immatures
(Kuzawa et al. 2014). Thus, natural selection more readily
favors an increase in brain size when this leads to an
increase in net energy intake, a reduction in its variance,
or ideally both. Furthermore, a big brain slows down the
organism’s development, which means that a species’
ability to slow down its life history is a fundamental precon-
dition for its opportunity to evolve larger brain size. Accord-
ingly, the life-history filter approach (van Schaik et al. 2012)
shows that slowing down life history, and thus evolving a
larger brain, is only possible for species that can increase
adult survival and are not subject to unavoidable extrinsic
mortality, such as high predation pressure. Isler and van
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Schaik (2014) have shown that such a cost perspective can
explain a substantial amount of variation in brain size
across primates, and that allomaternal care plays an impor-
tant role in accommodating the costs associated with
bigger brains (in particular, because food subsidies by allo-
mothers help pay for the energetic costs of the growing
immatures, and because of life-history consequences; see
also Burkart 2017).
Natural selection thus evaluates the net fitness benefit of
a bigger brain, which also takes the costs into account. The
balance of benefits and costs is critically influenced by how
efficiently an individual can translate brain tissue (or
general cognitive potential) into survival-increasing innova-
tions – that is, knowledge and skills. The cultural intelli-
gence approach stresses that species that rely more
systematically on social learning are more efficient in onto-
genetically constructing survival-relevant skills (Herrmann
et al. 2007; van Schaik & Burkart 2011; van Schaik et al.
2012; Whiten & van Schaik 2007) because social influences
are very powerful domain-general canalization processes
(as highlighted in Table 1). Whereas in the human litera-
ture, many approaches stress the importance of social
inputs in the development of intelligence (e.g., Moll &
Tomasello 2007; Tomasello 1999), the evolutionary
version of this approach that suggests that social learning
also plays a crucial role for the evolution of intelligence
and brain size has received far less attention. Importantly,
it builds on a broad notion of social learning (Heyes
1994, Box 1984; see also van Schaik et al. [2017], for a clas-
sification of social learning particularly suitable to test the
predictions of the evolutionary dimension of the cultural
intelligence hypothesis).
Consistentwith the cultural intelligence approach, empir-
ical results show that innovation rates in birds and primates
are not only correlated with brain size orG, but also with the
efficiency of social learning (Reader 2003; Reader et al.
2011). According to the cultural intelligence hypothesis,
this is the case because, for species engaging systematically
in social learning, additional brain tissue translatesmore reli-
ably in survival-relevant skills, which lowers the threshold for
evolution to favor an increase in brain size and general cog-
nitive ability compared with species that do not rely on social
learning. The frequency of opportunities for social learning
is thus part of the answer why some lineages did evolve
bigger brains, whereas others did not, even though they
would all benefit from being more intelligent (van Schaik
& Burkart 2011). Put in other words, we can use the
pattern of solutions to the canalization problem (outlined
in Table 1) to better understand under what conditions a
species responds to a domain-specific selection pressure
with a domain-general adaptation rather than with a
narrow, domain-specific modular adaptation. The core
message (to be derived from Table 1) was that all identified
canalization problems can readily be overcome by social
learning, and, therefore, species able to rely more on
social learning should be more likely to be able to evolve
domain-general cognitive adaptations. In sum, the cultural
intelligence approach seems to best accommodate the find-
ings of general intelligence as reviewed previously. For a
more detailed comparison and discussion of the different
approaches, see van Schaik et al. (2012) and Burkart (2017).
The cultural intelligence hypothesis was originally devel-
oped to explain why humans have evolved far bigger brains
and far greater intelligence than other great apes. Toma-
sello (1999; see also Herrmann et al. 2007) stressed that
humans have evolved a set of species-specific socio-cogni-
tive skills that facilitate social transmission, by allowing us
to participate and exchange knowledge in cultural groups
from an early age on. In other words, humans have
become specialized in making use of social inputs to onto-
genetically construct their skills, and rather than having
evolved predominantly into a “cognitive niche” (Pinker
2010), they have evolved into a “cultural niche” (Boyd
et al. 2011). Our extreme dependence on the socially
guided ontogenetic construction of skills can also explain
why the intraspecific link between g and brain size within
humans is relatively weak (Muthukrishna & Henrich
2016; Pietschnig et al. 2015).
Humans can thus be seen as a special case of cultural
intelligence, due to the active involvement of caretakers
and the improved imitative abilities of our species. This
view is consistent with approaches to human cognitive evo-
lution that stress the role of allomaternal care, which not
only results in energy subsidies to growing immatures but
also increases the scope of social learning through the avail-
ability of more, and more tolerant, role models, who even-
tually also engage in teaching (Burkart & van Schaik 2016a;




The current body of evidence reviewed in this article is
arguably most consistent with general intelligence not
being unique to humans but also present in other species,
even though much validation remains to be done, as out-
lined in sections 2.4 and 2.5. At present, the best-supported
model for both animals and humans therefore views the
ecological and social cognitive skills that can be measured
in a species as the result of two pathways (indicated in
Fig. 3).
In the downward pathway, cognitive skills result from
general intelligence, which shows strong empirical correla-
tions with brain size and executive functions. These skills
correspond to Cattell’s (1963) crystallized intelligence and
Geary’s (2005) secondary learning. In this case, the cogni-
tive skills are ontogenetically constructed, facilitated by
mechanisms of adaptive canalization beyond Fodorian
modularity (summarized in Table 1) and eventually may
become automatized (secondary modularization, which
makes these skills particularly difficult to identify). As
stressed by the cultural intelligence approach, social learn-
ing is a particularly efficient mechanism of ontogenetic can-
alization, particularly in large-brained animals. In the
upward pathway, cognitive skills directly emerge as a
result of dedicated, Fodorian cognitive modules that are
independent of general intelligence, executive functions
(Firestone & Scholl 2015), or brain size.
These two pathways to cognitive skills can coexist, and in
fact almost certainly do. This situation has major implica-
tions. First, closely related, big-brained species that rely
to some significant extent on the downward pathway and
thus general intelligence may nevertheless exhibit rather
distinct social and ecological skill sets. Some of their
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species-specific ontogenetic canalization mechanisms can
result in species differences in performance in specific
domains, such as extractive foraging and tool use. Second,
species may not primarily vary with regard to whether
they have g, but with regard to the relative importance of
these two pathways in building their skill sets, consistent
with the increasing evidence for g in several nonhuman
species. Approaches like cultural intelligence and the
expensive brain framework delineate the conditions
under which one or the other is more likely to evolve.
This model is thus consistent with the broad pattern of
results summarized in this review, including the results of
mixed-species studies (sect. 2.3), and also with the idea of
evolutionary continuity.
This preliminary synthesis suggests there is an alternative
way of estimating the importance of general intelligence in
a given species. Rather than exclusively relying on compar-
ing the percentage of variance in performance explained by
g (which in fact may be misleading, under the conditions
outlined in sect. 2.4.1), one may attempt to estimate the
importance of one pathway over the other in constructing
an individual’s skill set. To do so, it is crucial to be able to
distinguish the origin of the skills in the green box (see
Fig. 3), whether they result from the upward or the down-
ward pathway. This is particularly difficult because eventu-
ally, skills constructed via the upper pathway may become
automatized, and thus difficult to distinguish from
primary modules (see also Table 2 in sect. 1.2.3). To iden-
tify them, one needs to show that they critically rely on EFs
(see also Table 6b) and show signs of being effortfully
learned (see also Meulman et al. 2013; Schuppli et al.
2016). This is most feasible when the learning is social,
either by directly recording the socially induced patterns
of attention and practice (e.g., Jaeggi et al. 2010) or by
interspecific cross-fostering (see section 2.4.3) where this
is feasible. This alternative way of estimating the impor-
tance of general intelligence in a given species may turn
out to be a promising complement to the alternatives
pursued in nonhuman intelligence research so far.
4.2. Conclusions
Overall, the body of evidence from comparative studies
lends increasing support to the notion that general intelli-
gence is not unique to humans but also present in nonhu-
man animals and thus is not as tied up with language as
some have suggested. Intraspecific evidence for g is partic-
ularly strong in rodents, whereas interspecific evidence (G)
finds most support from primate and bird studies. Never-
theless, the rather young field of research into animal
general intelligence still needs to mature just as work on
human intelligence has taken decades to mature.
This enterprise can obviously profit from better integrat-
ing knowledge accumulated in the longstanding tradition of
human psychometrics, not only with respect to the method-
ological aspects highlighted previously, but also to concep-
tual issues. For instance, obvious parallels exist between
investment theory (Cattell 1987) and cultural intelligence
approaches; pursuing them further may lead to novel
insights. In other domains, however, superficial similarities
are misleading. Modern massive modularity, for instance,
based on very broad notions of modularity and inspired
by evolutionary biology (Barrett 2015), hardly informs the
debate about whether general intelligence exists in nonhu-
man animals. Among nonhuman animals, the ancestral
state most likely corresponds to animal minds being made
up entirely of dedicated modular adaptations (Shettleworth
2012a; 2012b). Among extant species, the question is,
which behaviors are (still) regulated this way?
It is worth emphasizing that fruitful inputs can flow in the
other direction too. For instance, the availability of valid
animal models of general intelligence increasingly allows
studying the underlying neurobiological and genetic mech-
anisms in ways that would not be possible in human studies
(reviewed in Galsworthy et al. 2014; Matzel et al. 2013;
Plomin 2001). Furthermore, via animal studies we can
experimentally address the role of factors such as explora-
tion tendency, known to be linked to g in mice (Grossman
et al. 2007; Light et al. 2008), most likely via mechanisms
stressed by investment theory (Cattell 1987). Finally, com-
parative studies are indispensable in addressing the broader
question of where, why, and how g evolved. Among the
most promising evolutionary explanations for general intel-
ligence is the cultural intelligence approach, which predicts
the coevolution of social learning and general intelligence.
This perspective is strongly supported by interspecific
studies where social learning, but also other social abilities
such as deception, are strongly correlated with G across
species (e.g., Reader et al. 2011) and where brain size is
linked to opportunities for social learning during develop-
ment (van Schaik et al. 2012).
A final issue concerns both animal and human studies. In
most intraspecific studies, socio-cognitive tasks were not
Figure 3. The origin of cognitive skills. Green: Ecological and
social cognitive skills that can be measured in animals and that
are visible to natural selection because they can result in fitness
benefits. Yellow: Empirical interrelations between brain size,
general intelligence, and executive functions. The latter two
entities are only visible to selection to the extent that they are
translated into fitness-enhancing cognitive skills. Blue: Adaptive
canalizations that either guide the ontogenetic construction of
cognitive skills from general intelligence (see Table 1 for details)
or represent fully fledged Fodorian, modular adaptations that
are independent of the domain-general (yellow) nexus.
Burkart et al.: The evolution of general intelligence
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES, 40 (2017) 23
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X16000959
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich, on 05 Aug 2018 at 14:46:40, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
part of the test battery, but where they were, the results
were inconclusive. Thus, whereas Hopkins et al. (2014;
Woodley of Menie et al. 2015) found socio-cognitive abili-
ties loading on g in chimpanzees, Herrmann et al. (2010b)
did not, neither in chimpanzees nor children. This may be
because the intraspecific measures of socio-cognitive abili-
ties used so far are less suitable than interspecific ones, for
instance, because they sometimes produce ceiling or floor
effects. However, human test batteries typically also do
not include social cognition, and the relationship between
general intelligence and socio-cognitive abilities in humans
therefore remains poorly understood (Korman et al. 2015).
Investigating the link between socio-cognitive abilities and
general intelligence within humans thus is an important
research priority.
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Abstract: Here, we specifically discuss why and to what extent we agree
with Burkart et al. about the coexistence of general intelligence and
modular cognitive adaptations, and why we believe that the distinction
between primary and secondary modules they propose is indeed essential.
We agree with Burkart et al. that general intelligence and special-
ized modules likely coexist in nonhuman animals. In mammals,
similar cognitive skills have evolved independently in different
phylogenetic lineages (Barton & Harvey 2000; de Winter &
Oxnard 2001), suggesting the existence of independently evolving
modules. These specialized modules likely reflect fitness-enhanc-
ing adaptations to specific socioecological challenges (Shettleworth
2010b). However, as Burkart et al. correctly argue, nonhuman
animals also solve problems flexibly across domains – something
impossible for a strictly modular brain. Therefore, general intelli-
gence and specialized modules likely coexist, at least in
mammals: Although cognitive modules are the response to
domain-specific socioecological challenges (Shettleworth 2010b),
general intelligence may allow behavioural flexibility across
domains – something especially useful in novel or unpredictable
environments (Lefebvre et al. 2013; Sol 2009a).
From a neurological perspective, general intelligence and inde-
pendent domain-specific cognitive skills compatibly coexist. Some
properties of the human brain (e.g., amount of grey matter, neu-
ronal speed of transmission) affect multiple brain regions, so that
performance in different domains may correlate even if cognitive
processes are localized in discrete regions (e.g., Jensen 1993; Lee
2007; Pennington et al. 2000). In our view, specific cognitive pro-
cesses may be localized in specific brain regions also in other
mammals, whereas other properties are intercorrelated across
brain regions and affect all cognitive domains. Lee (2007), for
instance, proposed that more synaptic connections might
enhance the overall processing power of the brain, regardless of
the brain regions involved. Therefore, having specific cognitive
modules and more synaptic connections are two different brain
characteristics that likely coexist.
In our view, Burkart et al. downplayed the importance of
multifactor (as opposed to g-based) approaches in human intelli-
gence (e.g., Kaufman 1979; Sternberg 1988; Gardner 1993). The
concept of g, originally postulated by Spearman (1927), has been
challenged on countless occasions and its current use in human
IQ assessment is marginal at best, having been largely replaced
by multifactor theories (see Kaufman 2009). An excessive reli-
ance on g prevented Burkart et al. from considering multifactor
approaches that may better capture interspecific cognitive diver-
sity without necessarily invoking modularity. Several studies in
nonhuman mammals have failed to find g and instead support
a multifactor view of intelligence (e.g., Amici et al. 2012;
Herrmann et al. 2007, 2010b; Herrmann & Call, 2012; Kolata
et al. 2008; Schmitt et al. 2012). We suspect that the attractive-
ness of g stems from its simplicity and its use as a bastion
against radical modularity. However, a multifactor view of intelli-
gence should not be conflated with a modular view of the mind,
at least not the kind of modularity defended by some evolutionary
psychologists (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 2002). The multifactor
view is general in spirit, as its factors subserve multiple cognitive
problems, but each factor is specialized in particular operations
(e.g., inference) or capacities (e.g., working memory). We think
that a substantial portion of interspecific (and interindividual)
variation in cognition can be captured by a multifactor theory
without invoking modules, and as such, the multifactor approach
is more germane with the notion of g than that of radical
modularity.
We agree with Burkart et al. that different experimental and
statistical approaches may lead to different results. Thus, finding
g may, at least partly, depend on which data are included and
how they are analysed. In particular, Herrmann and Call (2012)
argued that task selection may inflate the relative importance of
general intelligence (a point that Burkart et al. also made) by,
for instance, selecting tasks that share a key feature (e.g., associat-
ive learning). Burkart et al. also argued that the allocation of tasks
to specific domains (as done in confirmatory analyses and some
Bayesian approaches) may be problematic, although it is possible
to limit the drawbacks of a priori allocation by selecting multiple
basic tasks with low cognitive demands (see Amici et al. 2012).
Meta-analyses based on large data sets are especially useful for
large-scale interspecific comparisons, but they often entail
missing information (e.g., no interindividual variation), rely on
data that are not evenly distributed across species, and disregard
potentially important methodological differences across studies.
These problems remain a challenge for future research, also
because it is not easy to conceive tasks in which single cognitive
skills are required.
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We thought that the distinction between primary and secondary
modules was useful. Burkart et al. argue that, through ontogeny,
individuals may specialize in a certain domain, learning specific
skills that become automatized and therefore appear to be
domain-specific, even if they are not. The experimental distinction
between primary and secondary modules is not easy, and relates to
the more general problem of disentangling the relative contribu-
tion of evolutionary forces and developmental experience to cog-
nition. Although the epigenesis of cognitive skills in nonhuman
mammals is still largely unexplored, cross-fostering experiments
would be a powerful tool to differentiate between evolutionarily
selected and developmentally acquired behaviour. Experimental
studies have shown that young macaques change their reconcilia-
tion tendencies (which are usually considered species-specific)
depending on the social context in which they are raised (de
Waal & Johanowicz 1993). Evolutionary forces and developmental
experience are intertwined in complex ways: Differentiating
between primary modules and ontogenetically acquired skills is
an essential point that future research will need to address.
Finally, concerning the relative contribution of general intelli-
gence and primary modules across taxa, there are various hypoth-
eses as to how they should vary. On the one hand, an ecologically
oriented approach suggests that taxa living in more unpredictable
environments could especially benefit from behavioural flexibility
across domains, and thus more strongly rely on general intelli-
gence (Lefebvre et al. 2013; Sol 2009a). On the other hand, a
more socially oriented approach suggests that taxa showing
social learning can more efficiently acquire relevant skills
through ontogeny without having to mainly rely on cognitive
modules for their survival (Herrmann et al. 2007; van Schaik &
Burkart 2011; van Schaik et al. 2012). Future research will need
to find creative ways to contrast these hypotheses, while control-
ling for the existence of secondary modules.
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Abstract: We welcome the cross-disciplinary approach taken by Burkart
et al. to probe the evolution of intelligence. We note several concerns:
the uses of g and G, rank-ordering species on cognitive ability, and the
meaning of general intelligence. This subject demands insights from
several fields, and we look forward to cross-disciplinary collaborations.
Burkart et al. make a substantial contribution to the literature on
the evolution of intelligence. We agree with the implicit view of
the authors that fostering connections between contiguous fields
is essential in working towards a comprehensive understanding
of intelligence. The shared goal includes identifying, at least, the
selection pressures that shaped cognitive abilities in different
species; the structure of cognitive abilities within different
species; outcomes associated with intelligence; and the genetic
architecture of intelligence. The target article helpfully reaches
out to engage with scholars, questions, and methods emerging
from several fields including comparative and differential psychol-
ogy. We value highly this drawing together of disciplines. Here we
raise some points arising from Burkart et al.’s work.
First, we do not find compelling the authors’ argument that pos-
itive correlations among different cognitive abilities – and the
resulting latent variable g – reflect domain-general intelligence.
(“[E]vidence for domain-general intelligence in humans, esti-
mated by the first factor derived in psychometric, factor-analytical
approaches, is pervasive…” [sect. 1.1.2, para. 3].) By contrast, our
empirically testable prediction is that positive correlations among
cognitive abilities, and the resulting g factor, will be found within
most animal species, whether the species exhibit domain-general
intelligence. We expect this because random alterations to a
complex system usually degrade its function; genetic mutations
that affect multiple cognitive abilities will tend to affect them in
the same direction (i.e., deleteriously). Such directional pleiotropy
would cause positive correlations among cognitive abilities (even
within species that do not exhibit domain-general intelligence).
This conjecture is supported by the finding that lower scores on
cognitive tests are linked with a greater proportion of the
genome in runs of homozygosity (a measure of the extent to
which recessive alleles are expressed) (Howrigan et al. 2016).
Likewise, G – a latent variable arising from factorial analysis of
task scores between species – need not reflect domain-general
intelligence. In the absence of domain-general intelligence,
between-species differences in brain size, neural integrity, com-
plexity, or myelination, for example, could affect different cogni-
tive abilities in the same direction, leading to G. Therefore,
neither g nor G is evidence for domain-general intelligence.
Further, the causes of g and G may be unrelated; g might be
caused by directional pleiotropy, but G could not be. We agree
that existing within-species psychometric studies are few, small,
and underpowered. The cure is larger studies.
Another important point is that, because latent variables are by
definition unobservable, neither g nor G can itself be a direct
target of selection – contrary to Burkart et al.’s suggestion that
“G is thus the principal locus of selection in the evolution of
primate intelligence” (sect. 2.2, para. 4); g or G may reflect a
real trait that is visible to selection (Borsboom & Dolan 2006),
but we know of no conclusive evidence on this. Identifying biolog-
ical or cognitive correlates of g and G is a useful approach to this
question, but correlation is not causation, and so the cause(s) of g
andG remain unclear. An additional note on the topic of selection
is that, contrary to the target article (and Woodley et al. 2015),
greater heritability does not indicate stronger recent selection –
in fact, all else being equal, the opposite is true (Fisher 1930).
A linked issue is that the nature and cause(s) of g and G, and
their relation to natural selection, depend on the tasks that are
used to derive the factors. For example, interspecies differences
in performance on behavioural tasks may depend on the match
of the tasks to the species’ typical environments and physical abil-
ities as well as to their cognitive abilities (Barrett 2011) – in which
case, the cause(s) ofG could have environmental, physical, or cog-
nitive sources.
Also, probing G does not answer the question “why are some
species better at ‘catching on’ more generally than others?”; the
answer to that lies in the recurrent problems posed by different
ecologies and the costs and benefits of solving them. The costs
of “generalising” make relatively more domain-general brains a
better deal in some settings than in others. We should be cautious
in rank-ordering intelligence between species, especially in the
absence of comprehensive descriptions of cognitive abilities at
the within-species level. Although it is manifestly true that some
species are generalisers more than others (compare, for
example, koalas with racoons), it is also the case that a smart ele-
phant makes a lousy bat.
It should be noted that even human intelligence, which has
been shaped by selection, is not completely general; it is better
described as under-specified. For example, although we may
inhabit a 10-dimensional universe (Green & Schwarz 1984), we
are unable to form a mental image of higher dimensional
figures because our minds have evolved in a space containing rel-
evant objects of only three or fewer dimensions.
We note that we can learn much about the evolution of intelli-
gence from genetic analyses of cognitively well-characterised pop-
ulations including parameters such as heritabilities, genetic
correlations (among mental traits and biological substrates
within species), and coefficients of genetic variation. Genetic
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studies will allow us to test relations among any observed g factors
and other fitness-related traits, and to explore evolutionary ques-
tions concerning convergence and homologies of cognitive abili-
ties, or mechanisms that contribute to them, across species.
Last, we urge upon us all, conscious perspective-taking of those
in other fields. We are all “cursed with knowledge” (Pinker 2014,
p. 11). Unpalatable phrases like “positive manifold” (e.g., sect.
1.1.1, para. 3) and “phylogenetic inflection” (sect. 1.2.2, para. 4)
act as caltrops impeding the free flow of knowledge and scholar-
ship across disciplines. Reviewers and journals can help by empha-
sising writing clarity. In saying this, we are not criticising the target
article but celebrating and promoting the shared mission to help
scholars talk to one another effectively. The focal problem, under-
standing the evolution of intelligence, is hard; maximising band-
width across fields is essential.
Negative results are needed to show the
specific value of a cultural explanation for g
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Abstract: Burkart et al. suggest that social learning can explain the
cognitive positive manifold for social animals, including humans. We
caution that simpler explanations of positive trait intercorrelations exist,
such as genetic load. To test the suggested explanation’s specificity, we
also need to examine non-social species and traits, such as health, that
are distal to cognitive abilities.
We commend Burkart et al. for writing a clear review of the avail-
able data on intraspecies g and interspecies G. Although data on
individual differences on nonhuman animals are scarce,
mapping out the potentially far-ranging implications will, we
hope, encourage more high-quality nonhuman individual differ-
ences research. The authors’ effort to establish clearer and
cross-species terms in the modularity debate and to highlight
the existence of secondary modules is very welcome. Together
with the acknowledgment, as nicely laid out by Burkart et al.,
that evolution is a tinkerer, not an engineer (Jacob 1977), we
think these efforts will lead to progress in the understanding of
the evolution and genetics of general intelligence.
We agree that integration between subdisciplines currently
focused either on universals or individual differences (e.g., evolu-
tionary psychology and behavior genetics) is necessary (Arslan &
Penke 2015; Penke et al. 2007) and hope warnings about the
lack of generalizability in nonhuman animal cognition research
will be heeded (Arden et al. 2016; Thornton & Lukas 2012). On
the other hand, we are unsure whether the effort to connect the
appearance of psychometric g to the presence of general intelli-
gence in a species succeeds. This leads us to examine what
could cause g in the absence of a core intelligence trait.
We agree with the authors that psychometric g and domain-
general intelligence should not be thoughtlessly equated (Penke
et al. 2011). Although a species whose individuals vary in a core
domain-general intelligence ability should exhibit a psychomet-
ric g, finding a psychometric g does not imply that variation in a
core ability causes it. If g were caused by a core ability, then
training this ability should show transfer effects to distal cogni-
tive abilities. The authors cite such training studies, but
acknowledge controversy about bias and methods (see also
Colom et al. 2013; Redick 2015). Noack et al. (2014) concluded
that the existing literature cannot establish such latent transfer
effects. Claims of bilingual advantage have been similarly con-
tested (Paap et al. 2015). If training of purported core abilities
such as executive functions does not increase latent g, the case
for core abilities causing the positive manifold weakens consid-
erably. Moreover, positive correlations have not only been
found among cognitive abilities but also between cognitive abil-
ities and other fitness-related traits such as health, psychopa-
thology, and height (Arden et al. 2016). Hagenaars et al.
(2016a) showed molecular evidence that a shared genetic aetiol-
ogy underlies the phenotypic associations between health and
intelligence.
Reasonable, less cognition-specific explanations have been put
forward to explain such positive manifolds. First among them is
probably genetic load (Hill et al. 2016a; Penke et al. 2007). Indi-
viduals vary in the number of deleterious genetic mutations they
carry. Depending on where they occur, such wrong turns on the
genotype-phenotype map could affect the integrity and condi-
tion of the whole organism, its brain, or more specific abilities.
If many of the variants affecting cognitive abilities are pleiotropic
(be that because they affect early development steps or because
they disrupt frequently re-used genetic patterns), then we would
also expect positive correlations between cognitive abilities and
other fitness-related individual differences (Deary 2012; Houle
2000). Although causal inference from genetic correlations is
hard (Johnson et al. 2011; Solovieff et al. 2013), we ought to con-
sider the possibility that biological pleiotropy, not just health
behavior, explains associations between intelligence and health
(Hagenaars et al. 2016b). For example, evolutionarily conserved
genomic regions are strongly enriched for genetic variants affect-
ing intelligence (Hill et al. 2016a). We think this can explain part
of the g phenomenon. An explanation based on genetic load
can even explain correlations between abilities resulting
from primary modules. Other sources of individual differences
such as stochastic events in early development can take an
explanatory role similar to genetic load, by affecting early devel-
opmental steps and pervasive building blocks of the organism
(Deary 2012).
Hence, our null hypothesis should not be complete indepen-
dence of cognitive abilities, even if we knew they were primary
modules. Some intercorrelation should be expected. The
expected degree of intercorrelation depends on many unknowns,
among them the degree of pleiotropy, the mutational target size,
metabolic costs, and ontogeny of cognitive abilities.
With the nonhuman data available so far, we see a gap in the
authors’ case: the absence of clear negative results in the search
for g/G. The authors report no taxon where the search for the g
factor was conducted with sufficient power and appropriate
methods but still failed. We suggest that only after also gathering
data from less social species can we ask whether, for example,
social learning increases correlations between cognitive abilities.
And only when correlations with non-cognitive abilities are com-
pared can we ask what explains the increased correlation
between cognitive abilities. As the authors point out, nonhuman
research can help test explanations for g with designs infeasible
in humans, such as cross-fostering experiments. This extends to
genetic load. Using genetically uniform strains and mutation
accumulation lines (although these are already extremely time-
consuming in micro-organisms) could help clarify the involvement
of genetic load.
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We lack the space to fully address alternative explanations for
interspecies G, but hope to also see joint phylogenetic tree analy-
ses of sociality and variance explained by g. To be able to test this,
recommendations for increased sample sizes in such studies
should be followed (Thornton & Lukas 2012). Differential mea-
surement error across subtests and species has to be modelled
and corrected for, not just used to explain negative findings.
In conclusion, we would add the following to the authors’ call for
research: We need individual differences of data along the whole
gradient of sociality including maybe even octopuses, and studies
should also examine more distal traits such as health and size.
Then, the specific added value of the proposed model can be
tested. We want to echo this and previous calls (Arden et al. 2016;
Thornton & Lukas 2012) for more individual differences research
on nonhuman animal cognition. We hope for more stimulating evo-
lutionary theorizing on individual differences, as in this target article.
G but not g: In search of the evolutionary
continuity of intelligence
doi:10.1017/S0140525X1600159X, e199
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Abstract: Conceptualizing intelligence in its biological context, as the
expression of manifold adaptations, compels a rethinking of measuring
this characteristic in humans, relying also on animal studies of analogous
skills. Mental manipulation, as an extension of object manipulation,
provides a continuous, biologically based concept for studying G as it
pertains to individual differences in humans and other species.
Burkart et al.’s review of studies involving g and G in animals is
illuminating. However, the authors seem to assume that a
century of studies settled the question of g in humans. In this com-
mentary, we challenge this assumption. We suggest that the def-
inition of intelligence (Gottfredson 1997) cited by the authors
seems to be overly anthropocentric: It emphasizes skills character-
istic of Homo sapiens. This very definition appears to constrain g
in humans and, in our opinion, limits its generalizability in a bio-
logical context. Furthermore, the old debate about the cultural
fairness of intelligence testing is testimony to the vicissitudes of
defining and measuring g in humans.
As an alternative, we propose a description of intelligence in a
biological context, inspired by the work of Piaget, who suggested
that “Intelligence is an adaptation… The organism adapts itself by
materially constructing new forms to fit them into those of the uni-
verse, whereas intelligence extends this creation by constructing
mental structures which can be applied to those of the environ-
ment” (Piaget 1952, pp. 3–4). Thus, intelligence is the ability of
a species to adapt flexibly to many environmental challenges in
the service of survival. Note that this definition is species relative:
It follows naturally that the larger the range of environmental con-
ditions to which an organism can potentially adapt, the more intel-
ligent it might be relative to other organisms with more limited
repertoire of adaptations (Piaget 1971).
Furthermore, we propose that intelligence is not a trait. Rather,
it is the inference by the human observer in the face of increasing
the potential and scope of domain-specific skills developed by
species in adapting to a variety of environmental pressures.
These domain-specific skills allow for increasing the range of
environments to which the organism is able to respond efficiently.
Of course, the converse is also the case: Environmental changes
will result in adaptation by the emergence of new domain-specific
skills. Such increase is the consequence of evolving ever-larger
brains, especially frontal lobes, which enables the development
of an ever-greater repertoire of skills (Parker & Gibson 1977).
Moreover, a procedure or skill developed specifically within a spe-
cific domain might become accessible to systems or brain struc-
tures that serve other domains (Anderson 2010). Such change in
accessibility creates domain-general skills or procedures, thus
improving intelligence (or adaptability) (Rozin 1976). The result
appears to be g to the human observer. Lest we revert again to
an overly anthropocentric view, we emphasize that increasing
brain size is just one means of increasing survivability.
Instead of the mysterious g factor, we propose that G is
reflected in a capacity: object manipulation in various species,
with its evolution into a mental manipulation (MM) in humans –
the hallmark of human activity. MM can be investigated by various
tests using verbal, mathematical, or spatial manipulation of con-
tents. These tests tend to correlate positively not because they
reflect g, but because they reflect MM. We suggest that MM is
the ability to perform transformations on concrete and abstract
objects (e.g., mental rotation) and imagine the results, without
needing the actual objects. This ability clearly improves adaptabil-
ity to a wide range of environments. One example of MM is when
a child learns to consider a situation from the perspective of
another person. We claim that linguistic construction, as well as
other cognitive processes, involves MM, so that it may be consid-
ered as an overarching principle of human operations and as the
basis of human culture.
To illustrate the biological continuity and the development of
domain-specific skill, we consider the ontogeny of mathematical
skills in humans (described originally by Piaget 1971). Initially,
babies develop the concept of one, few, and many, requiring direct
perception of objects. Animals exhibit number concept at this level
(Pahl et al. 2013). Later, children learn that abstract symbols repre-
sent quantities, and they learn how to manipulate them. Next,
algebra supplants numbers at ever higher levels of abstraction,
with ever more abstract manipulations (i.e., operations). An analo-
gous analysis was offered by Greenfield (1991) regarding the devel-
opment of linguistic structures from motor schemata in children.
The essence of these developmental achievements is that they
reflect the ability to perform transformations, translations, recombi-
nations, projection, predictions, and so on, in infinite ways. What is
crucial for adaptation is the ability to entertain the results of these
MMs, and then select only the best one for action.
One challenge to which MM could offer a positive contribution
is in measuring the nebulous g. Many, if not all, IQ testing instru-
ments may be viewed as assessing domain-specific abilities. To
what extent do they reveal an underlying, domain-general or uni-
versal ability? For example, the Raven Progressive Matrices is
commonly used as a measure of the g factor (Deary et al. 2010).
However, in a wider cultural context, this test may measure no
more than a domain-specific, culturally acquired skill (Owen
1992). We suggest that MM is such an overarching set of opera-
tions. It is possible that MM started as an ability to manipulate
or view actual objects designed for the visual-spatial domain.
These visual-spatial specific abilities evolved to serve other
domains (e.g., language) and have become accessible to other
systems that serve other commitments.
In sum, we propose that the alternative conception of intelli-
gence as offered here, compels rethinking g in humans. It is sug-
gested that animal behavior, specifically, object manipulations,
and perspective taking (a variant of MM) with increasing cortex,
provide specific precursors to human abilities, as reviewed by
Burkart et al. A good example of a transitional stage to MM dem-
onstrating biological continuity is deception in apes (Byrne &
Corp 2004).We further submit that MMmay better serve as a bio-
logically based concept for studying individual differences in
humans, while providing for continuity across species.
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Domains of generality
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Abstract: We argue that general intelligence, as presented in the target
article, generates multiple distinct and non-equivalent characterisations.
Clarifying this central concept is necessary for assessing Burkart et al.’s
proposal that the cultural intelligence hypothesis is the best explanation
for the evolution of general intelligence. We assess this claim by
considering two characterisations of general intelligence presented in
the article.
Recent studies suggest that general intelligence is not limited to
humans, but can be identified in a number of nonhuman
species. Such studies provoke the question: How does general
intelligence evolve? Burkart et al. argue that the cultural intelli-
gence hypothesis is the best explanation for the evolution of
human and animal general intelligence. According to this hypoth-
esis, the access to socially maintained knowledge generates selec-
tion pressures for increased reliance upon domain-general
capacities. In order to assess the cultural intelligence hypothesis,
one must have a good grasp of what is meant by general intelli-
gence. The authors are quick to note that this is a tricky
concept to pin down. Defining general intelligence in terms of
specific measures of intelligence like problem solving and learning
is problematic insofar as these skills can result from adaptive
domain-specific modules. The authors thus characterise general
intelligence as a domain-general ability best understood in con-
trast to the properties of domain-specific modules (sect. 1.2.1,
para. 5, 6). There are many ways to make this contrast,
however. As a result, the authors characterise domain-generality
in a variety of ways: as phenotypic plasticity, as being non-
modular in structure, as requiring learning or other processes of
“ontogenetic construction” or canalisation, as involving reasoning,
or as involving belief or belief-like states. The fact that domain-
generality can be understood in many distinct and non-equivalent
ways is worrisome insofar as different conceptualisations of
domain-generality are likely to require distinct evolutionary
narratives.
To take one example, domain-generality can be purchased
quite cheaply if it is understood as mere phenotypic plasticity.
Peter Godfrey-Smith (1996), for instance, makes a convincing
case that phenotypic plasticity is selected for in heterogeneous
environments – a scenario one expects to be common. To the
extent that this is the case, phenotypic plasticity will be a wide-
spread adaptive solution, seen quite deep in evolutionary history
(Godfrey-Smith’s central example of Bryozoan, sometimes
known as “sea-moss,” behaviour makes this point clear). One
does not need to invoke the cultural intelligence hypothesis in
order to purchase such flexibility.
Elsewhere, the authors characterise domain-generality as
involving reasoning and belief or belief-like states. The idea
here is that domain-generality can be conceptualised as the
ability to use a variety of distal cues to generate mental represen-
tations, which in turn can be used to produce adaptive behaviour
(sect. 1.1.2, para. 4). Of course, mental representations can be
understood more or less restrictively. In some extenuated way,
simple neuronal systems like those of Caenorhabditis elegans
“represent” or register their local environment. However, it
seems clear that the authors are interested in representations in
a richer sense, in line with what Kim Sterelny (2003) called “de-
coupled representations.” These are representational states with
the function of tracking features of the environment, but which
are not tightly coupled to specific types of response. Such repre-
sentations identify what Sterelny called “action targets” which
can be acted on in a variety of different ways to satisfy goals.
De-coupled representations are an interesting evolutionary
phenomenon, and one that the cultural intelligence hypothesis
may get some explanatory purchase upon. De-coupled represen-
tations are the kind of psychological structure one would expect of
creatures who need to rationalise and predict the thoughts of con-
specifics, as well as weigh the complex tradeoffs involved in
acquiring knowledge from multiple sources. However, even
here we urge caution. The coleoid cephalopods (cuttlefish,
squid, and octopuses) seem to display de-coupled intelligent
behaviour, particularly those of the order Octopoda. Octopuses
display sophisticated cognitive capacities including problem
solving, individual recognition, and perhaps imitation (Godfrey-
Smith 2013; Mather & Kuba 2013; Roth 2013). Nonetheless,
octopuses are not social, often interacting with conspecifics only
during mating (Roth 2013). The existence of cephalopod intelli-
gence may thus pose a counterexample to the cultural intelligence
hypothesis even when general intelligence is understood in the
restricted sense of involving de-coupled representations.
The authors might respond by arguing that the evolutionary
phenomenon they are attempting to describe is not merely the
existence and amplification of one of the aforementioned features
of domain-general cognition, but how a conglomerate of such
properties came about and increased in sophistication. This con-
glomerate might include flexible reasoning and learning gener-
ated by de-coupled representations, in turn underpinned by the
contents of an increasingly large brain. If this conglomerate
really is what the authors mean by domain-generality, however,
then they need to do more in order to motivate it. Recent work
on grackles and New Caledonian crows, for example, shows that
behavioural flexibility occurs independently of innovativeness,
problem-solving ability, problem-solving speed, and brain size
(Logan et al. 2014; Logan 2016a; 2016b). Given that purported
features of domain-general intelligence do not always co-occur,
further justification is required to ground claims that “general
intelligence” is a unitary explanandum.
We suggest that the consequences of this analysis are twofold.
First, we urge the authors to be clearer about the terms they
use, and to operationalise them when possible. Second, the argu-
ments presented here suggest that the cultural intelligence
hypothesis may be insufficient for explaining the evolution of
general intelligence, understood as involving the evolution of
de-coupled representational states. Although this hypothesis
may capture some directional effects in some clades, more
needs to be done in order to show that it is the best explanation
for the evolution of general intelligence in all clades.
Theory of mind: A foundational component of
human general intelligence
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Abstract: To understand the evolution of general intelligence, Burkart
et al. endorse a “cultural intelligence approach,” which emphasizes the
critical importance of social interaction. We argue that theory of mind
provides an essential foundation and shared perspective for the efficient
ontogenetic transmission of crucial knowledge and skills during human
development and, together with language, can account for superior
human general intelligence.
We commend Burkart et al. for their impressive review of current
theory and research on the evolution of general intelligence.
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Although their analysis yields a persuasive account of the empiri-
cal data regarding general intelligence across species, it also moti-
vates increased attention to key components of human cognition
that, in our view, will prove to be essential for a complete under-
standing of the evolution of cognition.
A comprehensive theory of general intelligence and its evolu-
tion must somehow account not only for the commonalities
evident across species, as targeted by Burkart et al., but also for
the obvious wide divide between humans and nonhuman pri-
mates. Although we agree that the “cultural intelligence
approach” endorsed by the authors will be at the heart of a suc-
cessful theory, we believe their analysis also suggests directions
for further elucidation that would specifically address what is
special about human cognition.
Specifically, and consistent with the cultural intelligence
approach, we propose that language and theory of mind (ToM)
together can go far toward explaining superior human general
intelligence. Language and ToM arguably have the markings of
primary modules, at least as characterized by Burkart et al.
(sect. 1.2.3, Table 2): Both appear rapidly and dependably early
in development across all cultures without explicit instruction
and even in the most disadvantaged and deficient environments
(e.g., Wellman et al. 2001).
Others can better address the role of language in human intelli-
gence (seeDunbar 1998; Smith 1996), so we focus here on the con-
tribution of ToM, defined as the universal propensity of humans to
understand and explain their own and others’ behavior in terms of
internal mental states and processes such as beliefs, desires, goals,
and intentions (e.g., Wellman 1990). We note here that language
and ToM are so ontogenetically and symbiotically intertwined
that they are difficult to discuss separately. Indeed, some have
made a strong case for their co-evolution: “The evidence at hand
suggests that language and theory of mind evolved … in constant
interaction, serving one primary adaptive goal: to improve social
coordination” (Malle 2002, p. 280).
Nevertheless, a conceptual case can be made for ToM alone
being especially foundational for human general intelligence. As
a developing domain-specific causal framework that supports
advanced meta- and social cognition, such as recognition of the
possibility of false beliefs and variation in knowledge states
between individuals, ToM contributes essentially to social learn-
ing as characterized by the cultural intelligence approach. We
offer here a few examples of phenomena illustrating the crucial
role of ToM in social learning and, by extension, the evolution
of human general intelligence. For a recent collection of relevant
research and commentary on these issues, see Legare and Harris
(2016), and especially Tomasello (2016).
Even children under age 2 engage in observational imitative
learning that depends on attention to the actor’s intended action
or goal. For instance, Meltzoff (1995) demonstrated that when
shown an actor who tried and failed to achieve a goal, such as
hanging a string of beads on a peg, 18-month-old children imi-
tated what the actor tried to do rather than what the actor actually
did (dropping the string of beads). Carpenter et al. (1998) found
that young children shown adult demonstrations of action
sequences containing both accidental and intentional actions
more often reproduced the intentional actions, suggesting that
even early observational learning is contingent on an appreciation
of another’s intentional state.
Similarly, research on children’s early attunement to potential
knowledge in others reveals the advantages for a social learner
afforded by an emerging ToM. Even 2-year-olds attempting to
locate a desired object efficiently seek help from informed
rather than ignorant adults (O’Neill 1996), demonstrating an
incipient appreciation of mental states that will eventually help
them when they seek to obtain information rather than objects.
Recent studies of children’s reaction to testimony suggest that,
although children generally assume what they are told is truthful
(e.g., Harris 2012), they are more willing to believe an expert or
experienced source. Moreover, as children advance from early to
middle childhood, their evaluation of others’ testimony increas-
ingly recognizes the possibility of deception or distortion (Mills
2013). On the positive side, children’s growing sophistication even-
tually includes recognizing the specifically pedagogical motives of
adult teachers, as described in Gergely and Csibra’s (2006;
Csibra & Gergely 2009) proposed theory of natural pedagogy.
Children’s particular “readiness” to learn through social instruction
(and also to teach others; seeFlynn&Whiten 2008) hinges on a rec-
ognition of the internal content of others’ minds. From our own
research, we can add that young children’s reflections on their
own learning, as assessed in transcripts of at-home conversations,
are in fact particularly focused on their teachers and what their
teachers know as opposed to other aspects of learning events,
such as how or when learning occurred (Bartsch et al. 2003).
Early childhood is replete with phenomena suggestive of the
central role of ToM in social learning. In addition to these exam-
ples, the acquisition of belief understanding, widely recognized as
a hallmark of developing ToM and first evident around 4 years of
age in children’s explicit predictions and explanations of action
(e.g., Wellman et al. 2001), can also be viewed as foundational
to the most advanced human achievements, such as those that
occur in the collaborative activity of scientific research and the
uniquely human creation of formal methods to facilitate learning
(e.g., Meltzoff et al. 2009). At a fundamental level, our greatest
accomplishments must rest on our basic capacity to imagine and
recognize the variations and vulnerabilities of human cognitive
states. With this in mind, future researchers guided by Burkart
et al.’s final recommendation to explore further the relationship
between intelligence and socio-cognitive abilities would do well
to direct those efforts toward theory of mind.
Understanding the relationship between
general intelligence and socio-cognitive
abilities in humans
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Abstract: Burkart et al. consider that the relationship between general
intelligence and socio-cognitive abilities is poorly understood in animals
and humans. We examine this conclusion in the perspective of an already
substantial evidence base on the relationship among general intelligence,
theory of mind, and emotional intelligence. We propose a link between
general intelligence and socio-cognitive abilities within humans.
Burkart et al. assess what studies on general intelligence in nonhu-
man animals mean for current theories about the evolution of
general intelligence. Although we agree with their conclusions
in favor of the cultural intelligence approach, we do not entirely
agree with their assessment that the relationship between
general intelligence and socio-cognitive abilities is poorly under-
stood in animals and humans (sect. 4.2, para. 4).
In this commentary, we aim to place their conclusion in the per-
spective of an already substantial evidence base demonstrating a
relationship between general intelligence and socio-cognitive abil-
ities in humans. We review recent meta-analyses on this relation-
ship, focusing on connections among general intelligence, theory
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of mind (ToM; Baron-Cohen et al. 1997; Baron-Cohen et al.
2001) and ability-based emotional intelligence (EI; Mayer &
Salovey 1997).
ToM is the ability to attribute mental states (e.g., emotions,
intentions, or beliefs) that differ from our own (Baron-Cohen
et al. 1985; Baron-Cohen et al. 2001). ToM is widely assessed
using the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET; Baron-
Cohen et al. 1997; 2001), which can reveal intersubject differ-
ences in social cognition and emotion recognition across different
groups and cultures (Fernández-Abascal et al. 2013). A recent
meta-analysis involving 3,583 participants revealed a small positive
correlation between general intelligence and RMET score (r = .24),
with both verbal and performance IQ showing similar correlations
with RMET score (Baker et al. 2014). The authors of that meta-
analysis concluded that intelligence contributes significantly to
ToM, with verbal and performance IQ contributing equally.
EI is a construct central to conceptualizing and evaluating
socio-cognitive abilities. EI refers to the ability to reason validly
with emotions and with emotion-related information and to use
emotions to enhance thought (Mayer & Salovey 1997; Mayer
et al. 2008). The most common measure of ability-based EI is
the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test
(MSCEIT; Mayer et al. 2002). This test assesses the four
primary abilities (branches) of the Mayer and Salovey model of
EI: perceiving emotions in oneself and others, using emotions
to facilitate thought, understanding emotional information, and
regulating emotions in oneself and others (Mayer & Salovey
1997). MSCEIT assesses these emotional abilities by asking the
subject to solve a series of emotion-based problems, thereby
avoiding the high risk of bias associated with self-report EI mea-
sures. MSCEIT-based studies have demonstrated a relationship
between general intelligence and EI. For instance, Webb et al.
(2013) found significant correlations of MSCEIT score with
general IQ, verbal IQ, and performance IQ. A meta-analysis of
53 studies involving 3,846 participants found positive correlations
of scores on the MSCEIT or its forerunner MEIS with general
intelligence (r = .30), verbal intelligence (r = .26), and nonverbal
intelligence (r=.23) (Kong 2014).
Factor-analytic exploration of howmental abilities correlate with
one another suggests an even broader range of intelligences linked
to ability-based EI, including fluid intelligence, crystallized intelli-
gence, and quantitative reasoning (Legree et al. 2014; MacCann
et al. 2014). These intelligences lie within the second stratum of
theCattell-Horn-Carrollmodel (McGrew2009). Further evidence
for the relationship of ability-based EI with a range of broad intel-
ligences comes from a study involving more than 12,000 people
ranging in age from 17 to 76 years (Cabello et al. 2016). In this
study, MSCEIT scores varied with age according to an inverted-
U curve: Younger and older adults scored lower than middle-
aged adults, just as reported for several other intelligences.
In this way, the extensive literature on ability EI provides sub-
stantial evidence linking various types of intelligence to socio-
cognitive abilities. Nevertheless, one thing that remains unclear
is how the EI assessed on the MSCEIT relates to executive func-
tions, some of which – such as inhibitory control and working
memory – strongly correlate with general intelligence, as
Burkart et al. point out (sect. 1.1.2, para. 2). Gutiérrez-Cobo
et al. (2016) systematically reviewed 26 studies on the relationship
between EI and cognitive processes reflected in tasks such as the
Stroop task or Iowa gambling task. The authors found that perfor-
mance-based ability EI (such as measured on the MSCEIT) – but
not self-report EI – positively correlated with efficiency on emo-
tionally laden tasks. In contrast, no correlations were observed
between EI measured in various ways and non-emotionally
laden tasks. These findings suggest that the greater intelligence
reflected in higher ability-based EI can mean superior perfor-
mance on emotionally laden socio-cognitive tasks, but not neces-
sarily on other kinds of tasks.
In summary, the body of studies examining ToM and ability-
based EI build a strong case that general intelligence, particularly
intelligence in the second stratum of the Cattell-Horn-Carroll
model, is associated with socio-cognitive abilities in humans.
Studies of ability-based EI and cognitive processes nuance that
this relationship is likely to be complex: For example, higher
ability EI may lead to more efficient cognitive processes in emo-
tionally laden tasks but not other tasks. A link between general
intelligence and socio-cognitive abilities coincides nicely with
studies from affective and social neuroscience showing that
emotion processing and cognition in the brain are highly inter-
twined and mutually determined (Phelps et al. 2014).
Future work should (1) examine to what extent different socio-
cognitive abilities are related (e.g., how are ToM and EI related?),
(2) analyze to what extent different socio-cognitive abilities relate
to general intelligence, (3) test whether and how specific social
inputs play a role during ontogenetic construction of socio-cogni-
tive abilities, and (4) identify brain regions involved in different
socio-cognitive abilities and examine their relationship and
overlap with regions implicated in general intelligence.
Taking amultiple intelligences (MI) perspective
doi:10.1017/S0140525X16001631, e203
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Abstract: The theory of multiple intelligences (MI) seeks to describe and
encompass the range of human cognitive capacities. In challenging the
concept of general intelligence, we can apply an MI perspective that
may provide a more useful approach to cognitive differences within and
across species.
In line with the view of most psychologists and psychometricians,
Burkart et al. assume that there is a single general intelligence (g);
controversy centers around the identity and nature of domain-spe-
cific computational capacities and the extent to which nonhuman
animals can be said to have a g-like capacity.
Over the past several decades, researchers have challenged this
consensus and developed alternative ways of conceptualizing
human intellect (Guilford 1967; Sternberg 1984). In my case, I
deliberately disregarded paper-and-pencil instruments of the
sort favored in scholastic settings, and which almost always yield
a “positive manifold.” Instead, culling evidence from a range of
disciplines – from anthropology and education to neuropsychol-
ogy and evolutionary biology – I put forth the claim that human
beings are better described as having a set of relatively indepen-
dent computational capacities, which I termed the “multiple intel-
ligences” (Gardner 1983/2011).
According to my analysis, the kind of intelligence typically mea-
sured in IQ tests is scholastic intelligence – the bundle of skills
needed to succeed in modern secular schools. In my terms,
success on such instruments depends on a combination of linguis-
tic and logical-mathematical intelligences, with spatial intelligence
sometimes tapped as well. It is worth noting that, at the extremes,
strength (or weakness) with one of these intelligences does not
predict comparative strength (or weakness) with the other (Det-
terman 1993). Largely ignored in standard measures of intellect
are several other intelligences that I identified: interpersonal
and intrapersonal intelligences (often described as social or emo-
tional intelligence), musical intelligence, bodily kinesthetic intelli-
gence, and naturalist intelligence. Because we do not have
comparable instruments to assess nonscholastic intelligences
(but see Gardner et al. 1998), we do not know to what extent
ability in, say, musical intelligence correlates with strength (or def-
icits) in, say, social or intrapersonal intelligence. Yet ample evi-
dence confirms that these intelligences can be dissociated from
one another, as happens with prodigies (Winner 1997) or
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individuals on the autistic spectrum (Silberman 2016). Put differ-
ently, ability to succeed in school settings is decreasingly impor-
tant, as one ventures to contexts that differ significantly from
the canonical Western school.
Even as MI theory differs from a g-centric view of the world, it
also differs fromFodorianmodules. Intelligencesmay contain spe-
cific modules (e.g., linguistic intelligence may contain a parsing or
phoneme discriminationmodule), but their exercise in the world is
far less reflexive, far more adaptive. An individual skilled in linguis-
tic intelligence is able to speak, write, communicate, and learn new
languages and the like. Skill in spatial intelligence involves making
sense of local two-dimensional arrays, as well as navigating around a
neighborhood or, indeed, around the globe.
It may seem that the intelligences are a grab-bag of primary
Fodorian modules as well as more-general secondary informa-
tion-processing or problem-solving capacities processing certain
kinds of content. And, indeed, as we attempt to make sense of
human cognition, that characterization proves serviceable. MI
theory stands out less in terms of the precision of its claims with
respect to the execution of tasks in the world than in its challenge
to the notion that there exists any sensible and defensible notion
of general intelligence – even within Homo sapiens.
For those sympathetic to an MI view, formidable questions
remain. What are the basic building blocks of intellect? To what
extent is each heritable? How do strictly modular capacities inter-
act with ones that are more permeable? Do we need to posit a sep-
arate “executive function,” a so-called “central intelligence
agency,” or does such a capacity emerge naturally out of intraper-
sonal intelligence (the ability to know oneself accurately) and
logical intelligence (the ability to reason about one’s actions)?
An MI perspective yields far more specific pictures of how
human beings carry out the raft of tasks for which the species
has specifically evolved as well as those tasks that have emerged
over the centuries by virtue of newly emerging cultural artifacts
and technologies, and, perhaps, acts of nature (e.g., diseases, vol-
canic eruptions). Furthermore, such a perspective suggests an
alternative approach to the issue addressed in the target article.
Instead of invoking g, plus specific modules, one can instead
break down any task in terms of its demands on specific intelli-
gences (e.g., playing chess involves logical and spatial intelligence
but little bodily or musical intelligence) as well as the various ways
in which one can become proficient at the task (e.g., some chess
players weigh interpersonal intelligence – knowing the opponent –
much more than do others). We avoid the conundrum that
human intelligence is most naturally assessed through language-
based instruments, and yet such instruments cannot be employed
with other animals – leaving us with a situation where we can do
species comparisons only by eliminating what is widely regarded
as the essence of human intellect. By the same argument, we
cannot use “musical intelligence” of birds, or the “echoing intelli-
gence” of bats, again ignoring a dominant intellectual capacity.
More generally, we may be better able to trace the similarities
and differences between human beings and particular species
(be they birds, bats, or dolphins) if we think of them in terms of
each species’ own dominant and less salient intelligences, rather
than their having more or less of g.
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Abstract: Burkart et al.’s proposal is based on three false premises: (1)
theories of the mind are either domain-specific/modular (DSM) or
domain-general (DG); (2) DSM systems are considered inflexible, built
by nature; and (3) animal minds are deemed as purely DSM. Clearing
up these conceptual confusions is a necessary first step in understanding
how general intelligence evolved.
“The best-laid schemes o’mice an’men,” penned Robert Burns in
his ode to mice. It is an astute observation of how our intelligence
has outwitted theirs. Though I appreciate Burkart et al.’s attempt
to synthesize a wild and wooly comparative literature on general
intelligence in mice, men, and many other species, they have
introduced a few red herrings and false premises that muddy
the waters and undermine suggestions for future research.
The problem starts with the authors’ initial premise: Scholars
tend to view the mind as either domain-specific/modular (DSM)
or domain-general (DG), and those who lean to DSM see the
mind as predetermined and inflexible, and thus largely the work
of nature. These views conflict with a theory of general intelli-
gence. Burkart et al. claim that their framework shows “that
human cognition involves elements of domain-specific and
domain-general processes” (sect. 1.2.3, para. 4), and in contrast
to prior views, “animal minds need not be bundles of specialized
cognitive adaptations” (sect. 1.2.3, para. 4). But their premise is
false as is their characterization of animal research. This commen-
tary addresses these misconceptions and introduces some addi-
tional distinctions in order to productively explore how general
intelligence evolved.
Those who have synthesized DSM perspectives (e.g., Pinker
1997) do not deny the existence or significance of DG capacities:
evolutionarily ancient mechanisms that typically interface with
and often constrain the outputs of each domain. Research on
theory of mind (ToM), number, and language – domains often
considered as modules – has long explored how executive func-
tions interact with the computations and representations of each
domain (Bradford et al. 2015; Soltész et al. 2011). For example,
delays in the expression of ToM and number competence are inti-
mately related to the development of working memory, whereas
performance on ToM tasks can be improved by lifting constraints
that arise from inhibitory control or perseverative responses.
Thus, although it is inaccurate to pigeonhole scholars as either
DSM or DG, it is true that those who have explored the nature
of DSM systems are more interested in them and in how they
can be characterized on the basis of evolutionary theory. Similarly,
although the generative computations that subserve language
competence (but also other domains such as music, number,
and ToM) have no limit, our capacity to produce or comprehend
sentences is limited by working memory. Thus, although DSM-
focused researchers tend to emphasize the nature of the represen-
tations and computations within a domain or module, they don’t
deny the existence or potentially constraining impact of DG
processes.
Of relevance to the evolution of general intelligence is the
underlying architecture of DSM systems. Here, too, Burkart
et al. mischaracterize these as innate and inflexible. Research on
faces reveals this error. Neurobiological studies in macaques
and humans reveals dedicated circuitry that is consistent with a
DSM perspective. However, this system matures slowly over
time and depends on experience with faces as elegantly demon-
strated by studies of individuals with early-appearing cataracts
that were later removed (Rhodes et al. 2017). A similar character-
ization applies to language, wherein there are core underlying
computations and representations, some specific to language
and others shared (Hauser & Watumull 2016), but with experi-
ence selecting among the options to generate specific languages
(e.g., French, English).
Lastly, it is simply not the case that nonhuman animals are per-
ceived as mere bundles of modules, fixed and inflexible. Research
on model systems such as aplysia and songbirds reveals both
ancient, general mechanisms for learning and memory, as well
as highly dedicated systems that nonetheless show plasticity. For
example, although passerines acquire their song on the basis of
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specialized circuitry that enables vocal imitation, this same system
requires specific input (e.g., species-specific song), is not engaged
for other vocalizations (e.g., alarm calls), and in some species,
shows plasticity throughout life as individuals create new songs
each season. In addition, many researchers have recognized and
detailed other DG processes that go beyond what Burkart et al.
discuss. For example, there is considerable comparative work
exploring the concept of “sameness,” analogical reasoning, and
algebraic computations (Martinho & Kacelnik 2016; Smirnova
et al. 2015; ten Cate 2016). These are not part of the executive
system, have not typically been linked to general intelligence,
and yet they cut across domains and appear evolutionarily ancient.
Putting these strands together suggests that any approach to
exploring the evolution of intelligence must consider the interac-
tion between DSM and DG, understand the specificity of the
content of DSM, examine a diversity of DG systems (i.e.,
beyond executive functions), and document how maturational
changes in DG can impact the ontogeny of DSM. The content
of a domain is particularly relevant as tasks within the general
intelligence battery are often assumed to be part of a given
domain without rigorous testing. Take, for example, work on
tool use. Many researchers have considered tool technology a
domain, one based in part on the functional design features of
its objects. Thus, when animals such as chimpanzees and New
Caledonia crows – natural tool users – show sensitivity to an
object’s design features, using those objects that are most likely
to lead to successful outcomes, we consider this to be evidence
of domain-specificity. And yet, cotton-top tamarins – a species
that never uses tools in the wild and shows virtually no interest
in object manipulation in captivity – show the same kind of sensi-
tivity to an object’s design features as chimpanzees and crows; fur-
thermore, this sensitivity appears early in ontogeny in the absence
of experience (Hauser et al. 2002a). This suggests that we should
be more cautious with our claims of DSM capacities, and thus,
how we classify the tasks within a general intelligence battery.
In conclusion, although Burkart et al. introduce a tension
between DSM and DG that doesn’t exist, incorrectly consider
DSM perspectives as innate and inflexible, and falsely accuse
other scholars of classifying nonhuman animals as rigidly DSM,
they are correct in emphasizing the importance of looking more
deeply at general intelligence in animals. Progress will depend
on a clear articulation of the different skills tapped in the
general intelligence battery, and standard methods that can be
implemented across a diversity of species.
The evolution of general intelligence in all
animals and machines
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Abstract: We strongly agree that general intelligence occurs in many
animals but find the cultural intelligence hypothesis of limited
usefulness. Any viable hypothesis explaining the evolution of general
intelligence should be able to account for it in all species where it is
known to occur, and should also predict the conditions under which we
can develop machines with general intelligence as well.
In their rich and thought-provoking review, Burkart et al. use
impeccable scholarship to produce a heroic synthesis of multiple
complex literatures. Their two main goals are to critically evaluate
the question of whether general intelligence exists in nonhuman
animals, and to evaluate the implications of general intelligence
for current theories about the evolution of cognition. In our
view, they accomplish the first goal extremely effectively,
making a compelling argument that general intelligence is
indeed widespread among animals. Regarding their second goal,
they argue that existing data from vertebrates support the cultural
intelligence hypothesis, which stresses the critical importance of
social inputs during the ontogenetic construction of survival-rele-
vant skills. However, the general intelligence explained by the cul-
tural intelligence hypothesis is actually quite limited, so we must
seek a more robust explanation for its evolution.
We believe that the cognitive buffer hypothesis (Allman et al.
1993; Deaner et al. 2003; Sol 2009a; 2009b; Lefebvre et al.
2013) offers a better alternative because it can account for phe-
nomena the cultural intelligence hypothesis leaves unexplained.
The cognitive buffer hypothesis posits that general intelligence
is favored directly by natural selection to help animals cope with
novel or unpredictable environments, where it enables individuals
to exhibit flexible behavior, and thus find innovative solutions to
problems threatening their survival and reproduction. In our
view, Burkart et al. dismiss the cognitive buffer hypothesis prema-
turely. They argue that fundamental preconditions for the evolu-
tion of large brains include a slow life history and high
survivorship, possible only in species not subject to unavoidable
extrinsic mortality such as high predation pressure (van Schaik
et al. 2012). However, much can be learned by considering appar-
ent exceptions to “rules” like these, so we offer the octopus as one
such exception.
Most octopuses are strictly solitary except when copulating,
have very short lives, have countless predators, and produce thou-
sands of offspring, most of which die. Nevertheless, they have
some of the largest brains known among invertebrates (Hochner
et al. 2006; Zullo & Hochner 2011); they exhibit a great deal of
curiosity about their environments (Montgomery 2015); they rec-
ognize individual humans (Anderson et al. 2010); they exhibit pro-
nounced individual differences (Sinn et al. 2001; Mather et al.
2012); they use tools; and they play (Mather 1994; Mather &
Anderson 1999). Octopuses thus appear to exhibit a considerable
amount of general intelligence without any opportunity whatso-
ever for social learning. Clearly, the cultural intelligence hypoth-
esis cannot account for the general intelligence apparent in
creatures like these.
Similarly, the cultural intelligence hypothesis offers little
promise with respect to evolving general intelligence in machines.
Computer scientists and robotic engineers have understood for
decades that the embodiment of intelligent machines affects
their ability to adapt and learn via feedback obtained during
their interactions with the environment, mediated by sensors
and activators (Brooks 1990; 1991; Sharkey & Ziemke 1998;
Goldman & de Vignemont 2009). Most hypotheses forwarded
to explain the evolution of intelligence in animals, including the
cultural intelligence hypothesis, fail to address the question of
how morphological traits outside of the nervous system might
have shaped intelligence. In creatures such as octopuses and pri-
mates, mutations affecting nervous system structure or function,
which might generate less-stereotyped and more-flexible behav-
ior, are visible to selective forces in the environment because
they can be embodied in the limbs. Thus, greater intelligence is
likely to evolve in these animals than in those whose interactions
with their environments are more highly constrained.
Roboticists have also realized that logic alone cannot generate
much intelligent behavior in their machines, and that to achieve
better performance, their robots must also want things. The
skills discovered by evolutionary algorithms are diverse, and
many such skills may occur within a single population of digital
organisms, but individual agents are rarely motivated to acquire
a large array of skills. As a result, most current evolutionary algo-
rithms produce domain-specific intelligence in machines that
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rarely possess more than a small set of skills, and they are thus
suited to performing only tasks that demand that particular skill
set. Although an intrinsic motivation to explore the environment
has been imitated in artificial agents via machine learning
(Schmidhuber 1991; Oudeyer et al. 2007), the production of gen-
eralist learners within an evolutionary context remains highly
problematic (Stanton & Clune 2016).
Any selection pressure that promotes behavioral diversity or
flexibility within the organism’s lifetime, including the ability to
learn from experience, should theoretically result in enhanced
general intelligence. Novel or changing environments should
select for individuals who can learn as much as possible in their
lifetimes, as suggested by the cognitive buffer hypothesis.
Indeed, Stanton and Clune (2016) recently developed an evolu-
tionary algorithm that produces agents who explore their environ-
ments and acquire as many skills as possible within their lifetimes
while also retaining their existing skills. This algorithm encourages
evolution to select for curious agents motivated to interact with
things in the environment that they do not yet understand, and
engage in behaviors they have not yet mastered. This algorithm
has two main components: a fitness function that rewards individ-
uals for expressing as many unique behaviors as possible, and an
intra-life novelty score that quantifies the types of behaviors
rewarded by the algorithm. Agents are also provided with an
intra-life novelty compass that indicates which behaviors are con-
sidered novel within the environment. The intra-life novelty
compass may simply identify and direct agents toward areas of
high expected learning because new knowledge often promotes
the ability to perform new skills. Aligned with these results, we
suggest that the primary value of the cultural intelligence hypoth-
esis is to offer social learning as an intra-life novelty compass, but
that this hypothesis provides neither the requisite fitness function
nor anything analogous to an intra-life novelty score.
A viable hypothesis explaining the evolution of large brains and
general intelligence should be able to account for general intelli-
gence in any species where it is known to occur, and it should be
able to predict the conditions under which we can develop
machines with general intelligence as well. The cultural intelli-
gence hypothesis simply cannot do these things.
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Abstract: This commentary contrasts evolutionary plausibility with
empirical evidence and cognitive continuity with radiation and
convergent evolution. So far, neither within-species nor between-species
comparisons on the basis of rigorous experimental and species-
appropriate tests substantiate the claims made in the target article.
Caution is advisable on meta-analytical comparisons that primarily rely
on publication frequencies and overgeneralizations (from murids and
primates to other nonhuman animals).
In this thought-provoking, highly inspiring article, Burkart et al.
explore the possibility of the existence of general intelligence in
nonhuman animals. Given the evidence for g in humans, it is a rea-
sonable and worthwhile endeavor to look for its existence in other
taxa. However, to pursue a psychometric approach to nonhuman
intelligence, it is necessary to obtain relevant and reliable data. As
the authors themselves admit, evolutionary plausibility does not
amount to empirical evidence.
Within-species comparisons. For more than a century, psycho-
metricians have devised IQ tests to measure human intelligence.
However, the breadth of test items is quite narrow. The tasks
are, for the most part, administered in the same manner, with
no or only modest variation of test-taking situation, motivation,
or sensory domain (Locurto et al. 2006). For instance, the
WAIS-IV (Wechsler et al. 2008) comprises four index scores,
focusing on verbal comprehension, perceptual reasoning,
working memory, and processing speed. This paper-and-pencil
task may be enough to represent major components of human
intelligence, but it does not tap the most interesting cognitive abil-
ities in nonhuman animals, especially in the technical and social
domains.
A crucial question in the search for the influence of an under-
lying general mental ability is the rationale behind which tests
are included in the test batteries and the reliability of those
tests for uncovering cognitive abilities. Tests measure perfor-
mance, not cognitive abilities per se. A huge number of possible
noncognitive factors may influence performance, from anatomical
to perceptual and motivational. Therefore, it is important to know
which cognitive tasks and which controls are included in the test
battery. Human IQ tests are often constructed in the manner of
a best-case scenario, in that tasks are included in the final
battery only if they correlate positively with other tasks and
loaded positively on the first component. That is, the presence
of g is assumed and tasks chosen that verify its presence
(Locurto et al. 2006). Furthermore, human IQ tests are standard-
ized with several hundreds to thousands of people of all age
classes. This is not feasible with (most) nonhuman animals.
Between-species comparisons. Large data sets for valid com-
parisons are only possible if we collect data from different labs.
But can we rely on data sampled in different labs, using (slightly)
different methods (different stimuli, apparatuses, procedures,
etc.) and groups of subjects differing in important features like
housing and rearing conditions, individual experiences, age, and
sex composition? This is both a practical and a theoretical
problem. It would demand an enormous amount of labor,
money, space, and other resources to test a large sample of
species in one lab. Even if one has access to a zoo or game
park, testing the abilities that tap reasoning in nonhuman cogni-
tion is a difficult and time-consuming business. Furthermore, if
the tasks were designed to tap different response systems,
sensory modalities, and motivations, it would be a huge
undertaking.
Therefore, the evidence for general intelligence on the inter-
specific level so far rests on meta-analyses. This strategy is based
on the assumption that the frequency of reported observations
of complex traits associated with behavioral flexibility is a reflec-
tion of that species’ intellectual capability. For instance, Reader
and Laland (2002) used indices of innovation, tool use, and
social learning for their correlations. But is innovation really a
direct outcome of a cognitive trait of a species? The relation is
vague and the behavioral definitions are rather slippery. Further-
more, most of these meta-analyses rely on observation frequency,
which may deviate widely from the experimentally proven exis-
tence of a cognitive trait in a species. For instance, reports of
true imitation in callithrichids are very rare, but rigorous labora-
tory tests have proven its existence (Voelkl & Huber 2000;
Voelkl & Huber 2007). The same is true with invisible displace-
ment in Callithrix jacchus (Mendes & Huber 2004). Tool use
may be the best example of the problem with drawing conclusions
about species differences in general intelligence based on publica-
tion counting. It is an important ability in chimpanzees, New Cal-
edonian crows, and Galápagos woodpecker finches. However,
these species have no clear, experimentally proven cognitive supe-
riority over their non-tool-using relatives, bonobos, carrion crows,
or tree finches, respectively (Gruber et al. 2010; Herrmann et al.
2010a; Teschke et al. 2011; 2013). This led to the conclusion that
habitual tool use is not a clear predictor of general intelligence,
not even physical intelligence (Emery & Clayton 2009). Although
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it would be unfair to dismiss the meta-analytical studies
completely, at least they require substantiation by experimental
data collected with similar methods across large samples of
species (Healy & Rowe 2007). So far, such experimental compar-
isons are rare, and if available, they don’t support the meta-analyt-
ical studies. All four experimental comparisons listed in Table 5 of
Burkart et al.’s target article lack clear-cut evidence for G.
Reasoning. Burkart et al. claim that “recent studies are consis-
tent with the presence of general intelligence in mammals” (in the
Abstract), which is defined as the ability to reason, plan, and think
abstractly (Gottfredson 1997). However, the only cited reasoning
study outside of rodents (Anderson 1993; Wass et al. 2012) has not
found evidence for g (Herrmann & Call 2012). The author of this
commentary has found evidence for reasoning by exclusion in
several human animals (Aust et al. 2008; Huber 2009; O’Hara
et al. 2015; 2016), but so far, evidence for g in these species is
lacking.
Finally, concerning the search for g or G in nonhuman animals,
caution toward overgeneralization is warranted. The few suppor-
tive studies in rodents and primates, two taxa that together repre-
sent about 20% of mammalian species and only 2% of vertebrates,
cannot be generalized to “nonhuman animals.” Especially prima-
tologists may be at risk of overemphasizing cognitive continuity
between humans and nonhuman animals, instead of seeing radia-
tion of traits outward in all directions (Hodos & Campbell 1969;
Shettleworth 2010a). The search for (human-like) general intelli-
gence (based on reasoning) should be compensated by an appre-
ciation of convergent evolution (Emery & Clayton 2004; 2009;
Fitch et al. 2010; Güntürkün & Bugnyar 2016).
The false dichotomy of domain-specific versus
domain-general cognition
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Abstract: The qualitative division between domain-general and domain-
specific cognition is unsubstantiated. The distinction is instead better
viewed as opposites on a gradual scale, which has more explanatory
power and fits current empirical evidence better. We also argue that
causal cognition may be more general than social learning, which it
often involves.
Burkart et al. view domain-specific and domain-general intelligence
as qualitatively different categories and then attempt to find plausi-
ble evolutionary scenarios. However, viewing intelligence as a
scalar trait is more consistent with biological gradualism. Exclusive
categories do not exist for the complex continuous interplay
between genes and environment resulting in unique individual
development and their evolutionary interactions (Laland et al.
2011; Osvath et al. 2014; Ploeger & Galis 2011; West-Eberhard
2003). The authors also do not explain how any cognitive adapta-
tion can be fully independent of brain size and executive func-
tions, as they posit in Figure 3 of the target article. Although it
is true that small brains can house many cognitive adaptations
with poor executive functions, they must clearly be at least some-
what related. For instance, primary modules can be inhibited or
stored in working memory. The tendency of kittens to respond to
small moving objects with behaviours from the hunting repertoire
is considered an example of a primary module (Table 2 of target
article), yet they can wait for the right time to pounce (inhibitory
control) and recall where they have last seen objects (working
memory).
The problems of the dichotomy can also be illustrated by con-
sidering precocial birds such as ducks and chickens, which are
born relatively well-developed; they walk, have open eyes, and
forage. Their cognitive abilities can therefore be tested soon
after hatching. Precocial animals are perfect for distinguishing
between primary and secondary modularization because they
can be tested with minimal experience. Filial imprinting occurs
when a newly hatched precocial chick limits its social behaviour
to a particular object. Under normal circumstances, this means
that the chick will attend to and follow its mother. It is one of
the most extensively described phenomena in ethology (Bolhuis
1991) and is traditionally considered to be the archetype of
instinct, so categorizing it as domain specific and modular
should be straightforward. Imprinting indeed appears to be a
species-wide adaptive specialisation to a predictable situation
that is stable across generations, with relatively quick learning in
a specific domain following a characteristic ontogeny.
The concepts of primary modules and instinct resemble each
other greatly (see Table 1), so we can criticize them on similar
grounds –mainly, that they are not truly qualitatively distinct
from their supposed polar opposites (Bateson & Curley 2013;
Bolhuis 1991). Many aspects of imprinting go beyond instinct or
primary modules. It can be considered domain general and may
involve secondary modules because it is phylogenetically and
ontogenetically canalized; it is learned until automated; and it
can have variable contents with individual differences. Moreover,
ducklings understand the relational concept of “same or different”
based on imprinting (Martinho & Kacelnik 2016), and chicks are
born with advanced folk biology, psychology, and physics (Vallor-
tigara 2012a; 2012b). This suggests massive modularity, which
according to Burkart et al. is “entirely compatible with the
co-existence of domain-general processes and general intelli-
gence” (sect. 1.2.1., para. 4). It is possible that imprinting is
more of the one than the other, but according to their view it
has to be either general or specific, which is incompatible with
current empirical evidence.
Table 1 (Jacobs & Gärdenfors). The description of primary modules by Burkart et al. (Table 2 of target article) strongly resembles the
nine different meanings of instinct by Bateson and Curley (2013) when rearranged.
Primary Modules Instinct
Etiology Evolutionary; reflect natural selection for domain-
specific cognitive adaptation
Adapted during evolution; genetic – highly heritable;
controlled by a specialised neural module
Development Skill matures, motor practice (experience-expectant) Present at birth or particular stage of development;
develops before function is established
Content of skills Pre-set, highly predictable Developmentally robust –well-canalized; not learned; a
functional behavioural system
Distribution Uniformly present in a given species Shared by all members of species/sex/age group
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The theoretical and empirical evidence for an absolute divide
between domain-specific and domain-general intelligence is
thus poor. One might argue that certain individuals have
general intelligence in the sense that they consistently perform
well on various tests across domains, but this hardly seems surpris-
ing or controversial. A gradual notion of intelligence means its
evolution is more plausible – even repeatedly in different clades
(Osvath et al. 2014) – than the potential “hard step” of categori-
cally unique general intelligence.
We are also sceptical of Burkart et al.’s focus on cultural intel-
ligence. Social learning has undoubtedly played an important role
in the cognitive evolution of many species, but perhaps it is not as
central or exclusive as they claim. In fact, they are concerned that
socio-cognitive abilities too often yield inconclusive results or are
not even included in test batteries.
Causal cognition can arguably overcome the problems of
Table 1 in the target article equally well or better than social
learning, which in many cases can be considered to be causal.
Woodward (2011) distinguished three levels of causal reasoning
(see also Gärdenfors 2003); one can learn to shake a branch to
cause fruit to fall because of one’s own experience shaking
branches (egocentric causal learning), observing others shake
branches (agent causal learning), or observing the wind shake
branches (observation/action causal learning). It is reasonable
that these three levels represent an evolutionary order of expan-
sion of causal cognition. This would constitute another argument
that the dichotomy between domain-specific and domain-general
intelligence is not plausible.
Rather than learning many one-to-one relations, representing a
causal network based on individual and social learning can be
highly advantageous and at the base of novel causal interventions
(Tomasello & Call 1997; Woodward 2011). This sort of causal cog-
nition can be tested empirically in a variety of species (Blaisdell
et al. 2006; Jacobs et al. 2015), and may be of the general
nature that Burkart et al. are seeking.
The evolution of fluid intelligence meets
formative g
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Abstract: The argument by Burkart et al. in the target article relates to
fluid (not general) intelligence: a domain-general ability involved in
complex, novel problem solving, and strongly related to working
memory and executive functions. A formative framework, under which
the general factor of intelligence is the common consequence, not the
common cause of the covariance among tests is more in line with an
evolutionary approach.
The authors present a wide-ranging theory of the evolution of
intelligence. However, Burkart et al. seem to have confused the
general intelligence factor (psychometric g) with fluid intelligence
(Gf). Psychometric g is a statistical way of describing the positive
manifold: the phenomenon that ability tests, each with different
content, all correlate positively. As such, psychometric g is a nec-
essary algebraic consequence of the positive manifold itself
(Krijnen 2004). The concept of general intelligence interprets psy-
chometric g as a within-individual, domain-general cognitive
ability that permeates all human mental activity so that different
tests are functionally equivalent in the sense that they all
measure this general ability to a varying extent. This is a sufficient,
but not necessary, explanation of the positive manifold. Moreover,
it is contradicted by evidence from cognitive neuroscience, neuro-
psychology, and the study of developmental disorders (e.g.,
Duncan et al. 1995; Vicari et al. 2007; Wang & Bellugi 1994).
Contrary to g, fluid intelligence can be meaningfully conceptu-
alized as a domain-general ability involved in complex, novel
problem solving – according to its definition, it is “an expression
of the level of relationships which an individual can perceive
and act upon when he does not have recourse to answers to
such complex issues already stored in memory” (Cattell 1971,
p. 115.) or “the use of deliberate and controlled mental operations
to solve novel problems that cannot be performed automatically”
(McGrew 2009, p. 5). In humans, fluid reasoning is usually mea-
sured with tests of nonverbal inductive reasoning. Gf shares
nearly half of its variance with working memory (Kane et al.
2005; Oberauer et al. 2005), probably because they both tap exec-
utive/attentional processes to a large extent (Engle & Kane 2004).
There are reasons that can lead one to think that Gf and g are
the same: Gf is central to variation in cognitive abilities to the
extent that g and Gf are statistically near-indistinguishable (Gus-
tafsson 1984; Matzke et al. 2010). Yet general intelligence and
fluid reasoning are clearly different constructs (Blair 2006) – and
so are the psychometric factors g and Gf (Kovacs et al. 2006).
Additionally, whereas the neural substrate of fluid intelligence is
in the prefrontal and partly in the parietal cortex (Kane & Engle
2002; Kane 2005), it is difficult to localize g, as results depend
on the actual battery of tests used to extract g (Haier et al.
2009). Also, different components of g are differently affected
by aging or the Flynn effect (the secular increase in IQ), both
of which manifest themselves more strongly on nonverbal than
verbal tests (Flynn 2007; Horn & Cattell 1967; Trahan et al. 2014).
Verbal cognition itself is crucial from the target article’s perspec-
tive when interpreting g. In humans, g is composed of crystalized
intelligence (Gc), too: the ability to apply already acquired skills
and knowledge, with an emphasis on language – vocabulary,
reading comprehension, and verbal reasoning. This does not trans-
late to nonhuman animals, making it very implausible that general
factors reflect the same construct across species. The authors’
approach to general intelligence, emphasizing problem solving in
novel contexts, also in fact reflects fluid intelligence – the central
component of g, but not the same as g. Finally, executive functions
are more strongly related to Gf than to other components of g
(Conway & Kovacs 2013). In fact, given the authors’ emphasis on
problem solving in novel situations aswell as on the role of cognitive
flexibility and executive functions, we often had the impression
when reading the target article that Burkart et al. in fact discussed
fluid intelligence under the term general intelligence.
If g does not reflect a unitary domain-general cognitive ability
and is not identical to Gf, then how can the general factor of intel-
ligence be conceptualized? Or, more importantly, if mental tests
do not all measure the same general intelligence, then why do
tests with different content correlate so strongly?
There are two recent explanations of the positive manifold (with
corresponding mathematical formulations) that do not propose a
psychological equivalent of psychometric g: the mutualism
model (van der Maas et al. 2006) and process overlap theory
(Kovacs & Conway 2016). Mutualism explains the positive mani-
fold with mutually beneficial interactions between cognitive pro-
cesses during development. Process overlap theory proposes a
functional overlap of cognitive processes when people solve
mental test items, such that executive/attentional processes are
tapped by a large number of different items whereas domain-
specific processes are tapped by specific types of tests only.
Both explanations conceptualize intelligence as a set of inde-
pendent specific abilities and processes. According to the
process overlap theory, g is an emergent rather than latent prop-
erty of mental test scores. Technically, this means that g is concep-
tualized as a formative rather than reflective latent variable: the
common consequence of the covariance among tests rather than
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its common cause. Another common example is socioeconomic
status (SES), which clearly is the outcome, and not the cause of
a number of indicators like family income, parental education,
and so on (Fig. 1).
Such a stance would contribute greatly to the authors’ compar-
ative approach, in which g would vary from species to species
(depending on whether its exact composition includes social
skills, language, etc.), whereas a reflective fluid intelligence
could indeed be plausibly interpreted as an ability whose evolution
was shaped by evolutionary pressures to solve novel problems.
The evolution of fluid intelligence could probably be understood
through disentangling the evolution of the prefrontal cortex and
executive functions in a number of different species.
At the same time, applying a formative framework to g could
contribute to a functionalist approach, because the primary role
of formative constructs is predicting important real-life outcomes
(Bagozzi 2007; Howell et al. 2007); in this case, evolutionary ones.
Under such a formative/functionalist agenda, the focus would be
on individually identifying the cognitive capabilities of each
species, ranging from olfactory abilities to social cognition, and
how they uniquely contribute to the given species chances of sur-
vival and reproduction.
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Abstract: Does general intelligence exist across species, and has it been a
target of natural selection? These questions can be addressed with
genomic data, which can rule out artifacts by demonstrating that distinct
cognitive abilities are genetically correlated and thus share a biological
substrate. This work has begun with data from humans and can be
extended to other species; it should focus not only on general
intelligence but also specific capacities like language and spatial ability.
In 1904, Charles Spearman discovered g, the factor measured in
common by correlated tests of diverse human mental abilities.
The existence of possible g homologues in other species and the
extent to which the evolutionary trend in our own primate
lineage can be characterized as an increase in g are among the
most important issues facing researchers across the disparate
fields interested in cognitive evolution. We applaud Burkart
et al. for recognizing the centrality of g to any complete under-
standing of human and animal differences.
Burkart et al. are not alone in expressing concern over the pos-
sibility that the correlations between factors defining a statistical g
(and its between-species analog G) might not reflect common
information-processing mechanisms (general intelligence) but
rather artifacts of various sorts (e.g., Hampshire et al. 2012). In
humans, at least, data from twins and genome-wide association
studies (GWAS) can rule out various conceivable artifacts by dem-
onstrating that distinct abilities are genetically correlated. The
existence of a genetic correlation means that there are polymor-
phic sites in the genome affecting both traits – either because
one trait is on the causal path to the other, or because distinct
causal paths emanate toward both traits from a common biological
substrate (whose function is influenced by the genetic variants).
Empirically estimated genetic correlations between ability tests
of different kinds are as large as the simple phenotypic correla-
tions (Kovas & Plomin 2006; Loehlin et al. 2016; Trzaskowski
et al. 2013), thus pointing to common biological mechanisms.
For instance, Trzaskowski et al. estimated the genetic correlation
between g and a test of mathematics to be 0.74. A genetic corre-
lation is a coarse-grained summary statistic, but in the near future
we believe it will be possible to use DNA-level data to determine
whether a given polymorphic site is associated with multiple abil-
ities in a manner consistent with a common mediating mechanism
(van der Sluis et al. 2010).
The methodology of GWAS is enabling this revolution because
certain special properties of genomic data – such as the natural
randomization of genotypes within the offspring of the same
parents – enable a high degree of trust in the causal inferences
that can be drawn from it (Lee 2012; Lee & Chow 2013; Lee
et al. 2016). Unfortunately, genetic methods along these lines
may be somewhat difficult to apply to nonhuman species
because of the large sample sizes required for adequate statistical
power (Chabris et al. 2015). Even in the face of this obstacle,
Figure 1 (Kovacs & Conway). The structural model corresponding to process overlap theory on a simplified model.
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however, indirect progress may be possible. In recent work, we
identified a large number of polymorphic sites in the human
genome associated with educational attainment, a heritable trait
(Heath et al. 1985) that is genetically correlated with both g and
intracranial volume (Okbay et al. 2016). More specifically, we
found that sites associated with education are much more likely
to be found in regions of the genome annotated as likely to
affect gene expression in the brain. Armed with such predictive
functional annotations, we may be able to determine whether a
substitution of one allele for another that has occurred at any
point in mammalian evolution would be likely to affect educa-
tional attainment – even if the site of the substitution is not poly-
morphic in modern human populations.
There are some outstanding methodological issues with this
approach, such as which parts of the genome should be used as
a control for purposes of determining whether likely g-affecting
sites have undergone an unusual number of base-pair substitu-
tions that would be consistent with the action of natural selection
(e.g., Dong et al. 2016). More work also needs to be done to
ensure that the functional annotations truly predict causal
effects on g or some cognitive trait rather than other intermediate
phenotypes (e.g., personality traits like neuroticism) that are also
genetically correlated with educational attainment in modern
Western societies. If these issues can be addressed, however,
then many powerful inferences will become possible. For
instance, we may be able to find evidence of directional selection
increasing g in the human lineage or a correlation between the
number of substitutions from the time of the common ancestor
to the present and the rank of a taxon in some measure of G
(Johnson et al. 2002). Such findings would bolster many of the
points tentatively advanced in the target article, including the
identification of the statistical g/G factors in other species with
general intelligence in Homo sapiens.
We also urge Burkart et al. and other researchers to consider
important ability factors other than g. The correlations between
distinct human abilities can be attributed to their common mea-
surement of g, but the “error” or “residual” inherent in each
ability when it is regarded in this way is also of substantive interest.
The authors mention the Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) model of
these lower-order factors; setting aside various controversies
over terminology and substance, we single out two of these
factors because of their ecological validity in the prediction of
human behavior (Kell et al. 2013; Lee & Kuncel 2015). The
factor that we will call verbal comprehension is characterized by
tasks requiring the translation of meanings into verbal units
(words, sentences, discourses) and vice versa. Burkart et al. do
not emphasize human language, but the search for its evolutionary
antecedents has raised many issues – including whether language
is independent of other cognitive capacities – that may be illumi-
nated by an interdisciplinary approach (Hauser et al. 2002b;
Hurford 2007; Pinker & Jackendoff 2005). We call the other
non-g factor of interest spatial visualization, which is character-
ized by tasks requiring the mental transformation of representa-
tions of objects and scenes in a manner preserving spatial
relationships. We suspect a relationship between spatial visualiza-
tion and tool manufacture analogous to the one between verbal
comprehension and language; confirming such a relationship
may prove to be a worthwhile research program.
Given the prominence of both language and tool manufacture
in human evolution, we are intrigued by the prospect of a
mapping between these two capacities and the two arguably
most important lower-order ability factors in the hierarchy of
human individual differences. Of course, these are not the only
abilities relevant to human evolution; various aspects of social cog-
nition, such as face recognition and theory of mind, should also be
explored. But in any case, it is now time for this line of research to
incorporate and make maximal use of the abundance of genetic
data that are becoming available.
Contemporary evolutionary psychology and
the evolution of intelligence
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Abstract: Burkart et al.’s impressive synthesis will serve as a valuable
resource for intelligence research. Despite its strengths, the target
article falls short of offering compelling explanations for the evolution of
intelligence. Here, we outline its shortcomings, illustrate how these can
lead to misguided conclusions about the evolution of intelligence, and
suggest ways to address the article’s key questions.
Burkart et al. offer an impressive integration of intelligence
research across humans and nonhuman species. Their commend-
able synthesis will serve as a valuable, centralized resource.
Despite these strengths, the target article falls short of offering
compelling explanations for the evolution of intelligence.
We observe three major issues with the target article. First, it
poses multiple questions about intelligence but does not consis-
tently differentiate between them – despite their likely different
answers. For example, the question of whether interspecific
variation in psychometric intelligence (G) exists is fundamentally
distinct from whether G taps the same construct as within-
human variation in intelligence (g). Independent of these questions
are why G exists and why g exists – two independent questions that
may have different answers.
Conflating these questions can lead to misguided conclusions
about the evolution of intelligence. The article establishes the
existence of both G and g. However, it does not logically follow
that they therefore (1) tap the same construct or (2) share the
same evolutionary origins. First, the authors offer little defense
of the implicit position that g and G tap the same construct.
Second, it is plausible that some species exhibit superior
performance on intelligence batteries as a consequence of cross-
species differences in the information-processing demands of
survival- and reproduction-related problems. Individual differ-
ences in intelligence among humans may have entirely different
origins. Prokosch et al. (2005) proposed that g captures individual
differences in “developmental stability at the level of brain devel-
opment and cognitive functioning” (p. 203). For several reasons,
this alternative evolutionary model deserves consideration along-
side the target article. First, the term “evolved” refers not to the
products of just selection, but also of genetic drift, gene flow,
and mutation. The target article neglects these non-selective
forces and how they could produce g. By contrast, Prokosch
et al. considered a more comprehensive set of evolutionary
forces and posited that g reflects the outcome of a balance
between selection and genetic mutation. The target article
offers no consideration of the mechanistic basis of variation in
intelligence. Second, Prokosch and colleagues generated clear,
novel predictions based on their model. It is not immediately
clear what new predictions the target article’s “cultural intelli-
gence” (CI) approach yields. The crucial idea is not that we
favor Prokosch et al.’s model, but rather that their work exhibits
hallmarks of sound evolutionary science that the CI approach,
in its current form, lacks. These include a consideration of selec-
tive and non-selective forces, as well as the generation of specific,
falsifiable predictions. At present, it is not clear what evidence
could disconfirm the CI model. We suggest that the CI approach
could benefit from more clearly articulating its empirical
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predictions, with an emphasis on identifying where it and alterna-
tive models advance divergent predictions.
A second, related issue is that the target article attempts to use
inappropriate criteria to discriminate between the CI and
alternative evolutionary models. Here, we provide four examples
of this. First, Figure 1b in the target article presents a pattern of
cognitive performance expected from domain-general mecha-
nisms in homogeneous developmental conditions. However,
this pattern is identical to that expected when selective forces
favor domain-specific mechanisms but non-selective forces
(e.g., mutation) impair the performance of these mechanisms.
Second, the target article acknowledges that intelligence tests
are culture-biased. If we recognize this, then we – the creators
of these tests – should certainly acknowledge that they could
be species-biased. Intelligence batteries tap cognitive perfor-
mance on different tasks. If the computational demands of these
tasks align more closely with the computational demands of the
adaptive problems faced by some species, then we should
expect interspecific variation in performance on these tasks –G.
As such, the existence of G is not “particularly difficult to reconcile”
(sect. 2.5, para. 5) with domain-specific mechanisms. We agree with
the authors that reconciliation between the massive modularity
hypothesis and domain-general views of intelligence is needed,
but the mere existence of G is insufficient for adjudicating
between them.
Third, the target article interprets the absence of “empirical evi-
dence … of specialized adaptive behavioral functions to specific
modular neural units” (sec. 1.2.1, para. 2) as evidence against
domain-specific mechanisms. This reflects a deep misunderstand-
ing of domain-specificity. A domain-specific mechanism is one
that has specialized computational functions, not one that has a
delimited neural area.
Fourth, the article ascribes an inability to learn to “primary
modules” (sec. 1.2.3, para. 2), which it synonymizes with
domain-specific mechanisms. Consequently, the authors use
learning as an evidentiary criterion against domain-specific mech-
anisms. This misconception has been addressed in two recent
publications in the flagship journal of the American Psychological
Association (e.g., Confer et al. 2010; Lewis et al. [2017]).
These problems point toward our third major issue: the target
article badly mischaracterizes contemporary evolutionary psycho-
logical thinking. The domain-specific mechanisms proposed by
evolutionary psychologists process inputs from the environment,
execute computational procedures on these inputs, and produce
outputs – including social learning (see Henrich & Gil-White
2001; Lewis et al. [2017]). Accordingly, portraying social learning
and domain-specific mechanisms as competing alternatives is
highly misleading. Domain-specific adaptations can ontogeneti-
cally canalize social learning (e.g., see Henrich & Gil-White
2001; see also Karmiloff-Smith’s “domain relevant” approach
[2015, p. 91]). Crucially, this view squares with the literature pre-
sented in the target article without forcing the unnecessary and
outdated dichotomy between innate versus learned.
We have critiqued several aspects of this article, but we
believe it has the potential to advance research on the evolution
of intelligence. In particular, the article implicitly points toward
cost-benefit analysis as a valuable tool. Applying this tool to
cross-species differences in the computational complexity of
survival- and reproduction-related problems could be fruitful
for understanding G. For example, whether a species faces a
heterogeneous or homogeneous environment and whether the
adaptive problems it faces are characterized by social contingen-
cies (e.g., the psychology of conspecifics) may influence the
information-processing complexity of the species’ adaptive
problems. Comparative analysis of the information-processing
complexity of these problems, in conjunction with cost-benefit
analyses of the cognitive architecture needed to solve them,
has the potential to yield new and testable hypotheses about
the evolution of G.
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Abstract: The search for general processes that underlie intelligence in
nonhumans has followed two strategies: one that concerns observing
differences between nonhuman species (G), the second that concerns
observing individual differences within a nonhuman species (g). This
commentary takes issue with both attempts to mark a general factor:
Differential responding to contextual variables compromises the search
for G, and the lack of predictive validity compromises g.
The target article by Burkart et al. is a valuable study, bringing
together lines of evidence that have heretofore seldom been consid-
ered together (Locurto 1997). I do have several concerns about the
viability of marking a general factor in nonhumans using either
species differences or individual difference. I also have a more
minor quibble about the definition of general intelligence (g) itself.
The authors, quoting Gottfredson (1997, p. 13) offer a rather
complex definition of general intelligence that one might call unnec-
essarily impenetrable, as follows: “the ability to reason, plan, solve
problems, think abstractly, comprehend complex ideas, learn
quickly and learn from experience” The authors add: “It is thus not
merely book learning, a narrow academic skill, or test-taking smarts.
Rather it reflects a broader and deeper capability for comprehending
our surroundings – ‘catching on,’ ‘making sense’ of things, or ‘figuring
out what to do’” (sect. 1.1, para. 1; from Gottfredson 1997, p. 13).
I offer a simpler definition, based onCharles Spearman’s original
work in this area. It was Spearman (1904) who first developed the
idea of a general faculty, based onhis study of individual differences
in the performance of school children across a variety of tasks, some
sensory/perceptual, as in pitch discrimination, others more fully
representative of cognitive functioning, such as school grades
(see, in particular, Spearman 1904, p. 291). Spearman defined
the general factor as tapping “the eduction of correlates” (or,
more fully, “the eduction of relations and correlates,” Spearman
1927, pp. 165–66). I love the simplicity and sheer elegance of
“the eduction of correlates” expression, and I think it suffices in
the stead of more complex definitions. The implication of Spear-
man’s definition was that g was better conceptualized as a single
process –mental energy and the like – instead of a series of
strung-together mechanisms that functioned as a whole because
of overlappingmicroprocesses (seeMackintosh 1998, for presenta-
tion of the overlapping mechanisms idea for g.). Although the
essence of the target article favors density in the definition of g, I
think Spearman’s original simplicity remains defensible.
The marking of a general factor by looking for systematic differ-
ences between nonhuman species (G) is potentially compromised
by EuanMacphail’s argument that species differences in cognitive
performancemay be the result of differences in what he called con-
textual variables (Macphail 1982; 1987) – that is, all of the sensory/
motoric/motivational and so on factors that might differ between
species, and consequently might masquerade as cognitive differ-
ences. The end point of this argument is that we may not be able
to reject Macphail’s hypothesis that all nonhuman species are
capable of all types of learning/cognition. This argument may
appear easily rendered moot (after all, isn’t a chimpanzee capable
of more complex cognition than a frog?), but it has proven more
resilient than initially expected. To their credit, the authors cite
Macphail’s argument, and they offer a reasonable rebuttal in the
form that perhaps not all tasks are affected by this problem to the
same extent. Reversal learning tasks, for instance, adapt each
species to the task in the form of initial acquisition before measur-
ing the rapidity of reversal. Therefore, tasks like this might be seen
as mitigating what might be initial between-species differences in
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reaction to contextual variables. But the problem posed by contex-
tual variables is more insidious than the authors recognize. To fully
account for the influence of these contextual confounds, onewould
have to expose different species to rather strenuous parametric
work, where potential contextual confounds are systematically
examined across a given dimension, such as studying species differ-
ences in reversal learning across a number of sensory dimensions:
visual, olfactory, tactile, and so forth. That kind ofwork is unlikely to
be done, and, as a consequence, Macphail’s argument remains a
thorn in our collective side.
The study of within-species individual differences is a more
promising avenue for identifyingmarkers of a general process. Sys-
tematic individual differences have been observed in nonhumans,
particularly in mice, and these differences are not confounded by
differences in noncognitive factors: for instance, overall activity
levels (Locurto & Scanlon 1998; Locurto et al. 2006). However,
an important, perhaps even critical limitation of such studies is
that they lack something that is commonplace in studies of
human g – namely, what is called predictive or criterion-related
validity (Anastasi 1961). In psychometrics, validity refers to what
a test measures. Predictive validity refers to the effectiveness of a
test in forecasting behavior in domains outside of the test content
per se. To assess it, there need to be independent measures of
what the test is designed to predict. Independence in this sense
can be taken to mean measures outside of the province of the
test items themselves. In the human literature, predictive validity
of an intelligence test is not at issue: g is a reasonably good predictor
of variousmeasures of life outcome, including school achievement,
the probability of occupational success, social mobility, and even
health and survival. g is better at predicting such variables than
are specific cognitive abilities on their own (Locurto 1991). The
many criteria external to the test itself that correlate with human
g represent a powerful measure of real-life success.
There is nothing similar in the nonhuman literature on g,
although there have been important findings that stretch the
initial g battery to include a number of additional processes that
seem reasonably related to what g should measure, such as selec-
tive attention, working memory, and tests of reasoning (Matzel
et al. 2011b; Sauce et al. 2014). These extensions are valuable,
but they do not constitute extra-domain assays. They are simply
additional cognitive tasks that load on the initial g. This form of
adding tasks is itself a type of validity called content validity, but
it is not predictive validity. The authors recognize this issue, and
in their Table 7 they offer a series of additional categories of evi-
dence, some of which are forms of predictive validity, that would
be useful going forward. The authors end by raising the critical
question: does (nonhuman) g predict success in real life? Only if
that question can be successfully addressed can we conclude
that g is not uniquely human.
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Abstract: In this commentary, we support a complex, mosaic, and
multimodal approach to the evolution of intelligence. Using the arcuate
fasciculus as an example of discontinuity in the evolution of
neurobiological architectures, we argue that the strict dichotomy of
modules versus G, adopted by Burkart et al. in the target article, is
insufficient to interpret the available statistical and experimental evidence.
Burkart et al.’s premise is that cognitive abilities can be supported
either by the evolution of “primary modules” (sect. 1.2.3, para. 2;
domain-specific adaptations to specific environmental challenges),
or by the expansion of domain-general intelligence (G). If this
premise were true, then the current empirical research, based
largely on principal component analyses (PCAs), would be more
consistent with the idea that a large portion of cognition in
several species is explained by G rather than by collections of
primary modules. Reviewing this empirical literature, the
authors admit the results are somewhat ambiguous. Nevertheless,
they predict we will find stronger evidence for the evolution of G
in the future, because the data seem largely inconsistent with the
primary modular perspective.
Here, we argue that the strict dichotomy of primary module
versus G is misleading: There are occasional evolutionary discon-
tinuities in neurobiological architectures that support a range of
cognitive abilities, which are neither domain general nor
modular adaptations for specific environmental challenges.
Our target example is the arcuate fasciculus (AF), which is a
neural fiber tract enabling a direct connection between temporal
cortex (including auditory cortex) and inferior frontal gyrus
(involved in cognitive control) (Catani et al. 2005). This tract,
exceptionally well developed in humans in comparison with
other primates (Rilling et al. 2008), is a neurobiological evolution-
ary discontinuity. By neurally binding the regions responsible for
auditory processing and cognitive control, this new architectural
feature greatly enhanced (1) the working memory for verbal infor-
mation (vWM) – quite poor in nonhuman primates (Plakke et al.
2015; Scott et al. 2012); and (2) the capacity to process sequences
(Dehaene et al. 2015).
This peculiar connectivity pattern seems to be a crucial prereq-
uisite for the evolution of multiple abilities relying on hierarchical
sequential structure (e.g., language, music, and complex action)
(Fadiga et al. 2009; Fitch & Martins 2014). However, improve-
ments in vWM and sequence processing do not necessary perme-
ate other (nonsequential) cognitive domains, thus not allowing any
interpretation in terms of modules or G. For instance: (1) Some
nonhuman primates (e.g., chimpanzees) seem to show spatial
WM superior to that of humans (Inoue & Matsuzawa 2007),
and (2) although the capacity to represent social hierarchies
seems to be within the range of nonhuman primate cognition
(Seyfarth & Cheney 2014), and the ability to process spatial hier-
archies is conserved among nonhuman mammals (Geva-Sagiv
et al. 2015), the capacity to process sequential structures nonethe-
less remains limited in these clades.
Another source of evidence for this specialization comes from
neuroimaging. Although the processing of sequential hierarchies
activates the inferior frontal gyrus (a region strongly connected
with the AF) (Fadiga et al. 2009; Fitch & Martins 2014), the
same is not true for nonsequential hierarchies in the visual,
spatial, and social domains (Aminoff et al. 2007; Kumaran et al.
2012; Martins et al. 2014). Instead, the latter group of hierarchies
seems to be represented by a domain-general episodic memory
system.
This cognitive mosaic argues against a simple gradual expansion
of G. When performing a PCA, including individuals of different
primate species, the emergence of the human AF (and enhanced
vWM) would be more easily classified as multidomain or multi-
purpose cognitive ability, but neither as domain-specific
(because it increases the capacity within a range of domains)
nor as domain general (because these improvements are specific
to sequential but not to nonsequential domains).
In sum, we suspect that the research program advanced by
Burkart et al. is designed to distinguish only between modules
and G, leaving aside other possible interpretations that would
fit better with the available data (e.g., Anderson 2016; Karmiloff-
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Smith 2015). In our opinion, a third way between modules and G
will give a more suitable account for clade-specific discontinuities
(grounded on neurobiological architectural changes), which
would fit better the statistical models. These discontinuities offer
a great opportunity to capture capacities that are neither gradual
expansions of G nor specific modular adaptations to specific envi-
ronmental problems. Therefore, they are required to overcome
intrinsic limitations of current models, theoretically improving
them and achieving a more realistic account of the evolution of cog-
nition across different species.
Evolution, brain size, and variations in
intelligence
doi:10.1017/S0140525X16001722, e213
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Abstract: Across taxonomic subfamilies, variations in intelligence (G) are
sometimes related to brain size. However, within species, brain size plays a
smaller role in explaining variations in general intelligence (g), and the
cause-and-effect relationship may be opposite to what appears intuitive.
Instead, individual differences in intelligence may reflect variations in
domain-general processes that are only superficially related to brain size.
The “evolution” of interest in individual differences in the intelli-
gence of nonhuman animals has followed a circuitous route. Indi-
vidual differences in intelligence were a central focus of early
psychologists (note the inclusion of chapters in our first textbooks;
e.g., Seashore 1923), as well as, some decades later, of the first
animal learning theorists (e.g., Thorndike’s studies in the
1930s). However, with the increasing fixation on the “experimen-
tal approach” and reductionism, interest in individual differences
waned overall, and systematic studies of variations in intelligence
within animal species were virtually abandoned between 1940 and
2000. This trend has shifted dramatically in recent times, with
increasing interest in between-species comparisons of intelligence
(G), and more dramatically, in within-species variations in intelli-
gence (g). In this spirit, Burkart et al. have done commendable
work summarizing the advances, insights, and limitations of
animal research on individual differences in intelligence, and
have placed this work in the important context of contemporary
evolution theory.
Although we agree with many of Burkart et al.’s conclusions, we
are skeptical of their inference that the evolution of intelligence,
as well as individual differences in intelligence, is inextricably
tied to brain size. Brain size does appear to explain differences
in the cognitive capacities of closely related species, although
the relationship begins to break down across families and higher
taxonomic groups. It is similarly problematic that while Neander-
thal brain size ranged from 1,300–1,600 grams, their human coun-
terparts had brain sizes of 1,200–1,500 grams. Current theory
suggests that competition between the cognitively superior
humans and cognitively inferior Neanderthal accounted for the
latter’s rapid extinction (Banks et al. 2008; Gilpin et al. 2016).
Relatedly, the size of the human brain has decreased during the
last 100,000 years (Aiello & Dean 1990), a time during which
we underwent unusually rapid cognitive gains.
Although brain size does have some value in explaining the cog-
nitive capacities of closely related species (i.e., G), it is less suc-
cessful when applied to individual differences within a species.
Early estimates suggested a weak relationship between brain
size and intelligence (r2 = 0.02–0.07; reviewed in Van Valen
1974), and meta-analyses based on modern imaging techniques
find only a marginal increase in this estimate (r2 = 0.08; reviewed
in McDaniel 2005). Furthermore, the strength of correlations
between brain size and intelligence vary across specialized abili-
ties, and in the case of some abilities, no correlation is observed
(van Leeuwen et al. 2009; Wickett et al. 2000), suggesting that var-
iations in brain size may instantiate differences in specific abilities,
but not variations in general intelligence. So why might any corre-
lation exist between brain size and intelligence? A possibility that
is widely ignored is that more intelligent individuals interact more
extensively with their environments (e.g., they explore more, they
learn more; Light et al. 2011; Matzel et al. 2006), and this “envi-
ronmental enrichment” promotes brain growth (Rosenzweig &
Bennett 1996). Simply stated, brain size might be influenced by
intelligence, but might not itself cause differences in intelligence.
This possibility has received wide support outside of the field of
intelligence (Clayton 2001; Maguire et al. 2000; van Praag et al.
2000; Will et al. 2004), and can explain the paradoxical observation
that the correlation between IQ and brain size only emerges after
age 7 (by which time differential experiences will have begun to
accumulate; McDaniel 2005).
The role of brain size in intelligence may matter less than we
intuit. It is important to be reminded that brain size is only a
very indirect measure of how general intelligence is instantiated.
Higher cognition is highly complex, and the circuitry, neurochem-
istry, and intracellular components of the brain all contribute to its
computational capacity. For example, as noted by Burkart et al.,
we have reported that general intelligence in mice is correlated
with the expression in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) of a dopaminer-
gic gene cluster( Kolata et al. 2010), and smarter mice express
higher dopamine-induced activity in the prefrontal cortex (Wass
et al. 2013). In humans, the dopaminergic system in the PFC
seems also to be closely linked with executive functions and intel-
ligence (McNab et al. 2009; Miller & Cohen 2001). And whereas
the brain of birds differs strikingly from the mammalian brain
(e.g., it lacks the 6 layers of lamination in the neocortex), the
avian nidopallium caudolaterale (NCL) is remarkably similar to
the mammalian PFC. Like the PFC, the NCL is a hub of multi-
modal integration connecting the higher-order sensory input to
limbic and motor structures (Gunturkun & Kroner 1999) , and
dopamine in the avian NCL seems to play a similar functional
role in higher cognition as it does in the mammalian PFC (Kara-
kuyu et al. 2007; Veit et al. 2014). This confluence of evidence
across taxonomic groups (humans, mice, and birds) is compelling,
and at least as parsimonious as the descriptions of intelligence
based on variations in brain size.
Burkart et al. imply in their current article and state explicitly
elsewhere (van Schaik et al. 2012) that “general intelligence is
not a uniquely derived human trait but instead a phylogenetically
old phenomenon, found among primates, rodents and birds”
(p. 280). However, the PFC and NCL are on opposite ends of
the cerebrum and possess distinct genetic expression patterns,
leading some to claim that these regions are not homologous
but, rather, represent a case of evolutionary convergence (Gun-
turkun 2012). Thus, non-homologous fields converged over the
course of 300 million years into mammalian and avian prefrontal
areas that generate the same cognitive functions (e.g., working
memory capacity; Diekamp et al. 2002; Matzel et al. 2013) that
contribute to the establishment of general intelligence. In other
words, general intelligence could have evolved multiple times in
different taxonomic groups. Of course this is a matter of consider-
able controversy (Karten 2015), and the question is far from
resolved. Nonetheless, this type of solution is more parsimonious
than one based solely on brain size, and mitigates the extant
problem of the “cost” of bigger brains. We hope that the “evolu-
tion” of interest in the variation in general intelligence follows this
route for the next decade.
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Abstract: We discuss the evolutionary implications of connections drawn
between the authors’ learned “secondary modules” and the habit-
formation system that appears to be ubiquitous among vertebrates. Prior
to any subsequent coevolution with social learning, we suggest that
aspects of general intelligence likely arose in tandem with mechanisms
of adaptive motor control that rely on basal ganglia circuitry.
Burkart et al. conclude that many or all vertebrate minds consist of
two sets of modular skills: one hardwired and the other ontogenet-
ically constructed – primary and secondary skills respectively.
They seem to define general intelligence operationally in terms
of its facilitatory role in the process by which an organism
obtains secondary skills. If this is correct, the next step should
be to identify and understand the neurobiological mechanisms
that underlie this process. Studying the evolution of general intel-
ligence in terms of the evolutionary history of its constituent
neural structures should provide valuable direction to the compar-
ative research recommended by Burkart et al. Here, we offer a
mechanistic explanation for these two skill types and why they
could be indistinguishable from one another; this centers
around the basal ganglia, a set of subcortical nuclei that are
good candidate structures for the foundations of general intelli-
gence. In particular, learning and automatizing secondary skills
appears to be what cognitive neuroscientists describe as habit for-
mation, a process reliant on basal ganglia circuitry (Smith & Gray-
biel 2016).
Certain aspects of almost any ecological context cannot be
directly addressed by natural selection simply because those
aspects are too transitory to support intergenerational selection,
which is required for specific adaptive solutions to evolve.
Although inaccessible to evolved primary skills, some transitory
ecological factors nevertheless remain stable for significant por-
tions of an individual organism’s life span – the specific geograph-
ical features surrounding a given animal’s den, for example, or the
physical layout of the controls in a personal automobile (and the
associated actions required to operate those controls). Transitory
stability is itself an ecological factor that is susceptible to adaptive
exploitation via natural selection. Species that evolved the general
capacity to identify, learn, and exploit instances of transitory eco-
logical stability will have obtained organismal objectives more suc-
cessfully and more efficiently than species lacking this capacity.
Secondary skills as described by Burkart et al. are the exploitative
products of such a capacity; that is, although evolved primary skills
exploit the stability of specific perennial factors, the capacity to
form secondary skills exploits transitory stability as a perennially
general characteristic of temporary factors (Nordli 2012). From
this perspective, as primary and secondary skills have each
arisen to exploit ecological stability (whether long-term or transi-
tory), it is unsurprising that their shared properties – speed, effi-
ciency, automaticity – render them effectively indistinguishable
(absent knowledge of their ontogeny), as Burkart et al. point out.
Supporting this perspective, research suggests that primary and
secondary skills are each encoded within basal ganglia-based cir-
cuits (Graybiel 1995), such as the fixed sequence of grooming
behaviors that is ubiquitously exhibited in rats (Aldridge et al.
2004) and learned paths rats take in a maze (Barnes et al.
2005). These nuclei also appear to be integral to goal-directed
action selection, stringing behaviors together in service of achiev-
ing contextualized reinforcement (Graybiel 2008). As a sequence
of reinforced behaviors (e.g., a maze path) is repeated within a
specific context (e.g., a chocolate reward at the end), the entire
string is encoded within the basal ganglia as a single behavioral
“chunk” that then exhibits quick and efficient cue-based automa-
ticity (Jin et al. 2014). The basal ganglia contribute centrally to
cognition as well, through working memory, attention, decision
making, and other processes (Stocco et al. 2010). In this
context, it is intriguing that mice with a humanized version of
their Foxp2 gene – the so-called “language gene” – develop
neurons in the basal ganglia with increased plasticity and signifi-
cantly lengthened dendrites (Enard et al. 2009), and also exhibit
accelerated habit learning relative to normal mice (Schreiweis
et al. 2014).
If general intelligence is the set of processes that allow organ-
isms to discover, learn, and automatize secondary skills, the
basal ganglia may be largely responsible for much of what qualifies
as intelligence: (1) modulating rewards to direct or “canalize”
attention and motivate goals (e.g., inclining to attend toward
and imitate conspecifics); (2) exploring a potential action space
and achieving targeted objectives by selecting goal-directed
behaviors (e.g., practicing/refining an approximation of what con-
specifics do); and (3) automatizing contextualized behavioral
sequences that have been repeatedly reinforced (e.g., reproducing
efficient skill behavior that may now be imitated by others). This is
consistent with the cultural intelligence perspective advocated by
Burkart et al., but the coevolutionary enhancement of social learn-
ing and general intelligence does not itself explain the evolution-
ary origins of general intelligence. Instead, we should look to basal
ganglia circuitry, which is functionally conserved across all verte-
brate species, and which likely evolved over 560 million years
ago (Reiner 2010; Stephenson-Jones et al. 2011).
The most basic function of basal ganglia circuitry is adaptive
motor control, directing goal-oriented motor sequences (Grillner
et al. 2013). Energy demands and reproductive success are the
main fitness pressures, and most organisms adapt to that pressure
by moving about through space – foraging for food and mates – as
efficiently and effectively as possible (see Stephens & Krebs
1986); competition over limited resources in these domains
likely resulted in an evolutionary arms race. The capacity to
automatize stereotyped patterns of learned motor behaviors into
secondary skills is a powerful weapon in that war, enabling the
execution of learned motor patterns with the same speed, effi-
ciency, and specificity of evolved motor patterns. We suspect
that general intelligence initially coevolved with mechanisms of
adaptive motor control to facilitate the search for and learning
of new adaptive motor skills. This intelligent search capacity
may subsequently have been generalized through exaptation to
facilitate the search for new adaptive cognitive skills: spatial forag-
ing and searching through memory space appear to be expressions
of the same general exploratory capacity, the goal-directed nature
of which is modulated by basal ganglia circuitry via the
dopaminergic reward system (Hills et al. 2008; Hills et al. 2015).
Comparative investigations of interspecies differences in basal
ganglia-based circuitry may provide further clues regarding the
evolution of general intelligence; future studies should pay atten-
tion to these structures and the mechanisms of habit formation to
which they contribute.
The evolution of analytic thought?
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Abstract: We argue that the truly unique aspect of human intelligence is
not the variety of cognitive skills that are ontogenetically constructed, but
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rather the capacity to decide when to develop and apply said skills. Even if
there is good evidence for g in nonhuman animals, we are left with major
questions about how the disposition to think analytically can evolve.
In their admirably broad discussion, Burkart et al. review many
important distinctions in the study of human cognition, including
fluid versus crystallized intelligence and domain-general versus
domain-specific mechanisms. Nonetheless, by focusing on g, the
authors did not acknowledge that individual aspects of human
intelligence – some of which presumably evolved separately –
may have been particularly important for the evolution of
human intelligence. In our view, the capacity to decide when to
develop and use intellectual skills is not only a crucial aspect of
human intelligence, but also it may in fact be unique to human
intelligence. Human metacognition of this sort was not discussed
by Burkart et al.
Consider the following problem (Frederick 2005):
A bat and ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than
the ball. How much does the ball cost?
Most educated adult humans are capable of generating a
response to this question intuitively and automatically (namely:
10 cents). This likely occurs through a domain-general canaliza-
tion process (see “The urgency problem” in the target article,
Table 1). However, the automatic response is not the correct
answer (if the ball cost 10 cents, the bat would have to cost
$1.10 and together they would cost $1.20 – the correct answer is
5 cents). Although the majority of people simply give the incorrect
intuitive response to this question (e.g., 64.9% of University of
Waterloo undergraduates; Pennycook et al. 2016a), some are
capable of answering it correctly. This exercise of intelligence
requires not just the capacity to solve the problem, but also the
willingness to apply effortful cognitive processing to a problem
despite the presence of what initially appears to be a suitable
response (Stanovich & West 1998; 2000). There is now a great
deal of evidence that human rationality (however imperfect, see
Kahneman 2011; Kahneman & Frederick 2005) involves not
simply computational cognitive operations (i.e., g), but also algo-
rithmic-level operations that determine the course of reasoning
and decision making (see Stanovich 2009a; 2009b; 2011).
Moreover, recent research indicates that the propensity to think
analytically as a means to override automatic responses has conse-
quences for our everyday lives (Pennycook et al. 2015b). For
example, more analytic individuals have less-traditional moral
values (Pennycook et al. 2014; Royzman et al. 2014) and are less
likely to hold beliefs that are religious (Gervais & Norenzayan
2012; Pennycook et al. 2012; 2016b; Shenhav et al. 2012), para-
normal (Pennycook et al. 2012), and/or conspiratorial (Swami
et al. 2014). Analytic thinking disposition has also been linked
with increased acceptance of science (Gervais 2015; Shtulman
& McCallum 2014) and lowered acceptance of complementary
and alternative medicine (Browne et al. 2015) and pseudo-
profound bullshit (Pennycook et al. 2015a). Analytic thinking
can also undermine cooperation and prosociality (Rand 2016;
Rand et al. 2016; Rand et al. 2014; Rand et al. 2012), as well as
punishment (Grimm & Mengel 2011; Halali et al. 2014; Sutter
et al. 2003).
Consideration of the evolutionary dynamics of metacognition is,
therefore, of key importance for understanding the evolution of
human intelligence (Bear & Rand 2016b). Recent work using
formal evolutionary game theory models has begun to shed light
on this issue from a theoretical perspective, both in the domains
of intertemporal choice (Tomlin et al. 2015; Toupo et al. 2015)
and cooperation (Bear & Rand 2016a; Bear et al. 2016). These
models illustrate how the willingness to override intuitive
responses can be favored by natural selection in settings where
flexibility and planning are particularly useful, and also how
complex cyclical dynamics of automatic versus controlled cogni-
tion can emerge. This growing body of theoretical work calls for
empirical examination of cognitive control in nonhuman animals
(e.g., MacLean et al. 2014; Rosati & Santos 2016).
Burkart et al. discuss executive functions like inhibitory control,
working memory, and cognitive flexibility (sect. 1.1) and highlight
the importance of “reasoning ability and behavioral flexibility” for
human and nonhuman intelligence (sect. 1.1, para. 1). Thus, the
human capacity for overriding intuitive outputs (such as 10
cents in the bat-and-ball problem) is clearly acknowledged. None-
theless, treating these aspects of human cognition as other types of
cognitive processes suppresses a distinction we think should be
emphasized. Can humans alone decide when (or if) to initiate cog-
nitive processes, as well as when (or if) to reflect upon their
outputs? The findings highlighted previously suggest that the
capacity to decide to think is a core intellectual skill that distin-
guishes humans from each other. We assert that this skill is also
crucial to distinguishing humans from nonhuman animals.
Although we agree that the pursuit of g (and G) in nonhuman
animals is worthwhile, it is not simply that the current body of
work is preliminary (as the authors state). Rather, understanding
the evolution of human intelligence requires a broader view of
human rationality. Thus, unfortunately, we are even further
from definitive conclusions than is intimated by the target
article. Even if there is good evidence for g in nonhuman
animals and this ultimately informs us about the evolution of cog-
nitive skills in humans, we will still be left with major questions
about how the human capacity to decide when to think (i.e., the
disposition to think analytically, over and above g) can evolve.
“Birdbrains” should not be ignored in studying
the evolution of g
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Abstract: The authors evaluate evidence for general intelligence (g) in
nonhumans but lean heavily toward mammalian data. They mention, but
do not discuss in detail, evidence for g in nonmammalian species, for
which substantive material exists. I refer to a number of avian studies,
particularly in corvids and parrots, which would add breadth to the
material presented in the target article.
I agree with the authors’ basic thesis, depicted in the target arti-
cle’s Figure 3, which argues for combinations of heritable and
learned abilities that result in general intellectual achievements,
whether in humans or nonhumans. However, in their discussion
of nonhuman subjects, the emphasis on nonhuman primate, and
to a lesser extent mammalian, species is discouraging. The few ref-
erences to avian cognition do not do justice to the wide variety of
abilities and studies – sometimes in a single individual or species –
that provide evidence for generalized intelligence. Thus, the point
of my commentary is to advocate strongly for avian g.
I do, of course, understand that formal g analyses (i.e., batteries
of different tests on numerous individuals within and across
species) are lacking for avian cognitive capacities, as compared
to the several existent analyses on nonhuman primates and
rodents. Nevertheless, I hoped that Burkart et al. would have dis-
cussed the large number of studies on a wide variety of topics per-
formed on avian species, particularly on corvids and psittacids …
and maybe would have attempted some kind of review, if not anal-
ysis, of their own. For example, early in the article the authors
suggest that transfer of knowledge from one domain to another
novel context provides evidence for g, yet little discussion exists
of instances of such behavior in avian subjects (for example, trans-
fer of the trained use of the label “none” from describing the
absence of similarity and difference of specific attributes
between objects [Pepperberg 1988] to the spontaneous use of
the label for describing the absence of a size differential
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[Pepperberg & Brezinsky 1991] to the additional spontaneous use
for describing the absence of a specific numerical set in a collec-
tion [a zero-like concept; Pepperberg & Gordon 2005]).
The authors note that g has “robust correlates to brain structure
and function” (sect. 1.1, para. 3), yet do not mention significant
research on avian brains. Recent studies, although not always per-
forming the correlations themselves, have shown that avian brain
anatomy would correlate with many g-related abilities; see, for
example, in addition to those references cited, Iwaniuk et al.
(2009) or Jarvis et al. (2005). Specifically, Olkowicz et al. (2016)
have found that parrots and corvids have forebrain neuron
counts equal to or greater than primates with much larger sized
brains, and argue that this finding likely explains the advanced
cognitive abilities found in these avian species.
In general, the authors only partially consider parallel/conver-
gent evolution of g with respect to avian species, again particularly
concerning corvids and parrots. For example, K-selected traits
(e.g., long lives, few offspring that are relatively slow to mature,
etc.), are discussed at various points in the target article as
being associated with the evolution of g; these traits are found
in most corvid and parrot species. The authors highlight the
importance of sociality in driving intelligent behavior (sensu
Jolly [1966] and Humphrey [1976]): Notably, the majority of
parrot and corvid species live in complex social groups, and evi-
dence exists for several types of learning that are enhanced via
conspecific or allospecific social influences (e.g., corvids: Miller
et al. 2014; New Zealand kea parrots: Heyse 2012). Myriad
papers on corvid social cognition have been published by
Bugnyar and his colleagues (e.g., Bugnyar & Heinrich 2006).
Acquisition of referential use of human speech by Grey parrots
occurs through social learning (e.g., Pepperberg 1981; 1999); sim-
ilarly, “bilingual” songbirds learn the form and likely use of heter-
ospecific vocalizations via intense social interaction (e.g., Baptista
1981).
Furthermore, as with nonhuman primates, the dominance hier-
archies that are prevalent in social groups of corvids (e.g., Chiarati
et al. 2010) require an understanding of advanced cognitive pro-
cesses such as individual recognition (e.g., Izawa & Watanabe
2008) and transitive inference (e.g., Paz-y-Miño et al. 2004).
Granted, the references I cite involve different corvid species;
nevertheless, the cognitive requirements across species would
likely be quite similar given their similar ecology/ethology. And,
although dominance hierarchies in parrot flocks have not been
studied in the wild, hierarchies have been observed in captivity
(Szabo et al. 2016; parrots in my lab also exhibit a hierarchy),
and understanding linear ordering can also be related to cognitive
capacities such as the spontaneous comprehension of ordinality
(Pepperberg 2006).
Tests used as evidence of general intelligence, even by the
authors’ admission, are mostly basic, but other tests, even if per-
formed on only a limited number of subjects, strongly demon-
strate advanced avian capacities. For example, evidence for
executive function (planning, delayed gratification) is evident in
corvids (Hillemann et al. 2014; Raby et al. 2007). One cannot
argue that such behavior is modularly related to caching, as
success on the same tasks can be seen in parrots that do not
cache (Auersperg et al. 2013; Koepke et al. 2015). Grey parrots
understand not only categories (e.g., what is or is not green),
but also concepts such as “color,” “shape,” and “matter” (i.e.,
the existence of these hierarchical concepts, under which catego-
ries such as green and wood are sorted; Pepperberg 1983) and
that two objects can be related based on just a subset of these con-
cepts; that is, for second-order concepts of same-different (Pep-
perberg 1987). The authors mention reasoning by exclusion: for
such abilities in parrots and corvids, see Pepperberg et al.
(2013), Schloegl (2011), and Schloegl et al. (2009). Likewise, for
advanced avian understanding of number concepts, see Smirnova
(2013) and Ujfalussy et al. (2014); these abilities are often at a level
more advanced than those shown to date for nonhuman primates
(e.g., Pepperberg 2006; Pepperberg & Carey 2012). Research
papers on tool use by corvids that do not use tools in nature are
too numerous to mention; for aspects of physical cognition in
parrots, note van Horik and Emery (2016).
The authors have, essentially, performed a meta-analysis on a
number of meta-analyses, and I have no arguments about their
basic thesis –my criticism is merely that readers interested in
this thesis, particularly readers with little knowledge of nonhuman
capacities, would unfortunately be left unaware of a large number
of striking avian abilities that provide considerable evidence for g.
General intelligence is an emerging property,
not an evolutionary puzzle
doi:10.1017/S0140525X1600176X, e217
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Abstract: Burkart et al. contend that general intelligence poses a major
evolutionary puzzle. This assertion presupposes a reification of general
intelligence – that is, assuming that it is one “thing” that must have been
selected as such. However, viewing general intelligence as an emerging
property of multiple cognitive abilities (each with their own selective
advantage) requires no additional evolutionary explanation.
As the authors acknowledge, the concept of general intelligence is
empirically grounded solely in the observation of positive correla-
tions between all test scores, as reflected by a general factor
termed g explaining a large share of variance in all tests (Spearman
1904). All other accounts are simply debatable interpretations or
hypotheses attempting to relate g to some other cognitive or bio-
logical constructs. They run the risk of reifying what is primarily a
statistical construct, and also of seriously confusing the search for
an evolutionary explanation. For instance, Gottfredson’s (1997)
definition of intelligence is little more than a scholarly formulation
of the folk concept of intelligence, but offers no guarantee of
matching psychometric g. Burkart et al. initially conflate g with
executive functions, but this changes the nature of the problem.
If general intelligence reduced to executive functions, then to
the extent that each executive function offers a selective advan-
tage, the evolution of general intelligence would not be a major
puzzle. Similarly, general intelligence is also identified with
domain-general cognitive processes, which is a different, and
unnecessary, hypothesis as we will show. Furthermore, many
putative domain-general cognitive functions turn out to be less
general than they seem. For instance, there are separate
working memory systems for verbal, visuospatial, and other
modalities. Similarly, words such as inhibition and attention
wrongly suggest unitary phenomena, whereas they are used to
describe a host of distinct processes, none of which can be said
to be truly domain-general, and none of which is an evolutionary
puzzle. Finally, certain cognitive functions can serve domain-
general purposes while having been selected for more specific
adaptive value. This may be the case of language, which serves
as a mediator across many cognitive functions, yet may have
evolved for purely communicative purposes (Jackendoff 1999;
Pinker & Bloom 1990).
More generally, every attempt to reduce general intelligence to
a single cognitive (processing speed, working memory, etc.) or
biological (brain volume, nerve conduction velocity, etc.) con-
struct has failed, each construct showing moderate correlation
with g and being best described as simply one contributor to
the g factor (e.g., Mackintosh 2011). Thus, trying to tackle the evo-
lution of general intelligence by addressing the evolution of any of
these constructs is a form of attribute substitution (Kahneman &
Frederick 2002).
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Understanding the evolution of psychometric g requires under-
standing how it comes about. As early as 1916, Thomson (1916)
showed that it is sufficient to postulate underlying group factors
that influence several tests to obtain a positive manifold without
a general factor (see also Bartholomew et al. 2009). Reframed
in modern psychological terms, an elementary analysis of tests
shows that no test is a pure measure of a cognitive function (or
construct). The relationship between cognitive functions and
test scores is many-to-many: Each test score is influenced by
several cognitive functions, and each cognitive function influences
several test scores (in the same direction). The latter observation
suffices to explain that test scores are positively correlated. We
submit that the logic of Thomson’s bonds model is much more
general, as it also applies to factors underlying cognitive functions.
Indeed, each brain function or property (e.g., frontal gray matter
volume, nerve conductance velocity, dopamine synthesis, etc.)
influences several cognitive functions, thereby inducing intrinsic
positive correlations between cognitive functions. One step
further back, each gene expressed in the brain (e.g., genes that
code for neurotrophic factors, transcription factors, and any mol-
ecule involved in neurotransmission) typically influences several
brain functions and properties, thereby inducing positive
correlations between them. In parallel, many environmental
factors (e.g., nutrition, socioeconomic status, education, diseases,
and so on) influence more than one brain or cognitive function,
thereby inducing further correlations. Finally, van der Maas
et al. (2006) have shown that positive correlations between cogni-
tive functions may emerge through mutual interactions in the
course of cognitive development, even in the absence of intrinsic
correlations. Thus, all of the factors underlying test performance
are pleiotropic and conspire to produce positive correlations at
all levels of description, hence the emergence of the positive
manifold.
Note that, according to the explanation given previously, the
positive manifold can arise in an entirely modular mind (because
modules selected for different purposes nevertheless have to
share underlying factors), and therefore there is no antagonism
between modularity and general intelligence. Furthermore, the
very same pleiotropic mechanisms are at work in other species
and, therefore, readily explain that a g factor can be measured
in nonhuman primates, rodents, and probably all organisms with
a nervous system. Finally, in the speciation process, genes that
progressively diverge between two populations influence more
than one brain and cognitive function; therefore, the two popula-
tions are bound to eventually differ in more than one brain and
cognitive function. This directly predicts that performance in dif-
ferent tests should covary across species, or what the authors term
G. Thus, all of the evidence that the authors gather in support of a
reified notion of general intelligence is more parsimoniously
explained by the pleiotropy of the underlying factors, within and
across species. The “independent evolution of large numbers of
modules instead of general intelligence” is not “particularly
difficult to reconcile with interspecific findings of G” (sect. 2.5,
para. 5); it directly follows from an understanding of what modules
are made of: the same building blocks, shared between species.
There is, therefore, no need to postulate that the positive man-
ifold reflects one particular cognitive function or one brain func-
tion, whose evolution would require a special explanation. The
positive manifold emerges spontaneously from the pleiotropy of
all of the underlying factors. Only these underlying factors
require an evolutionary explanation. It is indeed very interesting
to inquire about the evolution of genes involved in brain develop-
ment and function, the evolution of brain functions and proper-
ties, and the evolution of cognitive functions. If there is any
brain or cognitive function whose evolution is a major puzzle,
then it should be identified and studied as such. However, this
is not the case for general intelligence, which does not reduce
to a single brain or cognitive function, and whose evolution
follows directly from that of the underlying biological, cognitive,
and environmental factors.
General intelligence does not help us
understand cognitive evolution
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Abstract: Burkart et al. conflate the domain-specificity of cognitive
processes with the statistical pattern of variance in behavioural measures
that partly reflect those processes. General intelligence is a statistical
abstraction, not a cognitive trait, and we argue that the former does not
warrant inferences about the nature or evolution of the latter.
Is “the presence of general intelligence” the “major evolutionary
puzzle” that Burkart et al. claim? Like much of the literature on
general intelligence in animals, the target article draws inferences
about the nature and evolution of cognitive traits from the correla-
tions among measures of performance, both within and between
species. The “positive manifold” (sect. 1.1, para. 1) is thus taken to
be a nontrivial finding, and g is treated as being – or reflecting – a
trait with causal effects (amechanism). g, however, is of course a stat-
istical construct: When the authors refer to “the structure of cogni-
tion” (sect. 1.1.1, para. 1), what they actually describe is the
statistical structure of variance in performance on behavioural
tests. What can this statistical structure tell us about cognitive
traits? We suggest that it tells us very little, or possibly nothing,
because of themultiple plausible ways inwhich itmight arise.More-
over, the analysis of g fails to provide a clear framework for empirical
research, because the putative underlyingmechanism, general intel-
ligence, cannot bemeaningfully defined in the absence of the corre-
lations that are used as evidence for its existence.
More specifically, the reification of g involves a conflation of
the proposed domain-generality of cognitive processes with the
statistical pattern of variance in the behavioural output of those pro-
cesses. Thus, “Massive modularity would appear to be irreconcil-
able with general intelligence” (sect. 1.2.1, para. 4) –well, only in
the sense that apples are irreconcilable with oranges. Burkart
et al. follow many in assuming that the positive manifold can be
explained “by positing a dominant latent variable, the g factor, asso-
ciated with a single cognitive or biological process or capacity” (van
der Maas et al. 2006, p. 842). As pointed out by the latter authors,
other explanations, which account for not only the presence of gbut
also its heritability and neuro-anatomical correlates, are not only
possible, but also plausible. In citing van der Maas et al. (2006),
Burkart et al. explicitly “equate general intelligence with the posi-
tive manifold” (sect. 1.1.1, para. 3), implying that their position and
that of van derMaas et al. are in harmony. The point emphasised by
van der Maas et al., however, and the point we also emphasise, is
that the positivemanifold provides little or no constraint on the pos-
sible architectures of cognition.
To labour the point, correlated variance does not imply any par-
ticular kind of cognitive process. That said, we might still want an
explanation for why performance or behaviours are correlated
across domains. Here, in brief, are some possibilities.
(1) They are not really different domains. For example, Reader
et al. (2011) and Fernandes et al. (2014) found positive correlations
among the rates of social deception, social learning, innovation,
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extractive foraging, dietary breadth, percentage of fruit in the diet,
and tool use across primate species, leading both sets of authors to
conclusions about the domain-generality of cognitive processes.
Neither these authors nor Burkart et al. explain how a domain is to
be identified, and therefore how these behavioural measures can,
in principle, be used to test for domain-generality. We can envisage
plausible arguments to the effect that at least some of these behav-
iours draw on the same domain-specific processes. It is a question
of natural ontologies: How do we carve nature at her joints? The
only way that makes sense to us is in an evolutionary context
where we identify a domain with a selection pressure. Deciding
that “social” and “non-social” are distinct domains is, therefore, a
hypothesis about what selection pressures have operated, not neces-
sarily a fact about the world. Burkart et al. recognise this problem
(“The issue of task selection is thus closely linked to the identification
of domains in animal cognition” [sect. 2.4.2, para. 5]) but do not offer
a convincing solution.
(2) Related to (1), it may well be that the behaviours measured
are influenced by cognitive processes they share in common, but
this does not mean it is helpful to describe those processes as
“general processes,” or that together they comprise “general intel-
ligence.” For example, primate species vary in their sensory-motor
adaptations – in particular, in their stereo visual acuity and manual
manipulative abilities – and these differences correlate with the
evolution of binocular convergence supporting stereo vision, the
size of visuomotor structures in the brain, and consequently
overall brain size (Barton 2012; Heldstab et al. 2016). Clearly,
such sensory-motor specializations may influence performance of
a range of behaviours and/or experimental test procedures. Yet,
describing them as “domain general” tells us nothing about how
they work or how they evolved. We also do not share the optimism
of Burkart et al. that reversal learning is free of such problems.
(3) Niche dimensions tend to be correlated (Clutton-Brock &
Harvey 1977). For example, folivorous primates generally live in
smaller social groups, have smaller home ranges, and engage less in
extractive foraging and tool use than more omnivorous primates.
Cognitive adaptations for specific niche dimensions could therefore
theoretically be completely informationally encapsulated and yet per-
formance across domains would still be correlated.
(4) The rates of naturally occurring behaviours in the wild
(Reader et al. 2011; Fernandes et al. 2014, cited by Burkart et al.),
may be systematically biased, leading to spurious correlations.
Although these studies attempt to control for observation effort,
they don’t control for the number of individuals under observation.
Rates of all behaviours will, other things being equal, correlate pos-
itively with group size and therefore with each other, because more
individuals are under observation per unit time in larger groups. Var-
iation in observability due to habitat will only exacerbate the
problem. The implications are obvious.
For a theory to be useful, it has to be well defined in such a way as
to generate testable predictions that differentiate it from other
theories. Burkart et al., along with the wider literature on
general intelligence and g, fail to achieve this. If we are to make
progress in our efforts to understand the evolution and structure
of cognition, we need to stop confusing the map for the territory.
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Abstract: The target article provides an anthropocentric model of
understanding intelligence in nonhuman animals. Such an idea dates
back to Plato and, more recently, Lovejoy: On Earth, humans are at the
top and other animals at successively lower levels. We then evaluate
these other animals by our anthropocentric folk theories of their
intelligence rather than by their own adaptive requirements.
Burkart et al. have written a very interesting, erudite, and anthro-
pocentric account in the target article of how principles discov-
ered for human intelligence might be generalized to animals
other than humans. The presuppositions behind this article are
captured well by Lovejoy (1936) in his book, The Great Chain
of Being. The general idea, which goes back to Plato and Aristotle,
is that there is a Great Chain of Being containing, among other
entities, God at the top, then humankind, and then successively
lower animals. At the top of the Earthly beings are humans. So
if we want to understand other organisms, according to this
view, we can do so by comparing them to humans and seeing in
what ways they are similar and in what ways they are different
and lacking. Much of early comparative psychology was based
on this idea (e.g., Bitterman 1960).
Other areas of psychology and other behavioral sciences have
not been immune from the logic of the Great Chain of Being,
except that, in some cases, they viewed different cultures or
races of people as occupying differentially elevated positions on
the Great Chain (Sternberg 2004; Sternberg et al. 2005). Many
eminent behavioral scientists, such as Sir Francis Galton and
Raymond Cattell, believed in some version of the Great Chain
(see https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/indi-
vidual/raymond-cattell). Moreover, traditional cross-cultural psy-
chological studies of intelligence involved (and still involve)
translating Euro-centric intelligence tests, such as the Wechsler,
and then administering them to people in other cultures (e.g.,
Georgas et al. 2003).
But in the field of cultural studies of intelligence, progress has
been made, largely due to the pioneering work of Luria (1976).
Luria, in testing individuals in non-European cultures, found that
the problems that were alleged to measure intelligence in Euro-
pean populations did not do so in other cultures because the indi-
viduals did not accept the presuppositions of the problems they
were given. For example, when Uzbekistan peasants were given a
syllogisms problem, such as, “There are no camels in Germany.
The city of B. is in Germany. Are there camels there or not?”, sub-
jects could repeat the problem precisely and then answer “I don’t
know. I’ve never seen German villages …” The subjects did not
accept the problems in the abstract modality for which they were
intended. Of course, one could argue that they could not do so.
But then, Cole et al. (1971) found that Kpelle tribesmen seemed
not to be able to sort items categorically but rather sorted only func-
tionally, until they were told to sort the way a stupid person would,
at which point they had no trouble sorting categorically. In our own
research (see Sternberg 2004), we found that rural Kenyan chil-
dren and rural Alaskan Yup’ik Eskimo children could do tasks
that were extremely important for adaptation and even survival in
their own cultures (e.g., treating malaria with natural herbal med-
icines, finding their way across the frozen tundra fromone village to
another with no obvious landmarks) that their White teachers
never could do, but were considered stupid by their teachers
because they underperformed in school and on standard Euro-
centric cognitive tests. Who was lacking intelligence: the children
or the psychologists who gave them tests inappropriate to the
demands of their everyday adaptation?
The tests we used for the Kenyan and Alaskan children cut to
the heart of what intelligence is – ability to adapt to the environ-
ment. That is the core of intelligence, according to surveys of
experts in the field of intelligence (“Intelligence and Its Measure-
ment” 1921; Sternberg & Detterman 1986). But the tests that
Burkart and her colleagues have devised are not tests highly rele-
vant to animal adaptation; at best, and even then questionably,
they are tests of folk conceptions of what animal intelligence
should be from a human viewpoint.
An appropriate way to look broadly at the intelligence of any
organism is to look at how well it adapts to the range of
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environments it confronts. Gibson’s (1979) concept of an afford-
ance – an action possibility latent in the environment – is
perhaps key here. The humans and other animals that are intelli-
gent, in this view, are those that adapt well to the challenges of the
range of environments they can encounter over the course of their
lives. To understand animal intelligence, we should be looking at
skills that are relevant to the animals’ everyday adaptation, such as
how well they can forage for food, create adequate shelter, and
most important, avoid predators, including humans and the
traps humans set for them.
Perhaps, furthermore, we humans should test human intelli-
gence not with the often trivial tests we use (Sternberg 1990),
but rather with tests of how well we humans can avoid the
traps – for example, global warming, violence, pollution, poverty,
inequality – that we set for ourselves.
Humans, with the serious problems they have created for them-
selves – pollution, global warming, weapons of mass destruction,
terrorism, inequality, among others –may not be well positioned
to be the judges of what intelligence looks like in other organisms,
or of how intelligent they are. To hold other various animals to the
standards of human folk conceptions of intelligence is perhaps an
act of intellectual hubris. In the end, how intelligent, really, is a
species that may be the only species ever to live on Earth actually
to create and sow the seeds for its own destruction (Sternberg
2002)? If nonhuman animals were to create tests of intelligence
for humans, perhaps they would create tests that would
measure which humans were not intent on destroying both the
animals’ habitats and their own.
Disentangling learning from knowing: Does
associative learning ability underlie
performances on cognitive test batteries?
doi:10.1017/S0140525X16001795, e220
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Abstract: Are the mechanisms underlying variations in the performance
of animals on cognitive test batteries analogous to those of humans?
Differences might result from procedural inconsistencies in test battery
design, but also from differences in how animals and humans solve
cognitive problems. We suggest differentiating associative-based
(learning) from rule-based (knowing) tasks to further our understanding
of cognitive evolution across species.
In the target article, Burkart et al. highlight the importance of
identifying variations in domain-general intelligence across
species. However, with the exception of mice and possibly pri-
mates, there remains little evidence suggesting that variations in
domain-general intelligence (g) underlie intraspecific variations
in cognitive performance in nonhuman animals. Moreover, such
an attribution remains debatable as procedural differences in
test battery design may confound interpretations of the underlying
mechanism. Our concern is exacerbated where support for a g
factor is sparse and limited to studies that predominantly test sub-
jects in the wild. For example, the mechanisms underlying success
on test batteries designed to assess performances of birds in the
wild (Isden et al. 2013; Keagy et al. 2011; Shaw et al. 2015)
bear little resemblance to those effective in tasks presented to
non-avian species tested in captivity (Herrmann et al. 2010b).
To accurately address whether it is meaningful to talk about
domain-general intelligence in animals, it is important that the
inherent design of the items within a cognitive test battery
accurately capture domain-specific cognitive abilities, indepen-
dent of procedural factors, and that relevant testing paradigms
are used to assess the cognitive performances of subjects in the
wild as well as in captivity. Direct comparisons between species
are unavoidably difficult as different animals possess different
adaptive specialisations; for example, a human cognitive test
battery may assess verbal skills whereas nonhuman test batteries
cannot. Test batteries, therefore, also need to consider the inher-
ent differences in cognitive processes between species.
Performances on nonhuman cognitive test batteries, particu-
larly those presented to subjects in the wild, require individuals
to first interact with a novel apparatus before experiencing its
affordances. Accordingly, such test batteries often use tasks that
involve trial-and-error learning to quantify subjects’ performances
and assess their ability to learn to attend to cues based on reward
contingencies. For example, subjects may be presented with tasks
that assess how quickly they can learn to differentiate rewarded
from unrewarded colours, or learn about the spatial location of
concealed rewards. Although performances on such tasks are con-
sidered to capture domain-specific abilities, success will inevitably
also be mediated by fundamental processes of learning that are
common to the inherent design of these problems. As a result,
an individual may perform well when learning both colour and
spatial discrimination problems, not because this individual
excels in anything we would want to call intelligence but
because it is a relatively rapid learner of all kinds of association,
including those involved in the two novel problems. Hence,
what seems to be evidence for domain-general intelligence may
reflect individual consistency in speed of associative learning,
rather than individual consistency in cognition across different
domains.
Between-species comparisons may be further confounded
because associative learning ability plays a greater role in task per-
formance in animals than it does in humans, and may play a
greater role in some nonhuman species than others. Such differ-
ences may be particularly pronounced between evolutionarily dis-
parate species such as primates and birds. Pigeons consistently
show purely associative solutions to problems that humans, and
to some extent nonhuman primates, tend to solve by the use of
rules (e.g., Lea & Wills 2008; Lea et al. 2009; Maes et al. 2015;
Meier et al. 2016; Smith et al. 2011; 2012; Wills et al. 2009). In
humans, preferential attention to rules may expedite perfor-
mances on rule-based tasks (Danforth et al. 1990), but may also
impair responses to experienced contingencies (Fingerman &
Levine 1974; Hayes et al. 1986). Consequently, as different cog-
nitive processes govern the performances of different species on
psychometric test batteries, analogous performances between
human and nonhuman animals may be difficult to capture.
To overcome these issues, we highlight the importance of dif-
ferentiating between performances on tasks that require subjects
to “learn” to solve a problem, from performances on tasks that
assess whether subjects “know” the solution to a problem. We
therefore advocate the use not only of associative tasks such as dis-
crimination learning of colour cues that require trial-and-error
experience to solve, but also of tasks that require subjects to be
trained beforehand to a particular learning criterion, so that
their performance on a subsequent novel test or “generalization”
condition can be assessed. Such conditions provide a controlled
version of the tests of “insightful” or “spontaneous” problem
solving that, from the time of Köhler (1925) on, have often
been considered critical in assessing animal intelligence.
Learning tasks are particularly relevant when assessing individ-
ual differences in associative performances and may be more
relevant when investigating the cognitive performances of nonhu-
man animals. Binary discriminations involving spatial or colour
cues can be presented to subjects and their rates of learning quan-
tified across these different cognitive domains. Although rates of
associative learning may differ across domains (Seligman 1970),
individual differences in such tasks may still be correlated,
leading to a general factor reflecting associative learning ability
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(hereafter “a”). However, for reliable comparisons, it also remains
important to show that subjects’ performances are consistent
within domains.
Knowing tasks, by contrast, can be designed to assess the more
flexible cognitive processes associated with rule-based learning or
generalisation and may be more relevant when assessing cognition
in humans. Such tasks require training subjects to a predeter-
mined criterion of success to standardise their understanding of
the problem, and then presenting subjects with a single test trial
using novel cues. Importantly, performances on knowing tasks
may highlight whether the mechanism underlying g in humans
resembles that which may be found in nonhuman animals.
By incorporating both learning and knowing tasks into cognitive
test batteries, we can address whether a general factor of cognitive
performance in human and nonhuman animals is better repre-
sented by g or a. Distinguishing learning and knowing problems,
therefore, provides a measure of individual variation in both
domain-specific and domain-general abilities that do not just
reflect speed of associative learning, and so can be used to
assess whether variation in nonhuman cognitive performance
reflects a dimension of general intelligence of the same kind as
is thought to underlie human variation.
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Abstract: A higher-order function may evolve phylogenetically if it is
demanded by multiple domain-specific modules. Task-specificity to solve
a unique adaptive problem (e.g., foraging or mating) should be
distinguished from function-specificity to deal with a common
computational demand (e.g., numeracy, verbal communication) required
by many tasks. A localized brain function is likely a result of such
common computational demand.
The authors of the target article provide an excellent discussion on
the evolution of human intelligence, particularly on the formation
of secondary modules that are more variable and domain-general.
As discussed in section 1 of the target article, general intelligence
seems evolutionarily implausible because the mind is populated
by a large number of adaptive specializations that are functionally
organized to solve evolutionarily typical and recurrent problems of
survival and reproduction (see also Cosmides et al. 2010; Wang
1996). To resolve this paradox, the authors propose a model
that construes the mind as a mix of truly modular skills (primary
modules) and more variable and flexible skills (secondary
modules) that are ontogenetically acquired via the guidance of
general intelligence (see sect. 1.2.3). In the following, I propose
a novel hypothesis to extend this discussion by showing that sec-
ondary or higher-order modules can be formed not only ontoge-
netically, but also phylogenetically as adaptations, evolved from
domain-specific modules.
If general intelligence consists of a set of secondary modules,
each secondary module may be an evolved programing solution
for a function that could be shared by multiple primary
modules. These secondary modules of general intelligence can
be either ontogenetically constructed or phylogenetically
evolved. Imagine that a computer architect was creating a
system called Unix using the programming language C. At the
beginning, the operating system was written in assembly, where
nearly every line would contain memory addresses. Would it be
possible to program the system for its input/output devices
without repetitively stating these tedious memory addresses?
This problem has been solved by creating a pointer variable,
whose value specifies the address of a memory location. If a
memory address is called upon repeatedly, creating a pointer to
store the address would be an effective programing solution. Sim-
ilarly, if a random number generator is used repeatedly by many
local modules, it would be more efficient to make it globally acces-
sible by each of the modules.
Now imagine you are using a computer and have created many
folders for different papers. At the beginning, you included a copy
of a word processor in each folder. You then realized that all of
these papers require a word processor. It would be more efficient
if you place a single copy of a generic word processor in a visible
place that is accessible by all of the papers. This word processor
has then become a general tool for a common requirement of dif-
ferent tasks. Similarly, numeracy, as a component of general intel-
ligence, may be evolved as a result of a common demand by
multiple specific adaptations (e.g., counting foraging outcomes;
gauging social exchanges, assessing mate values, tracking recipro-
cal activities, etc.). A general-purpose device would be cognitively
economical if it is utilized for multiple tasks. From a design view-
point, general intelligence comes as a solution for overlapping
components of primary modules or for coordinating secondary
modules via executive functions (see sect. 1.2.2). From this
perspective, task-specificity to solve a unique adaptive problem
(e.g., foraging, hunting, or mating) should be distinguished from
function-specificity to deal with a common computational
demand (e.g., numeracy, verbal communication, etc.)
By the same token, if a particular emotion is a common compo-
nent of many specific adaptations, this basic emotion would
become a general mechanism shared by these adaptations. For
instance, anger is the expression of a neurocomputational
system that evolved to adaptively regulate behavior in the
context of resolving conflicts of interest in favor of the angry indi-
vidual (Cosmides & Tooby 2013). Anger can be triggered by mul-
tiple task-specific adaptations, such as territory defense, mating
competition, sibling rivalry, and cheater detection. Once trig-
gered, the anger system would produce one of two outputs:
threatening to inflict costs (aggression) or threatening to withdraw
expected benefits (Cosmides & Tooby 2013). Similarly, fear is a
basic emotion that plays a role in multiple adaptations and has
its brain center mainly located in the amygdala. This localized
brain function allows the organism to react not only to specific
and typical fear-inducing stimuli, but also to learn to react to non-
specific stimuli with fear via fear conditioning (e.g., Phelps &
LeDoux 2005).
General intelligence and basic emotions may both be solutions
for multiple primary modules that demand some common func-
tions. This pointer’s hypothesis of general intelligence challenges
a couple assumptions in the research literature of cognitive evolu-
tion. As indicated by the authors, many previous accounts of evo-
lution of human intelligence assume that domain-specific modules
ought to be cheaper and simpler than domain-general cognitive
mechanisms (see sect. 1 for relevant discussion). However,
being specific does not necessarily mean that the mechanism is
simple or cognitively economical. Because a domain-specific
mechanism is designed for solving a specific problem, its design
purpose is to do whatever it takes to solve the problem instead
of achieving structural simplicity, computational economy, or
functional efficiency. Such designs can be either as exquisite as
the human visual system or as patchy and lousy as a male’s repro-
ductive system, revised and modified from the Wolffian duct.
Thus, these adaptive specializations can either be cheap and
simple or costly and complex. Unlike engineering designs, evolu-
tionary designs cannot afford to erase existing blueprints and start
from scratch. Evolutionary efficiency is inevitably an efficiency
under phylogenetic constraints.
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The pointer’s hypothesis also challenges the notion that domain-
specific mechanisms are more localized in the brain than domain-
general mechanisms (see also sect. 1.1 for relevant discussion).
However, this notion is at oddswith the following two observations.
First, a specific adaptation can be implemented by a distributed
neural network. Second, a localized brain function is likely a
result of a common demand of multiple primary modules. Thus,
a more general-purpose mechanism may be implemented by allo-
cating a particular brain region to perform a function shared by
multiple primary modules. For instance, a localized motor cortex
(e.g., the precentral gyrus) can be used for motor controls in forag-
ing, hunting, gathering, mating competition, and so on. For the
same reason, localized brain regions for language processing
serve as a general-purpose system for all of the tasks that require
information exchange and verbal communication.
When does cultural transmission favour or
instead substitute for general intelligence?
doi:10.1017/S0140525X16001813, e222
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Abstract: The cultural intelligence hypothesis is an exciting new
development. The hypothesis that it encourages general intelligence is
intriguing, but it presents a paradox insofar as social learning is often
suggested to instead reduce reliance on individual cognition and
exploration. There is thus a need to specify more clearly the contexts in
which cultural transmission may select for general intelligence.
Burkart et al. provide a comprehensive and erudite review offering
new perspectives on the burgeoning developments in human and
nonhuman animal research on intelligence. I particularly welcome
the eventual focus on the relatively recently formulated cultural
intelligence hypotheses, which I have collaborated in developing
(Whiten & van Schaik 2007; and see Whiten [in press] for relation-
ships with the broader, earlier research on social intelligence).
However, I have a few comments and puzzlements to share.
The first concerns the authors’ conclusion in section 1.2.2 that
“natural selection for social learning seems to automatically trigger
selection on individual learning and general cognitive ability, sug-
gesting that ontogenetic canalization through social learning may
have contributed to enabling the evolution of domain-general cog-
nition” (para. 8). This principle is elaborated further in section 3.3,
hypothesising that selection for cultural intelligence offers an
explanation for the evolution of greater general intelligence in
some species, largely because the rewards consequent on the effi-
ciency of learning from experienced others minimise energetic
constraints on encephalization required for greater general intel-
ligence. However, this is an “enabling” explanation rather than
one positing positive selection on general intelligence through
an emphasis on cultural transmission, and I suggest there is some-
thing of a paradox here, or at least a conundrum.
The conundrum is that Burkart et al. propose that cultural learn-
ing encourages general intelligence, whereas it is common in the
social learning literature to assert, to the contrary, that a core adap-
tive advantage of this form of learning is that it reduces the costly
needs of individual learning. Thus, for example, it appears from
the restriction of chimpanzees’ nut-cracking to only far West
Africa thatmost chimpanzees have insufficient general intelligence
to invent the practice, despite availability of the requisite rawmate-
rials (excepting at least one rare innovator, at some stage); however,
a suite of experiments has shown that naïve chimpanzees (some
from East Africa) can learn the skill following observation of a
nut-cracker (Whiten 2015). This suggests that most wild chimpan-
zees in theWest achieve the skill via observational learning, remov-
ing selection pressure on the general intelligence necessary to
invent the skill.
If this is the case, it suggests that Burkart et al. havemorework to
do to specify just exactly what aspects of general intelligence they
propose may be selected for in such scenarios. They mention prac-
tice in this context, which is certainly protracted in the example of
nut-cracking (Whiten 2015). But the practice involved in perfect-
ing nut-cracking learned fromothers seems rather far from the def-
inition that “general intelligence, as defined in either humans or
nonhuman animals, stresses reasoning ability and behavioural flex-
ibility” (sect. 1.1, para. 1). In the human case, the phenomenon of
“over-imitation,” in which children (apparently unlike other apes)
copy others’ visibly causally irrelevant actions suggests a marked
relinquishing of reasoning and flexibility, commonly interpreted
as a correlate of our species’ extreme reliance on cultural transmis-
sion (Whiten et al. 2009).
Does the authors’ emphasis on the potential knock-on effects of
cultural intelligence on general intelligence perhaps neglect the
direct effects of selection for cultural transmission encouraging
other, socio-cognitive enhancements with implications for
encephalization? The cultural intelligence hypothesis was origi-
nally developed to explain the encephalization and intelligence
of the great apes (Whiten & van Schaik 2007), which was not
accounted for by broader social intelligence theories that work
well for primates in general (Dunbar & Shultz 2007a). Consistent
with this, a recent study reported multiple-tradition cultures for
gorillas (Robbins et al. 2016) that are consistent with those
earlier described for chimpanzees (Whiten et al. 1999) and orang-
utans (van Schaik et al. 2003) and appear rich compared to the
putative cultures of other animals, although a parallel analysis
for spider monkeys, in some ways a New World chimpanzee-
like niche, reported a quite similar complexity (Santorelli et al.
2011), and studies of capuchin monkeys suggest something
similar may await systematic assessment (e.g., Coehlo et al.
2015) . Both the latter species are relatively encephalized, and
of course the same is true for cetaceans for which a strong eviden-
tial case has been made for multiple-tradition cultures including
foraging techniques, migration routes, and song (Whitehead &
Rendell 2015). The social learning capacities of such animals
with heavy dependence on extended cultural repertoires may
themselves need to be cognitively sophisticated, including imita-
tive and emulative processes, with neural demands (Whiten
2017; in press). In addition, encephalization may be extended
simply to facilitate the storage of a greater cultural repertoire.
In the human case, this may be very significant when one contem-
plates the vast scope of the cultural information we assimilate,
from language to all aspects of social and material culture.
The latter leads to a related but different comment. The
authors tend to run together two threads in the literature when
referring to “the cultural intelligence hypothesis” (sect. 3.3,
para. 3), and I think it would reduce potential confusion to sepa-
rate these. The first thread is exemplified by the writings of Tom-
asello et al. that are cited, such as Moll and Tomasello (2007). The
second thread is exemplified by the writings of van Schaik et al.
(e.g., Whiten & van Schaik 2007; van Schaik & Burkart 2011).
It is this second thread that sets out a cultural intelligence hypoth-
esis addressed originally to the problem of great ape intelligence
and encephalization, but in principle relevant to any relevant
animal species. By contrast, the first thread was specifically con-
cerned with what makes humans different from all other
animals, and was originally and appropriately dubbed “the Vygot-
skian intelligence hypothesis” (Moll & Tomasello 2007, p. 639).
This made sense to me, until Herrmann et al. (2007) then referred
to these ideas as “the cultural intelligence hypothesis” (p. 1360).
This was potentially quite confusing insofar as the argument was
that it did not apply to nonhuman species. I feel it is important
to recognise these differences, whether that is achieved by revert-
ing to the “Vygotskian” tag to distinguish the “human” focused
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version. This is not, of course, to deny that there is a potentially
important linkage between the sets of ideas embedded in these
two theories.
General intelligence is a source of individual
differences between species: Solving an
anomaly
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Abstract: Burkart et al. present a paradox – general factors of intelligence
exist among individual differences (g) in performance in several species,
and also at the aggregate level (G); however, there is ambiguous evidence
for the existence of g when analyzing data using a mixed approach, that is,
when comparing individuals of different species using the same cognitive
ability battery. Here, we present an empirical solution to this paradox.
As Burkart et al. note in the target article, it is possible that the g
factors that exist within species at the level of individual differ-
ences have somewhat different factorial characteristics for each
species. For instance, certain cognitive elements that combine
to give rise to g in chimpanzees may fall outside of the positive
manifold in other species (e.g., humans). In other words, perfor-
mance in certain abilities may be driven by g in some species
but not in others. Lack of measurement invariance (i.e., discord-
ance between species in terms of which cognitive abilities give
rise to g) renders single batteries unable to identify a g factor
common to individuals of different species (i.e., the mixed
approach). One cause of these compositional differences may be
the different ways in which ancestral selection pressures shaped
the g factors across different species. Some species may have
highly integrated abilities, dominated by a strong g factor,
whereas others might have highly specialized and largely indepen-
dent abilities, where the positive manifold of correlations underly-
ing g is weaker.
Another potentially significant cause of the failure of measure-
ment invariance across individuals of different species may be
floor or ceiling effects upon performance. For example, a cogni-
tive task that may be hard for one species may be trivially easy
for another, more intelligent species. The latter condition is char-
acterized by all or most individuals performing maximally well,
revealing a ceiling effect. Hence, the g loading of the success
rate at solving this task may be high for the less intelligent
species, but will be low for the more intelligent one – this
species having hit the test ceiling.
Operationally, both (1) species-specific specialization or modu-
larization of cognitive abilities and (2) floor/ceiling effects can be
identified empirically based on within-species statistical distribu-
tions in performance. The two conditions are likely to share a
common observable feature: that is, low within-species variability
in certain tasks. Highly specialized abilities are proposed to be
species-typical and monomorphic, with little to no interindividual
variation (Tooby & Cosmides 1990). Consistent with this, human
and nonhuman primate data indicate that cognitive functions that
are more specialized (and thus less g-loaded) exhibit lower pheno-
typic and genetic variability (Spitz 1988; Woodley of Menie et al.
2015). The presence of ceiling or floor effects in measurement
when testing abilities in a given species also, by definition, limits
variation. These alternative scenarios are therefore connected,
as any apparent floor or ceiling effect in the performance of mod-
ularized abilities may not be due to a poor measurement approach
but, rather, due to adaptive species-typical modularization.
We propose that the mixed design would support the presence
of a g factor inclusive of individuals of different species if species
differences in cognitive ability are larger on tasks that share more
variance with others (larger part-whole correlations, representing
g-loadings) but not if species differences are uniform across tasks.
Here, we use combined data from two sources (Herrmann et al.
Figure 1 (Woodley of Menie et al.). Increasing magnitude of the vector correlations between task g loadings and the difference scores (d)
between human children and chimpanzee performance, as a function of the average coefficient of variance of the tests kept in analyses.
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2010b; Woodley of Menie et al. 2015) on the Primate Cognitive
Test Battery (PCTB; Herrmann et al. 2007) performance in
human children and chimpanzees to test this hypothesis and
examine the importance of the confounding role of tasks on
which individuals of at least one of the two species exhibit
limited variability in scores.
Human children outperform chimpanzees to a greater degree
onmore g-loaded PCTB tasks – this can be demonstrated by corre-
lating the vector of task g loadings with the vector of the between-
species differences in performance (d) on those same tasks. To
examine whether the true strength of this relationship was
masked by the inclusion of tasks that yielded little within-species
variation, we eliminated tasks from the analyses sequentially, start-
ingwith those that yielded the smallest coefficients of variance (CV)
in human performance. The relationship between g loadings and
the size of human-chimpanzee differences was thus examined in
multiple stages, with each successive step having a more stringent
cutoff for CV. Recall that the ceiling effects are a feature of the ease
with which humans can execute certain basic cognitive tasks, sug-
gesting that these abilities are modularized in human populations.
CV was in fact smaller among humans on all tasks, suggesting that
they solved all tasks more easily than chimpanzees.
Figure 1 shows that the g*d vector correlation magnitude
increased inversely to the number of tasks retained, with smaller
numbers of tasks exhibiting larger variation among the human par-
ticipants yielding bigger vector correlations. The vector correlation
magnitude approached unity when only the three tests with the
highest human CV values were used. The association was indiffer-
ent to the use of different g loadings (human, chimpanzee, and
averaged) as the basis for computing the g*d vector correlations
(the correlations between the vector correlation magnitudes and
average CV across tasks ranged from .91 to .94, p < .05).
Furthermore, as expected, tasks yielding smaller CV values
were also less g-loaded in humans (r = .52; one-tailed p < .05),
which replicates prior findings involving chimpanzees (Woodley
of Menie et al. 2015).
This approach is currently being applied by our group to compar-
isons involving a larger number of species. The implication of our
finding is that differences between individuals of different
species may be consistently concentrated on g – this being espe-
cially apparent when focusing on experimental tasks whose
design permits sufficient within-species variation. This finding fur-
thermore indicates that the patterning of species differences in the
g andG factors are concordant,meaning that they are likely one and
the same, reinforcing the arguments put forward by Burkart et al.
NOTE
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Abstract: The goal of our target article was to lay out current
evidence relevant to the question of whether general intelligence
can be found in nonhuman animals in order to better understand
its evolution in humans. The topic is a controversial one, as
evident from the broad range of partly incompatible comments it
has elicited. The main goal of our response is to translate these
issues into testable empirical predictions, which together can
provide the basis for a broad research agenda.
R1. Introduction
We are grateful to the commentators for raising a wide
variety of issues. Because these generally fall into a
number of distinct categories, we organized our response
around them, as follows:
Section R2: Domains of cognition
Section R3: Tasks for test batteries
Section R4: Domain-specificity versus domain-generality
Section R5: What is g/G? (More) on the necessity of
validation
Section R6: g/G and brain size
Section R7: g and biological fitness
Section R8: Cultural intelligence
Whenever commentators provided input in more than one
of these categories, we discuss them in more than one of
the sections. Some of the commentaries show that we did
not always present our points with sufficient clarity, so we
also take the opportunity to make these clarifications as
well as to highlight what we did not claim.
The complicated nature of the issues is illustrated by the
fact that different commentators made confident claims
that are mutually incompatible. For instance, Ramus and
Arden & Zietsch argue that the evolution of g is no
puzzle at all, and that it is most likely present in all organ-
isms with a nervous system, Jacobs & Gärdenfors simi-
larly argue that it is hardly surprising or controversial that
some individuals consistently perform well, and Pepper-
berg recites the impressive examples from bird cognition
that to her necessarily imply the presence of general intel-
ligence in at least some birds. On the other hand, other
commentators question whether there is evidence for g
or G in any nonhuman species at all (Huber) or feel the
importance of g is overestimated (Amici, Call, & Aureli
[Amici et al.]).
The goal of our target article was to make progress on
understanding animal intelligence without getting bogged
down in terminological debates on what exactly g repre-
sents. We suggested complementing the psychometric
approaches, which are a necessary first step to establish
the possibility of general intelligence, with a variety of val-
idation measures and more demanding tests that look for
domain-generality of cognitive processes. This is even
more important because animal studies are unlikely to
ever reach the sophistication in terms of tests and the
sample sizes needed to attain the practical level of utility
achieved by human intelligence testing (pace Arden &
Zietsch). We will focus, therefore, especially on these
forward-looking points.
R2. Domains of cognition
One of the unresolved issues in nonhuman psychometrics is
what an ideal test battery should look like. The criteria are
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obvious: (1) A test battery should be composed of tasks
from a broad range of domains rather than tasks that re-
sample performance in the same domain, and (2) the
tasks should reliably assess the cognitive abilities they are
supposed to assess, both within and across species.
To fulfill criterion (1), it is crucial to know what a domain
is. In the classical psychometric tradition, a domain of
mental ability refers to a statistically derived group factor
on which a set of tasks show strong loadings. For instance,
Deary et al. (2010) referred for humans to the group factors
processing speed, memory, spatial ability, reasoning, and
vocabulary. Thus, the straightforward approach to identify
domains in nonhuman animals is to likewise use large bat-
teries of tasks and identify the factor structure statistically.
This bottom-up, data-driven approach in animals is ambitious
because it requires very large sample sizes. However, this
does not mean that, in the meantime, we are unable to cor-
rectly identify g in animals. Empirical tests with human
subjects have revealed that as long as there is sufficient
variety in the tasks of test batteries, g factors derived
from different test batteries are almost perfectly correlated
(Johnson et al. 2008).
Evolutionary approaches often consider domains to be
functional contexts (see alsoWang). These can be very spe-
cific such as finding food, finding mates, deterring preda-
tors, outwitting conspecifics, or cooperating with others
(Figure R1), or rather broad, such as in the classic trichot-
omy in physical, spatial, and social cognition, as followed by
Tomasello & Call (1997). Obviously, the individual may fail
to show a particular ability that it is shown to possess in one
context, when tested in a functional context different from
the one for which it evolved. Thus, it remains challenging to
identify domains.
Importantly, it is not useful to decide a priori that one
notion of domain would be more correct than the other
one. Rather, acknowledging that a domain can refer to
both a mental ability (as in the psychometric tradition)
and a functional context (as in evolutionary approaches;
see also the proposal by Shuker, Barrett, Dickins,
Scott-Phillips, & Barton [Shuker et al.] or Hauser’s
examples of abilities that “cut across domains”) allows us
to ask the questions that are at the core for understanding
the evolution of general intelligence: Under what circum-
stances can a species that evolves a cognitive ability for a
specific context generalize this ability to other contexts as
well (cf. Stevens et al. 2016)? Can this be true for some abil-
ities, but not others? And are these the same species that
also show correlated performance across mental abilities
and thus show psychometric g?
Thus, rather than committing to one specific notion of a
domain, it is better to identify ways to combine these per-
spectives to ultimately better understand the evolution of
intelligence. Furthermore, this combined perspective will
also clarify many of the issues surrounding domain-specific-
ity and domain-generality, and modularity (sect. R4).
Due to the sample size problems in identifying domains
using the psychometric approach, some have defined
domains a priori (e.g., Herrmann et al. 2007). However,
as we point out in the target article, empirical data do not
necessarily confirm that tasks supposed to tap into one
such domain actually also cluster around it (see sect. 2.4.1
in target article). Although we agree in principle with the
proposal of Amici et al. that it is important to take multi-
factorial approaches into account (see also Lee &
Chabris), we think more empirical work is needed to iden-
tify which tasks indeed measure particular cognitive opera-
tions (such as inference) or mental capacities (such as
working memory). In fact, most tasks probably tap into
more than one operation and/or capacity, and it therefore
is highly unlikely that one specific test measures one spe-
cific cognitive ability, as also pointed out by Huber and
Ramus. Even for humans there is often a lack of agree-
ment on how to quantify specific cognitive constructs
such as, for instance, working memory (Oberauer et al.
2005).
Finally, Figure R1 also helps us to answer how ecologi-
cally valid a test should be. An often-made claim is that in
order to fully appreciate a given species’ cognitive potential,
one should look only at problems of high ecological rele-
vance to this species (e.g., Sternberg). However, when
Figure R1. Domains can refer to statistically derived group factors such as processing speed, memory, spatial ability, reasoning, or
vocabulary in humans (Deary et al., 2010) or to evolutionarily functional contexts. Classical psychometric studies (vertical arrow), in
humans and nonhuman animals, typically refer to domain as mental ability. From an evolutionary perspective, however, it is equally
informative to ask to what extent a given cognitive ability is correlated across functional contexts (horizontal arrows). Because
performance across functional contexts is likely to vary, evolutionarily novel tasks are most suitable for classical psychometric studies
that aim at testing individuals across mental ability domains.
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we look only at ecologically relevant problems we will never
be able to disentangle whether we are dealing with a
primary module or with the result of true and flexible
problem-solving ability. As indicated in Figure R1, there
are at least two ways to demonstrate this kind of flexibility.
A psychometric approach would compare different abilities
in evolutionarily novel tasks, precisely in order to avoid
tapping into predominantly hard-wired solutions to recur-
ring adaptive problems. This approach is particularly pow-
erful in combination with validation studies (sect. R5). The
other one is to compare the same ability across functional
domains (e.g., asking whether the excellent memory abili-
ties in the ecologically relevant context of caching in
food-caching birds also generalize to other functional con-
texts). Although this second possibility has received surpris-
ingly little attention (but see Stevens et al. 2016), it presents
an excellent opportunity to externally validate a psychomet-
rically derived g factor (see also Locurto, sect. 2.5 in target
article, and sect. R4).
R3. Tasks for test batteries
Many commentators have proposed specific tasks, and we
think these are excellent proposals that will help construct
broad and diverse test batteries. Van Horik & Lea stress
the necessity to also include what they call knowing tasks,
which can assess rule-based learning or generalization.
Such knowing tasks, as for instance reversal learning, also
have an additional advantage, linked to criterion 2 of a
good test battery: that the tasks should reliably assess the
cognitive abilities they are supposed to assess, both within
and across species (sect. R2). The advantage is that
knowing tasks are less vulnerable to producing variation
in performance due to differences in sensory-motor spe-
cializations between species (see Shuker et al., and sect.
2.4.2 in the target article for a detailed discussion of Mac-
phail’s critique of species comparisons). We are confident
that many of these issues can be resolved, particularly in
closely related species, but also agree that it remains prob-
lematic for comparisons of very diverse species, such as
cephalopods, with completely different sensory-motor
traits and even body plans (Holekamp & Miikkulainen).
Commentators Jacobs & Gärdenfors highlight causal
cognition tasks; Huber, reasoning by exclusion; and
Buskell & Halina, tasks suggestive of de-coupled repre-
sentations. Tasks in which birds excel may also be useful
additions to existing test batteries. As stressed by Pepper-
berg, corvids and parrots are particularly prime candidates
for exhibiting high levels of general intelligence, and we
look forward to future empirical studies that explicitly
address this question with psychometric test batteries com-
bined with predictive validation studies (Locurto; see also
sect. R5). Pennycook & Rand add the possibility to
include studies of cognitive control and metacognition.
Commentators Pennycook & Rand also argue that var-
iation in performance between individuals may not only
reflect cognitive capacity per se, but also the willingness
to engage in effortful cognitive processing when a
simpler, more routine solution seems available. They thus
refer to the concept of need for cognition, which is an indi-
vidual predisposition rather than a cognitive ability, even
though in humans it is correlated with general intelligence
(Hill et al. 2016b). This link is entirely consistent with our
view that cognitive skills emanating from general cognitive
capacity (i.e., the downward pathway in Figure 3 of the
target article) are ontogenetically constructed. Therefore,
individuals with higher levels of need for cognition will
more systematically expose themselves to situations that
require effortful processing and are, therefore, more
likely to establish a larger and more powerful set of cogni-
tive skills. To what extent substantial variation in willingness
to engage in effortful processing is also available in nonhu-
man animals remains to be established, but an increasing
body of research suggests that this may account for the sys-
tematic differences in cognitive performance between
captive and wild primates such as orangutans (van Schaik
et al. 2016).
R4. Domain-specificity versus domain-generality
Several commentators (Arden & Zietsch;Hauser; Jacobs
& Gärdenfors;Martins & Di Paolo) think we advocate a
strict dichotomy between a mind made up of modules and
one that has general intelligence. This is surprising, because
in the target article, we devote an entire section (1.2.2
including Table 1) to exactly why such a dichotomy is not
helpful for the debate, and in Figure 3 we present what
we believe is the most promising working model given
the current state of evidence on g/G in human and nonhu-
man animals. This working model suggests that the actual
skill set of an individual can be construed as a mix of
primary or secondary modules. Whereas both can be sensi-
tive to experience (as detailed in Table 2 in the target article
and unlike the claim by Lewis, Al-Shawaf, & Anderson
[Lewis et al.]), this sensitivity differs: Primary modules
are experience-expectant; secondary modules, experi-
ence-dependent.
The extent of domain-specificity and domain-generality
obviously critically depends on the notion of domain one
adopts (see sect. R2). This distinction between domain as
mental ability or as functional context, as detailed in
Figure R1, is also reflected in the many different notions
of modularity that have been the focus in the modularity
debate ever since Fodor. Proposals range from defining
modules as adaptive behavioral functions localized in
delimited neural areas to seeing them as being nothing
else than components and processes into which a pheno-
type can be decomposed (Barrett 2015). When referring
to domain specificity, we focus on functional specialization
in the biological, ultimate sense (as used, for instance, in
the commentary by Amici et al.), rather than referring to
any other specific notion of domain-specificity (Lewis
et al.). This allows us to ask under which conditions a cog-
nitive adaptation to a specific problem, – for instance, the
impressive memory of food-caching birds – can also be
used in a different context. From comparative studies, we
know that cognitive abilities in nonhuman animals some-
times do generalize to other domains, sometimes do so par-
tially, and sometimes do not at all (Cauchoix & Chaine
2016; Stevens et al. 2016). When cognitive abilities do gen-
eralize, domain-general cognition emerges, and the funda-
mental question we are interested in is under what
conditions this can happen.
If it is not straightforward to define domain-specificity or
modularity, this is even truer for domain-generality in cog-
nition or general intelligence. Not unexpectedly, several
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authors have commented on this. Sternberg suggests that
“an appropriate way to look at the intelligence of any organ-
ism is to look at how well it adapts to the range of environ-
ments it confronts” (see also Bar-Hen-Schweiger,
Schweiger, & Henik [Bar-Hen-Schweiger et al.]).
This is problematic because intelligence is only one way
among many to adapt to the environment. Under this con-
ception, the thickening of the fur in autumn clearly is an
adaptation to the environment but most would agree it
has nothing to do with intelligence. For the same reason,
it is problematic to refer to domain-generality as pheno-
typic plasticity (Buskell & Halina) because it is merely
one aspect of that. Equally unhelpful is the proposal by
Sternberg to look at skills that are relevant to an
animal’s everyday adaptation. If we go back to our food-
caching birds and assess only their memory capacities in
the context of food caching, we are simply not able to
exclude the possibility that we are dealing with a highly
domain-specific capacity.
It is this latter issue that makes psychometric g studies so
appealing to comparative psychologists. As highlighted in
the target article (sect. 2.4 and sect. 2.5) and by several com-
mentators, this approach comes with a whole suite of issues,
addressed here in sections R5, R6, andR7.However, at least
in humans, g is well established, known to reflect general
intelligence as broadly defined in the target article (following
Gottfredson 1997 and Nisbett et al. 2012), has a variety of
genetic correlates, including those linked to neurobiological
features, and is a good predictor for various measures of life
outcome and thus shows high levels of predictive validity. In
nonhumans, more validation is critically required, as also
emphasized by Locurto.
R5. What is g/G? (More) on the necessity of
validation
A common concern not only to many commentators, but
also to ourselves (see sect. 2.5 in the target article), is that
once one has statistically established a reliable g factor in
a given species, based on adequate tasks from a broad
range of domains, it does not necessarily follow that this
corresponds to general intelligence as broadly defined
and predictive for a variety of life outcome measures, as
is the case in humans. Furthermore, even for humans,
despite the predictive validity of g, it does not necessarily
follow that the predominant hierarchical CHC model
(see para. 1.1.1 in the target article) is the only compelling
interpretation. Some suggest that a statistical g simply
results from variation in non-cognitive factors, such as
developmental stability, and thus reflects general health
(Lewis et al.), or genetic load or heterozygosity (Arslan,
von Borell, Ostner, & Penke [Arslan et al.]). Several
commentators discuss plausible alternative models to the
hierarchical CHC model. Thus, the process overlap
theory of Kovacs & Conway (see also Kovacs & Conway
[2016] and the responses in the same issue of Psychological
Inquiry) argue that performance in a specific task is deter-
mined by several cognitive abilities, and different tasks
resample the same abilities to different extents. The mutu-
alism model of van der Maas et al. (2006) (see Ramus;
Shuker et al.) argues that g arises because of mutual inter-
actions during cognitive development. These alternatives
thus see g as a composite of independent but overlapping
or interacting processes, rather than as a single top-down
ability (which Bar-Hen-Schweiger et al. see as the
ability to engage in mental manipulation). Hence, they
regard g more as a developmental consequence or emer-
gent property, rather than as an underlying latent variable,
and are fully compatible with the constructive nature of
domain-general cognition.
Nonetheless, these varying interpretations still argue for
the presence of some domain-general ability, even if it is
entirely emergent, and remain compatible with the
various neurobiological and genetic correlates of g. For
instance, if g arises as a result of process overlap because
cognitive tests from different domains tap the same
domain-general executive processes such as working
memory, this would exactly correspond to domain-general-
ity as identified by the horizontal arrow in Figure R1.
The exact nature of g continues to be a major puzzle
(Deary et al. 2016). But we would argue that this puzzle
doesn’t have to be fully solved for studies of domain-
general processes to be useful, provided g in nonhuman
animals survives future tests of external validation, as we
discuss next. Some argue that emergent properties or stat-
istical constructs cannot be meaningful individual-level var-
iables subject to natural selection (Arden & Zietsch;
Ramus). We do not think this is correct, because even if
g is an emergent property of several cognitive and even
non-cognitive processes, natural selection should evaluate
the degree to which these processes are compatible or
even how they synergize to produce organized and appro-
priate behavior. Indeed, each of the models for g discussed
previously is compatible with natural selection having
honed g. Hence, considering g a measurable property of
an organism is not reification.
These ambiguities in the interpretation of g necessarily
spill over into interpretations of animal studies, especially
in light of the weaknesses of intraspecific studies, as high-
lighted by Arden & Zietsch, Lee & Chabris, and
Lewis et al. Nonetheless, as we have argued in section
2.4 of the target article, the fact that all purely interspecific
studies produce clear evidence for G is incompatible with
the notion of g as an artifact of testing the same basic
ability or of inadequate test batteries. One can, of course,
criticize the use of the rate of naturally occurring behaviors
as applied in some G studies (e.g., Huber; Shuker et al.
See also Reader et al. [2011] for a discussion of the advan-
tages and disadvantages of this procedure). However, if this
method would only produce noise, one would not find
strong correlations with brain size or aspects of executive
functions, or that G is the principal locus of selection in
the macroevolution of primate intelligence (Fernandes
et al. 2014). Moreover, the anomaly of the lack of success
of the mixed intraspecific and interspecific studies to gener-
ate a common main factor has been solved by Woodley of
Menie, Fernandes, te Nijenhuis, Aguirre, & Figuer-
edo. They suggested that variables with floor or ceiling
effects may obscure differences in general intelligence
across species because they cannot load on g. Their analysis
supports this idea because species differences are especially
striking for tests that load highly on g. Overall, then, the
increasing plausibility of the idea that g and G can be
equated automatically supports the argument that animals
have something that closely resembles human g, and may
even be homologous to it. This position would also be con-
sistent with the increasing knowledge of the nature of
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cortical development and especially plastic responses to
external inputs during brain development (Anderson &
Finlay 2014). It also should serve to refute the alternative
interpretations of G as totally unrelated to g, offered by
Arden & Zietsch and Lewis et al.
In order to resolve current debates, we believe empirical
work is needed that confirms the presence of domain-
general processes. First, if g were all about health, myelini-
zation, or developmental stability – that is, non-cognitive
features –we would expect a correlation between all cogni-
tive abilities, regardless of whether they derive fromprimary
or secondary modules. But if we were dealing with general
intelligence, the pairwise correlations between abilities
deriving from primary modules should be weaker (largely
because they should all be at ceiling or floor values).
Second, more specific tests can be done to provide exter-
nal validation for the interpretation of domain-general intel-
ligence, along the lines outlined in the target article (sect.
2.5, Table 7) and as also stressed by Locurto. We can
derive additional ones from the commentators’ comments.
Arslan et al. propose to use genetically uniform strains
and mutation accumulation lines to help clarify the role of
genetic load, and Lee & Chabris propose to use genome-
wide association studies to test if distinct cognitive abilities
are genetically correlated and thus potentially the target of
natural selection. More specifically, Pennycook & Rand-
suggest to focus on meta-cognitive abilities; van Horik &
Lea stress the usefulness of reversal learning paradigms;
and Jacobs &Gärdenfors, causal reasoning. Pepperberg
summarizes additional fruitful paradigms in which several
bird species excel. Bar-Hen-Schweiger et al. propose to
also include object manipulation. This is intriguing
because recent results show that object manipulation com-
plexity is indeed correlated with brain size (Heldstab et al.
2016), but to what extent mental manipulation can be seen
as a direct extension of object manipulation requires addi-
tional research, in particular in nonhuman animals. For
interspecific studies, species differences in basal ganglia–
based circuitry may provide further insight into the evolu-
tion of G, as highlighted by Nordli & Todd.
In sum, we acknowledge and agree that themere presence
of afirst PCA factor (g) in intraspecific psychometric studies is
not sufficient evidence for general intelligence, but that such
an interpretation critically requires evidence for predictive or
criterion-related validity as stressed byLocurto and outlined
in section 2.5 in the target article.However,we also argue that
if a g factor becomes manifest in psychometric studies, and if
this g is not an artifact and shows predictive and criterion-
related validity, how exactly the positive intercorrelations
arise no longer matters for the claim that g was the target of
selection. In other words, it may well be that g is an emergent
property of the central neural system, andwe in fact think it is
unlikely that it can be reduced to any specific psychological or
biological trait or construct, and thus agree on this with
Ramus or Arden & Zietsch. But this does not imply that g
as potentially emergent property cannot be the target of
selection. This view is supported by the majority of results
from interspecific G studies.
R6. g/G and brain size
Brain size is reliably associated with G in interspecific
primate studies, and less strongly with g in intraspecific
studies. Matzel & Sauce argue that brain size cannot be
important in intelligence. First, they argue that Neander-
thals had larger brains than humans, but were “cognitively
inferior” to modern humans. However, cultural intelligence
can explain this difference because modern humans had
much larger groups (Mellars & French 2011), and social
inputs play a crucial role in affecting the size of a popula-
tion’s skill repertoires (see also Henrich 2016). Thus, differ-
ences in brain size (provided they also extended to
differences in relative brain size) can be compensated for
by differences in the quality and quantity of inputs during
development. This observation also deals with their
second objection, namely that brain size predicts only a
modest proportion of variation in human g.
The second argument by Matzel & Sauce as to why
brain size should not matter for intelligence was that intel-
ligence can look quite similar in lineages with very different
absolute or relative brain sizes, particularly in birds versus
mammals. This can partly be explained by major
between-lineage differences in neuron densities, between
cetaceans and other mammals, and between mammals
and birds (Olkowicz et al. 2016). Accordingly, comparative
studies on relative brain size within birds are consistent
with the presence of general intelligence in this lineage
(Lefebvre et al. 2004). Nonetheless, it would be useful to
examine the degree to which more extensive tests of
general intelligence in birds (e.g., Isden et al. 2013; Shaw
et al. 2015) show the same structure of cognition as in
humans and presumably other mammals. If multiple inde-
pendent origins can indeed be demonstrated, as suggested
byMatzel & Sauce, this would support the contention that
beyond a certain level of complexity, domain-general pro-
cesses evolve to take over the control of procedures that
serve a useful function in many different domains (Wang).
R7. g and biological fitness
If general intelligence is an adaptation, then we expect
some link to fitness. Thus, one intuitive way of assessing
predictive validity of g is to ask if individuals scoring
higher on g have better survival and higher reproductive
success. This basic idea is compelling, but both empirical
and conceptual caveats need to be carefully considered.
In humans, reproductive success is often no longer max-
imized in modern societies due to the demographic transi-
tion (Coale 1989). Survival, however, continues to be a high
individual priority and, therefore, is a better measure for
this link in humans. There is in fact extensive evidence
that g scores predict survival or longevity (Deary 2008).
If general intelligence is an adaptation in nonhuman
species, too, then the estimates of this ability should also
correlate with fitness measures. This correlation has in
fact been proposed as a test of the predictive validity of
the concept (Locurto). Tests in the wild presuppose that
we can actually estimate general intelligence in wild
animals. This may be feasible in birds (Isden et al. 2013;
Shaw et al. 2015), but will be extremely difficult in many
other species that show strong neophobia in the wild
(Forss et al. 2015). Moreover, as stressed by van Horik
& Lea, it is more difficult to control for confounds or selec-
tive participation, or to retest the same individuals (see also
Rowe & Healy 2014).
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Yet, we must also be careful for conceptual reasons.
General intelligence is developmentally constructed, and
investment in increased intelligence may trade off against
other vital activities. It is, therefore, quite conceivable
that estimates of general intelligence need not show a
positive relationship with fitness but, rather, an inverted
U-shaped relationship. Thus, if investment in general intel-
ligence and the brain requires resources that also positively
affect other vital processes such as growth and reproduc-
tion, this can have a negative impact on an individual’s
fitness. The positive relationship in modern humans may
thus be something of an anomaly, perhaps linked to the
absence of such tradeoffs (although it could well be that
it existed for reproduction). Indeed, the emerging work
examining the link between cognitive abilities and fitness
(Morand-Ferron & Quinn 2015) produces mixed results.
One reason for this may be that a direct positive relation-
ship with fitness is expected for primary modules, but not
for secondary modules. This topic is worth exploring in
greater depth if practical obstacles can be overcome (see
also Morand-Ferron et al. 2015; Rowe & Healy 2014).
R8. Cultural intelligence
The presence of high general intelligence in animals poses
something of a conundrum. Individual problem solving
based purely on general cognitive ability will only rarely
produce useful behavioral innovations, but will often also
carry risks of injury or poisoning. Moreover, rarely invented
innovations are not transmitted to the next generation; only
the ability to make such inventions is. The cultural intelli-
gence hypothesis, therefore, suggests that general intelli-
gence is most likely to evolve where the process of
problem solving is socially canalized – that is, in species
that strongly rely on social learning, because social canaliza-
tion increases the odds of actually finding a solution. It
stresses that social information can efficiently guide explo-
ration during development. It is, therefore, asWhiten cor-
rectly points out, an enabling hypothesis, which concerns
the acquisition process of cognitive skills (and the condi-
tions selecting for them), but is silent on the actual
nature of the cognitive benefits. The latter could often be
cognitive flexibility serving as a cognitive buffer, allowing
animals to survive in seasonal habitats, as suggested by
Holekamp & Miikkulainen (cf. van Woerden et al.
2012). However, this functional benefit should have been
favored in many species, and the cultural intelligence
hypothesis argues that selection is more likely to produce
this adaptive benefit for behavioral flexibility where costs
remain low due to many opportunities to acquire social
information.
Cognition requires brains, and brains are energetically
expensive. Thus, the significant increase in energy need
accompanying increased brain size must be met, directly
or indirectly. As shown in Figure R2, natural selection
would, therefore, favor those mechanisms that either
provide a direct energy boost (for instance, ecological
effects of cognition leading to reduced fluctuations in
food intake: arrow 1) or allow for reduced allocation to
growth and reproduction due to improved survival (arrow
2). The far greater efficiency provided by skill acquisition
through social learning rather than inefficient and risky
innovation (arrow 3) is another selective benefit highlighted
by the cultural intelligence hypothesis. This argument
clearly implies, although we did not point this out explicitly,
that the cultural intelligence hypothesis is, like almost all
evolutionary hypotheses, a ceteris paribus hypothesis:
Holding all other conditions constant, the availability of
social information should make it easier to evolve the sup-
porting infrastructure for increased behavioral flexibility in
a particular lineage.
Theremay also be other conditions favoring the evolution
of intelligence. Cephalopods, especially octopus, have no
contact between generations, and mustelids disperse at a
very young age and then remain solitary, yet show signs of
strong cognitive performance (Holekamp & Miikkulai-
nen; cf. Holekamp et al. 2015). In the expensive brain
framework, this would suggest unusual payoffs from explo-
ration and innovation (arrow 2 in Figure R2), or unusually
low risks of exploration –which are testable predictions.
These seemingly intelligent solitary species, therefore,
would appear to be exceptions to the cultural intelligence
hypothesis that should be acknowledged, although the
impressive imitation ability of solitary octopus (Fiorito &
Scotto 1992) is puzzling. The possibility of alternative evolu-
tionary pathways to intelligence makes it even more impor-
tant to explicitly deploy extensive test batteries to examine if
these species truly show evidence of general intelligence, or
whether we find specialized (albeit quite impressive)
domain-specific cognitive adaptations.
R9. Conclusions
Our goal is to understand the evolutionary origin of general
intelligence. The case is still open, even though the body of
evidence suggests we also find it in other species and that
the cultural intelligence approach can help us understand
why it arose in some species but not in others. But identi-
fying the evolutionary origin of g or G in nonhumans is not
the full answer to how the human mind evolved. Humans
are more than g (Amici et al.; Gardner; Pennycook &
Rand) and other components are important too, first and
foremost language, but also components summarized as
multiple intelligences by Gardner. In principle, the same
approach as taken here can be applied to each of these
components, by asking what the interspecific distribution
of this trait is, and what factors may best explain this distri-
bution. For general intelligence, the most likely factor is
brain size, whereas for prosocial attitude, allomaternal
care seems to explain interspecific distribution (Burkart
et al. 2014).
Figure R2. Processes that could be affected by selection for
increased brain size: (1) an immediate effect of improved
cognition on reduction in energy costs; (2) an unusually large
fitness benefit from possessing cognitive skills; or (3) an
unusually efficient translation of brain tissue into cognitive skills,
as argued by the cultural intelligence hypothesis. The argument
may hold especially for domain-general processes, because the
latter appear to require exceptional amounts of brain tissue.
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Cultural intelligence effects are particularly pronounced
in humans. Among others, this is evident in the Flynn
effect, and the strong influence of environment on
general intelligence, particularly early in ontogeny when
individuals still cannot seek out an environment that
matches their abilities (Flynn 2016). Human cultural
intelligence is supported by additional adaptations such as
language and pedagogy, which involves strong theory-of-
mind abilities and intentional teaching as pointed out by
Estes & Bartsch (see also Burkart et al. 2009). For
humans in particular, one would expect, therefore, that
socio-cognitive abilities predict general intelligence, and
Fernández-Berrocal, Cabello, & Gutiérrez-Cobo
present evidence for humans supporting this prediction
(for interspecific tests of this link, Arslan et al. suggest
joint phylogenetic tree analyses of sociality and variance
explained by g, but this will not work because the amount
of variance explained is not a good measure for how
much “g” a given species “has,” as detailed in the target
article (sect. 2.4.1)).
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